












In the summer of 2012, 
the Supreme Court of Canada issued rulings on fi ve copyright 
cases in a single day. The decisions, which were quickly dubbed 
“the copyright pentalogy,” represent a seismic shift in Canadian 
copyright law. 
In this book, many of Canada’s leading copyright scholars 
examine the long-term implications of these fi ve landmark 
cases. The diversity of contributors provides rich analysis as they 
explore fi ve key issues raised by the pentalogy: the standard 
of review of copyright decisions; fair dealing that ensures a 
balance between the interests of creators and users of content; 
a technology-neutral approach to copyright law; the scope 
of copyright law; and the implications of the decisions for 
copyright collective management.
Michael Geist is a professor of law at the University of Ottawa, where he holds the 
Canada Research Chair in Internet and E-commerce Law, and an internationally 
syndicated columnist on technology law issues. He is the editor of From “Radical 
Extremism” to “Balanced Copyright”: Canadian Copyright and the Digital Agenda 
(2010) and In the Public Interest: The Future of Canadian Copyright Law (2005) and 
the author of a popular blog on Internet and intellectual property law issues. 
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Copyright cases typically reach the Supreme Court of Canada (the 
Court) only once every few years, ensuring that each case is carefully 
parsed and analyzed. On 12 July 2012, the Court issued rulings on five 
copyright cases in a single day, an unprecedented tally that shook the 
very foundations of copyright law in Canada. In fact, with the decisions 
coming just weeks after the Canadian government passed long-awaited 
copyright reform legislation, Canadian copyright law experienced a 
seismic shift that will take years to sort out.
Not surprisingly, the immediate coverage of the Court’s decisions, 
which were quickly dubbed the “copyright pentalogy,” focused on the 
specific outcomes for the litigants, including wins for Bell and computer 
giant Apple (no fees for song previews on services such as iTunes),1 
the entertainment software industry (no additional payment for music 
included in downloaded video games),2 and the education community 
(copying materials for instructional purposes may qualify as fair dealing).3 
Yet it took little time for the Canadian copyright community to begin 
to debate the larger implications of the decisions. Several issues quickly 
came to the fore. First, the cases provided an unequivocal affirmation 
that copyright exceptions such as fair dealing should be treated as users’ 
rights. The Court first raised the notion of balancing creator rights and 
user rights in 2004. Publisher and creator groups had urged the Court 
to retreat from its user rights approach, claiming it was merely a meta-
phor, yet the Court used these cases to re-emphasize the importance of 
users’ rights. The user rights analysis affects virtually all copyright cases, 
forcing all courts to ensure that there is a fair balance between the 
interests of creators and users. Moreover, the users’ rights framework 
has attracted growing attention worldwide, as Canadian copyright law is 
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increasingly cited as the paradigm example for emphasizing both creator 
and user rights. 
Second, the Court endorsed a technology-neutral approach to copy-
right law. For example, in striking down the demand for payment for 
music included in downloaded video games, it noted that there is “no 
practical difference between buying a durable copy of the work in a store, 
receiving a copy in the mail, or downloading an identical copy using the 
Internet.”4  Instead, it likened the Internet to a “technological taxi” and 
warned that additional payments for a downloaded copy violated the 
principle of technological neutrality. It stated that the “principle of tech-
nological neutrality requires that, absent evidence of Parliamentary in-
tent to the contrary, we interpret the Copyright Act in a way that avoids 
imposing an additional layer of protections and fees based solely on the 
method of delivery of the work to the end user.”5 
In doing so, the Court effectively embedded a technology-neutral 
principle into the law that will extend far beyond these particular cases, 
as future litigants will undoubtedly argue that existing exceptions can be 
applied to new uses of copyright works to ensure technological neutrality.
Third, the Court continued its expansion of fair dealing by interpret-
ing it in a broad and liberal manner. In Bell, where Bell and Apple argued 
that 30-second song previews could be treated as consumer research and 
thus qualify for fair dealing, the Court agreed, concluding that “limiting 
research to creative purposes would also run counter to the ordinary 
meaning of ‘research’, which can include many activities that do not de-
mand the establishment of new facts or conclusions. It can be piecemeal, 
informal, exploratory, or confirmatory. It can in fact be undertaken for 
no purpose except personal interest.”6 
Similarly, in Alberta (Education), the Court adopted an expansive 
view of private study (another fair dealing category) by ruling that it 
could include teacher instruction and that it “should not be understood 
as requiring users to view copyrighted works in splendid isolation.”7  The 
decisions point to a very broad approach to fair dealing that can be used 
by a wide range of businesses and education groups to make the case 
that innovative uses of copyrighted materials qualifies as fair dealing and 
therefore does not require prior permission or compensation. 
This book represents an effort by many of Canada’s leading copyright 
scholars to begin the process of examining the long-term implications 
of the copyright pentalogy. This is the third such initiative, following on 
the 2005 book In the Public Interest: The Future of Canadian Copyright 
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Law, to respond to the introduction of Bill C-60, and From “Radical Ex-
tremism” to “Balanced Copyright”: Canadian Copyright and the Digital 
Agenda, which addressed Bill C-32 (later Bill C-11), the 2010 copyright 
reform bill. The books have brought together many leading Canadian 
academics who are researching and writing about intellectual property 
with representatives from universities stretching from Dalhousie on the 
east coast to Simon Fraser University and the University of British 
Columbia on the west.
This book followed much the same approach. All contributors from 
the prior books were invited to participate once again. In addition, new 
intellectual property scholars were identified and given the opportunity 
to contribute. This book features fourteen articles on copyright written 
by independent scholars from coast to coast. The diversity of contribu-
tors provides a rich view of the copyright pentalogy, with analysis of the 
standard of review of copyright decisions, fair dealing, technological 
neutrality, the implications of the decisions for copyright collective man-
agement and the scope of copyright law.
While I am honoured to have again served as editor (and contribute 
my own work on the shift from fair dealing to fair use in Canada), each 
contributor was granted total freedom to address whatever aspects of 
the decisions they saw fit. There was no editorial attempt to prescribe 
a particular outcome or perspective. Indeed, the contributors differ in 
their views of the decisions and their support for the Court’s analysis 
and conclusions. 
Contributions are grouped into five parts. Part 1 features three chap-
ters on standard of review and the courts. Part 2 examines the fair dealing 
implications of the copyright pentalogy, with five chapters on the evolu-
tion of fair dealing and its likely interpretation in the years ahead. Part 3 
contains two chapters on technological neutrality, which the Court estab-
lished as a foundational principle of copyright law. Part 4 features two chapters 
on copyright collective management and its future in the aftermath of the 
Court’s decisions. The scope of copyright is assessed in Part 5 with two 
chapters that canvass the exclusive rights under the copyright and the 
establishment of new “rights” associated with user-generated content.  
Standard of Review and the Courts
While the copyright pentalogy may have shaken the foundation 
of Canadian copyright law, the cases themselves raised important 
vi
administrative law questions about the standard of review. With all 
five cases originating with the Copyright Board of Canada, the inter-
play between the Copyright Board and Canada’s appellate courts is at 
issue throughout the five cases, with two decisions: Rogers Commu-
nications Inc. v Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers 
of Canada8 and Alberta (Education) v Canadian Copyright Licensing 
Agency (Access Copyright), both specifically discussing standard of 
review issues.
Graham Reynolds provides a powerful endorsement of the Court’s 
decisions. He argues that by failing to adopt a broad, liberal approach 
to fair dealing in Alberta (Education), the Copyright Board fell outside 
the range of acceptable outcomes. Therefore, as a matter of law, it was 
not open to the Copyright Board to reach the decision it did. Given that 
conclusion, Reynolds maintains that Abella J applied a reasonableness 
standard of review in a manner consistent with prior cases.
The implications of Reynolds’s chapter extend to future fair dealing 
cases, as he notes that “one conclusion that we can draw from Alberta 
(Education) is that fairness (in the context of fair dealing) is not as discre-
tionary a concept as it appears to be. Alberta (Education) and Bell clarify 
that the purpose of the Copyright Act requires a broad, liberal approach 
to fairness. By implication, then, fairness is not broad and open-ended; 
rather, it is infused with certain expectations with respect to the way in 
which it is to be applied (namely, in a large and liberal manner).”
Paul Daly is more critical of the administrative law implications of 
the decisions, warning that there is a risk of confusion for lower courts. 
Daly is particularly critical of the Court’s refusal to accord deference to 
the Copyright Board. He argues that the Copyright Board is far more 
than a rate-setting tribunal. Rather, it is the body “best positioned to 
identify and develop the underlying principles of the [Copyright] Act.”
Daly’s chapter also considers the administrative law implications 
of the decisions beyond intellectual property. He notes that lawyers are 
likely to try to extend the administrative law findings beyond intellectual 
property and, in so doing, will undermine the principle of deference in 
administrative law decisions.
Margaret Ann Wilkinson attempts to place the copyright pentalogy 
within the broader context of the Court’s jurisprudence. She notes that 
copyright has assumed an increasingly important role within the Court’s 
docket, yet there has been relatively little scholarly attention paid to how 
copyright fits within the larger jurisprudence of the Court.
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Wilkinson’s study brings together the copyright pentalogy and the five 
other copyright cases rendered over the past decade: Théberge (2002),9 
CCH (2004),10 the Tariff 22 decision (2004),11 Robertson (2006)12 and the 
Toblerone decision (2007).13 Wilkinson traces the judges participating 
in these decisions, noting that there has been a steady evolution in which 
judges have participated. Further, there are no discernible patterns 
among the common and civil law judges. Wilkinson identifies the 
most active Supreme Court justices on copyright, with Abella J having 
written or co-written reasons for all but one copyright-related case since 
she joined the Court in 2004.
Fair Dealing
Given the centrality of fair dealing to the recent decisions, the issue 
is the most discussed in this book. Led by Abella J, the Court reaffirmed 
that fair dealing is a user’s right that must be interpreted in a broad and 
liberal manner. 
Ariel Katz begins the fair dealing analysis with an exceptional chapter 
examining the legislative history of the fair dealing provision contained 
in the 1911 UK Copyright Act. Katz discovers that the provision was 
intended to be flexible, yet for more than a hundred years, courts treated 
the fair dealing principle in a narrow, restrictive manner. 
Katz characterizes the distinction between fair use and fair dealing 
as a “myth,” marshalling evidence culled from the historical record 
to make the case that the codification of fair dealing in 1911 was not 
designed to limit its application to the five enumerated purposes included 
in the statute. Katz’s unique history of fair dealing suggests that the Court 
has not expanded fair dealing, but rather has aligned its treatment of the 
exception with the historical record.
My substantive contribution covers similar terrain, but without 
reference to the historical record. I argue that the Court’s fair dealing 
analysis, when coupled with Bill C-11’s statutory reforms, may have 
effectively turned the Canadian fair dealing clause into a fair use provision. 
The Court’s emphasis on the need for balance between creators’ rights 
and users’ rights laid the foundation for a shift away from a two-stage 
fair dealing test toward a single analysis based on fairness of the use of a 
copyrighted work. By elevating fair dealing to a user’s right, it made little 
sense for the law to premise the exercise of those rights on fitting within 
a small number of narrowly defined purposes.
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While Canadian copyright law still involves the two-stage analysis, 
the first stage has become so easy to meet that Canada appears to be 
inching closer to fair use. Indeed, the breadth of the fair dealing purposes 
is now so wide—eight purposes covering most imaginable uses—that fu-
ture Canadian fair dealing analyses are likely to involve only a perfunc-
tory assessment of the first-stage purposes test together with a far more 
rigorous analysis (what the Court in Bell described as “heavy-hitting”) in 
the second-stage, six-factor assessment.
Giuseppina D’Agostino shifts the fair dealing discussion in her 
chapter with a critical assessment of the decisions. D’Agostino argues 
that the Court’s reliance on the six-factor test found in the CCH deci-
sion has elevated the framework to the level of law. Describing the 
approach as “six-factor absolutism,” she maintains that rigidity in 
applying the six-factor test ultimately muddles the state of fair dealing 
in Canada.
D’Agostino believes the Court’s decisions have created a framework 
whereby assessing fairness is now a matter of arithmetic, with courts 
simply adding up the six factors in order to determine whether the pro-
posed use is more or less fair. D’Agostino argues that a more flexible ap-
proach is needed, with courts free to reject a one-size-fits-all framework 
in favour of a more nuanced analysis.
Sam Trosow considers how the decisions will affect fair dealing prac-
tices in the post-secondary education sector. Given the heated debates 
over collective licensing within the education sector, Trosow’s chapter 
provides a timely look at how the decisions and recent copyright reforms 
will be implemented at the local level.
Trosow argues that the decisions and statutory reform should allevi-
ate concerns about fair dealing uncertainty that may have previously led 
to a reluctance among some institutions to rely on fair dealing as a cor-
nerstone of an institutional copyright policy. Nevertheless, he remains 
somewhat pessimistic, pointing to “the problems of undue risk aversion, 
overreaching on the part of content owners, and an inadequate under-
standing of copyright throughout the academy.”
Meera Nair’s comparative analysis of the Canadian and Israeli paths 
toward fairness of use is the fifth and final chapter in the fair dealing part. 
Nair points out that the Israeli Supreme Court was seized with concerns 
related to restrictive copyright even earlier than the Canadian Supreme 
Court. The Israeli court, facing a legal framework that restricted com-
mercial, satirical uses in 1993, began introducing more flexibility to the 
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fair dealing provision. Almost fifteen years later, Israeli copyright reform 
included a fair use provision.
Despite the introduction of a fair use provision, Nair notes that the 
Canadian jurisprudence on fair dealing features a stronger articulation 
of users’ rights within the framework. By contrast, the Israeli court has 
been more conservative, yet it has emphasized the importance of trans-
formative uses.
Technological Neutrality
The inclusion of technological neutrality as a foundational principle 
of Canadian copyright was a landmark aspect of the copyright pentalogy. 
The message from the Court is clear: copyright law should not stand in 
the way of technological progress and potentially impede the opportuni-
ties for greater access afforded by the Internet through the imposition of 
additional fees or restrictive rules that create extra user costs. Viewed in 
this light, technological neutrality as a principle within Canadian copy-
right may have the same dramatic effects on the law as the articulation of 
users’ rights did in 2004.
Carys Craig opens the technological neutrality part with a critical 
assessment of the significance of the principle and its potential to guide 
future development of copyright law and policy in Canada. Craig’s chap-
ter examines the various meanings that can be attached to technological 
neutrality, as a principle of both regulation and statutory interpretation.
Craig offers a strong endorsement of technological neutrality as a 
guiding principle for Canadian copyright, arguing that its justification 
can be found in the oft-referenced need for balance in copyright. Her 
chapter emphasizes the importance of thinking of technological neutral-
ity in a functional sense with the goal of shaping copyright norms that 
treat technologies in a roughly equivalent fashion in order to preserve 
the copyright balance in the digital environment.
Greg Hagen’s discussion of technological neutrality considers its 
potential application to contentious copyright policy issues. For ex-
ample, Hagen argues that the principle of technological neutrality 
can be used to create new exceptions to the prohibition on circum-
venting technological protection measures (TPMs, often referred to 
as “digital locks”) and to strike down some prohibitions (which make 
user rights subject to not circumventing a TPM) on the basis of a 
conflict with the rule of law.
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Hagen notes that anti-circumvention legislation favours incum-
bents over new market rivals, raising concerns about whether such rules 
meet the technological neutrality principle articulated by the Court. 
Indeed, Hagen suggests that courts should be empowered to establish 
new exceptions to the anti-circumvention rules in order to preserve 
technological neutrality.
Copyright Collective Management
The complexity of copyright collective management is a recurring 
theme in debates over whether the Copyright Board of Canada, the 
Copyright Act and industry practice result in multiple payments for use 
of the same works. Jeremy de Beer describes this as “copyright royalty 
stacking” in his important chapter that unpacks “the layering of multiple 
payments for permission—through a certified tariff, collective blanket 
license or individual contract—to use copyright-protected subject matter.”
The chapter notes there is reason for optimism as the decisions, 
along with recent copyright reforms, may reduce copyright royalty 
stacking. While this may result in reduced revenues for copyright man-
agement organizations in the short term, the longer-term effects may be 
more positive, with increased certainty, reduced transaction costs, and 
a growing market. Creators—whether individually or acting through 
collective management organizations—would be the net beneficiaries, 
with more commercial opportunities and innovation in the distribution 
of creative works.
With copyright collectives involved as parties in all the copyright 
pentalogy cases, the implications of those decisions are particularly 
pronounced for the collectives and the future of copyright collective 
management. Daniel Gervais sharply criticizes the Court’s decisions, 
which, he says, “can be seen as a frontal assault on collective manage-
ment of rights.”
Gervais assesses the ESA, Bell and Alberta (Education) deci-
sions, finding each wanting. He maintains that the decisions adopt 
a binary view of copyright—good vs. bad, control vs. free—when the 
reality is far more nuanced. Gervais argues that collective manage-
ment organizations better reflect that nuance and that a system that 
effectively replaces collective management with fair dealing runs the 
danger of creating greater uncertainty and lost revenues for creators. 
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The Scope of Copyright
While the public’s attention in ESA was focused primarily on du-
elling references to “technological taxis”, Elizabeth Judge notes that 
the more far-reaching implication of the decision lies in the nature of 
exclusive rights of copyright for works. At issue are the rights enumer-
ated in section 3(1) of the Copyright Act and the more specific rights 
listed in sections 3(1)(a)-(i). The majority ruled that the three rights 
defined in 3(1)—reproduction, performance and publication—are ex-
haustive with the subsection 3(1)(a)-(i) rights illustrative of the gener-
al rights. The dissent disagreed, concluding that all rights are distinct.
Judge struggles with the majority’s interpretation of the scope of 
copyright, citing statutory interpretation principles, prior case law, and 
differing approaches in other jurisdictions. She notes that the subsection 
rights do not always map neatly onto one of the three general rights. For 
example, section 3(1)(a) refers to translation, yet its comprehensive cov-
erage extends beyond mere reproduction.
Teresa Scassa links one of the most notable reforms in Bill C-11—the 
inclusion of a new user-generated content provision—with the Court’s 
decisions. Scassa argues that the statutory and case law developments 
“signal a new paradigm for copyright law in Canada—one that tolerates 
a much greater level of interaction with copyright-protected works.” 
This extension in the scope of copyright from a user perspective 
has been criticized by some as an unfair limitation on the rights of 
copyright owners. Yet Scassa persuasively illustrates how the reforms 
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Of Reasonableness, Fairness and  
the Public interest: 
Judicial Review of Copyright Board  
Decisions in Canada’s Copyright Pentalogy 
graham reynolds
introduction1
On 12 July 2012, five copyright law decisions were handed down 
by the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC). These decisions have been 
referred to (among other names) as the pentalogy (or the copyright 
pentalogy).2 One of the more contentious topics addressed in the 
pentalogy was judicial review of Copyright Board decisions. Two 
of the five cases dealt with issues relating to judicial review of such 
decisions. 
In one case—Rogers Communications Inc. v Society of Composers, 
Authors and Music Publishers of Canada [Rogers]—the SCC addressed 
the standard of review that ought to apply to questions of law decided 
by the Copyright Board. Rothstein J, who wrote the reasons for 
judgment, held that the proper standard was one of correctness. In 
concurring reasons, Abella J argued that the majority’s approach did 
not give sufficient deference to the Copyright Board. Instead, Abella J 
advocated for the adoption of a reasonableness standard to be applied 
to questions of law decided by the Copyright Board.
In a second case—Alberta (Education) v Canadian Copyright 
Licensing Agency (Access Copyright) [Alberta (Education)]—the SCC 
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reviewed the Copyright Board’s application of fair dealing to a specific 
set of facts (an issue which, as I will suggest in Part II.B, is ultimately 
one of statutory interpretation).3 Alberta (Education) arose in the 
context of the Copyright Board’s review of a proposed tariff applied 
for by Access Copyright that would apply to the reproduction of 
works for use in primary and secondary schools in Canada (outside 
Quebec).4 One issue of disagreement with respect to this tariff was 
whether short excerpts from textbooks reproduced by teachers and 
distributed to students (referred to in the decision as Category 4 
copies) met the test for fair dealing. 
The Copyright Board determined that Category 4 copies did 
not meet the test for fair dealing.5 This decision was appealed to 
the FCA, which determined that the Copyright Board’s reasons 
with respect to fair dealing were reasonable.6 The judgment of the 
FCA was appealed to the SCC. Abella J, who wrote the reasons for 
judgment in a 5-4 decision (McLachlin CJ and LeBel, Moldaver and 
Karakatsanis JJ concurring), determined that the Copyright Board’s 
decision with respect to fair dealing was unreasonable.7 Abella J thus 
allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the Copyright Board 
for reconsideration in accordance with her reasons.8 
Rothstein J, who wrote dissenting reasons in Alberta (Education) 
(Deschamps, Fish and Cromwell JJ concurring), disagreed with Abella 
J’s conclusion that the Copyright Board’s decision was unreasonable. 
In his dissenting reasons, Rothstein J also implied that Abella J, in 
reaching her conclusion, did not give adequate deference to the 
judgment of the Copyright Board; or, said differently, that Abella J, in 
spite of using the language of reasonableness, inadvertently applied a 
correctness standard instead of a reasonableness standard.9 
A pentalogy can be defined as “a combination of five mutually 
connected parts”.10 Are the five copyright decisions handed down 
by the SCC on 12 July 2012 mutually connected? Is there a coherent 
narrative with respect to judicial review of Copyright Board decisions 
in Canada’s copyright pentalogy? If so, what is this narrative? Is it 
a story of inconsistency and inadvertence, where Abella J advocated 
for deference in one decision11 yet did not give adequate deference 
in another, as suggested by Rothstein J in his dissenting reasons in 
Alberta (Education)? Or is there another story? 
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In this chapter, I suggest that the story told in the pentalogy is 
instead the story of the continuing evolution of the SCC’s interpretation 
of the purpose of the Copyright Act, a process that began in Théberge 
v Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc. [Théberge]12 and which is 
ongoing; of the nature of fair dealing and the fairness analysis; and of 
the relationship between the Copyright Board and reviewing courts. 
I will argue that the purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted 
by the SCC, is to contribute to the development of a robust public 
domain. In order to fulfill this purpose, it is necessary for courts 
and the Copyright Board to adopt a broad, liberal approach to fair 
dealing. I will suggest that in its decision in Alberta (Education), the 
Copyright Board interpreted fair dealing in a narrow manner that—to 
paraphrase the reasons for judgment of Moldaver JA (as he then was) 
in Toronto Police Services Board v (Ontario) Information and Privacy 
Commissioner [Toronto Police Services Board]—“[failed] to reflect the 
purpose and spirit of the [Copyright Act] and the generous approach 
to [fair dealing] contemplated by it.”13 As a result, the outcome reached 
by the Copyright Board fell outside the range of “possible, acceptable 
outcomes” (this range being defined as the outcomes that flow from 
the adoption of an interpretation of fair dealing or an approach to fair 
dealing that is consistent with the purpose of the Copyright Act, as 
interpreted by the SCC).14 As a matter of law, it can thus be said that 
it was not open to the Copyright Board to decide the question in the 
way that it did.
Based on this argument, Abella J did not incorrectly apply a 
correctness standard in Alberta (Education). Rather, Abella J applied 
a reasonableness standard of review in a manner consistent with the 
way in which reasonableness has been applied in Dunsmuir v New 
Brunswick [Dunsmuir], in numerous SCC decisions handed down 
post-Dunsmuir, and in several Canadian appellate decisions. As well, 
based on this argument, Abella J’s reasons for judgment in Alberta 
(Education) can be seen as consistent with her concurring reasons 
in Rogers. 
How, then, to explain Rothstein J’s dissenting reasons in Alberta 
(Education)? One point of divergence between the majority and 
dissent in Alberta (Education) relates to the nature of the fairness 
requirement (the second step in the fair dealing analysis). Rothstein 
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J’s dissenting reasons can be seen as being grounded in an assumption 
that fairness is an open-ended discretionary concept; one that is 
capable of multiple interpretations, none of which are preferable 
over any other. If fairness is open-ended, then there would be little 
scope for appellate review on a reasonableness standard. If this were 
the case, almost any decision of the Copyright Board with respect to 
fairness, provided it is transparent and intelligible, would fall within 
the range of “possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in 
respect of the facts and law” (as required by Dunsmuir).15 
However, one conclusion that we can draw from Alberta 
(Education) is that fairness (in the context of fair dealing) is not as 
discretionary a concept as it appears to be. Alberta (Education) and 
Bell clarify that the purpose of the Copyright Act requires a broad, 
liberal approach to fairness. By implication, then, fairness is not 
broad and open-ended; rather, it is infused with certain expectations 
with respect to the way in which it is to be applied (namely, in a large 
and liberal manner).
This chapter will proceed as follows. In Part I, I will briefly discuss 
the (recent) history of judicial review of decisions of the Copyright 
Board. In Part II, I will analyze Abella J’s reasons for judgment in 
Alberta (Education) in light of Rothstein J’s implied suggestion, in 
his dissenting reasons, that Abella J applied a correctness standard as 
opposed to a reasonableness standard. In Part III, I will discuss the 
implications of Alberta (Education) for fair dealing (and specifically 
the fairness analysis), for future Copyright Board decisions, and for 
the relationship between the Copyright Board and reviewing courts. 
i: Judicial Review of Copyright Board Decisions16 
A. Introduction
In 2008, the SCC handed down its decision in Dunsmuir. In this 
decision, Bastarache J and LeBel J delivered joint reasons for 
judgment in which they “reassess[ed]” the “approach to be taken 
in judicial review of decisions of administrative tribunals.”17 Two 
determinations, made by Bastarache J and LeBel J in their reasons 
for judgment, are particularly relevant for this chapter. First, they 
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determined that the existing three standards of review (correctness, 
patent unreasonableness and reasonableness simpliciter) ought to 
be replaced with two standards—correctness and reasonableness.18 
Second, Bastarache J and LeBel J concluded that “[d]eference will 
usually result where a tribunal is interpreting its own statute or 
statutes closely connected to its function, with which it will have 
particular familiarity”.19 
One question, following Dunsmuir, was the impact that it might 
have on judicial review of Copyright Board decisions. The Copyright 
Board is an “independent administrative tribunal”20 consisting of “not 
more than five members, including a chairman and a vice-chairman, 
to be appointed by the Governor in Council.”21 The chairman of 
the Copyright Board “must be a judge, either sitting or retired, of 
a superior, county or district court.”22 Through this requirement, 
as noted by the FCA in Society of Composers, Authors and Music 
Publishers of Canada v Canadian Assn. of Internet Providers [SOCAN 
v CAIP (FCA)], “[t]he Act…ensures that the Board possesses legal 
expertise.”23 Qualifications for the other members of the Copyright 
Board, including the vice-chairman, are not explicitly set out in the 
Copyright Act (its home statute). While there is no right of appeal 
from Copyright Board decisions, these decisions are subject to 
judicial review by the FCA.24 Would the SCC’s restatement of judicial 
review principles in Dunsmuir impact the standards of review applied 
to questions of law, questions of mixed fact and law, and findings of 
fact made or decided by the Copyright Board? 
B.  Standard of Review to Be Applied to Questions of Law 
Decided by the Copyright Board
At the time Dunsmuir was decided, the leading case addressing the 
standard of review on questions of law decided by the Copyright 
Board was the SCC decision in SOCAN v CAIP.25 Binnie J, who 
delivered the reasons for judgment in SOCAN v CAIP (McLachlin 
CJ and Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour, Deschamps 
and Fish JJ concurring26) concluded that the standard of review to 
be applied to questions of law addressed by the Copyright Board is 
correctness.27 
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This determination was a departure from previous decisions in 
which questions of law decided by the Copyright Board had been 
reviewed on a standard of “patent unreasonableness.”28 This standard 
had been applied by courts largely on the basis that courts perceived 
the Copyright Board to be, as noted by Létourneau JA in Canadian 
Assn. of Broadcasters v Society of Composers, Authors and Music 
Publishers of Canada, “in a better position than…Court[s] to strike a 
proper balance between the interests of copyright owners and users.”29 
The first court to address the issue of the standard of review on 
questions of law decided by the Copyright Board post-Dunsmuir was 
the FCA in Shaw Cablesystems G.P. v Society of Composers, Authors 
and Music Publishers of Canada.30 Citing Dunsmuir, the FCA held 
that “[t]he Board is a specialist tribunal which deals extensively with 
copyright matters. The Act is its home statute. It is therefore entitled 
to deference with respect to its interpretation of that Act.”31 
The FCA’s judgment in Shaw was appealed to the SCC, where it 
was heard as Rogers (one of the cases in the copyright pentalogy).32 
As noted above, the reasons for judgment in Rogers were written 
by Rothstein J.33 Echoing the judgment of Evans JA in SOCAN v 
CAIP, Rothstein J concluded that largely on the basis of “the unusual 
statutory scheme under which the Board and the court may each 
have to consider the same legal question at first instance”,34 and due to 
concerns for consistency,35 the standard of review on questions of law 
decided by the Copyright Board should be correctness.36 
In her concurring reasons in Rogers (to which no other judge 
signed on), Abella J critiqued Rothstein J’s reasons for judgment, 
arguing strongly that courts ought to take a more deferential approach 
to decisions of the Copyright Board. She did so in two main ways: first, 
by advocating for a reasonableness standard of review to be applied 
to questions of law decided by the Copyright Board,37 and second, by 
offering a much more fulsome view of the role and mandate of the 
Copyright Board than that suggested by Rothstein J in Rogers.38
With respect to the question of the standard of review that ought 
to be applied to questions of law decided by the Copyright Board, 
Abella J stated that “since Dunsmuir…this Court has unwaveringly 
held that institutionally expert and specialized tribunals are entitled 
to a presumption of deference when interpreting their home statute.”39 
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In support of this statement, Abella J cited the SCC’s decision 
in Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta 
Teachers’ Association [ATA], which Abella J stated stands for the 
proposition that “deference on judicial review is presumed any time 
a tribunal interprets its home statute.”40 Abella J characterized the 
approach adopted by the majority in Rogers—which she summarized 
as “[a]pplying a correctness standard of review on the sole basis 
that a court might interpret the same statute”41—as an “anomalous 
jurisprudential relapse”,42 the consequences of which are to “effectively 
[drain] expert tribunals of the deference and respect they are owed.”43 
In dismissing the majority’s concern about inconsistent results 
that might flow from the adoption of a reasonableness standard of 
review when judicially reviewing Copyright Board decisions, Abella 
J characterized the Copyright Board as a body with “particular 
familiarity and expertise with the provisions of the Copyright Act”.44 
She stated: 
The Act may sometimes be home to other judicial actors 
as part of their varied adjudicative functions, but their 
occasional occupancy should not deprive the Board of 
the deference it is entitled to as the permanent resident 
whose only task is to interpret and apply the Act.45 
This statement implicitly rejects Binnie J’s characterization of the 
Copyright Act, in SOCAN v CAIP, as an “act of general application 
which usually is dealt with before courts rather than tribunals”.46 
Binnie J’s characterization was accepted by Rothstein J in his reasons 
for judgment in Rogers.47 
In addition to disagreeing on the question of which standard of 
review ought to apply to questions of law decided by the Copyright 
Board, Abella J and Rothstein J, in their respective reasons in Rogers, 
also presented very different views of the role and mandate of the 
Copyright Board. In his reasons, Rothstein J affirmed Binnie J’s 
statement in SOCAN v CAIP that “the core of the Board’s mandate is 
‘the working out of the details of an appropriate royalty tariff ’.”48 
Objecting to the characterization of the Copyright Board as a 
mere rate-setter, Abella J instead provided a much more expansive 
view of the role of the Copyright Board. She stated: 
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The Board has specialized expertise in interpreting the 
provisions of the Copyright Act. … The Board does not 
simply “wor[k] out…the details of an appropriate royalty 
tariff ”, despite what is suggested in [SOCAN v CAIP], 
at para. 49. It sets policies that collectively determine 
the rights of copyright owners and users, and plays an 
important role in achieving the proper balance between 
those actors.49
In advocating for a reasonableness standard of review for 
questions of law that are decided by the Copyright Board, and in 
offering a broad interpretation of the Copyright Board and its 
mandate (as opposed to the interpretation of the board’s mandate as 
set out by the majority), Abella J provided, in her concurring reasons 
in Rogers, a robust defence of a deferential approach to decisions of 
the Copyright Board. 
C.  Standard of Review to Be Applied to Findings of Fact and 
Questions of Mixed Fact and Law Made or Decided by the 
Copyright Board
In Dunsmuir, Deschamps J (Charron and Rothstein JJ concurring) 
wrote that in the context of administrative review, deference is 
owed by reviewing courts both with respect to findings of fact and 
questions of mixed fact and law made or decided by administrative 
bodies (implying a reasonableness standard of review).50 The first 
court, post-Dunsmuir, to address the issue of the proper standard 
to be applied to findings of fact made by the Copyright Board was 
the FCA in Alberta (Education) (FCA).51 In this decision, the FCA 
confirmed that the standard of review to be applied when reviewing 
findings of fact made by the Copyright Board was reasonableness.52 
This conclusion was upheld by Abella J in Alberta (Education).53 In 
Canadian Recording Industry Association v Society of Composers, 
Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, the FCA confirmed that 
questions of mixed fact and law decided by the Copyright Board are 
also reviewed on a reasonableness standard.54 
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ii:  The Reasonableness standard applied:  
analyzing abella J’s Reasons in Alberta (Education) 
A. Introduction
In this Part, I will focus on Abella J’s application of the reasonableness 
standard in her reasons in Alberta (Education). As noted above, while 
Abella J (who wrote the majority decision) and Rothstein J (who wrote 
dissenting reasons) agreed that the question of whether photocopies 
made by teachers for their students qualified as fair dealing ought to 
be reviewed on a reasonableness standard,55 they disagreed both on 
how this standard ought to be applied and on the ultimate conclusion 
(namely, whether the Copyright Board’s decision with respect to fair 
dealing was unreasonable). 
Prior to the pentalogy, the leading SCC case to address fair 
dealing was CCH.56 CCH dealt with copyright infringement actions 
brought by legal publishers CCH Canadian Ltd., Thomson Canada 
Ltd. and Canada Law Book Ltd. against the Law Society of Upper 
Canada (LSUC). The publishers alleged, among other claims, that the 
LSUC—which, “[s]ince 1845…has maintained and operated the Great 
Library at Osgoode Hall in Toronto, a reference and research library 
with one of the largest collections of legal materials in Canada”57—
had infringed copyright by “providing [a] custom photocopy service 
in which single copies of the publishers’ works are reproduced and 
sent to patrons upon their request [and by]…maintaining self-service 
photocopiers and copies of the publishers’ works in the Great Library 
for use by its patrons”.58
In the course of her decision (in which she found that the LSUC had 
not infringed copyright), McLachlin CJ, writing for the Court, made 
several statements with respect to the nature and scope of fair dealing. 
Specifically, McLachlin CJ noted that fair dealing is an “integral part of 
the Copyright Act”;59 that it is a “user’s right”;60 and that “[i]n order to 
maintain the proper balance between the rights of a copyright owner 
and users’ interests, it must not be interpreted restrictively”.61
Fair dealing is the broadest defence to copyright infringement 
available under the Copyright Act.62 Under fair dealing, individuals 
have, in certain circumstances, the “right” to use a substantial amount 
of copyright-protected expression without the authorization of the 
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copyright owner.63 The fair dealing analysis proceeds in two steps. 
First, it must be established that the dealing was done for one of eight 
purposes, namely research, private study, education, parody, satire, 
criticism, review and news reporting.64 Dealings done for the purpose 
of criticism, review or news reporting, in order to be considered fair, 
must also satisfy certain attribution requirements.65 Second, it must 
be established that the dealing was “fair.”66 
With respect to the second part of the fair dealing analysis, 
McLachlin CJ, in CCH, noted that “[t]he Copyright Act does not 
define what will be fair; whether something is fair is a question of fact 
and depends on the facts of each case”.67 In support of this statement, 
she cited the judgment of Lord Denning M.R. in Hubbard v Vosper 
[Hubbard] in which he noted that “[i]t is impossible to define what is 
‘fair dealing’. It must be a question of degree…after all is said in done, 
it must be a matter of impression.”68
In the attempt to provide some guidance to future decision makers 
with respect to the fairness analysis, McLachlin CJ set out a list of 
factors outlined originally by Linden JA that, in the view of the SCC, 
“provides a useful analytical framework to govern determinations 
of fairness in future cases”.69 Specifically, based on CCH, factors that 
may be considered are the purpose of the dealing, the character of 
the dealing, the amount of the dealing, alternatives to the dealing, the 
nature of the work, and the effect of the dealing on the work.70 
As described earlier, in Alberta (Education), in the context of 
reviewing the tariff proposed by Access Copyright, the Copyright 
Board determined that short excerpts from textbooks reproduced 
by teachers and distributed to students did not meet the test for fair 
dealing. This determination was reviewed first by the FCA (which held 
that it was reasonable) and subsequently by the SCC. In her decision, 
Abella J concluded that “the Board’s finding of unfairness was based 
on…a misapplication of the CCH factors.”71 As a result, Abella J held 
that “its outcome was rendered unreasonable.”72 Consequently, Abella 
J allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the Copyright Board 
for reconsideration based on her reasons.73 
Rothstein J, in his dissenting reasons, disagreed with Abella J, 
stating that “[i]n my view, the Board made no reviewable error in 
principle in construing the CCH factors and, with one relatively minor 
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exception, its factual analysis, application of the CCH factors to the 
facts and its conclusions were not unreasonable.”74 Rothstein J also 
objected to what he viewed as the approach taken by Abella J in her 
reasons for judgment, implying that Abella J did not give adequate 
deference to the Copyright Board with respect to its analysis of the 
fairness (or CCH) factors. As Rothstein J stated: “The application of 
these factors to the facts of each case by the Copyright Board should 
be treated with deference on judicial review. A principled deferential 
review requires that courts be cautious not to inadvertently slip into a 
more intrusive, correctness review.”75
Rothstein J’s contention that Abella J did not give adequate 
deference to the Copyright Board in her decision in Alberta (Education) 
merits further analysis, particularly given Abella J’s concurring reasons 
in Rogers in which Abella J called for greater deference to be given to 
decisions of the Copyright Board. What can explain this outcome?
As noted above, one explanation—alluded to by Rothstein 
J, in his dissenting reasons in Alberta (Education), is that Abella J, 
in her reasons for judgment in Alberta (Education), “inadvertently 
[slipped] into a more intrusive, correctness review.”76 Based on this 
explanation, Abella J did not give adequate deference to the decision 
of the Copyright Board; rather, she simply substituted her judgment 
for that of the Copyright Board. This explanation, however, implies 
an inconsistency between Abella J’s decision in Alberta (Education) 
and her concurring reasons in Rogers—that Abella J advocated for 
deference to be given to determinations of the Copyright Board in one 
case, yet failed to give deference in another. Such an inconsistency—
particularly given that Rogers and Alberta (Education) were heard by 
the SCC on back-to-back days, and the judgments delivered on the 
same day—would be surprising. 
I suggest that there is another explanation. Specifically, in this 
Part, I suggest that the Copyright Board, in applying fair dealing to 
a specific set of facts, adopted an approach to fair dealing that was 
inconsistent with the purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted by 
the SCC. In so doing, it reached an outcome that fell outside of the 
range of possible, acceptable outcomes. As a result, Abella J’s decision 
to allow the appeal did not reflect a lack of deference to the decision 
of the Copyright Board.
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In the next section of this Part, I will describe the application 
of the reasonableness standard, post-Dunsmuir, in the context of 
statutory interpretation. While the question of “whether something 
is fair is a question of fact”, as noted by McLachlin CJ in CCH,77 the 
question of how to interpret and apply fair dealing is ultimately a 
question of statutory interpretation. The interpretation or approach 
adopted by a court or the Copyright Board to fair dealing is (or ought 
to be) informed by their view of the purpose of the legislation as a 
whole. Thus interpreted, fair dealing is applied to the facts of the case, 
making the question dealt with in Alberta (Education) a question of 
mixed fact and law, reviewable on a reasonableness standard.78 In 
numerous judgments, as will be described below, reviewing courts 
have found decisions of administrative bodies to be unreasonable on 
the basis that the administrative body adopted an interpretation of 
the statutory provisions in question that was inconsistent with the 
purpose of the legislation, as interpreted by the reviewing court.
B.  The Application of the Reasonableness Standard in the 
Context of Statutory Interpretation 
In Dunsmuir, the SCC describes reasonableness as a 
[D]eferential standard animated by the principle that 
underlies the development of the two previous standards 
of reasonableness: certain questions that come before 
administrative tribunals do not lend themselves to one 
specific, particular result. Instead, they may give rise to 
a number of possible, reasonable conclusions. Tribunals 
have a margin of appreciation within the range of 
acceptable and rational solutions. A court conducting a 
review for reasonableness inquires into the qualities that 
make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process 
of articulating the reasons and to outcomes. In judicial 
review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the 
existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility 
within the decision-making process. But it is also 
concerned with whether the decision falls within a range 
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of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in 
respect of the facts and law.79 
In Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland 
and Labrador (Treasury Board) [NLNU],80 Abella J (writing for 
the Court) clarified the approach taken by reviewing courts in 
determining whether a decision of an administrative decision maker 
is unreasonable.81 Rather than requiring the reviewing court to 
engage in “two discrete analyses—one for the reasons and a separate 
one for the result”, Abella J described the reasonableness analysis as a 
“more organic exercise—the reasons must be read together with the 
outcome and serve the purpose of showing whether the result falls 
within a range of possible outcomes.”82 
As noted in Catalyst Paper Corp. v North Cowichan (District) 
(following Dunsmuir), “reasonableness must be assessed in the 
context of the particular type of decision making involved and all 
relevant factors”.83 In the context of cases in which the issue being 
reviewed involves the tribunal’s interpretation of a specific statutory 
provision, many reviewing courts engage in a process of statutory 
interpretation in order to determine whether the “decision falls 
within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible 
in respect of the facts and law.”84 Abella J, who delivered the judgment 
of the Court in Celgene Corp. v Canada (Attorney General) [Celgene], 
described “statutory interpretation [as] involv[ing] a consideration of 
the ordinary meaning of the words used and the statutory context in 
which they are found…. The words, if clear, will dominate; if not, they 
yield to an interpretation that best meets the overriding purpose of 
the statute”.85 
Reviewing courts engage in the process of statutory interpretation, 
at least theoretically, not to determine whether they would agree 
with the outcome reached by the tribunal (this would be an 
inappropriate application of the correctness standard in the context 
of a reasonableness analysis), but to determine the range of possible 
outcomes (thus allowing the reviewing court to determine whether 
the tribunal’s decision fell within the range of possible, acceptable 
outcomes, even if it is not the outcome that the reviewing court itself 
would have adopted).86 
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This is not to say, however, that some courts engaged in this 
process of statutory interpretation do not “inadvertently slip into 
a more intrusive, correctness review”.87 This concern was noted by 
Binnie J in ATA.88 Binnie J pointed to two cases—Dunsmuir89 and 
Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v Canada (Attorney 
General) [CHRC]90—in which he argued that “the intensity of 
scrutiny” applied by the reviewing courts was “not far removed from 
a correctness analysis”.91 Similarly, Gus Van Harten, Gerald Heckman 
and David J. Mullan have noted that 
[o]ccasionally, there are cases, usually involving issues 
of legal interpretation, where a court applies the 
reasonableness standard in a way that appears to show 
little if any deference to the decision-maker. In such 
cases, it is pertinent to ask whether the court carried 
through on its commitment to defer or whether, instead, 
the court engaged in correctness review ‘in disguise.’92
In addition to questioning whether some reviewing courts might 
use this process to engage in “correctness review ‘in disguise’”,93 it 
can also be asked, more broadly, how the range of possible outcomes 
should be determined. In the context of a case involving statutory 
interpretation, should the court’s determination of statutory 
purposes trump that of the administrative tribunal? This approach 
sits uneasily with the idea of “deference as respect” articulated by 
David Dyzenhaus and adopted by the SCC in Dunsmuir.94 Rather, it 
seems to perpetuate a policy of judicial supremacy over the actions of 
administrative tribunals.95
The resolution of this question is beyond the scope of this 
chapter to address. Instead, this chapter will merely note that the 
approach to the reasonableness analysis described above, in which 
the reviewing court determines whether the outcome reached by the 
tribunal falls within the range of possible, acceptable outcomes after 
having engaged in the process of statutory interpretation in order to 
ascertain the range of outcomes, has been adopted in numerous SCC 
and Canadian appellate decisions since Dunsmuir. 
In many of these cases, reviewing courts have found decisions 
of administrative tribunals to be unreasonable, at least in part on 
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the basis that the tribunal’s approach to or interpretation of specific 
statutory provisions was inconsistent with the purpose of the statute, 
as interpreted by the reviewing court. In Dunsmuir, for instance, 
Bastarache and LeBel JJ critiqued the “reasoning process of the 
adjudicator”, suggesting that it was “deeply flawed” in that “[i]t relied 
on and led to a construction of the statute that fell outside of the range 
of admissible statutory interpretations”.96
A similar approach was adopted in CHRC.97 After having 
engaged in an interpretive process to determine the range of possible 
outcomes, LeBel and Cromwell JJ (McLachlin CJ and Deschamps, 
Abella, Charron and Rothstein JJ concurring), stated that
[i]n our view, the text, context and purpose of the 
legislation clearly show that there is no authority in the 
Tribunal to award legal costs and that there is no other 
reasonable interpretation of the relevant provisions. 
Faced with a difficult point of statutory interpretation 
and conflicting judicial authority, the Tribunal adopted 
a dictionary meaning of “expenses” and articulated what 
it considered to be a beneficial policy outcome rather 
than engage in an interpretive process taking account of 
the text, context and purpose of the provisions in issue. 
In our respectful view, this led the Tribunal to adopt an 
unreasonable interpretation of the provisions.98
In Halifax (Regional Municipality) v Canada (Public Works 
and Government Services) [HRM]99 (Cromwell J, writing for the 
Court), the Minister of Public Works and Government Services’ 
determination that “roughly 40 acres of the Halifax Citadel National 
Historic Site of Canada has only nominal value for the purposes of 
municipal taxation”100 was held to be unreasonable on the basis that 
it was “inconsistent with the Act’s purpose”.101 As the Minister had 
adopted an approach that would “[defeat] Parliament’s purpose”, the 
outcome reached as a result of this approach was determined to fall 
outside the range of possible, acceptable outcomes.102
This type of approach to the reasonableness analysis has also 
been adopted in several decisions of appellate courts. For instance, in 
Toronto Police Services Board, Moldaver JA (as he then was) (Sharpe 
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and Blair JJA concurring) restored the order of the Adjudicator and 
set aside the order of the Divisional Court (which had found the 
Adjudicator’s interpretation of s 2(1)(b) of the Municipal Freedom 
of Information and Protection of Privacy Act to be unreasonable) 
on the basis that “[t]he Divisional Court [gave] s 2(1)(b) a narrow 
construction—one which…[failed] to reflect the purpose and spirit 
of the Act and the generous approach to access [to information] 
contemplated by it”.103 
Celgene is an example of a decision in which the SCC determined 
that the tribunal’s decision fell within the range of possible, acceptable 
outcomes (and was thus reasonable) largely on the basis that the 
tribunal’s decision was consistent with the purpose of the statutory 
provisions, as interpreted by the reviewing court.104 In Celgene, Abella 
J framed the question to be decided as whether the interpretation 
adopted by the Patent Medicine Prices Review Board (Board) 
of ss. 80(1)(b), 83(1) and 85 of the Patent Act was “justified.”105 In 
order to determine the answer to this question, Abella J relied on 
general principles of statutory interpretation, noting that the Board 
adopted an interpretation of these provisions that was “guided by the 
consumer protection goals of its mandate”106 and stating that “[t]he 
Board’s interpretive choice is supported by the legislative history”.107 
Abella J determined that in adopting an interpretation of ss. 80(1)(b), 
83(1) and 85 of the Patent Act that was consistent with the Board’s 
consumer protection purpose, the Board had reached an outcome 
that fell within the range of possible, acceptable outcomes. 
As this section has demonstrated, in a number of cases, reviewing 
courts have found tribunal decisions to be either reasonable or 
unreasonable on the basis that the tribunal had adopted an approach 
to or an interpretation of statutory provisions that was either 
consistent with or inconsistent with the purpose of the legislation, 
as interpreted by the reviewing court. In the next section, I will 
argue that consistent with the decisions described above, Abella J, in 
Alberta (Education), determined that the Copyright Board’s decision 
was unreasonable on the basis that it adopted an approach to fair 
dealing that was inconsistent with the purpose of copyright, as 
interpreted by the SCC.
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C.  The Application of the Reasonableness Standard in Alberta 
(Education)
a.  The Continuing Evolution of the Purpose of the Copyright 
Act, as Interpreted by the SCC
i.  The Author-centric Approach to Copyright
In Bell, Abella J, writing for the Court, referenced the “author-
centric” view of copyright in her reasons for judgment.108 She described 
this view of copyright as “focus[ing] on the exclusive right of authors 
and copyright owners to control how their works were used in the 
marketplace,”109 and cited Bishop v Stevens as an example of an SCC case in 
which this approach to copyright was employed.110 Abella J’s description 
of the author-centric approach to copyright can be seen as implying 
that the purpose of the Copyright Act, under this approach, is to reward 
and protect authors and copyright owners.111 As well, based on this 
statement, it can be suggested that under the author-centric approach to 
copyright, owners’ rights are to be interpreted broadly, while exceptions 
to copyright infringement are to be interpreted narrowly. Interpreting 
the Copyright Act in such a manner would be consistent with the focus 
of the Copyright Act being on authors and copyright owners (and not on 
users or the broader public interest, for instance). Citing Carys Craig, 
Abella J noted that under the author-centric approach to copyright, “any 
benefit the public might derive from the copyright system [is] only ‘a 
fortunate by-product of private entitlement.’”112 Based on this statement, 
it can be suggested that the author-centric approach privileges private 
interests over broad consideration of the public interest. 
In Bell, Abella J described the author-centric approach to copyright 
as the “former framework” and the “earlier” view of copyright.113 This 
choice of diction is significant. It implies that this view of copyright 
was, at one time, the dominant conception of copyright in Canada. It 
also implies that this is no longer the case. What, then, is the current 
governing approach to copyright in Canada?
ii. The Instrumental–Public Interest Approach
Beginning in Théberge and most recently affirmed in the 
pentalogy,114 the SCC has interpreted the Copyright Act as supporting 
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a conceptualization of copyright as a mechanism (or instrument) 
employed to achieve a specific outcome. I refer to this approach to 
copyright as the instrumental–public interest approach. Under this 
approach to copyright, the purpose of the Copyright Act is to advance 
the public interest by contributing to the development of a “robustly 
cultured and intellectual public domain”.115 
Copyright contributes to the development of the public domain by 
providing an economic incentive for the creation and dissemination 
of works of the arts and intellect.116 This economic incentive spurs 
the creation and dissemination of works that would otherwise not 
have been created or disseminated. Once created and made public, 
these works become available for certain types of unauthorized 
uses (thus facilitating future creation and contributing to a vibrant 
public domain). In order to ensure that the economic incentive of 
copyright functions properly (and that individuals continue to invest 
in the creation and dissemination of expression), copyright owners 
must receive a “just” or “fair reward.”117 Ensuring a fair reward for 
copyright owners is thus consistent with and advances the public 
interest in a vibrant public domain. As such, it is an integral part of 
the instrumental–public interest approach to copyright. 
Interpreting the rights of copyright owners too broadly, however, 
could negatively impact and run counter to the public interest. 
To quote McLachlin CJ, the “public domain…flourish[es]” when 
“others are able to produce new works by building on the ideas 
and information contained in the works of others”.118 It becomes 
impoverished if copyright owners are able to restrict, to too great 
a degree, the ideas, information and expression contained within 
their works. 
Ensuring that information and expression is disseminated is 
crucial in maintaining a vibrant public domain. Works that are 
not disseminated (or that are not disseminated broadly) cannot 
be accessed or used by others. As noted by Binnie J in Théberge, 
“[e]xcessive control by holders of copyrights and other forms of 
intellectual property may unduly limit the ability of the public 
domain to incorporate and embellish creative innovation in the long-
term interests of society as a whole, or create practical obstacles to 
proper utilization”.119
GRAHAM REYNOLDS  |   19
Recognizing that overcompensating copyright owners risks 
harming the public interest in a vibrant public domain, the SCC has 
taken several steps to limit the rights of copyright owners. First, it 
has emphasized that the rights of copyright owners are of a “limited 
nature”.120 As noted by Binnie J in Théberge, “[i]n crassly economic 
terms it would be as inefficient to overcompensate artists and authors 
… as it would be self-defeating to undercompensate them”.121 Second, 
the SCC has also reframed exceptions, limitations and defences 
to copyright infringement as “users’ rights”.122 Users’ rights help 
to mediate “[e]xcessive control by holders of copyrights” and, as a 
result, to protect the public domain.123 In so doing, users’ rights play 
an “essential” role in “furthering the public interest objectives of the 
Copyright Act”.124 Fair dealing, the broadest users’ right set out in the 
Copyright Act, contributes to the development of a vibrant public 
domain by giving individuals the right to reproduce, build upon and 
disseminate works of the arts and intellect in various ways.
Under the instrumental–public interest approach, fair dealing 
and other user rights are seen as an “integral part of the Copyright 
Act”.125 As such, they “must not be interpreted restrictively”.126 
The role played by the fairness analysis (the second step in the fair 
dealing analysis) is particularly important in “balanc[ing] between 
protection and access”127 and in advancing the public interest in a 
vibrant public domain. Abella J has described the fairness analysis 
as the part of the test in which the “analytical heavy-hitting is done 
in determining whether the dealing was fair”.128 It is thus crucial, 
under the instrumental-public interest approach to copyright, that 
the fairness analysis not be interpreted restrictively.129 Under this 
approach to copyright, both fair dealing (broadly) and the fairness 
analysis (specifically) must be given large, liberal interpretations.
b.  Abella J’s Decision in Alberta (Education) Focuses  
on the Approach to Fair Dealing Adopted by the 
Copyright Board
In his dissenting reasons, Rothstein J suggested that Abella J 
“seize[d] upon a few arguable statements or intermediate findings to 
conclude that the overall decision is unreasonable”.130 I suggest that 
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this is not the case. Although Abella J does not explicitly ground her 
decision in the text of Dunsmuir or other, more recent SCC decisions 
in the area of administrative law, I suggest that Abella J—in a manner 
consistent with the way in which Dunsmuir has been interpreted by 
numerous SCC and Court of Appeal decisions, as described above—
found the decision of the Copyright Board to be unreasonable on the 
basis that it adopted an approach to fair dealing that was inconsistent 
with the purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted by the SCC. By 
virtue of its adoption of such an approach, the outcome reached by 
the Copyright Board fell outside the range of “possible, acceptable 
outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law”.131 
The contention that Abella J’s reasons for judgment focused on 
the overall approach to fair dealing taken by the Copyright Board 
and not to a few isolated statements or findings is supported by 
reference to Abella J’s reasons for judgment. On numerous occasions 
throughout her reasons for judgment, Abella J indicated that she 
took issue either with how the Copyright Board “approached” a 
fairness factor, or the “approach” taken by the Copyright Board in the 
context of its fair dealing analysis. For instance, Abella J stated that 
“[i]n my view, the key problem is in the way the Board approached 
the ‘purpose of the dealing’ factor”;132 she distinguished several 
authorities from the United Kingdom on the basis that “courts in the 
U.K. have tended to take a more restrictive approach to determining 
the ‘purpose’ of the dealing than does CCH”;133 she critiqued “[t]he 
Board’s approach” for “driv[ing] an artificial wedge” into what she 
states are the “unified purposes” of “teacher/copier and student/
user”;134 she stated that “[t]he Board’s skewed characterization of the 
teachers’ role…also led to a problematic approach to the ‘amount of 
the dealing’ factor”,135 noting that this was a “flawed approach”;136 
she stated that she “[had] difficulty with how the Board approached 
the ‘alternatives to the dealing’ factor”,137 noting that “the Board’s 
approach” led to a “demonstrably unrealistic outcome”;138 and stated 
that “[t]he final problematic application of a fairness factor by the 
Board was its approach to the ‘effect of the dealing on the work’”.139 
In the penultimate paragraph in her decision, Abella J connected 
the Board’s approach to the outcome that it reached, stating that 
“[b]ecause the Board’s finding of unfairness was based on what was, in 
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my respectful view, a misapplication of the CCH factors, its outcome 
was rendered unreasonable”.140 
I will proceed by discussing the approach to copyright adopted by 
the Copyright Board in Alberta (Education). I will demonstrate that 
the Copyright Board, in its decision, adopted an interpretation of fair 
dealing that was inconsistent with the purpose of the Copyright Act, 
as interpreted by the SCC. In so doing, it arrived at an outcome that 
was outside of the range of possible, acceptable outcomes.
c.  The Approach to Fair Dealing Adopted by the Copyright 
Board in Alberta (Education) was Inconsistent with the 
Purpose of the Copyright Act, as Interpreted by the SCC
Although acknowledging that CCH is the “unavoidable starting 
point of any analysis of fair dealing”,141 the Copyright Board, through 
the course of its decision, interpreted and applied both CCH and 
fair dealing more generally in a narrow, restrictive manner. Such an 
approach is inconsistent with the purpose of the Copyright Act, as 
interpreted by the SCC, namely to contribute to the development of 
a strong, robust public domain.142 This purpose, as outlined above, 
requires a large, liberal interpretation to be given to user’s rights such 
as fair dealing. 
The approach adopted by the Copyright Board, on the other hand, 
is more consistent with the author-centric approach, under which the 
purpose of the Copyright Act is to reward and protect authors and 
copyright owners. The Copyright Board adopted such an approach in 
order to have its analysis “conform with”143 article 9(2) of the Berne 
Convention144 and article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement145 and to reach 
the only result that it believed was consistent with these two treaty 
provisions—a result it viewed as “self-evident”—namely, “that copies 
made on a teacher’s initiative for his or her students either conflict 
with the normal exploitation of the work or unreasonably prejudice 
the legitimate interests of the rights holders” and as a result ought not 
to satisfy fair dealing.146 
The Copyright Board’s decision to interpret fair dealing in a manner 
consistent with the Berne Convention and TRIPS Agreement—done 
on the basis of its view that “the Supreme Court has been placing 
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significant emphasis on treaties that Canada has not yet ratified; it 
seems even more crucial to account for those that have been”147—is 
not in itself necessarily unreasonable.148 However, both article 9(2) 
of the Berne Convention and article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement 
can be seen as presenting a view of limitations and exceptions to 
copyright infringement that is inconsistent with the purpose of the 
Copyright Act, as interpreted by the SCC. Both article 9(2) of the 
Berne Convention and article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement portray 
limitations and exceptions to copyright infringement as carve-outs 
from the copyright owner’s exclusive rights, as opposed to integral 
elements of the copyright scheme that must not be interpreted 
restrictively. In interpreting CCH through the lens of these two 
articles, the Copyright Board adopted an approach to copyright that 
was more reflective of now-rejected interpretations of the purpose 
of the Copyright Act—namely, to reward and protect authors and 
copyright owners—than contemporary interpretations of its purpose, 
as interpreted by the SCC. 
The Copyright Board’s adoption of a narrow, restrictive 
interpretation of fair dealing is evident in several ways that will be 
described in more detail below. First, several statements from CCH 
that point to the continuing evolution in the SCC’s interpretation 
of the purpose of the Copyright Act were absent from the Copyright 
Board’s decision in Alberta (Education); second, the Copyright 
Board reframed one of the central conclusions reached in CCH in a 
manner that is more reflective of now-rejected interpretations of the 
purpose of the Copyright Act than contemporary interpretations of 
its purpose, as interpreted by the SCC; third, the Copyright Board 
repeatedly adopted a narrow interpretation of the scope of CCH; 
and fourth, the Copyright Board made certain assumptions when 
evaluating the fairness factors set out in CCH that led it to conclude 
that the factors tended to unfairness. Taken together, these elements 
of the Copyright Board’s decision suggest that the approach to fair 
dealing adopted by the Copyright Board was inconsistent with the 
purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted by the SCC.
As noted above, the Copyright Board began its fair dealing analysis 
by stating that “CCH now is the unavoidable starting point of any 
analysis of the notion of fair dealing”.149 It then set out what it viewed 
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as the “substance of the propositions resulting from that decision”.150 
The Copyright Board summarized CCH’s main principles as follows: 
76 First, all exceptions provided in the Act are now 
users’ rights. They must be given a liberal interpretation, 
according to the purposes of copyright in general, 
including maintaining a balance between the rights of 
copyright holders and the interests of users, and the 
exception in particular.
77  Second, the fair dealing exception applies only 
to certain allowable purposes: private study, research, 
criticism, review, and news reporting. Dealings for other 
purposes are not covered by the exception, even if they 
would otherwise be fair. 
78  Third, dealings for an allowable purpose are not 
ipso facto fair. The fairness of the dealing is assessed 
separately, according to an open list of factors including 
the purpose, character and amount of the dealing, 
available alternatives, the nature of the work and the 
effect of the dealing on the work.
79  Fourth, since all of the conditions for application 
of the exception must be satisfied, the exception will not 
apply as long as any one condition is not met.
80  Fifth, a practice or a system may constitute a 
“dealing” just as well as an individual act. The exception 
can benefit a practice or system if it is established either 
that all of the individual dealings are research-based and 
fair, or that the practice or the system itself is research-
based and fair.
81  Sixth, the notion of fair dealing is a legal concept 
that must be interpreted according to the framework laid 
down in CCH. […]151
Certain important elements of CCH are absent from this 
summary. While the mere fact that “[r]easons may not include all the 
arguments, statutory provisions, jurisprudence or other details the 
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reviewing judge would have preferred…does not impugn the validity 
of either the reasons or the result under a reasonableness analysis”, 
as noted by Abella J in NLNU,152 the manner in which the Copyright 
Board summarized CCH reveals inconsistencies, with respect to the 
scope of defences to copyright infringement, between the approach 
adopted by the Copyright Board and the purpose of the Copyright 
Act, as interpreted by the SCC. Three elements of CCH, in particular, 
are absent from the Copyright Board’s summary. 
First, in CCH, fair dealing is referred to as an “integral part of 
the Copyright Act”153 and an “integral part of the scheme of copyright 
law.”154 Reference to fair dealing as being “integral” to the Copyright 
Act is absent from the Copyright Board’s decision. This absence can 
perhaps be attributed to the Copyright Board’s view that the Copyright 
Act ought to be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Berne 
Convention and the TRIPS Agreement. Conceiving of fair dealing as 
an “integral” part of the Copyright Act can be seen as inconsistent with 
the adoption of a view of fair dealing that is “confine[d]” to “certain 
special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
right holder”, as articulated in article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement.155 
Second, in CCH, McLachlin CJ referenced Binnie J’s statement in 
Théberge that one must not only “recogniz[e] the creator’s rights but…
giv[e] due weight to their limited nature.”156 Reference to the “limited 
nature” of creator’s rights is absent from the Copyright Board’s 
decision. Instead, the Copyright Board noted that its approach “helps 
to ‘maintain the proper balance between the rights of a copyright 
owner and users’ interests’ and avoid restricting them unduly (since 
both copyright owners’ interests and users’ rights can be unduly 
restricted)”.157 The idea that the Copyright Board should guard against 
interpreting the Copyright Act in a manner that would unduly restrict 
the rights of copyright owners (perhaps through a large and liberal 
approach to users’ rights) echoes the language used in article 9(2) of 
the Berne Convention and article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement, and is 
more consistent with the author-centric approach to copyright than 
with the purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted by the SCC. To 
refer to the interests of copyright owners as being “limited”—as was 
done in CCH —could be seen as being inconsistent with the language 
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used in article 9(2) of the Berne Convention and article 13 of the 
TRIPS Agreement, which focuses on the need for states to ensure that 
exceptions or limitations to exclusive rights are not interpreted in an 
overbroad manner.
Third, in CCH, in the context of discussing the originality standard, 
McLachlin CJ stated that creating “safeguard[s] against the author 
being overcompensated for his or her work…helps ensure that there 
is room for the public domain to flourish as others are able to produce 
new works by building on the ideas and information contained in the 
works of others.”158 No reference to this statement, or to the idea of 
the public domain more generally, is made in the Copyright Board’s 
decision in Alberta (Education). Although the Copyright Board was 
not required to include reference to this statement (or the concept 
of the public domain, more broadly) in its reasons, its absence again 
suggests an inconsistency between the approach adopted by the 
Copyright Board and the purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted 
by the SCC.
In addition to selectively quoting from and reframing elements 
of CCH, the Copyright Board, through the course of its decision in 
Alberta (Education), also repeatedly interpreted CCH in a restrictive 
manner. It did so in several ways. First, while noting that the “notion 
of research must be interpreted broadly,”159 a comment that draws 
directly from the statement by the SCC in CCH that “‘[r]esearch’ must 
be given a large and liberal interpretation in order to ensure that users’ 
rights are not unduly constrained,”160 the Copyright Board then stated 
that “it appears that CCH did not challenge previous interpretations 
of the notion of private study.”161 In making this statement, the 
Copyright Board thus chose not to interpret CCH as authority for 
the proposition that a “large and liberal interpretation” ought to be 
applied to all fair dealing purposes (and not simply the purpose at 
issue in CCH itself).162 As well as serving as a restrictive interpretation 
of CCH, this statement is also inconsistent with the language used 
by the SCC in CCH. Three paragraphs after stating that “‘research’ 
must be given a large and liberal interpretation,” the SCC broadens 
the scope of this statement, noting that “the allowable purposes under 
the Copyright Act, namely research, private study, criticism, review or 
news reporting…should not be given a restrictive interpretation or 
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this could result in the undue restriction of users’ rights”.163
Second, the Copyright Board, in the course of its decision, 
relied on judgments in which a restrictive approach to fair dealing 
was adopted. For instance, in support of its view that the purpose of 
the dealing should be analyzed from the perspective of the teacher 
or copier rather than from the perspective of the ultimate user, the 
Copyright Board relied heavily on three decisions, two of which were 
from the United Kingdom. As noted by Abella J, however, “courts in the 
U.K. have tended to take a more restrictive approach to determining 
the ‘purpose’ of the dealing than does CCH”.164 Thus, relying on 
these decisions can itself be seen as inconsistent with the purpose of 
the Copyright Act, as interpreted by the SCC (which mandates the 
adoption of a large and liberal interpretation to fair dealing). 
A third example of the Copyright Board’s application of a 
restrictive interpretation of CCH is found in the way in which it 
distinguished between the role of the teacher in a school and that 
of staff at the Great Library. Describing these two roles as “scarcely 
comparable”, the Copyright Board noted that165 
[T]he teacher-student relationship is not the same as 
that between the Great Library and lawyers. The Great 
Library is simply an extension of a lawyer’s will. A 
teacher does not merely act on behalf of a student, given 
that, to a large extent, it is the teacher who instructs the 
student what to do with the material copied.166
In constructing the comparison between teachers and staff at the Great 
Library in such a manner, the Copyright Board narrowed the ambit 
of CCH to situations in which an intermediary acts as an extension of 
the will of the user. In so doing, the Copyright Board was able to avoid 
overtly challenging the determination in CCH while concluding that, 
in this instance, fair dealing was not made out. 
The characterization of teachers adopted by the Copyright Board 
(as performing a role very different from staff at the Great Library) 
was not the only characterization that could have been adopted. 
Instead of being seen as having roles that are “scarcely comparable”, 
teachers and the staff at the Great Library could instead have been 
seen as playing similar roles, in that both attempt to increase access to 
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works of the arts and intellect. This appears to be the approach taken 
by Abella J, who noted that “[t]he teacher…facilitates wider access 
to [the] limited number of [purchased originals] by making copies 
available to all students who need them”.167 This approach is consistent 
with the purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted by the SCC.
A fourth instance of the Copyright Board adopting a narrow, 
restrictive interpretation of CCH is found in the way in which the 
Copyright Board interpreted CCH as indicating that in order for a 
photocopy made by one party (A) for another party (B) to qualify 
for the purpose of research, B must request the copy (thus imposing 
a procedural requirement not dictated by the SCC in CCH). Abella J 
pointed out that
Nowhere in CCH did the Court suggest that the lawyer 
had to ‘request’ the photocopies of legal works from 
the Great Library before those copies could be said to 
be for the purpose of ‘research.’ On the contrary, what 
the Court found was that the copies of legal works were 
‘necessary conditions of research and thus part of the 
research process’…. Similarly, photocopies made by a 
teacher and provided to primary and secondary school 
students are an essential element in the research and 
private study undertaken by those students.168
The final way in which the Copyright Board interpreted and 
applied fair dealing in a manner inconsistent with the purpose of 
the Copyright Act, as interpreted by the SCC, is demonstrated in 
the assumptions made by the Copyright Board when evaluating the 
fairness factors; assumptions that led it to conclude that the factors 
tended to unfairness and that, as a result, the dealing was not fair. For 
instance, when evaluating the alternatives to the dealing factor, the 
Copyright Board determined that it tended to unfairness on the basis 
that there was an alternative to the dealing—namely, that educational 
institutions could “[b]uy the originals to distribute to students or to 
place in the library for consultation.”169 The assumption made by the 
Copyright Board in the context of reaching this conclusion was that 
schools could afford to purchase multiple copies of original texts to 
distribute to students. The Copyright Board stated that “[t]he fact 
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that the establishment has limited means does not seem to bar the 
recognition of this point.”170 This is a curious statement, given that 
in the previous sentence, the Copyright Board notes that this option 
(namely, purchasing the book) is, “from a practical standpoint…not 
open to the student.”171 
On the basis of this assumption, the Copyright Board was able 
to conclude that the alternatives to the dealing factor tended to 
unfairness (a conclusion that contributed to the Copyright Board’s 
ultimate conclusion that the dealing at issue was unfair). Abella J was 
highly critical of the Copyright Board’s suggestion that schools could 
“buy the original texts to distribute to each student,” describing this 
suggestion as “a demonstrably unrealistic outcome”.172 
With respect to two other factors to be considered in the fair 
dealing analysis, namely the amount of the dealing and the effect of 
the dealing on the work, the Copyright Board made assumptions, 
in the apparent absence of evidence, that led it to conclude that 
the factors tended to unfairness. In CCH, the SCC had noted that 
in assessing the amount of the dealing, “[b]oth the amount of the 
dealing and importance of the work allegedly infringed should 
be considered”.173 In applying this factor to the facts of CCH, the 
SCC noted that “[a]lthough the dealings might not be fair if a 
specific patron of the Great Library submitted numerous requests 
for multiple reported judicial decisions from the same reported 
series over a short period of time, there is no evidence that this has 
occurred.”174 In the absence of evidence, the SCC did not accept 
this finding (and as a result, concluded that this factor tended 
to fairness).
The Copyright Board, however, adopted a different approach in 
Alberta (Education). Although noting that “it seems that teachers 
generally limit themselves to reproducing relatively short excerpts 
from a work to complement the main textbook” (a result which 
should cause this factor to tend to fairness), the Copyright Board 
then stated that “[on] the other hand, in our view, it is more than 
likely that class sets will be subject to ‘numerous requests for…the 
same…series’, which would tend to make the amount of the dealing 
unfair on the whole.”175 It is unclear on what evidentiary basis (if 
any) the Copyright Board reached this conclusion.176 Reaching this 
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conclusion in the absence of evidence would be inconsistent with the 
SCC’s decision in CCH, and with the purpose of the Copyright Act, 
as interpreted by the SCC. One way to ensure that copyright owners’ 
rights are not interpreted in an overbroad manner is to insist on 
evidence demonstrating the amount of the work that was used by the 
party relying on fair dealing, and, in the absence of such evidence, to 
decline to find that this factor tends to unfairness.
When analyzing the factor that addresses the effect of the dealing 
on the work, the Copyright Board also made assumptions, in the 
apparent absence of evidence, that led it to conclude that the dealing 
was unfair. As noted by the SCC in CCH, the effect of the dealing 
factor looks at whether the “reproduced work is likely to compete 
with the market of the original work”.177 If so, “this may suggest that 
the dealing is not fair”.178 Applying this factor to the facts of CCH, on 
the basis that “no evidence was tendered to show…that the publishers’ 
markets had been negatively affected by the Law Society’s custom 
photocopying service”,179 the SCC refused to find that “the market 
for the publishers’ works had decreased as a result of [the copies in 
question] having been made”.180 
The Copyright Board, however, in its decision in Alberta 
(Education), accepted the “uncontradicted evidence from textbook 
publishers…that textbook sales have shrunk by more than 30 per 
cent in 20 years”, noted that “[s]everal factors contributed to this 
decline, including the adoption of semester teaching, decrease in 
registrations, longer lifespan of textbooks, use of the Internet and 
other electronic tools, resource-based learning and use of class 
sets”,181 and, despite the fact that they were “not able to determine 
precisely to what extent each factor [described above] contributed 
to this decline”,182 concluded that “the impact of photocopies…is 
sufficiently important to compete with the original to an extent that 
makes the dealing unfair”.183 To paraphrase the SCC judgment in 
CCH, although “no evidence was tendered to show that the market 
for the publishers’ works had decreased as a result of these copies 
having been made”,184 the Copyright Board still “conclude[d] that 
photocopies made on a teacher’s initiative for his or her students have 
an unfair effect on the works in Access Copyright’s repertoire.”185 
Referring to the lack of evidence on this point as an “evidentiary 
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vacuum”,186 Abella J criticized the Copyright Board’s conclusion that 
the photocopies had a sufficiently detrimental impact on the original 
to make this factor tend to unfairness, pointing out that “other than 
the bald fact of a decline in sales over 20 years, there is no evidence 
from Access Copyright demonstrating any link between photocopying 
short excerpts and the decline in textbook sales”.187 
In reaching its conclusion in the absence of such evidence, 
the Copyright Board adopted an approach to fair dealing that is 
inconsistent with the purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted 
by the SCC. This purpose requires a large and liberal interpretation 
to be given to users’ rights, and for courts and the Copyright Board 
to ensure that the rights of copyright owners are not overprotected. 
One way through which these outcomes can be achieved is to insist—
before concluding that the factor addressing the effect of the dealing 
on the work tends to unfairness—on evidence either linking the 
dealing with negative economic consequences for the work or works 
in question, or establishing that the dealing resulted in negative 
economic consequences.
In the above analysis, I have suggested that the approach to 
copyright adopted by the Copyright Board is inconsistent with the 
purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted by the SCC. Although 
the Copyright Board framed its decision within the language of CCH 
(in which the SCC continued the process of articulating the modern 
understanding of the purpose of the Copyright Act as promoting an 
instrumental–public interest approach to copyright), its decision was 
shaped by its view that the outcome must “conform with” article 9(2) 
of the Berne Convention and article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement.188 
These two articles emphasize the ability of the copyright owner to 
control and to profit from the use of his or her works. While they 
contemplate (and accept) that there may be some limitations and 
exceptions to owners’ exclusive rights, these exceptions are limited. 
Such an approach, as described above, is inconsistent with the 
purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted by the SCC, through 
which both copyright and user’s rights work in concert to advance 
the public interest by contributing to the development of a vibrant 
public domain, and in which users’ rights are given a large and liberal 
interpretation. Instead, the approach adopted by the Copyright Board 
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is more consistent with the author-centric approach to copyright, an 
approach that was explicitly rejected by the SCC in the pentalogy. 
Under this approach, exceptions and limitations to copyright 
infringement are narrowly interpreted in order to maximize the 
rewards given to (and protection offered to) authors and copyright 
owners. 
As a result of its adoption of an approach to fair dealing that is 
inconsistent with the purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted by 
the SCC, the Copyright Board reached an outcome that fell outside of 
the range of possible, acceptable outcomes (as defined by the SCC). 
While some commentators question whether reviewing courts should 
have the final say on determining the range of possible, acceptable 
outcomes, such an approach, as outlined above, is consistent with SCC 
and appellate jurisprudence both in Dunsmuir and post-Dunsmuir. 
Thus, the conclusion reached by Abella J—that the Copyright Board’s 
decision is unreasonable—can be seen as defensible under the 
approach to the reasonableness analysis adopted in authorities such as 
Dunsmuir, CHRC, Celgene, HRM, and Toronto Police Services Board.189 
iii: significance of Alberta (Education) 
What, then, is the significance of Alberta (Education)? What does 
this decision portend for fair dealing, for the future of the Copyright 
Board, and for Canadian copyright law more generally? With respect 
to fair dealing, Alberta (Education) suggests that fair dealing is no 
longer merely “a matter of impression”.190 Rather, it is rooted in and 
shaped by the purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted by the 
SCC—namely, to contribute to the development of a robust public 
domain. This purpose requires a broad interpretation to be given to 
fair dealing. 
One question that flows from this conclusion involves the nature 
of the fairness analysis. Rothstein J’s dissenting reasons in Alberta 
(Education) can be seen as being grounded in an assumption that 
“fairness” is a discretionary concept, one that is open-ended and 
capable of multiple interpretations. In Rothstein J’s view, the Copyright 
Board ought to be given wide latitude to apply the fairness factors 
to the facts of a specific dispute as it sees fit.191 Such an approach is 
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suggested in cases like Hubbard, cited with approval in CCH as well 
as other Canadian copyright decisions.192 If Rothstein J is correct, and 
if fairness is an open-ended, discretionary concept, then there would 
be little scope for appellate review when applying the reasonableness 
standard.
However, one conclusion that we can draw from Alberta 
(Education) is that fairness (and fair dealing more generally) is not as 
discretionary a concept as it appears to be (and as previous decisions, 
including CCH, have suggested it to be). From CCH, we know that 
the fair dealing categories are to be applied in a large and liberal 
manner.193 Abella J’s reasons in Alberta (Education), read alongside 
Bell, suggest that courts and the Copyright Board must also apply 
fairness in a large and liberal manner.
In Bell, Abella J affirmed the importance of fairness both to fair 
dealing and to the purpose of the Copyright Act. As stated by Abella 
J, the fairness analysis is the part of the fair dealing test in which the 
“analytical heavy-hitting is done in determining whether the dealing 
was fair.”194 It is the core of fair dealing. As such, it plays a particularly 
important role in “balanc[ing] between protection and access.”195 
Consequently, it must not be interpreted restrictively. Abella J’s 
reasons for judgment in Alberta (Education), in which she adopted a 
large and liberal approach to fairness, can thus be seen as the logical 
extension of—and an application of—her reasons in Bell.
The Copyright Board failed to apply a large and liberal approach 
when evaluating fairness. Instead, it adopted a narrow, restrictive 
interpretation of fairness (and fair dealing more generally). In so 
doing, the Copyright Board adopted an interpretation of fair dealing 
that was inconsistent with the purpose of the Copyright Act, as 
interpreted by the SCC. This led it to arrive at an outcome that fell 
outside of the range of possible, acceptable outcomes.
If, following Bell and Alberta (Education), fairness is now 
considered to be rooted in and shaped by the purpose of the Copyright 
Act, as opposed to being an open-ended, discretionary concept, 
might the fairness analysis itself have to be modified to reflect this 
shift? Is the list of factors outlined in CCH still a “useful analytical 
framework to govern determinations of fairness”, as McLachlin CJ 
referred to it?196 Should this “structured approach” be reformed to 
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take into account the importance of fairness to fair dealing and to 
the purpose of the Copyright Act, as articulated by Abella J in Bell? If 
so, how might the fairness analysis be reformed? Should some factors 
dominate or have greater weight than others? Are some factors now 
irrelevant? Or, instead of modifying the “structured approach”, ought 
it be abandoned entirely in favour of a new approach to determining 
fairness (such as a proportionality analysis)? It remains to be seen 
how these questions, which are beyond the scope of this chapter to 
address, will play out in future jurisprudence.197
With respect to the future of the Copyright Board and its impact 
on copyright policy, Alberta (Education) is authority for the principle 
that reviewing courts can challenge decisions of the Copyright Board 
on the basis that the Copyright Board applied the Copyright Act in 
a manner that was inconsistent with the purpose of copyright, as 
interpreted by the SCC. Post-Alberta (Education), failure to apply the 
Copyright Act in a manner consistent with the purpose of copyright—
as interpreted by the SCC in cases such as Théberge, CCH, Bell, and 
Alberta (Education)—can lead to the Copyright Board’s decision 
being overturned by reviewing courts. 
This is not to say, however, that Abella J is dismissive of the ability 
of the Copyright Board to play a positive role in the development 
of Canadian copyright law. Based on her concurring reasons in 
Rogers, it appears that Abella J sees the Copyright Board as playing 
an important role in this process. Respectful of the Copyright Board’s 
expertise, Abella J would be prepared to defer to its judgments, even 
with respect to questions of law. 
Nevertheless, in Alberta (Education), Abella J emphasized that in 
interpreting and applying the Copyright Act, the Copyright Board must 
do so in a manner that is consistent with the purpose of the Copyright 
Act, as interpreted by the SCC. This approach—sitting uneasily with 
the idea of “deference as respect”198—is consistent with what Sheila 
Wildeman refers to as an “[attitude] of judicial supremacy” through 
which reviewing courts “[set] strict limits of legality within which 
administrative reasoning is closely hedged”.199
Seen through this lens, Abella J’s reasons in Alberta (Education) 
are consistent with her concurring reasons in Rogers. In Rogers, Abella 
J advocated for a deferential approach to be taken to decisions made 
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by the Copyright Board while maintaining, in Alberta (Education), 
that it is the role of the Court to set the limits of legality within which 
the Copyright Board may reason, and while setting those limits 
more narrowly than Rothstein J thinks is acceptable (based on his 
dissenting reasons in Alberta (Education)). 
The end result is that post-Alberta (Education), the Copyright 
Board is significantly constrained in its ability to shape Canadian 
copyright law. Abella J’s reasons for judgment in Alberta (Education) 
clarify that the Copyright Board does not have unlimited discretion 
under fairness (and fair dealing more broadly) to implement policy 
goals or promote values that are inconsistent with the purpose of the 
Copyright Act, as interpreted by the SCC.
It can be argued that Canadian copyright law and policy may 
suffer as a result of this outcome. If the Copyright Board does have 
“specialized expertise”, and if it does “[play] an important role in 
achieving the proper balance between [owners and users]”,200 then 
it could perhaps have offered interpretations of the purpose of the 
Copyright Act different from those set out by the SCC, contributing 
to the “wider constitutional project…of public justification…
shared among the legislative, judicial, and executive/administrative 
branches.”201 Wildeman refers to this “model of constitutional 
ordering” as “‘constitutional pluralism’, wherein all three branches of 
government participate in working out the significance of the legal 
norms governing the exercise of state power”.202 The ability of the 
Copyright Board to contribute to this project, in the context of the 
Copyright Act, is limited by Alberta (Education). 
Alberta (Education), however, will not necessarily lead to the 
marginalization of the Copyright Board, an institution described 
by Canadian academics as playing “a crucial but underappreciated 
role in shaping Canadian copyright policy”203 and a “pivotal role in 
balancing the seesaw of interests in Canada’s copyright playground”.204 
Instead, Alberta (Education) can serve as the starting point for a new 
era in the history of the Copyright Board and in the development of 
Canadian copyright policy. If the Copyright Board responds to the 
SCC’s decision in Alberta (Education) by wholeheartedly embracing 
the purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted by the SCC, it can 
become what Abella J envisions based on her judgments in Rogers 
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and Alberta (Education)—a body that truly plays an important role 
in contributing to Canadian copyright policy by advancing the public 
interest in matters of copyright: that fairly rewards copyright owners; 
increases and facilitates access to works; and ultimately contributes to 
the development of a vibrant public domain. If the Copyright Board 
does not seize this opportunity, however, and continues to apply an 
approach to copyright that is inconsistent with the purpose of the 
Copyright Act as interpreted by the SCC, then Abella J’s reasons for 
judgment in Alberta (Education) provide reviewing courts with the 
framework through which they can—defensibly and in a manner 
consistent with prior jurisprudence—overturn the decisions of the 
Copyright Board on the basis that they are unreasonable. 
The story of the pentalogy with respect to judicial review of 
Copyright Board decisions is thus not a story about inconsistency 
and the inadvertent application of an incorrect standard of review. 
It is instead a story about the continuing evolution of the SCC’s 
interpretation of the purpose of the Copyright Act—from rewarding 
and protecting authors and copyright owners, to contributing to the 
development of a robust public domain—a process that originated in 
Théberge, was advanced in CCH, and was articulated most recently in 
the pentalogy; of the fairness analysis and its shift from a discretionary, 
open-ended concept to one that is rooted in and shaped by the 
purpose of the Copyright Act; and of the tension between the SCC 
and the Copyright Board with respect to the proper interpretation of 
the purpose of the Copyright Act. 
It is a story that points to two possible futures: one of continued 
tension between the SCC and the Copyright Board, and one in 
which both institutions work together toward a common purpose. 
Ultimately, it is up to the Copyright Board to write the epilogue to 
the story of the Canadian copyright pentalogy; to determine—based 
on whether it chooses to interpret the Copyright Act in a manner 
consistent with the purpose of the Copyright Act, as interpreted by 
the SCC—the future it wishes for itself.205
©
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Courts and Copyright: 
Some Thoughts on Standard of Review1
paul daly
A series of interesting questions was raised in the pentalogy of 
copyright cases decided by the Supreme Court of Canada (the Court) 
in July 2012. Are additional royalties payable when a video game is 
downloaded rather than bought over the counter?2 Is streaming a 
communication to the public that requires payment to the copyright 
holder?3 When a consumer listens to a preview of a song on iTunes, 
is Apple on the hook for an extra royalty?4 How much copying can a 
teacher do to create course materials for students?5 And is a movie 
soundtrack to be treated as a whole or a collection of components?6 
Amidst all this, the Court found time to introduce an innovation 
in administrative law doctrine that, regrettably, is likely to cause 
significant confusion for lower courts. In this chapter, I explain this 
innovation and outline the reasons to consider it a regrettable one. My 
primary focus is thus relatively narrow, confined to technical questions 
of administrative law. However, I adopt a broader lens toward the 
end of this chapter and suggest that Canadian courts ought to be 
more willing to accord deference to the decisions of the Copyright 
Board. I then conclude with some thoughts on the application of the 
general principles of administrative law in one of the other cases in 
2
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the pentalogy. The serious disagreement between the majority and 
minority judges in that case casts light on an important issue in 
administrative law: the characterization of administrative decisions.7
an innovation
As is well known, the Court held in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick8 that 
there are two standards of review: reasonableness and correctness.9 
Subsequently, the Court has made clear that there are certain 
categories of decision to which the two standards apply, as follows: (1) 
correctness for constitutional questions, resolutions of jurisdictional 
overlaps, true questions of jurisdiction, and questions of general law 
of central importance to the legal system, and (2) reasonableness for 
interpretations of a decision maker’s home statute, issues where law 
and fact are intertwined, and policy-making decisions.10 
In the Copyright Cases, the Court was reviewing decisions of the 
Copyright Board, the expert tribunal established under the Copyright 
Act (the Act)11 to set tariffs for the use of copyrighted material. The 
jurisdiction to impose tariffs is found in ss. 67 and 68 of the Act, while 
in Part I, the contours of copyright are traced; these were of central 
importance in the pentalogy.12 Within the post-Dunsmuir framework, 
the Act is clearly the home statute of the Copyright Board, and should 
be presumptively entitled to deference (i.e. review on a standard of 
reasonableness rather than correctness).
Instead, the Court introduced an exception to the framework. In 
Rogers,13 the Court explained that the appropriate standard of review 
was correctness, because the Copyright Board shares jurisdiction 
with the Trial Division of the Federal Court. Here, the Copyright 
Board had imposed additional tariffs on online music services on the 
basis that the streaming of music constituted a communication “to 
the public” under s 3(1)(f) of the Act.14
However, pursuant to s 37 of the Act, the Federal Court “has 
concurrent jurisdiction with provincial courts to hear and determine 
all proceedings…for the enforcement of a provision of this Act or 
of the civil remedies provided by this Act.” It is thus possible for an 
action to be brought to enforce a copyright in the Federal Court, 
which would require it to determine the boundaries of the copyright 
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in question. But part of the Copyright Board’s role in setting tariffs is 
to make precisely the same determination: after all, no tariff can be 
imposed in respect of material that cannot be copyrighted.15 Questions 
can arise, then, about the interpretation of Part I of the Act, where the 
contours of copyright are traced, before both the Federal Court and 
the Copyright Board.
For a majority of the Court, Rothstein J suggested that in these 
circumstances, according deference to the Copyright Board could 
lead to inconsistency.16 If the Federal Court were to answer a question 
of law in its determination of whether a copyright infringement 
had occurred, no deference would be owed, and in any appeal to 
the Federal Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, the standard 
of review would be correctness.17 But if deference were paid to the 
Copyright Board in interpreting its home statute, the exact same 
question might be reviewable on a standard of reasonableness by the 
Federal Court, the Federal Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. 
From this, Rothstein J inferred that Parliament could not have 
intended deference to be paid to the Copyright Board’s determinations 
of questions of law arising under the Act:
It would be inconsistent for the court to review a legal 
question on judicial review of a decision of the Board 
on a deferential standard and decide exactly the same 
legal question de novo if it arose in an infringement 
action in the court at first instance. It would be equally 
inconsistent if on appeal from a judicial review, the 
appeal court were to approach a legal question decided 
by the Board on a deferential standard, but adopt a 
correctness standard on an appeal from a decision of 
a court at first instance on the same legal question. 
Because of the unusual statutory scheme under which 
the Board and the court may each have to consider 
the same legal question at first instance, it must be 
inferred that the legislative intent was not to recognize 
superior expertise of the Board relative to the court 
with respect to such legal questions. This concurrent 
jurisdiction of the Board and the court at first instance 
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in interpreting the Copyright Act rebuts the presumption 
of reasonableness review of the Board’s decisions on 
questions of law under its home statute….18
Rothstein J’s argument can be pared down to this point: 
Parliament could not have intended to allow divergent approaches to 
the interpretation of copyright. Therefore, it must be inferred that the 
appropriate standard of review is correctness. Interpreting copyright 
must remain a matter for the courts, consistent with the intention 
of Parliament.19
legislative intent
In a strong set of concurring reasons, Abella J confessed that it was not 
“obvious to [her] why shared jurisdiction should be seen to displace 
Parliament’s attributed intention that a tribunal’s specialized expertise 
entitles it to be reviewed with restraint.”20 On this view, Parliament 
vested broad authority in the Copyright Board as an expert forum 
for the resolution of complex questions about the scope of copyright 
and its protections; resolutions in which interested parties could 
participate.21
One could suggest various reasons for the shared jurisdiction 
between the Federal Court and Copyright Board. Concerns may have 
been felt about whether fully ousting Federal Court jurisdiction over 
copyright was consistent with s 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867. Or 
it may have been thought prudent to incentivize central enforcement 
of copyrights in the Federal Court rather than allowing divergent 
approaches in the provinces.22
But in the end, all such speculation is beside the point, for in 
reality there is no “ghost in the machine”.23 Courts do not attempt to 
divine legislative intent in a literal sense.24 Rather, in following the 
“polar star” of legislative intent,25 it is necessary for courts to pay heed 
to the language, context and subject matter of statutory provisions and 
their purposes and consequences.26 In Rogers, however, Rothstein J’s 
inference as to legislative intent was dubious. If there was a legislative 
intent that issues arising under the Act should be within the purview 
of the courts, an appeal could have been provided for. Traditionally, 
this is the sort of indicator that Canadian courts have looked for.27 
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Indeed, the courts have “usually viewed the lack of a right of appeal 
in the Copyright Act as a factor favouring deference to the Board.”28 
Inserting such a clause would have been straightforward: 
Parliament could simply have provided that there would be an appeal 
to the Federal Court from the Copyright Board on any question of 
law concerning the interpretation of the Act. The failure to do so is a 
strong indicator that Parliament intended the Copyright Board, not 
the courts, to be the primary decision maker in copyright matters, 
subject to deferential review. Should deference to the Copyright 
Board prove unappealing as a matter of general policy, it would be 
open to Parliament to amend the Act to introduce an appeal clause.
a strange Reading of Dunsmuir
In Dunsmuir, the Court was clear that its goal was to simplify and 
clarify the general principles of judicial review, to find “solutions that 
provide real guidance.”29 One would think that Dunsmuir would be 
best interpreted with these overarching purposes in mind. However, 
the majority decision in Rogers provides another example from the 
2011–2012 term of the Court departing from the spirit of Dunsmuir.30 
It cannot be said that developing an exception to what has gradually 
become a settled judicial review framework assists in clarifying and 
simplifying the law. A strange reading of Dunsmuir was thus necessary.
In justifying his conclusion that a standard of review of 
correctness ought to apply to the Copyright Board’s determinations 
of the contours of copyright, Rothstein J relied on the fact that shared 
jurisdiction meant the Copyright Board was no longer operating in a 
discrete and specialized administrative regime. As a result, 
This is consistent with Dunsmuir, which directed that 
“[a] discrete and special administrative regime in which 
the decision maker has special expertise” was a “facto[r 
that] will lead to the conclusion that the decision maker 
should be given deference and a reasonableness test 
applied” (para. 55). Because of the jurisdiction at first 
instance that it shares with the courts, the Board cannot 
be said to operate in such a “discrete…administrative 
regime.”31 
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This language comes directly from Dunsmuir. But in Dunsmuir, 
discreteness was only one factor that could lead to a finding that a 
reasonableness standard ought to be applied. Here is the full paragraph 
from which Rothstein J extracted the factor:
A consideration of the following factors will lead to the 
conclusion that the decision maker should be given 
deference and a reasonableness test applied: 
— A privative clause: this is a statutory direction from 
Parliament or a legislature indicating the need for 
deference.
— A discrete and special administrative regime in 
which the decision maker has special expertise (labour 
relations for instance).
— The nature of the question of law. A question of law 
that is of “central importance to the legal system…
and outside the…specialized area of expertise” of the 
administrative decision maker will always attract a 
correctness standard. On the other hand, a question of 
law that does not rise to this level may be compatible 
with a reasonableness standard where the two above 
factors so indicate.32
To pluck one factor from one paragraph in a decision that aimed 
to simplify and clarify judicial review is a strange way of justifying 
the new shared jurisdiction exception. The exception is, as Abella J 
pointed out, “not even hinted at in Dunsmuir.”33 
The potential for confusion is obvious. The new exception can 
only complicate judicial review. Rothstein J seemed to suggest that the 
exception will apply only to intellectual property regimes34 and Abella 
J predicted a change in the trademarks field.35 But whatever the Court 
says about the scope of the new shared jurisdiction exception, it will 
inevitably have ramifications in the lower courts. For the logic of 
the Court’s approach extends far beyond the territory of intellectual 
property and into other domains regulated by the general principles 
of administrative law.
Clever counsel will undoubtedly argue before provincial and 
federal courts that the existence of a private right of action negates 
PAUL DALY   |   53
the deference owed to interpretations of a home statute. After all, 
in an action, a provincial superior court or the Trial Division of the 
Federal Court will be called upon to answer any questions of law 
arising, potentially the same questions addressed by the relevant 
administrative body in its regulatory functions. 
There are some obvious examples. As with the Copyright Act, 
the Competition Act36 creates a private right of action. Section 36(1) 
provides as follows:
Any person who has suffered loss or damage as a result 
of
(a) conduct that is contrary to any provision of Part VI, 
or
(b) the failure of any person to comply with an order of 
the Tribunal or another court under this Act, may, in 
any court of competent jurisdiction, sue for and recover 
from the person who engaged in the conduct or failed 
to comply with the order an amount equal to the loss or 
damage proved to have been suffered by him, together 
with any additional amount that the court may allow 
not exceeding the full cost to him of any investigation 
in connection with the matter and of proceedings under 
this section.
 Section 36(3) makes the Federal Court a “court of competent 
jurisdiction” for the hearing of such actions. Meanwhile, s 7(1)
(a) of the Competition Act makes clear that its “administration and 
enforcement” falls within the purview of the Commissioner of 
Competition. 
Although the Court has previously held that deference is owed 
to the bodies administering the Competition Act,37 this conclusion 
sits very uneasily with the shared jurisdiction exception developed 
in Rogers. A private right of action and an administrative body 
co-exist; jurisdiction is thus shared between courts and regulators. 
Rogers teaches that, in such situations, no deference is owed to 
administrative interpretations of law. The existence of conflicting 
decisions is unnecessary, because the mere potential for inconsistency 
is the trigger for the new shared jurisdiction exception.
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Securities legislation in the provinces may also fall within the 
shared jurisdiction exception. While the Ontario Securities 
Commission is “responsible for the administration” of the Securities 
Act,38 and is owed deference,39 Parts XXIII and XXIII.1 create 
civil remedies actionable in the Superior Court of Justice. Clearly, 
interpreting the provisions of the Securities Act is central both to the 
work of the Ontario Securities Commission and to that of the Superior 
Court. Jurisdiction is shared. Following Rogers, any questions of law 
that could arise before the Ontario Securities Commission or the 
Superior Court would be subject to review on a standard of correctness.
Beyond these two examples, counsel for the applicant in future 
judicial review cases will doubtless closely parse the statute book in 
order to identify areas of shared jurisdiction. 
Creative counsel might even argue that public law duties that can 
ground actions against public bodies in negligence also create shared 
jurisdiction. In determining whether an action lies against a public 
body in negligence, a provincial superior court must of necessity 
trace the contours of the public body’s duties;40 in order to accomplish 
this task, the body’s home statute will have to be interpreted. On the 
logic exhibited in Rogers, the mere potential for shared jurisdiction 
is what matters. Could it not be said, then, that the possibility of 
actions against a public body in negligence would require review on 
a standard of correctness? To so argue would be to stretch the Rogers 
logic very far indeed. If, in principle, the availability of actions in 
negligence would always justify a standard of review of correctness, 
deference could be completely gutted. This cannot be what Rothstein 
J intended. But the very availability of the argument is evidence that 
the approach taken in Rogers will complicate rather than simplify and 
clarify the general principles of judicial review.
embracing Pluralism: Multiple interpretations
One can appreciate Rothstein J’s concern with the potential for 
conflicting interpretations. Certainly, anomalous outcomes may 
result from the shared jurisdiction of the Federal Court and the 
Copyright Board.
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However, as Abella J responded, deference has always been “based 
on the idea that multiple valid interpretations of a statutory provision 
were inevitable, and ought not to be disturbed unless the tribunal’s 
decision was not rationally supported.”41 From the earliest days of the 
Court’s deferential approach, this has been a key idea.42
The philosopher Chaim Perelman put the point eloquently:
In fact, we admit that two reasonable and honest men 
can disagree on a determined question and thus judge 
differently. The situation is even considered so normal, 
both in legislative assemblies and in tribunals that have 
several judges, that decisions made unanimously are 
esteemed exceptional; and it is normal, moreover, to 
provide for procedures permitting the reaching of a 
decision even when opposing opinions persist.43
Admitting divergent outcomes is the sine qua non of deference. 
Quailing at the prospect contrasts starkly with the Court’s comfort 
with determining whether a particular result “falls within a range of 
possible outcomes.”44 
Even allowing that the potential for the sorts of divergent result 
identified by Rothstein J requires a solution, it is not clear that 
reserving questions of law to the courts is the appropriate one. Other 
solutions are available. 
First, Rothstein J could have placed faith in the paramountcy-
type analysis employed in British Columbia Telephone Co. v Shaw Cable 
Systems (B.C.) Ltd.45 There, contradictory decisions were reached by 
administrative bodies: compliance with one would have been defiance 
of the other.46 The Court resolved the conflict by reference to legislative 
intent. It essentially asked, based on the statutory provisions in question, 
which tribunal the legislature would have intended to have the last 
word in a situation of conflict. Here, the telecommunication regulator’s 
decision, “being an expression of the broad policy-making role accorded 
to it by Parliament, should take precedence over the decision of the 
labour arbitration board to the extent of the inconsistency.”47 In the 
Rogers scenario, the Court could simply have kicked the problem down 
the road. If and when contradictory decisions were issued, a reviewing 
court could determine which ought to prevail. 
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Second, the Court could simply have trusted in the ability of the 
Federal Court and Copyright Board to work out any problems between 
themselves. To put it starkly, the Federal Court would need a very good 
reason to depart from a decision of the Copyright Board and vice versa. 
Discretion would be the better part of valour. Moreover, if the Federal 
Court departed without adequate justification from a decision of the 
Copyright Board, the Federal Court of Appeal could, if necessary, correct 
it. If the Copyright Board departed without adequate justification from 
a decision of the Federal Court, its decision would be unreasonable.48
These two alternative solutions might excite opposition, but they 
would surely have been preferable to the development of an exception 
to the Dunsmuir framework, which is likely to complicate the law of 
judicial review.49 Moreover, the shared jurisdiction exception requires 
an interventionist standard of review where deference would otherwise 
be appropriate. Deference will be undermined by the new exception, 
and the legislative purpose of creating specialized administrative bodies 
will be subverted. Indeed, given the potential that the new shared 
jurisdiction exception has to undermine the framework of deference, 
I hope that future courts will use these alternative approaches to deal 
with inconsistency if and when it arises, thereby confining the Rogers 
exception to the intellectual property field.
Deference to the Copyright Board
Taking a step back and viewing the Rogers decision more broadly, 
the refusal to accord deference to the Copyright Board is most 
unfortunate. There is certainly a “long history” of judicial, rather than 
administrative, interpretation of the scope of copyright.50 Pedigree, 
however, is no reason to ignore principle, especially given that the 
Copyright Cases represented the Court’s first major post-Dunsmuir 
foray into intellectual property law. 
As Abella J explained, the Copyright Board is undoubtedly an 
expert body, to which decision-making authority had been delegated, 
and therefore deference was appropriate:
The Board has highly specialized knowledge about the 
media technologies used to create and disseminate 
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copyrighted works, such as the Internet, digital radio, 
satellite communications, as well as related economic 
issues…. This specialized knowledge is precisely the kind 
of institutional expertise that Dunsmuir concluded was 
entitled to deference.51
One might suggest that the Copyright Board’s expertise lies 
solely in the area of rate setting, not in defining the scope of 
copyright. This seems too narrow an approach. One would be wise 
to recall Abella J’s previous admonition: “If every provision of a 
tribunal’s enabling legislation were treated as if it had jurisdictional 
consequences that permitted a court to substitute its own view of the 
correct interpretation, a tribunal’s role would be effectively reduced to 
fact-finding.”52 No distinction between rate setting and law interpreting 
is made in the Act; again, providing an appeal, in order to segment 
these two questions, would not have been difficult. Indeed, the fact 
that the Chair of the Copyright Board must be a judge53 casts doubt on 
the plausibility of a segmentation of legal and economic questions.54 
While the other members need not have legal training, their regular 
exposure to the relevant legal principles and, crucially, their regular 
application of these principles in concrete contexts allows them 
to accrue significant expertise. Accordingly, the Copyright Board 
should not be treated as solely a technocratic body to be trusted only 
with complex economic questions and not broader questions of law 
and policy. 
More generally, the Copyright Board is the body that is best 
positioned to identify and develop the underlying principles of the 
Act. It deals with tariff applications and various issues pertaining to 
the contours of copyright on a regular basis. All interested parties can 
participate before the Copyright Board and submit their respective 
points of view in a deliberative forum.55 By contrast, the Court is only 
an occasional actor on the copyright stage. A similar justification for 
deference was advanced by Dickson J (as he then was) in his seminal 
set of reasons in Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 963 v 
New Brunswick Liquor Corporation:
The rationale for protection of a labour board’s 
decisions within jurisdiction is straightforward and 
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compelling. The labour board is a specialized tribunal 
which administers a comprehensive statute regulating 
labour relations. In the administration of that regime, 
a board is called upon not only to find facts and decide 
questions of law, but also to exercise its understanding 
of the body of jurisprudence that has developed around 
the collective bargaining system, as understood in 
Canada, and its labour relations sense acquired from 
accumulated experience in the area.56
For example, while there is doubtless much to be said for 
the Court’s recognition in the Copyright Cases of a principle of 
“technological neutrality”,57 there is much more to be said for leaving 
the identification, development and application of such principles 
to the Copyright Board. Once the Court has spoken on a question 
of law, the principles it announces are set in stone. If, say, major 
technological advances unforeseen by the Court render the principle 
of technological neutrality inappropriate, it will ultimately require 
an appeal to the Court to resolve the situation. Take, for example, 
Canadian judges’ treatment of fair dealing before the Court’s decision 
in CCH Canadian Ltd. v Law Society of Upper Canada:58 “For a long 
time, the Canadian approach to fair dealing was one of single-minded 
reliance upon specific rules, together with a distinct unwillingness 
to consider the purpose of fair dealing within the larger policy aims 
of copyright law.”59 It may be true that the Court’s decision in CCH 
revitalized fair dealing,60 but had the development of fair dealing been 
entrusted to the Copyright Board, a long period of stagnation might 
have been avoided.
If legal principles were developed by the Copyright Board in 
the first place, subject to deferential review, the principles could be 
modified or even jettisoned as conditions demanded it.61 Allowing the 
Court to review interpretations of the Copyright Board on a standard 
of correctness has the unfortunate potential to ossify the law. Far 
better to allow the various parties affected by the Copyright Board’s 
determinations to fight for their preferred interpretations in the forum 
provided for by Parliament. Instead, the Court seems to see itself as 
perched on the apex of the judicial hierarchy, reluctant to cede its 
position to an expert body that is better placed to answer polycentric 
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copyright questions and receive input from interested parties.62 Yet the 
Court does not, in short, have the copyright on wisdom in this field.
Deference in application: The Problem of Characterization
For all of Abella J’s ornate words about deference in Rogers, one 
could be forgiven for questioning just how deferential she was to the 
Copyright Board in the Alberta (Education) case. Two general points 
emerge from a consideration of the sharp disagreement between the 
majority and dissenting reasons. First, when it comes to deference 
to administrative decision makers, judicial acts matter as much as 
words. Second, the characterization of administrative decisions by 
reviewing courts plays an important role in determining whether the 
decisions will ultimately be upheld.
In Alberta (Education), the issue was whether photocopies 
made by teachers in order to distribute them to students as part of 
classroom instruction could qualify as fair dealing.63 On foot of a 
dispute between Access Copyright and its provincial and territorial 
partners about the extent of copying being done pursuant to their 
agreements, a quantitative study was conducted. The particular issue 
that emerged and wended its way to the Court was whether copies 
made on the initiative of teachers with a subsequent instruction to 
students to read the materials constituted fair dealing.64
The Copyright Board concluded that the copying was for an 
allowable purpose, but that, on application of the “fairness factors” 
laid out previously by the Court in CCH,65 the copying had been done 
in an unfair manner. The argument before the Court was entirely 
about the application of the fairness factors. There was no general 
question of legal interpretation. Accordingly, the parties agreed that 
the appropriate standard of review was reasonableness. I should sound 
a note of caution before describing the decision: the justices agreed 
among themselves neither about the way to conduct a deferential 
review nor about the way to characterize the impugned decision.
Abella J, writing for a five-member majority, noted four problems 
with the Copyright Board’s approach. First—indeed, the “key 
problem”66—the Copyright Board had misapplied the “purpose of 
the dealing factor”. According to Abella J, the Copyright Board’s error 
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was to look at the copying solely from the perspective of the teacher. 
Rather, the appropriate perspective to adopt was that of the “user”.67 
As a result, the Copyright Board drove an “artificial wedge” between 
the initiative of the teacher and the initiative of the student.68 It also 
“artificially” separated study in the classroom among one’s peers from 
study on one’s own.69 
Second, the Copyright Board’s approach to the “amount of 
the dealing” factor was “flawed”.70 Abella J took the view that the 
Copyright Board had been wrong to say that repeated copying of a 
particular set of materials tended to make the dealing unfair. Contrary 
to the view expressed by the Copyright Board, the “amount” factor 
requires an assessment of proportionality between the copied excerpt 
and the work as a whole. It is the “character” factor that speaks to 
overall quantification of the copying. The Copyright Board had 
inappropriately “conflated the two factors”.71
Third, in its discussion of “alternatives to the dealing”, the 
Copyright Board had suggested that the schools could buy more 
hard copies of the textbooks being copied. Abella J flatly rejected this 
suggestion: “buying books for each student is not a realistic alternative 
to teachers copying short excerpts to supplement student textbooks”.72
Fourth, the Copyright Board had concluded, in its application of 
the “effect of the dealing on the work” factor, that the copying had 
caused a decline in sales of hard copies of the textbooks in question. 
However, there was simply “no evidence” to suggest a causal link 
between the copying and the decline in sales,73 an observation shared 
by Rothstein J in dissent.74
Abella J concluded that as a result of the Copyright Board’s 
“misapplication of the CCH factors”, its decision was unreasonable.75
To take up my first general point about Alberta (Education)—
deference—the overview of Abella J’s reasoning, with its reliance on 
artificial wedges, inappropriate conflation and unrealistic alternatives, 
required an intrusive review of the Copyright Board’s decision. 
While the philosophy Abella J described in Rogers is laudable, it is 
difficult to square her philosophy with her application of it in Alberta 
(Education). Unsurprisingly, Abella J’s approach provoked a sharp 
dissent from four of her colleagues, for whom Rothstein J wrote. As 
he warned, courts should be “cautious not to inadvertently slip into a 
PAUL DALY   |   61
more intrusive, correctness review”.76 In particular, the substitution of 
judgment by the Court on whether the purchase of extra books was 
an “alternative to the dealing” was problematic: there was no doubt 
that these were “relevant facts” which the Copyright Board could 
consider;77 for the Court to take a diametrically opposed view was 
simply not appropriate. Moreover, the factors identified in CCH were 
outlined as an aid to interpretation of the Act.78 As Abella J noted 
in Rogers, interpretation of its home statute is precisely the area in 
which the Copyright Board has greater expertise than a reviewing 
court. For a judicial decision that aimed to establish guidelines for the 
Copyright Board to undermine deference is most unfortunate.
In addition, Abella J’s careful slicing of the Copyright Board’s 
decision into various components cuts against her own previous 
advice not to “segment” administrative decisions.79 Rothstein J’s 
criticism is vivid and persuasive:
I do not think it is open on a deferential review, where a 
tribunal’s decision is multifactored and complex, to seize 
upon a few arguable statements or intermediate findings 
to conclude that the overall decision is unreasonable. 
This is especially the case where the issues are fact-based, 
as in the case of a fair dealing analysis.80
Administrative decisions should be viewed in the round, not 
dismantled into distinct components. The sum of the parts is what 
should count, not the parts themselves. For example, Rothstein J 
agreed that there was insufficient evidence to justify the Copyright 
Board’s conclusion on the “effect of the dealing on the work” factor. 
Nevertheless, “an unreasonable observation under this one factor” 
was insufficient to render the whole of the Copyright Board’s 
assessment unreasonable.81 A properly deferential approach, such 
as that followed by Rothstein J, would not lead a reviewing court to 
strike down a complex administrative decision on the basis of an 
isolated unreasonable finding.
To lead into my second general point about Alberta (Education)—
characterization—I should say a brief word in defence of Abella J. 
It is true, although Abella J did not make reference to the concept, 
that a failure to follow judicially developed jurisprudence can cause 
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an administrative decision maker to take an unreasonable decision.82 
However, this sort of failure does not automatically require a 
decision to be struck down as unreasonable by a reviewing court: 
attention must be paid to whether the decision nonetheless has the 
characteristics of “justification, transparency and intelligibility” and 
falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes.83 In any event, 
without having regard to this possibility, Abella J clearly took the view 
that the decision was fatally flawed
Rothstein J disagreed: he found that the Copyright Board’s 
decision was reasonable. Indeed, although he agreed with Abella J 
that the Copyright Board’s decision was, in part, unsupported by 
evidence, he did not agree that the Copyright Board had misapplied 
CCH. What is interesting, therefore, is why he disagreed. 
It seems that the disagreement arose because Abella J and 
Rothstein J adopted diametrically opposed characterizations of 
CCH and of the Copyright Board’s application of the CCH factors. 
In respect of CCH, recall that Abella J held that in the course of its 
“purpose of the dealing” analysis, the Copyright Board had inserted 
an “artificial wedge” between the purpose of the teacher and the 
purpose of the student.84 Rothstein J flatly disagreed: “the distinction 
drawn by the Board remains consistent with and reasonable in light of 
CCH”.85 Indeed, in Rothstein J’s view, the purpose of the teacher could 
not reasonably have been ignored by the Copyright Board. Abella J 
and Rothstein J, then, took very different views of the meaning of 
CCH, views that indelibly coloured their performance of the task of 
judicial review. 
In respect of the Copyright Board’s application of the CCH 
factors, a similar difference can be perceived. Recall Abella J’s 
criticism of the Copyright Board for having “conflated” the “amount” 
and “character of the dealing” factors.86 Rothstein J, however, saw no 
reason to rebuke the Copyright Board. He held that the Copyright 
Board had quite properly “remained focused” on the question of 
proportion throughout its analysis.87 Rothstein J’s characterization 
of the Copyright Board’s decision was that the Copyright Board was 
concerned about teachers returning to copy further excerpts from the 
same works they had copied from previously
There was no confusion at all between the two factors, on 
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Rothstein J’s reading of the Copyright Board’s decision. Two 
completely different views of the Copyright Board’s decision were 
taken: Abella J concluded that the Copyright Board was confused; 
Rothstein J concluded that the Copyright Board was perfectly clear. 
At its core, then, the disagreement between Abella J and Rothstein 
J was not necessarily one about the proper way for a reviewing court 
to be deferential toward an administrative decision maker. Rather, it 
was about the nature of CCH and the Copyright Board’s decision. It is 
fair to conclude that her skepticism about the quality of the impugned 
decision led Abella J to apply an intrusive standard of reasonableness. 
There is an important lesson here for administrative lawyers: 
the comparatively neglected question of characterization is an 
important one. Ultimately, its characterization by a reviewing court 
will determine to an important extent whether an administrative 
decision will survive judicial review. In circumstances of good 
faith disagreement between judges about how to characterize 
administrative decisions, it seems logical that the more deferential 
course would be to adopt the characterization that casts the decision 
in the most favourable light available. Similarly, if two reasonable 
readings of a judicial precedent are available, a reviewing court should 
not substitute its preferred reading for a reasonable one chosen by an 
administrative decision maker. Accordingly, the obligation to defer is 
not necessarily exhausted by the application of a standard of review of 
reasonableness. Even Abella J, so elegant in her defence of deferential 
review in Rogers, proved less than deferential in Alberta (Education), 
because of the manner in which she characterized the Copyright 
Board’s decision. 
Conclusion
It remains to be seen how the shared jurisdiction exception will play 
out in the lower courts. It is almost certain that applicants will attempt 
to extend Rothstein J’s logic beyond the parameters of intellectual 
property. If they succeed in doing so, deference will be undermined. It 
is hoped that the innovation will be limited to intellectual property law. 
Enough harm has been done to the autonomy of the Copyright Board. 
It would be most unfortunate if other administrative bodies were 
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to suffer collateral damage as a result of the unnecessary development 
of the new shared jurisdiction exception. Finally, however, as a 
consideration of Alberta (Education) reveals, simply applying a 
deferential approach may not be enough. Adopting an appropriately 
deferential mindset may require in addition a deferential approach to 
the characterization of administrative decisions. 
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71
The Context of the supreme Court’s 
Copyright Cases
 margaret ann wilkinson1
a. setting the stage
In the summer of 2012, the Supreme Court of Canada created history 
by simultaneously releasing five copyright judgments: Entertainment 
Software Association v Society of Composers, Authors and Music 
Publishers of Canada [ESA],2 Rogers Communications Inc. v Society 
of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada [Rogers],3 
Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Bell 
Canada [Bell],4 Alberta (Education) v Canadian Copyright Licensing 
Agency [Alberta (Education)],5 and Re:Sound v Motion Picture Theatre 
Associations of Canada [Re:Sound]. 6
This historic event reverberated in a number of domains. 
These five judgments mark the final moments before a long-
anticipated major reform in Canada’s copyright law: on 12 July 2012, 
when the five judgments were released, the Copyright Modernization 
Act had been passed by Parliament but had not been declared in force.7 
In addition to marking the end of one version of the Copyright Act, 
in the context of intellectual property development in Canada, the 
“pentalogy” instantly enormously multiplied the total jurisprudence 
from Canada’s highest court that bears on copyright. Indeed, between 
3
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the time McLachlin J became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
in 2000 and the release of the pentalogy, there had only been five 
copyright judgments from the Court:8 Théberge v Galérie d’Art du 
Petit Champlain [Théberge],9 CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of 
Upper Canada [CCH],10 Society of Composers, Authors, and Music 
Publishers of Canada v Canadian Association of Internet Providers 
[SOCAN v CAIP],11 Robertson v Thomson Corp [Robertson],12 and 
Euro-Excellence Inc. v Kraft Canada Inc. [Toblerone].13 Taken together, 
these ten cases represent a greater volume of interest from the Supreme 
Court in copyright than has been evinced at any time since it became 
Canada’s final appeal court.14 For example, in Ian Bushnell’s history 
of the Federal Court, spanning 1875 to 1992, there is mention of only 
one intellectual property case being appealed to the Supreme Court,15 
a trademark case, Benson & Hedges v St. Regis Tobacco Corporation.16 
Others did reach the Supreme Court but did not merit discussion 
in Bushnell’s history: for example, in copyright, on appeal from the 
Exchequer Court (predecessor to the Federal Court), the Supreme 
Court decided Cuisenaire v South West Imports Ltd in 1969—but 
consideration of copyright by the Supreme Court under previous 
Chief Justices has definitely been infrequent.17 One reason for this 
relative paucity of copyright cases in the Supreme Court may be the 
strong contribution to intellectual property jurisprudence between 
1964 and 1980, which is universally acknowledged as being made by 
Jackett CJ of the Federal Court.18
But, beyond the context of copyright jurisprudence, the release of 
these five copyright decisions together was a landmark in the history 
of Supreme Court jurisprudence in general. This chapter will focus on 
the historic copyright “pentalogy” but, rather than considering these 
judgments primarily in light of Canadian copyright jurisprudence—
or, indeed, in light of intellectual property jurisprudence more 
broadly—the discussion will focus on these five judgments in the 
context of Canada’s Supreme Court jurisprudence generally. 
Although scholarly attention to Canadian courts is slowly gaining 
momentum, it still lags behind the academic attention given, for 
instance, to the United States Supreme Court (USSC). A seminal 
monograph, as recently as 1985, about the Supreme Court was James 
Snell and Frederick Vaughan’s The Supreme Court of Canada: History 
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of the Institution.19 Sometime later, in 1992, Ian Bushnell published 
a second major study, The Captive Court: A Study of the Supreme 
Court of Canada, in which he analyzed the “voices” of individual 
justices as revealed in a selection of cases from the period 1876 to 
1989, selected because their reasons discussed issues concerning the 
function of the judiciary.20 A decade later, Saywell’s The Lawmakers: 
Judicial Power and the Shaping of Canadian Federalism appeared.21 
Over twenty years after Snell and Vaughan’s ground-breaking 
work, there was a flurry of academic interest in the Supreme Court 
engendered by Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s procedural changes 
in the way appointments to the Court were to be made.22 At about 
that same time, C. L. Ostberg and Matthew E. Wetstein published 
Attitudinal Decision Making in the Supreme Court of Canada,23 which 
self-consciously emulated empirical methodologies pioneered in the 
American scholarship about the USSC24 and applied them to analyze 
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada.25 This was followed by 
Donald Songer’s The Transformation of the Supreme Court of Canada: 
An Empirical Examination.26 Recently, marking the occasion of a 
decade of Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin’s leadership of the Court, 
a festschrift honouring the Chief Justice appeared in 2011: Public Law 
at the McLachlin Court: The First Decade.27 
Probably because of the relative dearth of copyright decisions 
rendered by the Supreme Court, this growing scholarship about 
the Supreme Court tends to overlook copyright decisions,28 either 
ignoring them altogether29 or incorporating them into databases 
of decisions so large that the role of the copyright jurisprudence in 
the analysis becomes insignificant. As an example of the former, 
Graham Mayeda’s recent study “Between Principle and Pragmatism: 
The Decline of Principled Reasoning in the Jurisprudence of the 
McLachlin Court”30 is based upon analysis of a set of decisions of the 
Court, none of them copyright cases.31 As mentioned, in the latter 
instance, in studies based upon quantitative methodologies, the very 
small numbers of copyright decisions will render their influence on 
the results negligible. Peter McCormick’s work, as an example, draws 
upon a database “initially created in the mid-1990s to cover Supreme 
Court of Canada decisions since 1949 [and]… kept up to date on a 
personal and voluntary basis.”32 While, in addition to his quantitative 
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work, McCormick’s analysis also includes discussion of a good number 
of specific cases, none of them is a copyright case. Donald Songer and 
Julia Siripurapu, on the other hand, rely solely on quantitative analysis 
in their study and, consequently, make no reference to individual 
decisions, copyright or otherwise.33 Nonetheless, their analysis, using 
data from 1970 up to and including 2002, would have included the 
Théberge decision34—however, it represents but a tiny fraction of 
the 1,639 cases comprising the “N” in Table 1 of their analysis.35 In 
Songer’s earlier monograph based on data from the same period, the 
category “other private law”, itself a subset of the category “private 
economic law”, accounts for only 5.2 percent of the Court’s docket.36
This chapter will focus directly upon the copyright-related 
decisions of the Supreme Court since 2002, including the pentalogy, 
and establish whether they fit patterns identified in studies of the 
larger jurisprudence of the Court. 
Songer and Siripurapu studied the unanimous decisions of the 
Court between 1970 and 2003,37 concentrating particularly on the 
period 1982 to 2002 (after the passage of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms),38 complemented by interviews with ten then current or 
recent justices of the Court (and four former law clerks). 
Emmett Macfarlane39 also focused on the unanimous decisions 
of the Court, conducting twenty-eight research interviews with then 
current and retired justices, former law clerks and other staff.40
Peter McCormick focused on analysis of concurrent reasons, 
from the start of Dickson CJ’s Court (April 1984) until the end of 
December 2006.41 
Finally, Christine Joseph focused on solo dissents, examining all 
133 solo dissent judgments rendered between 1974 and 2003.42 
With respect to unanimous judgments of the Court, Songer 
and Siripurapu established that the fewer the number of separate 
legal issues raised in a case, the more likely the decision was to be 
unanimous. Emmett Macfarlane noted that previous research had 
established that the Court achieved unanimity in 63 percent of 
cases,43 and concluded from his own analysis that this relatively high 
degree of unanimity44 should “be viewed as a natural by-product of 
the institution’s norms and processes, rather than as an overt goal of 
the justices.”45
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McCormick demonstrated, through his data, that “separate 
concurrences are a regular and ongoing aspect of the work of 
the Supreme Court of Canada…[and that] all judges participate 
to a greater or lesser degree.”46 However, although he found 600 
concurrences in twenty-three years of activity at the Supreme Court, 
concurring reasons peaked in 1995–1996 and declined thereafter.47 
McCormick attributes this change to the fact that the
dynamic period of flux and change has come to an 
end…[as] most of the major questions [raised by the 
Charter] have been answered; as a result, fewer “big” 
questions are coming before the Court, and few policy-
divergent responses need to be generated to prepare the 
field within which these can be managed.48
McCormick made this observation based on the theory that “divided 
decisions demonstrate a court that is both open to a variety of 
arguments (and that therefore mollifies the losing side) and willing 
to change its mind over time (which keeps the losing side in the 
game.)”49
Christine Joseph established that the rate of solo dissents was 
rising in the Supreme Court, with solo dissents in the McLachlin 
Court (to 2003) reaching a rate of 6.3 percent of cases.50 She describes 
three categories of solo dissent: free-standing (extensive, reasoned 
arguments similar in style to the form of majority opinions), limited 
(generally shorter, focused on a specific point of divergence from 
the majority judgment) and adoptive (“brief, content-free analyses 
which reiterate the reasons from the lower court”).51 She also asked 
whether there was a relationship between the overall disagreement52 
on the Court in a particular case and the likelihood of a solo dissent 
and found that, although the McLachlin court (to 2003) had the 
highest rate of solo dissents, it also had the lowest disagreement rate 
(34 percent).53 
Joseph’s data also indicated that though the proportion of solo 
dissents rises as the size of the panel sitting moves from five justices 
to seven justices, it drops to its lowest level when all nine justices 
are sitting.54 The analysis also showed that in the five-justice panels 
and seven-justice panels, the solo dissents were most often “free-
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standing”55 dissents, while when the full Court was sitting, the solo 
dissents were most often “limited” dissents.56 
B. The Decisions
Although heard as a group and released at the same time, each 
judgment in the recent copyright pentalogy is unique and has its own 
set of characteristics. For instance, the group includes two unanimous 
judgments (Re:Sound and Bell), a decision with concurring reasons 
Rogers, and two decisions with majority judgments and minority 
reasons (ESA and Alberta (Education)). Although LeBel J wrote for 
the Court in Re:Sound, Abella J wrote for the Court in Bell. Rothstein 
J wrote for the majority in Rogers, with Abella J writing concurring 
reasons. Moldaver and Abella JJ wrote for the majority in ESA, while 
Abella J wrote alone for the majority in Alberta (Education); Rothstein 
J wrote for the minority in both Rogers, and Alberta (Education). 
While the five cases each involved copyright, the issues in each 
were quite distinct from one another and highlighted different facets 
of the copyright regime. The issue in Re:Sound was focused on the 
question of what is protected under the Copyright Act as “other subject 
matter”. Both ESA and Rogers centred upon the ambit of s.3(1)(f) of 
the Copyright Act, the rights holder’s right “to communicate the work 
to the public by telecommunication.” The Bell case, on the other hand, 
was concerned with the user’s right of “fair dealing” and the Alberta 
(Education) case was concerned with the user’s rights provided under 
the Copyright Act for “Educational Institutions” as defined by the Act.
For purposes of this analysis, then, the five cases of the pentalogy 
released in 2012 will be considered, together with five previous 
copyright judgments of the Court that dealt with the same version 
of the Copyright Act as do the pentalogy judgments.57 These latter are 
the same five mentioned at the outset as having been decided since 
McLachlin CJ has headed the Court: Théberge (2002), CCH (2004), the 
SOCAN v CAIP decision (2004), Robertson (2006), and the Toblerone 
decision (2007). In addition, this analysis will include consideration 
of one libel decision rendered in 2011 by the Supreme Court, Crookes 
v Newton [Crookes]. 58
The Crookes decision, although rendered in defamation and not a 
copyright case, is included in this analysis, in part, because it invokes 
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a concept of “context”—a concept that was raised by the majority in 
the Supreme Court’s copyright decision in Robertson.59 In Robertson, 
LeBel and Fish JJ wrote the joint majority judgment in which they 
de-emphasized a “process” analysis60 in favour of focusing on the 
“context” in which the articles written by Heather Robertson appeared 
in the various products created by the respondent Thomson. Abella 
J, writing for the dissenting justices, favoured the kind of analysis the 
Court had previously used in the SOCAN v CAIP decision. 
Consideration of the concept of “context” by the courts is not the 
only way in which the Crookes case is linked to copyright. Crookes 
focused on the question of the meaning of “publication” in an 
Internet environment—a question germane to both copyright and 
defamation. There is no statutory definition of “publish” in either the 
libel or copyright context, although the concept is relevant to both.61 
Specifically, the question before the Court in Crookes was whether 
the inclusion of a hyperlink to another website in a given website 
constituted publication by the given website of the material to which 
the link was made on the other website. 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal, in both the majority62 and 
minority63 reasons in Crookes, used the language of “context”. The 
majority agreed the following: 
If it is apparent from the context in which the hyperlink is used 
that it is being used merely as a biographical or similarly limited 
reference to an original source, without in any way actively 
encouraging or recommending to the readers that they access 
that source then…this would not amount to publication.64
Factors tending toward a finding of publication, however,
would include the prominence of the hyperlink, any words of 
invitation or recommendation to the reader associated with 
the hyperlink, the nature of the materials which it is suggested 
may be found at the hyperlink…the apparent significance of the 
hyperlink in relation to the article as a whole, and a host of other 
factors dependant upon the facts of a particular case.65
The Supreme Court released its judgment in the Crookes appeal 
in 201166 and all three sets of reasons rendered in the decision use 
language broad enough to be adopted in the context of copyright 
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publication as well as in the circumstances of this libel case itself. 
Abella J, writing the majority decision for herself and Binnie, LeBel, 
Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ, holds that hyperlink technology 
is technologically neutral and creates no more than a footnote—
which is not “publishing” the underlying content.67 McLachlin CJ and 
Fish J co-author concurring reasons in which they agree that there 
is no publication on the facts of the case before the Court but leave 
open the possibility that there could be situations in which linking 
can constitute publication. Deschamps J, writing separately and 
concurring in the result, holds that the analogy between footnotes 
and links is not helpful to the question before the Court because both 
footnotes and links may be defamatory in a given case, although not 
the one before the Court. Not one of the three sets of reasons referred 
to the Robertson decision, although both the majority reasons and 
Deschamps J’s reasons refer to the Court’s copyright decision in the 
SOCAN v CAIP case.68
It is interesting to note, in this connection, that in the Toblerone 
decision, the copyright decision that the Court made in 2007, the 
justices writing three of the four sets of reasons refer to the Robertson 
decision,69 but in no instance is any reference made to the concept of 
“context”. While in several of the pentalogy decisions, Robertson is also 
cited,70 it is, again, not cited with reference to “context.” In ESA, both 
the majority and minority cite it in support of their own perspectives 
on media neutrality.71 In the unanimous decision in the Bell case, 
Robertson is also cited for the proposition that the Copyright Act is to 
be interpreted as media neutral.72 In Rogers, the majority judgment 
cites it in support of the proposition that the Copyright Act applies 
to new technologies,73 while Abella J, concurring, does not refer to it. 
The Crookes case, rather than any of the subsequent copyright cases, 
therefore, is the Supreme Court’s most recent word on the “context” 
approach, and the majority judgment, written by Abella J, does not 
favour it.
For these two reasons—the Court’s views on publishing and 
on “context” (concepts that bear equally on defamation and on 
copyright)—it appears appropriate to include the Crookes defamation 
case in this analysis of copyright jurisprudence.
In examining the set of eleven cases just described, then, a first 
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observation is that the Supreme Court that has decided the copyright 
pentalogy, with the addition of Karakatsanis and Moldaver JJ, is a 
court different in composition from the Supreme Courts that decided 
the earlier six cases. The Court that decided the pentalogy is also, at 
the same time, a court that will never again decide a copyright case: 
Deschamps J retired from the Court on 7 August 2012 and has been 
replaced by Wagner J. (See Figure 1.)
Figure 1. The composition of the court deciding copyright-related 
cases since 2002
It may also be noted that only two justices of the Court that existed 
at the time the Théberge case was heard in 2002 remain on the bench 
(the Chief Justice and LeBel J). As it happens, both participated in the 
decision in Théberge, although that bench involved only seven of the 
justices (Arbour and Bastarache JJ did not participate74). It is striking 
to notice that all the copyright cases after Théberge have been heard 
by the full panel of nine, as was the Crookes libel case. This is surely 
an indication of the importance to society the Court is recognizing in 
this area of law.
When Théberge was decided, all three civil law judges were 
sitting—and comprised the dissent in the decision. The majority was 
comprised entirely of common law–trained judges. In their reasons, 
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Gonthier J, for the minority, and Binnie J, for the majority, explicitly 
referred to the common and civil law traditions behind copyright 
concepts.75 It might have been thought that the division that occurred 
in that case between the common- and civil law–trained judges would 
be seen in subsequent copyright decisions. As shown in Figure 2, no 
such pattern emerges in the subsequent judgments of the Court.
In her study, discussed above, Joseph looked at the solo dissenting 
patterns of the individual Supreme Court judges who had sat or 
were sitting between 1974 and 2003. Among the thirty-two judges 
examined, L’Heureux-Dubé J accounted for almost 25 percent of all 
the solo dissents written.76 L’Heureux-Dubé J sat on the Théberge 
appeal under consideration here, before retiring from the Court, but, 
although she did dissent, she did not do so “solo” and she was not the 
author of the dissenting reasons.77
Table 1 below has been developed from Joseph’s study and shows 
those judges who were included in the study and have sat on at least 
one of the copyright-related decisions under consideration in this 
chapter.78  
Table 1. Solo dissents record for Justices involved in the decisions 
under review and sitting in 2002 or appointed by the end of 2003 
Justice (bold indicates on the Court  
for the pentalogy)
Frequency of solo dissent reported 
by Joseph (up to and including 2003)
Major More than average
Arbour More than average
L’Heureux-Dubé More than average
Bastarache More than average
Mclachlin Average
leBel Average
Iacobucci Less than average
Gonthier Less than average
Deschamps Less than average
Binnie Never
Fish Never
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McLachlin CJ, LeBel and Fish JJ, shown in bold in Table 1, are 
the only three judges of those studied by Joseph who remain on the 
Supreme Court (DesChamps J, also shown in bold because she was 
part of the “pentalogy court,” has now retired). 
Of those whom Joseph found wrote solo dissents a “more than 
average” number of times, only Bastarache J wrote in the eleven cases 
under consideration here, writing concurring reasons in the Toblerone 
case, for himself and for LeBel and Charron JJ. The Toblerone case 
is itself a bit of an outlier among these eleven decisions because it 
really involved questions about the limits of grey marketing and 
turned not on copyright infringement issues directly, but on the issue 
of secondary infringement.79 Much of the disagreement within the 
Court (which produced four separate sets of reasons in the case—see 
Figure 2, below) focused on questions involving assignment of rights.
Despite the fact that McLachlin CJ and LeBel J were found by 
Joseph to tend to write solo dissenting reasons at an “average” rate, 
and though both have written reasons among the eleven cases under 
consideration,80 neither has written a dissent in any of these eleven, 
let alone a solo dissent. In fact, there have been no solo dissenting 
reasons written in these eleven cases (see Figure 2, below). This 
complete lack of solo dissents is clearly not because the judges never 
write solo reasons in these cases. Of the twenty-two separate sets of 
reasons written in the eleven cases, four were concurring reasons 
written by one judge and not adopted by any other. LeBel J wrote 
his own reasons in the SOCAN v CAIP case, concurring in the result 
and with most of the areas of the majority judgment but dissenting in 
part and also alone raising the issue of privacy. Fish J wrote his own 
concurring reasons in the Toblerone case.81 Deschamps J concurred 
in the result in the Crookes case, but for her own reasons. Abella J 
concurred in the Rogers case, but for her own reasons.
On the other hand, of the eleven cases under consideration, only 
in three has the Court been unanimous (see Figure 2, below). In the 
2004 decision in the CCH case, the Chief Justice wrote the judgment 
(her only reasons written in all the ten strictly copyright cases under 
discussion: she did write concurring reasons with Fish J in the Crookes 
libel case). Two of the 2012 pentalogy are unanimous judgments: Bell, 
for which Abella J wrote, and Re:Sound, for which LeBel J wrote. Even 
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allowing for the fact that the number of judgments being considered 
here is very small, three of eleven (or 27 percent) is a far cry from the 
63 percent proportion of unanimous cases found in research based 
upon the full range of cases undertaken by the Court. The difference 
may suggest that these copyright cases82 possess unique characteristics 
that make it more difficult for the Court to achieve consensus.
The CCH case raised many difficult issues for the Court, among 
them the appropriate test for originality, the relationship of the more 
recent “Libraries, Archives and Museums” statutory exceptions to 
the older “Fair Dealing” provisions of the Copyright Act, whether a 
concept of agency could be involved in exercising rights under the Act, 
the ambit of “Fair Dealing” and so on. It could hardly be described as 
a case with a small number of separate legal issues. Re:Sound might be 
characterized as involving a more discrete problem: is a soundtrack in 
a movie within the s.2 definition of “sound recording”? The Bell case
 
Figure 2. The judgments in the eleven cases
MARGARET ANN WILKINSON  |   83
again, however, raised more than one question: do music previews 
fall within the category of “research” under s 29? And, if so, do 
they meet the requirements of “Fair Dealing”? Thus, despite Songer 
and Siripurapu’s expectation that cases with fewer separate legal 
questions are more likely to produce unanimous judgments, the three 
unanimous judgments in these copyright-related cases (i.e. the Bell, 
Re:Sound and CCH cases) defy this expectation, ranging, as they do, 
from more straightforward to extremely complex.
 McCormick has noted that, between 1984 and late 2007, judges 
of the Supreme Court co-authored eighty-six times.83 Amongst the 
twenty-two sets of reasons in these eleven cases, there are three 
instances of co-authorship (14 percent): the majority judgment in 
Robertson was co-authored by LeBel and Fish JJ, one of the sets of 
concurring reasons in the Crookes case was co-authored by the Chief 
Justice and Fish J, and the majority judgment in ESA was written by 
Moldaver and Abella JJ.
C. Conclusions
The increased interest in copyright that the SCC seems to be 
demonstrating is at odds with the overall decline in docket space 
that the Supreme Court is assigning to “private economic law” cases 
generally (of which copyright would form a subset) as identified since 
1970 by Donald Songer.85
Within the limited domain of these eleven cases, McCormick’s 
assertion that “all judges participate to a greater or lesser degree”86 
in concurring reasons is not borne out: Major, Rothstein, Binnie, 
Karakatsanis, Iacobucci, Moldaver, Cromwell, Gonthier, Arbour 
and L’Heureux-Dubé JJ did not write or participate in concurring 
reasons in any of these cases. On the other hand, of the twenty-two 
sets of reasons involved in the eleven cases, six are concurring reasons 
(27 percent, more than one quarter of all the reasons written in the 
cases).87 There are concurring reasons in four of the eleven cases (36 
percent)—which is exactly identical to the percentage of concurring 
reasons McCormick found in his 1,716 judgments between 1984 
and 2006.88 This certainly makes this data on the Supreme Court’s 
copyright-related judgments between 2002 and the present consistent 
with McCormick’s earlier data right across the ambit of cases heard by 
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the Supreme Court, which showed that “separate concurrences are a 
regular and ongoing aspect of the work”89 of the Court. 
Of the eleven decisions reviewed here, there are five decisions 
in which the Court has been divided into a majority and minority 
(Théberge, Robertson, Toblerone, ESA and Alberta (Education)) and 
three decisions in which the majority has been accompanied by 
concurring judgments but no minority dissent (SOCAN v CAIP, 
Crookes and Rogers): eight of the eleven copyright-related decisions 
of the past eleven years. This data makes it clear that there are divided 
opinions at the highest level in Canada over issues related to copyright. 
It is evident that, with only three unanimous decisions in that period, 
unanimity is more the exception than the rule in copyright cases, in 
marked contrast to the prevailing prevalence of unanimous decisions 
found overall in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. Moreover, 
there is a complete absence of solo dissents across this data, which 
would appear to suggest that the reasons for lack of unanimity in 
the copyright area are more likely to be those same reasons that 
McCormick identified as leading to concurrent judgments: copyright 
is in a “dynamic period of flux and change”, “‘big’ questions are coming 
before the Court” and “policy-divergent responses [would appear to] 
need to be generated to prepare the field within which these can be 
managed.”90 
Since joining the Court in 2004 after the CCH and SOCAN v CAIP 
copyright cases were decided, Abella J has written (or co-written, in 
the case of the majority judgment in ESA) reasons for every one of 
the eight subsequent copyright-related cases discussed here, except 
the unanimous judgment in Re:Sound (which LeBel J authored). 
Rothstein J, who joined the Court just in time to participate in all the 
same decisions, has written reasons in half of the same eight cases. 
This makes him the second most prolific author of copyright reasons 
of those participating in any of the copyright-related judgments 
examined here. Fish and LeBel JJ have authored reasons in three cases 
each, of the eleven analyzed here, and all the other judges discussed 
here, past and present, have authored fewer. 
It is interesting to compare the relative positions of the two 
leading authors in the copyright area. While they have obviously been 
in agreement in the Court’s two unanimous copyright judgments 
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delivered since they both joined the Court (in Bell Abella J wrote 
the judgment, in Re:Sound, as mentioned, LeBel J did), Abella and 
Rothstein JJ have rarely otherwise agreed. In their first copyright 
case together on the Supreme Court, Robertson, Rothstein J agreed 
with the majority while Abella J wrote the dissent. Immediately 
following, in Toblerone, Rothstein J wrote the majority judgment and, 
again, Abella J penned the dissent. In the libel case, Crookes, which 
appears to have such strong copyright implications, Abella J wrote the 
majority and, here, Rothstein J agreed with her. In the three pentalogy 
judgments that were not unanimous, however, the two judges again 
differ. In Rogers, their differences are not great: Rothstein J writes the 
majority judgment and Abella J pens her own concurring reasons (the 
only concurring reasons written), differing with Rothstein J over his 
views of the proper characterization of the authority of the Copyright 
Board. But in the ESA and Alberta (Education) cases, the differences 
between their two views in copyright matters are marked, with Abella 
J writing for the majority and Rothstein J for the dissent in each case.
In each of the eight cases, Rothstein J has found himself of like 
mind with other members of the bench; this has been the case for 
Abella J in seven of the eight, the single exception being Abella J’s 
lone concurrence in Rogers. Although Fish J seems to view matters 
consistently from Rothstein J’s perspective, and Cromwell J has also 
agreed with Rothstein J in these copyright-related matters since 
joining the Court, neither Karakatsanis nor Moldaver JJ, in deciding 
the pentalogy cases as part of the Court for the first time on copyright 
matters, always sided with one or the other of Rothstein or Abella 
JJ. Nor has the Chief Justice or LeBel J sided with one or the other 
consistently.
Looking at this pattern of copyright-related judgments in the 
Supreme Court since 2002 and comparing the judges’ participation 
and roles within these cases with the patterns discerned in other 
studies about the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, it has been 
demonstrated that the Court’s decision-making patterns in these 
copyright-related areas differ from the overall patterns of Supreme 
Court judgments in a number of ways: the lack of solo dissents; 
the good number of concurring reasons being written, both where 
there is a dissent and where there is not; the relatively low number 
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of unanimous judgments. In his own work based on data since 
1949, McCormick saw a decline in these kinds of patterns, overall, 
when the major questions raised by the Charter after 1982 had, as 
he said, “been answered.” But here, in copyright, we see evidence 
of the patterns McCormick associated with an area that the whole 
Court recognizes as important and yet in a dynamic state and one 
that requires the Court to canvass and welcome a diversity of policy-
divergent responses from among its members.
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Fair Use 2.0: 
The Rebirth of Fair Dealing in Canada 
ariel katz1 
i: introduction
A century ago, on 16 December 1911, the UK Copyright Act, 
1911 received royal assent, and for the first time fair dealing was 
explicitly recognized in the imperial copyright legislation.2 Ten 
years later, the same fair dealing provision would appear in the 
Canadian Copyright Act, 1921 and would remain the basis of the 
current fair dealing provisions. Tragically, what was supposed to be 
an exercise in the codification of a dynamic and evolving common-
law principle, usually referred to as “fair use”, ended up—with a few 
notable exceptions—in a hundred years of solitude and stagnation.3 
Misinterpreting the 1911 Act, some courts and commentators in 
many Commonwealth jurisdictions adopted a narrow and restrictive 
view of fair dealing. Meanwhile, in the United States, fair use, the 
same common law rule developed by English and American courts, 
remained uncodified for most of the twentieth century, and when 
the United States finally codified it in 1976, Congress left no doubt 
that the codification would not alter its common law basis and ought 
not hinder its flexibility and adaptability. Thus, toward the end of 
the twentieth century, a noticeable split in Anglo-American copyright 
4
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law emerged: an omnipresent, flexible fair use regime in the United 
States, and a seemingly rigid and restrictive fair dealing tradition in 
the Commonwealth countries. 
However, at the turn of the twenty-first century, fair dealing 
was reborn in Canada. In 2004 the Supreme Court of Canada heard 
CCH Canadian Ltd. v Law Society of Upper Canada [CCH],4 its first-
ever case involving fair dealing, and unanimously declared that fair 
dealing is a users’ right, which is as integral to copyright law as the 
rights of copyright owners and therefore should be given large and 
liberal interpretation.5 Eight years later, the Court rejected attempts 
to roll back its earlier decision and handed down two judgments 
reaffirming its holdings from CCH and clarifying that they apply to a 
wider range of activities.6 In doing so, the Court corrected a century-
long misconception of fair dealing, reunited it with its historical 
roots, and brought it closer to its American counterpart. Moving in 
the same direction, and shortly before the Supreme Court handed 
down its judgments, the Parliament of Canada passed the Copyright 
Modernization Act, which explicitly recognized education, parody 
and satire as purposes that could qualify as fair dealing,7 and added 
a series of other specific exceptions, dealing with issues such as user-
generated content, copying for private purposes, time-shifting or 
temporary copying.8
Still, both the Court and Parliament stopped short of explicitly 
adopting of an open-ended approach to fair dealing, seemingly unable 
to decide whether Canada is better off clinging to a burdensome 
colonial British past or embracing an imperfect (North) American 
present. This chapter shows, however, that this dilemma is false: 
while fair dealing has ossified under current British law,9 the colonial 
copyright past that Canada inherited is not quite as burdensome as it 
is commonly perceived to be. On some measures, Canada has already 
improved upon the present American model of fair use, yet it still 
seems hesitant to fully embrace its most important and salient feature: 
its open-endedness. But Canada is now poised to fully embrace an 
open-ended fair dealing, and there are very good reasons for doing 
that. It can and should upgrade from Fair Dealing 1.9 to Fair Use 2.0. 
The chapter will recount the history of fair use and fair dealing 
and show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the enactment of 
ARIEL KATZ   |   95
the Imperial Copyright Act of 1911—and subsequently the enactment 
of the Canadian Copyright Act of 1921—was not designed to cause any 
major alteration in the common law of fair dealing, and the explicit 
recognition of five enumerated purposes in the (then) newly enacted 
fair dealing provision was not intended to limit the principle of fair 
dealing exclusively to those five purposes. Moreover, despite abundant 
contemporary literature that highlights a seeming dichotomy between 
the open-ended US-style fair use, and the supposedly close-ended 
fair dealing,10 this dichotomy is false. The question of whether the 
list of enumerated purposes is exhaustive or, instead, illustrative of a 
broader principle has never been put squarely before the courts, let 
alone the higher courts, and certainly not in Canada. Similarly, no 
court has ever confronted the question of whether the common law 
fair use doctrine that existed before 1911 continues to coexist with the 
statutory fair dealing. Therefore, the question of whether fair dealing 
in Canada can apply to purposes that are not explicitly mentioned 
in the Copyright Act is an open one, and as this chapter shows, can 
and should be answered affirmatively. Doing so will not transplant 
a foreign legal concept, as some have argued.11 Rather, it will reunite 
present copyright doctrine with its rich and historic roots that were 
latent but never discarded. Embracing an open-ended fair dealing is 
the only logical application of the Court’s decisions and Parliament’s 
action, and the only interpretation of the Act that can be internally, 
historically and constitutionally coherent. 
ii: The Fair Use vs. Fair Dealing Myth
According to conventional wisdom, a fundamental difference exists 
between the American fair use doctrine and the Canadian fair dealing 
doctrine. American fair use can apply potentially to any purposes, 
and the enumerated purposes in section 107 of the US Copyright 
Act are only illustrative, as is clear from the explicit words “such 
as”.12 In contrast, ss 29 and 29.1 of the Canadian Copyright Act, like 
other descendants of the 1911 UK Copyright Act, do not contain the 
magic words “such as”, and therefore, the list of enumerated purposes 
(originally: research, private study, criticism, review or newspaper 
summary,13 and currently: research, private study, education, parody, 
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satire, criticism, review or news reporting)14 is treated as exhaustive.15 
Accordingly, the argument goes, “[d]ealings for other purposes are 
not covered by the exception, even if they would otherwise be fair.”16 
As the following parts show in greater detail, this conventional 
wisdom is flawed. The 1911 codification of fair dealing was not meant 
to limit its application to those five enumerated purposes. Moreover, 
the question of whether the list is indeed exhaustive has never 
been, as far as I know, put squarely before the courts, let alone the 
highest courts, neither in Canada nor in any other Commonwealth 
jurisdiction. Some courts assumed that the list is exhaustive, and 
judicial dicta and commentary supporting this proposition can easily 
be found, but the proposition that the list of allowable purposes is 
exhaustive has never been the ratio of any decided and reported 
case. In other words, there is no reported case in which a defendant, 
who dealt with a work in a manner that would be considered fair 
under the fairness factors developed by the courts, was found to be 
infringing nonetheless, solely on the basis that the dealing could not 
fit into any of the enumerated categories.17 Moreover, cases in other 
Commonwealth jurisdictions that may come close to that situation 
sometimes prompted ad hoc legislative amendments, and in any 
event were based on a pre-CCH conception: namely, that fair dealing 
is an exception that should be interpreted narrowly.18 Therefore, these 
cases are of limited utility in post-CCH Canada.19 
A related misconception is that distinct histories and origins of 
Canadian and American copyright laws, as well as differences in their 
constitutional foundations, reflect disparate conceptions of copyright 
and hence justify, or at least explain, differences in substantive rules. A 
representative example of a claim about distinct history and origin is 
Estey J’s remark in Compo v. Blue Crest that despite many similarities 
between the copyright acts of both countries, “United States court 
decisions, even where the factual situations are similar, must be 
scrutinized very carefully because of some fundamental differences 
in copyright concepts which have been adopted in the legislation of 
that country.”20 According to Estey J, the Canadian legislation has 
been based on the international copyright treaties of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, whereas the American legislation was not.21 
This historical account is highly inaccurate, as the copyright acts 
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of both countries are descendants of the Statute of Anne and the 
jurisprudential developments that followed in Britain and the US. 
The international treaties may explain some differences and later 
developments, but those treaties have not altered the fundamental 
concepts and key doctrines.
Attributing differences in the area of fair dealing to differences in 
the constitutional foundations is equally flawed. The US Constitution 
empowers Congress “To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”22, 
and this clause is generally understood to impose some limitations 
on Congressional legislative power in this area.23 In contrast, the 
argument goes, the Constitution Act, 1867 [previously known as the 
British North America Act] gives the Parliament of Canada exclusive 
jurisdiction over Patents of Invention and Discovery (s 91(22)), and 
over Copyrights (s 91(23)),24 but mentions no substantive limitation 
on the content of such laws. 
However, the lack of language similar to that of the US Constitution 
does not necessarily imply any differences in how copyright (and 
patent) laws were conceived when those constitutional documents 
were drafted.25 Indeed, the notion that purpose of copyright and patent 
laws is to promote progress of science and the useful arts was not 
invented by the Framers of the US Constitution, but rather reflected 
the common conception of the era. It is easy to see that the title of 
the Statute of Anne, the first copyright statute, contained the three 
elements found in the American Constitutional clause. The Act’s long 
title was An act for the encouragement of learning, by vesting the copies 
of printed books in the authors or purchasers of such copies, during the 
times therein mentioned. Both combine a public policy goal (compare 
“For the encouragement of learning” and “to promote the Progress of 
Science”); to be achieved by granting private exclusive rights (compare 
“by vesting the copies of printed books in the authors or purchasers of 
such copies” and “by securing…to Authors exclusive Right to their…
Writings”); and a duration limitation (compare: “during the times 
therein mentioned” and “for limited Times”).26 
The idea of “progress” was a buzzword in the eighteenth century27 
and reflected the contemporaneous ideals of the Enlightenment.28 
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While the US Constitution might be considered as one of the 
highlights of the Enlightenment,29 those ideals were not invented by 
the Framers and did not originate in the American colonies. Those 
ideas were prevalent in Britain, and it is not surprising that they 
would also appear in contemporaneous English judicial decisions. 
In 1785 (four years before the adoption of the US Constitution), 
Lord Mansfield warned that 
[w]e must take care to guard against two extremes 
equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have 
employed their time for the service of the community, 
may not be deprived of their just merits, and the reward 
of their ingenuity and labour; the other, that the world 
may not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress 
of the arts be retarded.30
And in 1802, Lord Ellenborough wrote that “a man may fairly 
adopt part of the work of another: he may so make use of another’s 
labours for the promotion of science, and the benefit of the public.”31 
And when in 1842, the Statute of Anne was repealed and replaced 
with a new Copyright Act, section 1 of that Act used similar language, 
evoking similar ideas, and recited that it was “expedient to amend 
the law of copyright, and to afford greater encouragement to the 
production of literary works of lasting benefit to the world.”32 
Thus, when Souter J of the US Supreme Court explained that 
“[f]rom the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for 
fair use of copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill 
copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts….’”33 his historical account of fair use was as accurate 
with respect to American law as it was true to English and Canadian 
law, notwithstanding the absence of explicit “progress” language in 
Anglo-Canadian constitutional documents.34 
Likewise, the notion that copyrights, like patents for inventions, 
were limited grants of statutory exclusive rights, justified in the name 
of the public interest, was common to both jurisdictions, and evolved 
in corresponding steps in Britain and the US. Why the British North 
America Act chose the terms “copyright” and “patents of invention 
and discovery” without adding any limiting language such as can 
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be found in the US Constitution is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
A possible answer, however, is that by 1867, the terms “copyright” 
and “patents of invention and discovery” already embodied an 
established meaning containing the inherent limitations on duration 
and purpose.35 This meaning harks back at least to Darcy v Allen from 
160336 and the Statute of Monopolies from 1624.37 As Bracha writes, 
By the end of the eighteenth century, the principle of 
limited duration of monopolies had been a staple of 
English political thought for two centuries. According to 
this principle, monopolies usually seen as reprehensible 
could be tolerated in exceptional cases where they served 
the public good, provided the monopolies were kept 
within certain safeguards. Chief among these safeguards 
was limited duration.38
While the applicability of this principle to patents of invention 
was beyond debate, it took longer for the law to settle on this point 
in the case of copyrights, where a competing vision of copyright 
as perpetual common law property right lingered until eventually 
being laid to rest, first in Britain and later in the US.
After the expiry of the statutory terms provided in the Statute 
of Anne, the London book publishers continued to assert that they 
had a perpetual common law copyright, which was not affected by 
the Statute. In Millar v. Taylor39 the King’s Bench agreed. Five years 
later, however, in Donaldson v Beckett,40 the House of Lords reached 
a different conclusion.41 The traditional account is that the House of 
Lords held that there was a common law right of first publication, 
replaced by the limited-term statutory copyright after publication, 
although doubts about that continued to linger.42 In 1854, however, in 
Jeffreys v Boosey,43 the House of Lords handed down another decision 
rejecting the notion of a common law property right whose nature 
was akin to the statutory protection first established by the Statute of 
Anne.44 If any rights existed prior to publication, they were no more 
than an incident of the author ownership of the tangible manuscript, 
but not “copyright”. Copyright, in contrast, was a pure creature of 
statute.45 To remove any doubt, the issue was finally settled when 
the 1911 Act abrogated any common law copyright that might have 
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existed, and applied statutory copyright indiscriminately to published 
and unpublished works. 
What prompted the Framers of the US Constitution in 1789 to 
include the specific language in cl. 8 is not entirely clear, and what their 
precise intention was is equally obscure.46 In any event, incorporating 
these limitations into the US Constitution did not prevent a competing 
narrative of common law copyright from emerging. As in Britain, the 
issue was finally settled by legislation, with the passage of section 
301 of the Copyright Act in 1976, pre-empting all state laws creating 
or recognizing, as a matter of state statutes or common law, rights 
equivalent to those within the scope of the Act.47 
The lack of similar language in the Constitution Act is very poor 
indication for fundamental differences in the conception of copyright 
between the two countries. If the language of the US Constitution 
was meant to limit legislative power, the absence of similar language 
in the Constitution Act is not surprising, because explicit limits on 
state power are a key feature of the American constitutional design.48 
In contrast, Canada’s Constitution Act is premised on the British 
concept of parliamentary omnipotence, and its core objective has 
been the division of theoretically unlimited legislative power between 
the Dominion of Canada and the Provinces. Moreover, the Statute 
of Anne did not use the term “copyright”, and although the term had 
already been in use by the end of the eighteenth century, the language 
in the US Constitution might have been adopted simply to describe 
the mandate that was given to Congress. It would be unnecessary to 
do the same in Canada because by 1867, the meaning of the terms 
“copyrights” and “patents of invention and discovery” had already 
been established. 
In sum, the claim that differences between American fair use and 
Canadian fair dealing arise from different constitutional structures 
reflecting divergent ideological views about copyright does not have 
any serious historic support. 
iii: The history of Fair Dealing
This part describes the history of fair dealing, from its emergence as 
a common law doctrine to its first statutory appearance in section 
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2(1)(i) of the Copyright Act, 1911 in the UK, and subsequently, in 
section 16 of the Copyright Act, 1921 in Canada. 
A. Common Law Origins
Fair use and fair dealing were not born by statute but developed 
as judge-made law, first by English and then by American judges, 
who mutually influenced and cross-referenced each other.49 The pre-
history of fair use and fair dealing has been documented by several 
scholars50 and needs not be repeated here fully, but a few highlights 
are worth mentioning. First, as Patry writes, “unlike Athena, the 
doctrine of fair use did not spring forth fully formed.”51 Its scope 
and contours developed gradually, although “the basic foundation 
and rationale were established remarkably early.”52 By 1841, when 
the doctrine made its full appearance in the United States in Folsom 
v Marsh,53 American courts already had a hundred years of English 
case law to draw upon.54 During the nineteenth century, fair use was 
a broad concept that encompassed several issues that today would 
often be treated separately: for example, it would apply to the copying 
of non-protectable facts and ideas as distinct from protectable 
expressions,55 to the copying of non-substantial parts of protected 
expressions,56 as well as to permissible copying of substantial parts 
of protected expressions. While current doctrine tends to treat these 
issues as conceptually distinct, and confine fair dealing to the third, 
the three are not entirely separate. The tests used for determining 
“substantiality” involve similar questions to those that are asked in 
determining “fairness”,57 and whether the work is mainly factual or 
expressive may influence the outcome of the fairness analysis.58
Second, the common terminology in English copyright law prior 
to 1911 was often “fair use”,59 just like the American terminology, but 
it was also common to use the term “fair” as an adjective to describe 
specific activities, such as “fair quotation”,60 “fair criticism”, “fair 
refutation”,61 and, in the earlier cases, “fair abridgement”.62 Sometimes 
courts would not use the term “fair” but its synonyms, such as “bona 
fide imitations, translations and abridgements.”63 The switch to “fair 
dealing” in Commonwealth jurisdictions seems to simply follow a 
terminology adopted when the doctrine was codified in 1911,64 but, 
as will be discussed in greater detail below, there is no evidence that 
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the switch from “use” to “dealing” was intended to reflect any change 
in the law or its direction.65
Third, the English judges who created fair use should not 
necessarily be seen as champions of users’ rights and the public 
interest reining in overly expansive copyrights—as might be seen 
through contemporary spectacles. Rather, recognizing fair use 
allowed judges to actively expand the scope of copyright protection, 
beyond the original exclusive right to print or reprint books.66 “By 
starting with the unobjectionable proposition that making a merely 
colourable alteration to an earlier work would not be sufficient to 
avoid the statute, the courts were able to expand copyright protection 
well beyond cases that could meaningfully be described as a case 
of reprinting.”67 
Still, even before the Supreme Court of Canada declared in CCH 
that fair dealing is a “users’ right”,68 courts and commentators often 
referred to the ability to use another’s work without permission as a 
users’ right, and employed the term “the right of fair user”.69 Similarly, 
the connection between fair use, the scope of protection, and the 
public interest was not invented in CCH, but had been recognized 
two centuries earlier.70 For example, in Cary v Kearsley, decided in 
1802, Lord Ellenborough CJ explained that 
a man may fairly adopt part of the work of another: he 
may so make use of another’s labours for the promotion 
of science, and the benefit of the public; but having done 
so, the question will be, Was the matter so taken used 
fairly with that view, and without what I may term the 
animus furandi? 
Then, after further elaboration, he put the question for the jury 
to consider as 
whether what so taken or supposed to be transmitted 
from the plaintiff ’s book, was fairly done with a view of 
compiling a useful book, for the benefit of the public, 
upon which there has been a totally new arrangement of 
such matter—or taken colourable, merely with a view to 
steal the copy-right of the plaintiff?71 
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Therefore, to the extent that CCH may be seen as revolutionary, it 
is only revolutionary when viewed through a very narrow historical 
lens, but viewing it with a broader historical perspective suggests that 
if CCH departed from earlier case law, it only brought back the law to 
its historical path.
B. The Codification of Fair Use
Fair use remained a common-law principle in the UK until 
the enactment of the Copyright Act, 1911, which for the first time 
included a statutory fair dealing provision. Section 2(1)(i) of the 1911 
Act provided that “Any fair dealing with any work for the purposes 
of private study, research, criticism, review, or newspaper summary” 
shall not constitute an infringement of copyright. It was supplemented 
by additional, specifically tailored exceptions. The same provision 
would appear a decade later in Canada, and its language would 
remain unchanged until 1993 (when attribution requirements were 
added to criticism, review and newspaper summary),72 and 1997 
(when “newspaper summary” was replaced with the wider “news 
reporting”, the phrase “private study or research” was modified to 
“research or private study”, apparently to pre-empt an interpretation 
that would limit research to private settings,73 and the reference 
to “work” was deleted to expand fair dealing to sound recordings, 
performers’ performances and communication signals,74 and again 
in 2012 (when “education, parody, and satire” were added alongside 
research and private study). In the US, the doctrine remained 
uncodified until 1976.
As noted above, conventional wisdom holds that the enactment 
created an exhaustive list of allowable purposes. However, this view is 
biased by hindsight. It confuses a narrow (and, as we shall see below, 
erroneous) subsequent interpretation of the 1911 Act with the intended 
effect of the 1911 codification, and it also wrongly deduces from the 
inclusion by US Congress of the explicit words “such as”, that their 
absence from the UK 1911 legislation necessarily reflects Parliament’s 
desire to limit fair dealing to the enumerated purposes. As I explain 
below, a small number of early English courts misinterpreted 
Parliament’s intent, adopting a restrictive but erroneous view of fair 
dealing, which has never been seriously challenged. Moreover, the 
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legislative history of section 107 in the US indicates that the decision 
of Congress to add the words “such as” reflects a lesson learned from 
the British earlier exercise in codification.75
C. Fair Dealing’s Decline 
In retrospect, it appears that the first attempt to legislate fair 
dealing has not been successful. A few early cases have set the law 
of fair dealing in the UK and the Commonwealth on a restrictive 
trajectory from which it has not yet recovered. This has also been 
the case of Canada, at least until the recent rulings of the Supreme 
Court. Of these cases, University of London Press, British Oxygen, and 
Hawkes and Son are particularly noteworthy: the first, not for what it 
actually held, but for how it had been misinterpreted, and the other 
two for their holding and reasoning.76 Overall, with some exceptions, 
these decisions set the tone for a castrated version of fair dealing, first 
by confining fair dealing to the list of enumerated purposes and then 
by construing them narrowly.77 
1. University of London Press
University of London Press Ltd v University Tutorial Press Ltd.78 
was one of the first reported cases decided under the 1911 Act, and 
the first case involving the newly enacted fair dealing provision, and 
a few other novelties of that Act. This, perhaps, explains its enduring 
influence, despite the fact that it was a trial level decision. University of 
London might be an example of an easy case that makes bad law. The 
outcome of the case does not seem to be particularly controversial or 
revolutionary—not in retrospect, and probably also not at the time it 
was decided—but some of its dicta and misinterpretations of some of 
its holdings have turned it into an important milestone in the takeover 
of an owner-centric view of copyright in English law.79 
The defendants published a book entitled London Matriculation 
Directory, which contained several matriculation papers copied from 
a prior publication of the plaintiff, a subsidiary of the University of 
London, that were written by examiners hired by the university. The 
defendants’ publication also included “answers to the questions in 
[some of] the papers…; and it also comprise[d] a short criticism of 
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the construction of the various papers,… intended for the guidance of 
future examiners rather than for the edification of possible students.”80 
The court found that both publishers recognized that students 
and teachers derived significant utility from samples of previous 
examination questions, and that recognizing that demand, both 
publishers had decided to compete in that market.81 Even though the 
defendants’ publication was not identical to the plaintiffs’ and added 
its own content, copying a significant amount from one publication 
for the purpose of publishing a competing publication would hardly 
make an easy case for fair dealing, either today or a century ago. 
MacGillivray, who acted as co-counsel for the defendants, probably 
recognized that fair dealing would be an uphill battle, and focused 
most of its defense on other issues: whether the publisher plaintiff had 
any valid legal or equitable interest in the copied works,82 and whether 
the author co-plaintiffs suffered any damage.83 He also challenged 
the copyrightability of the copied examination papers, arguing that 
the reference to “literary works” and “original” in the 1911 Act had 
set a higher standard compared to the 1842 Act, which referred only 
to “books”.84 Fair dealing was the last line of defense, pleaded in the 
alternative, should other arguments fail.85 
Peterson J’s judgment appears to share the same view of the 
importance of the issues. It devoted only one paragraph to the 
fair dealing argument, which he easily dismissed without much 
elaboration. After describing how both publishers sought to compete 
in the same market, how there was very little in the defendants’ work 
that could be seen as criticism, and how the partial answers provided 
by the defendant to some of the questions provided relatively little 
added value, he concluded that
It could not be contended that the mere republication 
of a copyright work was a “fair dealing” because it was 
intended for purposes of private study; nor, if an author 
produced a book of questions for the use of students, 
could another person with impunity republish the book 
with the answers to the questions. Neither case would, 
in my judgment, come within the description of “fair 
dealing.” In the present case the paper on more advanced 
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mathematics has been taken without any attempt at 
providing solutions for the questions, and the only way 
in which the defendants have dealt with this paper is 
by appropriating it, except that there are eleven lines 
of criticism of it, dividing the questions into easy, 
troublesome, and difficult questions. To the questions 
in the other two papers answers are provided. Both 
publications are intended for educational purposes and for 
the use of students, and in my judgment the defendants 
have failed to bring themselves within the protection of 
s. 2, sub-s. 1 (i.), of the Act.86
When read in context, it is clear that University of London did not 
define what “private study” is, let alone hold that the term applied only 
to copying made by students for their own private use, nor it did say 
anything about whether fair dealing could apply to other purposes, 
beyond those explicitly mentioned in the Act. University of London 
stands only for the proposition that the mere republication of a work, 
by a competing publisher, without adding anything substantial, does 
not make a credible fair dealing case—a proposition that, on the 
reported facts of the case, does not seem to be highly controversial. 
Nevertheless, for almost a century, this case has been 
misinterpreted, and was frequently cited as an authority supporting 
both propositions. The first misinterpreter seems to be F. E. Skone 
James, who, as the editor of the sixth edition of Copinger, cited 
University of London as authority for the proposition that private study 
“only covers the case of a student copying out a book for his own use, 
but not the circulation of copies among other students.”87 And until 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Alberta (Education), Canadian courts 
repeated this error. 
For example, the Federal Court of Appeals (FCA) in CCH posited 
that “British courts have held that use in an educational institution 
was not for the purpose of private study”, but despite the reference 
to “British courts” in plural, provided a single reference, University of 
London Press.88 The Court further added that “the Court in University 
of London Press, supra interpreted private study as not including 
educational purposes, and therefore did not allow professors to 
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claim an exemption based upon their students’ purposes.”89 But 
University of London did not make any of those holdings. It did not 
deal with “professors [claiming] an exemption” or with “use in an 
education institution” but rather with two competing commercial 
publishers. Therefore, it did not and could not have held that “use in 
an educational institution was not for the purpose of private study”. 
University of London held that the defendant publisher’s dealing was 
not fair, but it did not interpret the meaning of “private study” at all, 
and nowhere did it mention professors invoking the private study of 
their students to justify their own copying and therefore could not 
have disallowed them to invoke it. 
The Copyright Board in Alberta (Education) repeated the same 
errors. It stated: “Almost a century ago, British courts established a 
dichotomy between private study and teacher-student classroom 
interaction” and concluded that “[i]t therefore seems impossible that 
a copy made by a teacher for his or her class can be for the purpose 
of private study…”.90 Like the FCA, it referred to “British courts” in 
plural while citing a single reference, University of London, and in a 
similar erroneous fashion suggested that University of London was 
a case about a classroom setting, when no discussion of “teacher-
student classroom interaction” exists there.
On appeal, the FCA endorsed the Copyright Board’s 
interpretation. While the FCA did not repeat the same blatant errors, 
it still misinterpreted and misquoted University of London. The FCA 
recognized that “unlike the teachers in the case at bar, the University 
Tutorial Press was clearly using the examinations for commercial 
purposes”, but concluded that this was an irrelevant distinction. The 
FCA explained that “Justice Peterson found this was not private study 
and therefore not fair dealing because the publications were “intended 
for educational purposes and for the use of students” as opposed to 
private study”.91 This statement, however, misquotes and misinterprets 
University of London. The FCA quoted only half of a sentence, an 
omission that changes its meaning completely. The original sentence 
reads: “Both publications are intended for educational purposes and for 
the use of students, and in my judgment the defendants have failed 
to bring themselves within the protection of s. 2, sub-s. 1 (i.), of the 
Act.”92 Clearly, Peterson J was not making any distinction between the 
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defendant’s “educational purposes and for the use of students” on the 
one hand and “private study” on the other, and he did not hold that 
fair dealing did not apply because the use had been for the former 
purpose and not the latter. Rather, he used the phrase “educational 
purposes and for the use of students” as a synonym to “private study” 
and was emphasizing that both parties’ publications were intended for 
the same purposes, catering to the same market, and for that reason 
could not be considered fair dealing. The FCA confused a statement 
about the scope of fairness for a statement about the meaning of 
private study. 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court declined to repeat these errors 
and noted that University of London had very little bearing on the 
meaning of “private study” and does “not stand for the proposition 
that ‘research’ and ‘private study’ are inconsistent with instructional 
purposes.”93
2. British Oxygen
British Oxygen v Liquid Air94 involved two competitors: the 
plaintiff, who manufactured and sold oxygen gas, and the defendant, 
who manufactured equipment for producing oxygen gas. Both were 
competing for the same customers. To persuade a customer not to buy 
the defendant’s equipment, the plaintiff offered that customer a deep 
discount conditional on a long-term exclusivity commitment. The 
details of the offer were communicated in a letter sent to the customer. 
The defendant obtained the letter from that customer, reproduced 
twelve copies, and sent one of them to a firm of stockbrokers on the 
London Stock Exchange, together with a letter complaining about the 
plaintiff ’s competitive tactics.95 The plaintiff filed a lawsuit claiming 
copyright infringement. 
The defendant challenged the copyrightability of such a letter, but 
argued that if such a letter was a literary work within the meaning 
of the 1911 Act, then its reproduction was permitted as fair dealing 
for the purpose of criticism.96 The defendant also relied on earlier 
cases that found that a person was entitled to publish a letter when 
it was necessary to protect his character.97 Romer J rejected all those 
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arguments. He indicated that he was in agreement with the plaintiff ’s 
view that “criticism” within the meaning of the Act meant criticism of 
the work as such, but thought that he did not have to actually decide 
this matter because fair dealing simply could not apply to criticizing 
an unpublished literary work. Subjecting a literary work to public 
criticism, review or newspaper summary without the consent of the 
copyright owner would be, in his mind, “manifestly unfair.”98 He 
further doubted that the right to publish a letter to vindicate one’s 
character survived the passage of the 1911 Act and held that in any 
event that defence was inapplicable.99 
3. Hawkes & Son
Hawkes & Son involved the unauthorized use by Paramount Film 
of twenty seconds of the musical work Colonel Bogey (which lasted 
four minutes in total) in a newsreel reporting the opening of the Royal 
Hospital School by the Prince of Wales.100 At trial level, the defendants 
argued that the part copied was not substantial and that in any event 
fair dealing applied because “These news films are in effect a pictorial 
form of newspaper. The case comes within s. 2, sub-s. 1(i.), under which 
any fair dealing for the purposes of private study, research, criticism, 
review, or newspaper summary is not to constitute an infringement 
of copyright. The sound film is an audible and pictorial newspaper 
summary.”101 Eve J, the trial judge, ruled for the defendants on both 
counts. He held that in order to find for the plaintiff, he would have to 
find “that the introduction into the babel of sound inseparable from 
any pageantry, of a few bars of some more or less appropriate piece 
of music, would constitute an infringement calculated seriously to 
prejudice the rights of those whose aim is to reproduce the spectacle 
as a whole.”102 Such conclusion, he thought, was one that he could not 
believe could be right.103 He held that no substantial part of the work 
had been reproduced, and that if he was wrong about that then “the acts 
of the two defendants constitute a fair dealing with the work, under s. 
2, sub-s. 1(i.), of the Act. [And that] it is impossible that what has been 
done can inflict any substantial injury on the plaintiffs’ monopoly, or 
invade any market of the plaintiffs, actual or problematic.”104
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The Court of Appeals reversed. On appeal, the defendant’s lawyers 
conceded that the part taken was substantial, but maintained that fair 
dealing applied, because 
although it is admitted that the news reel cannot be 
called a newspaper summary it is something of much 
the same nature, and the matters specified in the proviso 
to s. 2, sub-s. l, are merely examples of “fair dealing,” and 
this case falls within the general principle involved in 
the proviso. The reproduction of part of “Colonel Bogey” 
was merely incidental to a sound film which as an item 
of news gave the opening of the Royal Hospital School 
by the Prince of Wales.105 
They emphasized that the reproduction was made for the sole 
purpose of indicating what happened when the Prince of Wales 
opened the school, and maintained, based on the case law prior to 
1911, that the purpose of the reproduction had always been “of vital 
importance for the purpose of ascertaining whether there has been 
an infringement.”106 MacGillivary, who acted as co-counsel for the 
defendant, must have been familiar with the legislative history, and 
his argument that “the matters specified in the proviso to s. 2, sub-s. l, 
are merely examples of ‘fair dealing’”107 is entirely consistent with that 
history.108 However, his ability to rely on the legislative history was 
probably constrained, because even though it was trite that proper 
interpretation of a statute requires considering “how the law stood 
when the statute to be construed was passed, what the mischief was 
for which the old law did not provide, and the remedy provided by 
the statute to cure that mischief ”,109 the use of extrinsic materials to 
help ascertain legislative intent was not permitted as it currently is.110 
Rather, the rule was that “Parliament’s intention must be gathered 
solely from the Act itself ”.111
The case is also interesting because it foreshadows some of the 
problems of overlaying royalties that would occupy the Supreme 
Court of Canada in 2012. The defendants emphasized that the 
“march has been performed in 417 cinema theatres with the consent 
of the author of the composition and on payment of fees to the 
plaintiffs. The only question is whether the making of the film is 
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unauthorized.”112 They must have referred to a blanket licence issued 
by the Performing Rights Society, but they did not and could not get 
a timely synchronization licence if one was needed, and urged that 
a holding for the plaintiff under the circumstances would seriously 
hamper trade. Lord Hanworth M.R. dismissed the argument, noting 
that the plaintiffs “do not at all intend or desire to hamper trade. All 
that they say is this: that if this reproduction of a copyright musical 
march is allowed or is sought by the defendants, then, on a payment, 
that licence can be granted.”113 He dismissed the defendants’ argument 
that “the rapidity with which they have to reproduce these new films 
makes it difficult, or indeed impossible, for them to obtain a licence 
from the owners of the musical copyright. Some system could no doubt 
be arranged whereby, if there is a possibility of some infringement of 
copyright, there could be a licence applicable to the occasion, so as to 
avoid any damage to the plaintiffs or other owners of copyright.”114 By 
“some system” he might have thought about obtaining an additional 
licence from a collecting society (a solution that would probably be 
viewed as undesirable “double dipping” by the Supreme Court of 
Canada, post ESA v SOCAN),115 but he did not elaborate.116 
Lord Hanworth then turned “simply to look at the statute” and 
to interpret it according to its purpose, which in his view was “the 
necessity for the protection of authors whether of musical or of 
literary compositions.”117 In interpreting the Act as if that was its only 
purpose, he adopted a very strong owner-centric view of copyright, 
ignored its public interest goals, and dismissed the relevance of any 
consideration of whether the defendant’s actions caused any harm 
to the plaintiff.118 Turning to consider the fair dealing argument, he 
rejected the defendant’s argument that the film was analogous to a 
newspaper summary. In an extremely narrow interpretation of the 
statute, he held that “the collocation of the words ‘criticism, review, 
or newspaper summary’ clearly points to the review or to notices 
of books which appear in newspapers, and not to anything of the 
nature that was done in the present case.”119 This holding was a clear 
departure from pre-1911 case law, which did not limit “review” to 
those narrow settings,120 and recognized that “criticism” did not apply 
solely to criticism of the copied work, but could extend to criticizing 
the views contained in it.121
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Slesser LJ agreed with Lord Hanworth and added a few interesting 
remarks. While he acknowledged that the notion of “substantial part” 
appeared in the statute for the first time in 1911, he emphasized the 
continuity with the pre-1911 case law and the fact that Parliament 
explicitly codified what had already been decided by the courts under 
the previous legislation.122 Interestingly, however, when considering 
the defense of fair dealing, he declined to recognize any similar 
continuity with the previous case law and adhered to strict and literal 
interpretation of section 2(1)(i). He took the view that “this proviso 
must be dealt with strictly, and when it says ‘newspaper summary’ 
it means newspaper summary and nothing else. Now here there is 
neither a summary nor a newspaper, and it is impossible, I think, to 
hold that this case comes within that protection.”123 
Romer J, despite showing some sympathy to the defendants, 
who caused no harm to the plaintiffs, was equally dismissive of their 
legal arguments. He joined the view that the plaintiffs’ harm—or lack 
thereof—was irrelevant because the plaintiffs were simply asking the 
court the enforce their property rights,124 and reasoned that even if 
the defendants’ film could be analogized to a newspaper summary, it 
was nonetheless unfair, because a newspaper reporting on the Prince 
of Wales’s visit would be free to report that the schoolboys marched 
past him to the tune of “Colonel Bogey” but it could not reproduce a 
substantial part of the tune’s musical score for the benefit of readers 
who were not there.125 This reasoning, of course, misses the point 
entirely. Not only does it assume that benefiting the readers who 
were not present is an irrelevant consideration, what it considers as 
a legitimate form of news reporting that might benefit from the fair 
dealing provision does not involve any reproduction of any part of 
the work at all.
The strong proprietary and owner-centric language used by 
the judges makes it difficult to speculate whether the outcome of 
Hawkes & Son would have been different under an explicitly open-
ended fair dealing provision, or one that used a different term from 
“newspaper summary.” In any event, while the owner-centric legacy 
of Hawkes & Son continued to burden Commonwealth law for 
many years, some of its harsh consequences were relieved through 
legislative change. In 1956, the UK changed the term “newspaper 
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summary” to “reporting current events”126; Canada would do the 
same in 1997, by replacing “newspaper summary” with “news 
reporting”.127 Subsequent amendments in both countries also 
exempted “incidental inclusion”.128 
It appears that this view of fair dealing as limited to the explicitly 
enumerated purposes has never been challenged, and accordingly 
courts did not have the opportunity to thoroughly consider it. 
Nevertheless, suggesting that prior to CCH, all Commonwealth courts 
subscribed orthodoxically to Hawkes & Son’s overly restrictive view of 
fair dealing would be an error. On occasion, courts have approached 
fair dealing in a more liberal way. For example, in Hubbard v Vosper, 
Lord Denning declined to interpret fair dealing as narrowly as the 
plaintiff suggested, and did not follow British Oxygen’s suggestion that 
“criticism” was limited to “criticism of the work as such” or that fair 
dealing cannot apply to criticizing unpublished works.129 Moreover, 
his canonical statement that “It is impossible to define what is ‘fair 
dealing’”, the general test that he offered for applying it, and his 
observation that “[a]s with fair comment in the law of libel, so with 
fair dealing in the law of copyright. The tribunal of fact must decide”130 
reflect a vision of flexibility and common law adjudication rather than 
one that sees courts as strictly bound by the literal confines of the 
statutory provision. A year later, the holding in Hubbard v Vosper led 
the court to recognize that a common law “public interest” defence 
may “override the rights of the individual, (including copyright), 
which would otherwise prevail and which the law is also concerned 
to protect.”131 
Pro Sieben v Carlton is also noteworthy for its suggestion that 
the phrase “for the purpose of ” ought to be interpreted as “in the 
context of ” or “as part of an exercise in”—an interpretation that defies 
strict construction of each of the individual purposes, and prefer an 
application of fair dealing in a wider array of circumstances.132 In Allen 
v Toronto Star, the court concluded that since “the nature and purpose 
of the use by the Toronto Star…of the [plaintiff ’s] photograph [was] 
to illustrate a current news story, the defence of fair dealing applie[d] 
in the circumstances of this case.”133 Even though the use might not 
fall neatly within the “newspaper summary” rubric, the court did not 
feel itself strictly bound by that. Guided by Lord Denning’s general 
114   |   THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY
test for applying fair dealing, the court reasoned that “test of fair 
dealing is essentially purposive. It is not simply a mechanical test of 
measurement of the extent of copying involved”.134
iV: interpreting the 1911 Act
The crucial question, therefore, is what the UK Parliament was 
trying to achieve and what it thought it was doing when it enacted 
the fair dealing provision in 1911. Did Parliament intend to replace 
the common law doctrine with an exhaustive statutory regime but 
without changing its scope, or did it contemplate a limited statutory 
regime that coexists with the common law? Did Parliament intend to 
amend the common law of fair use or fair dealing by confining the 
doctrine to the five enumerated purposes and restrain the judiciary 
from further developing it on a case-by-case basis, in light of new 
circumstances and new types of uses, or was Parliament’s intention 
merely to clarify that the doctrine existed without restraining courts’ 
power to continue developing it? Might it even be possible that in 
addition to clarifying the existence of the doctrine, Parliament 
intended to expand it? While plain reading of the statutory language 
may support the interpretation that Parliament replaced and restricted 
the common law doctrine, other principles of statutory interpretation, 
including the legislative history, support the conclusion that that is 
the least likely interpretation.
This part begins with discussing the restrictive interpretation, 
largely based on the fair dealing provision’s plain meaning, and then 
proceeds to refuting it. 
A. Interpreting the text 
1. Expressio unius
The strongest support for the interpretation that section 2(1)(i) of 
the 1911 Act (and its subsequent iterations in the Canadian legislation) 
confines fair dealing to the five enumerated purposes and excludes all 
other purposes is implied exclusion, based on an inference from the 
Act’s language. Arguably, if Parliament intended to allow courts to 
ARIEL KATZ   |   115
apply fair dealing to other purposes beyond the enumerated ones, it 
would have said so. Parliament could have added the words “such as” 
(as the US Congress did in 1976) or could have used similar drafting 
techniques to clarify that the enumerated purposes are illustrative rather 
than exhaustive. In other words, expressio unius est exclusio alterius: 
“to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other.”135 
While expressio unius is helpful in determining a text’s linguistic 
meaning, it does not necessarily ascertain its legal meaning.136 
As Barak writes, 
logic governs the scope of this canon [of interpretation]. 
If I say that people are mortal, you should not infer 
that animals live forever. Even when it is possible to 
infer “no” from “yes”, that choice does not necessarily 
become the text’s legal meaning. Perhaps the “yes” itself 
is included merely as a precaution, to remove doubt 
(ex abundanti cautela); perhaps it is only an example; 
perhaps it reflects sloppy writing.137 
Therefore, “[l]ike the other presumptions relied on in textual 
analysis, implied exclusion is merely a presumption and can be 
rebutted.”138
As the proceeding analysis shows, this presumption can be easily 
rebutted in the present context. There is no evidence in the legislative 
history to support the expressio unius interpretation, and there is 
sufficient evidence supporting the proposition that the most likely 
interpretation of the meaning of the “yes” is that rather than implying 
“no”, it reflects Barak’s three possibilities: some of the purposes may 
have been included to remove doubt; all of them, read together, stand 
in synecdochically for a variety of permissible uses;139 and, admittedly, 
and in retrospect, the omission of “such as” reflects sloppy writing. 
2. A Note on Plain Meaning
Even though the expressio unius interpretation assumes that the 
statute’s meaning is clear, it must be noted that this clear meaning 
is nevertheless peculiar. The notion that fair dealing applies only to 
certain allowable purposes implies that “[d]ealings for other purposes 
are not covered by the exception, even if they would otherwise be 
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fair”.140 This means that when the UK Parliament enacted in 1911 
(and Canada’s Parliament enacted in 1921) that “Any fair dealing 
with any work for the purposes of private study, research, criticism, 
review, or newspaper summary…shall not constitute an infringement 
of copyright”, it meant that dealings with works for other purposes, 
even though they may otherwise qualify as fair, still constitute an 
infringement of copyright. 
Under this interpretation, the scope of permissible copying 
is limited twice: first, by selecting only five categories of uses that 
could be eligible for an exemption, and then further narrowing them 
down by allowing only those among them that would be found to 
be “fair”. Even though this interpretation is plausible grammatically, 
it is paradoxical logically, because it implies that even though some 
activities might be entirely fair, they would still be categorically 
unlawful. But the adjective “fair” usually stands for something that 
is “just or appropriate under the circumstances”,141 and it would seem 
rather peculiar to adopt a provision that recognizes that some dealings 
are just or appropriate, but are still unlawful. If the intent had really 
been to limit the exception only to the five enumerated purposes, and 
further limit it to the subset of those that are fair, it would have been 
open to say “it shall not constitute an infringement of copyright to 
deal with any work for the sole purposes of private study, research, 
criticism, review, or newspaper summary, and provided that any such 
dealing is fair.” 
This point provides an additional illustration to the perils of 
plain meaning interpretation. Legislated texts are imperfect, and 
sometimes their legal meaning cannot be based solely on their textual 
meaning, but should be aided by resort to the legislative history and 
other interpretative principles, which are discussed below. 
3. “Research” and “Private Study”
A hurried plain meaning approach has also resulted in a restrictive 
interpretation of the term “private study”. Since the meanings of 
“research” and “study” overlap considerably, the fact that the adjective 
“private” precedes “study” but not “research” has led some to interpret 
this difference as an indication that Parliament intended “to expressly 
qualify ‘study’ but not ‘research’ [which] indicates an intention to 
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permit all fair research, whether in a private setting or not”142 but 
disallow study that is “non-private”.143 In Alberta (Education) this 
view was adopted by the decisions below, as well as by Rothstein 
J in his dissenting opinion at the Supreme Court. According to 
him, “Parliament does not speak in vain”144 and the only possible 
interpretation that would respect Parliament’s intention would be to 
interpret “private study” as excluding other forms of “non-private” 
study, which means that “private study” means “study by oneself ”, and 
excludes copying done by teachers to support their students’ private 
study in the ordinary course of instruction.145
While there is no question that this interpretation is within the 
range of plausible linguistic meanings, it is certainly not the only one, 
nor is it the only one consistent with the presumption that Parliament 
does not speak in vain. While Rothstein J conceded that the word 
“private” does not necessarily limit “study” to studying in solitude,146 
he failed to recognize the existence of a wider spectrum of meanings. A 
standard lexical meaning of “private” is “not open to the public”,147 and 
distinction between the legal significance of acts that are public and 
those that are not runs throughout the Act and copyright doctrine.148 
Applied to “private study”, this meaning could comfortably include 
study that is done in a setting that is not open to the public at large, 
such as in the case of ordinary classroom instruction.
In fact, rather than interpreting “private study” and “instruction” 
as antonyms, as Rothstein J and the decisions below did, English courts, 
before and after the enactment of the 1911 Act, interpreted “private 
study”, “teaching”, and “instruction” as synonyms. The distinction 
that was made was not between “private study” and “teaching”, but 
between works that are communicated to others in private settings 
and those communicated to the public at large. 
For example, in Caird v Sime,149 decided in 1887, the House of 
Lords held that a university professor had not forfeited his power to 
prevent the first publication of his lectures by delivering them to his 
students in the classroom in the ordinary course. Such lectures were 
held not to be public in the sense of being “communicated urbi et orbi 
by the mere act of delivery”,150 but private “inasmuch as the author 
does not by their delivery communicate his ideas and language to the 
public at large.”151 The Lords reasoned that the professor’s duty as a 
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teacher was not to address the public at large, but “to give personal 
instruction to the individuals composing his audience.”152 “The 
relation of the professor to his students is simply that of teacher and 
pupil; his duty is, not to address the public at large, but to instruct his 
students.”153 This sentence could easily read “the teacher’s duty is to 
assist students in their private study, not to address the public at large” 
without altering its meaning or the rationale of the ruling.154 Printing 
and selling copies would amount to publication, but “giving copies for 
private perusal or by recitation before a select audience…admitted for 
the purpose of receiving instruction or amusement”155 would not.156 
This interpretation opens the possibility that the term “private 
study” was not inserted to prevent fair dealing from applying to 
teaching, but instead to make sure that it does. As I explain in 
greater detail below, the case law on fair use prior to 1911 dealt 
predominantly with defendants who published works incorporating 
parts of, or based on, works of others. Where courts found that the 
use was fair, it was usually because the parts that were copied were 
non-copyrightable, not substantial, or that the defendant’s work had 
been—in modern terms—“transformative.” The few cases involving 
“private use” in the sense of “not public” were actually held to be 
infringing. Therefore, prior case law might have been interpreted as 
allowing only transformative uses that enrich the public by adding 
to the stock of knowledge, and excluding non-transformative or 
non-public uses (or both).157 On this account, “private study” could 
have been added to pre-empt such restrictive interpretation. Thus, by 
adding “private study” in addition to “research”, Parliament did not 
speak in vain at all, although it meant something different from what 
Rothstein J understood.158 
B. Legislative History of the 1911 Act
“The legislative evolution and history of a provision may often be 
important parts of the context to be examined as part of the modern 
approach to statutory interpretation.”159 Understanding the meaning 
of fair dealing also requires understanding the law that existed prior 
to 1911 and what changes, if any, the 1911 Act intended to effect.160 
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1. Background: The Law Prior to 1911 
The Copyright Act, 1911 was “An Act to amend and consolidate 
the Law relating to Copyright.” As early as 1878, consolidation of the 
law was recommended by a Royal Commission, which found the 
existing law “wholly destitute of any sort of arrangement, incomplete, 
often obscure, and, even when intelligible upon long study, so ill-
expressed that no one who did not give such study to it could expect 
to understand it.”161 As MacGillvray noted, “The great obstacle in 
the way of consolidation and amendment has been the difficulty in 
coming to a satisfactory settlement with the self-governing dominions. 
Canada, in particular …”.162 Indeed, Canada was concerned about 
the prohibitively high prices of British publications, which “were 
beyond the means of the ordinary reading public in Canada.”163 Some 
additional amendments were required in order to comply with the 
first revision of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works signed in 1908.164 
In addition to extending the term of copyright protection, its 
application to new subject matter and the abolition of mandatory 
registration, the new Act broadened the definition of what copyright 
was, expanded the definition of what constituted infringement, 
and enlarged the scope of remedies that might be available to the 
plaintiff under the Act, in comparison to what was contained in the 
Copyright Act, 1842. The changes were not entirely revolutionary, 
because many of them reflected developments already recognized 
in the case law. Still, their explicit recognition in the new statute 
removed any doubt that the rights and remedies were broader than 
those explicitly stated in the 1842 Act. For example, section 2 of 
the 1842 Act provided that “the word ‘copyright’ shall be construed 
to mean the sole and exclusive Liberty of printing or otherwise 
multiplying Copies of any Subject to which the said Word is 
herein applied”;165 section 1(2) of the 1911 Act made it clear that 
the exclusive right was not limited to reproducing the entire work, 
but extended to a reproduction of “any substantial part thereof ”. It 
also clarified that the exclusive right to reproduce was not limited 
to reproduction in the same material form (e.g., a printed book 
reproduced into another book), but also included reproductions 
120   |   THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY
“in any material form whatever”, including additional techniques, 
such as lithography.166 
Even more significant change was eliminating what appeared to 
be a mismatch between the scope of the exclusive right under section 
2 of the 1842 Act and the definition of what constituted infringement 
under section 15. While section 2 defined “copyright” as “the sole 
and exclusive Liberty of printing or otherwise multiplying Copies”,167 
remedy appeared to have been available only to a narrower set of 
commercial activities168 (similar to those currently termed “secondary 
infringement” in section 27(2)).169 Thus, the 1842 Act made actionable 
not the mere act of unauthorized reproduction, but only commercial 
dealing with such unauthorized reproductions, such as distribution, 
importation or exportation. This might have meant, and perhaps 
indeed meant, that reproductions outside this commercial domain 
were simply beyond the scope of the Act and not actionable. These 
could include, for example, copies made by individuals for their 
own personal use, but also copies made by teachers for educational 
purposes, and indeed any copying, as long as the copies were not 
commercially dealt with in the ways described in section 15.
Since entirely almost all reported cases, including those where 
copying was found to be fair use, involved commercial dealings (e.g., 
a published book containing extracts from another), it is hard to 
tell whether the lack of cases dealing with non-commercial copying 
reflected a common understanding that those types of reproductions 
were not prohibited by the Copyright Act, or whether the lack of cheap 
and ubiquitous reproduction technologies meant that instances of 
such non-commercial copying were rare, or at least did not really 
trouble copyright owners. In other words, it is hard to tell whether 
the mismatch between the right and the remedy under the 1842 Act 
was intentional or an oversight.
However, in the first case whose outcome would turn on the 
answer to this question, the court decided that Parliament could not 
have intended to render actionable only commercial activities. This 
case, Novello v Sudlow,170 involved 250 lithographic reproductions of 
a musical work (in the form of a music sheet) that were made and 
distributed to members of The Liverpool Philharmonic Society, to be 
performed in a particular event. This society, “consisting of several 
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hundred persons, was established for the purpose of giving concerts 
and musical performances for the gratification of the members, 
and for the promotion of music, and not as a source of profit to the 
members, who performed gratuitously.”171 The court struggled with 
the argument that section 15 of the 1842 Act rendered gratuitous 
distribution of these copies non-actionable, but eventually ruled that 
Parliament could not have intended to limit the common law remedies 
available to a granted property right and ruled for the plaintiff.172 
But this case was not a House of Lords case, so it might not have 
provided the certainty that copyright owners would have desired. The 
1911 Act, however, removed any doubt about that. Unlike the 1842 Act, 
the definition of an infringement in section 2 of the 1911 Act applied 
explicitly to “any person who, without the consent of the owner of 
the copyright, does anything the sole right to do which is by this Act 
conferred on the owner of the copyright”. In addition, to remove any 
doubt about the scope of available remedies, section 6(1) explicitly 
provided that “Where copyright in any work has been infringed, the 
owner of the copyright shall, except as otherwise provided by this 
Act, be entitled to all such remedies by way of injunction or interdict, 
damages, accounts, and otherwise, as are or may be conferred by law 
for the infringement of a right.”173
This overview helps understanding the motivation for legislating 
a fair dealing provision—what hitherto had been a set of loosely 
defined common law rules and principles.
A simple explanation might be that since the 1911 Act was 
mainly a project of consolidation of different acts and codification of 
different common law rules, it seemed prudent not to leave fair use 
without any statutory basis. Even though the Royal Commission in 
1878 recommended against legislating fair use, noting that “In the 
majority of cases these are questions that can only be decided, when 
they arise, by the proper legal tribunals, and no principle which we 
can lay down, or which could be defined by the Legislature, could 
govern all cases that occur”,174 it is possible that the drafters of the 
1911 Act had a different view and thought that their ambitious project 
of codification and consolidation would be incomplete without 
mentioning the doctrine in the statute.175
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Another explanation relates directly to the changes described 
in the previous paragraphs. Possibly, if the Act recognized only the 
expansion of the copyright but remained silent about limitations to 
those expanded rights, courts might have interpreted that as a signal 
that Parliament had decided to abolish fair use. MacGillivray, in his 
1912 commentary, offered an explanation along those lines: 
The protection granted under the general definition of 
copyright in sect. 1 is so absolutely prohibitive of any use 
in the nature of a reproduction of the whole or any part 
of the author’s work, that it is necessary to introduce the 
exceptions specified in sub-section (i) [of s 2]. It would 
hardly have been safe to have left it entirely to the Court 
to say what exceptions should or should not be admitted 
upon the analogy of the case law decided under the 
Copyright Act, 1842.176
Of course, Parliament could have achieved this result by simply 
stating that “any fair dealing with any work does not constitute 
copyright”, without specifying particular purpose. This, however, 
might have been considered too vague, and it would make sense to 
give some illustration.
Alternatively, it is possible that the purpose of specifying the 
five categories was not only to remove any doubts that fair dealing 
applied to those already recognized in the case law, but also to ensure 
that it applied to those who lacked solid grounding in the case law. 
In particular, the addition of “research”, “newspaper summary” and 
“private study”, categories that had no direct precedent in the case 
law, can support this explanation. Although commentators such as 
MacGillivray noted that “The liberty of fair dealing by way of research 
[was] probably intended to express the whole of the existing case law 
on the meaning of fair use”,177 there does not seem to be prior case law 
dealing with research as such, possibly because reproduction for the 
purpose of research that did not involve publication or distribution 
was not a reason for concern and might not have even been actionable 
under the previous Act.178 “Newspaper summary” did not appear in 
the Bill, but was added in Committee.179 And “private study” might 
have been added to overrule, or at least narrow the scope of, the 
holding in Novello v Sudlow and its progeny.180 
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Lastly, and in contrast, it is possible that by specifying five classes 
of cases to which fair dealing applies, Parliament intended to modify 
the common law, limit fair dealing to those and only those categories, 
and prevent the courts from recognizing additional ones. However, 
despite the fact that this view has been accepted lately as conventional 
wisdom, it is the least likely of all explanations. As we shall see below, 
there is no evidence supporting this explanation, and sufficient 
evidence to reject it.
2. The Legislative Record
Unfortunately, the legislative record is not rich enough to 
determine precisely and unequivocally what was Parliament’s 
intent in 1911, but it contains enough to refute the claim that 
the codification of fair dealing was intended to confine it to the 
five enumerated purposes, or otherwise change the common law 
nature of the doctrine. The record contains sufficient evidence to 
the contrary, and it also demonstrates the difficulties in drafting 
a detailed provision to codify a principle that defies precise 
articulation.
When the Bill was introduced to the House of Commons, 
Mr. Buxton, the President of the Board of Trade (the ministry 
responsible for drafting the legislation), surveyed the main changes 
in the proposed Act.181 If the Bill contemplated major reform with 
respect to fair dealing, it would have been expected that such 
change was mentioned, but it was not. Nor did Viscount Haldane, 
who introduced the Bill to the Lords, mention any contemplated 
change with respect to fair dealing. In fact, in objecting to a 
motion “to confine to literary and dramatic works the doctrine of 
fair dealing which has been laid down by the Courts, and not to 
extend it to pictures”,182 Viscount Haldane emphasized the judge-
made nature of the doctrine of fair dealing and stated:
All we propose to do is to declare that for the future 
the principle of fair dealing which the Courts have 
established is to be the law of the Code. … The principle 
of fair dealing is a principle which the Courts have 
applied with the greatest care. … All that is done here is 
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to make a plain declaration of what the law is and to put 
all copyright works under the same wording.183
This statement proves illuminating in several respects. First, it 
regards fair dealing as a principle, and recognizes that the purpose 
was to codify a general principle, applicable to a wide range of 
circumstances, instead of legislating specific rules, articulating specific 
exceptions, tailored to specific circumstances. Second, it clarifies that 
there was no motivation to effect any change in the nature of that 
principle, only to declare its existence. Third, it shows that there was 
no concern that the application of this principle by the courts had 
caused any mischief, and that legislation was required to rein them 
in and limit their discretion. Instead, the statement evinces trust in 
the way courts have applied the principle and confidence in their 
continued ability to do the same in the future. 
The parliamentary debates provide additional evidence. One 
of the debates concerned the status of copyright in written letters. 
One Member of Parliament proposed adding to section 2 an 
explicit exception permitting “The publication of letters where such 
publication is necessary in the public interest, or to preserve or 
establish the rights or reputation of the recipient or his family.”184 It 
was argued that the new Bill would take away such a right, which 
the courts had previously recognized.185 The Solicitor General 
opposed the amendment on the basis that such an amendment was 
unnecessary, because courts are perfectly capable of dealing with 
these issues, should they arise. He described the law as it stood then 
in the following way: 
A man who receives a private letter from another must 
not make an unconscionable or unfair use of it—he must 
not sell copies of it for reward or exercise a copyright in 
it. That would be to make an unfair use of it. But it may 
be possible that there are cases when a man who has 
received a letter, although he has no copyright in it, may 
be entitled to produce it in a court of law and publish it. 
He argued that there was no need for an explicit exception because 
the courts can be trusted not to enjoin or award damages against a 
person who published a letter when the publication was justified. 
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He believed that leaving that for the courts to decide is a better 
approach than creating an explicit exception that might be abused.186 
The subsequent withdrawal of the proposed amendment confirms 
that Parliament did not consider section 2 as preventing courts from 
finding certain uses to be fair, even if not mentioned explicitly.187 
Recent scholarship by Robert Burrell and Allison Coleman188 and 
from Isabella Alexander189 provides further evidence.190 It appears, 
therefore, that section 2(1)(i) was meant to codify the principle of fair 
dealing, without restricting or limiting its application, adaptation and 
adjustment by the courts according to the circumstances of particular 
cases. By specifying instances of dealings (two of which—criticism 
and review—were well recognized by the courts, and three—private 
study, research and newspaper summary—were new) and subjecting 
them to an overarching principle of fair dealing, Parliament intended 
to guarantee the continued vitality of the doctrine. As Isabella 
Alexander writes, rather than to restrict, the five enumerated purposes 
“were intended to be understood synecdochically as standing in for a 
variety of permissible uses.”191
3. Additional Extrinsic Evidence
In addition to the legislative record, other contemporaneous 
extrinsic aids support the view that the 1911 Act was not meant to 
restrict fair dealing and confine it to the five enumerated purposes. 
Several commentaries followed the enactment of the 1911 Act. All 
of them offer a general overview of the 1911 Act and survey the 
motivations for enacting it and the main changes relative to earlier 
law. Neither of them mentions fair dealing in that context, let alone 
viewing the fair dealing provision as a major change compared to 
previous law, nor do they indicate that the previous law on fair use was 
deficient in its overbreadth. All of them, when discussing the various 
provisions of the 1911 Act, including the issue of infringement, refer 
to earlier case law, thus clearly indicating that they did not regard 
the 1911 Act as revolution, but as evolution of a previous body of 
statutory rules and common law interpretation.
The views expressed in two of the leading contemporaneous 
commentaries on the 1911 Act are particularly noteworthy. 
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MacGillivray, as noted earlier, suggested that the fair dealing provision 
was added out of abundance of caution.192
J. M. Easton, the author of the fourth and fifth editions of Copinger 
on Copyright, the leading treatise on copyright,193 noted that “[a]ny 
fair dealing, with, any work for the purposes of private study, research, 
criticism, review, or newspaper summary is also expressly permitted 
by the Act”, but wondered why it was even necessary to include an 
explicit fair dealing provision for the enumerated purposes, because 
“fair dealing for other purposes has always been…permitted and, 
presumably, it was not intended to cut down the rights of fair use 
previously enjoyed under the old law.”194
Richardson’s general observation about the 1911 Act is consistent 
with Easton’s. In his introduction, he remarked that 
The passing of The Copyright Act, 1911, has completely 
recast the Law of Copyright, at any rate those parts 
which depend primarily on Statute Law, such as the term 
of protection and ownership of copyright. Only those 
parts of the law which are practically judge-made—such 
as the questions as to infringement by a new work other 
than an exact copy—have remained to any great extent 
unaltered, and even they are not untouched.195 
L. C. F. Oldfield’s commentary did not seem to read section 2(1)
(i) as limiting the common law of fair use either. In his introduction, 
he stated that when an Act of Parliament has received judicial 
construction, and a later Act in pari materia uses the same words, 
it is presumed that those words retain their meaning, unless there is 
indication to the contrary.196 His discussion of fair dealing reveals that 
he did not see anything in the 1911 Act suggesting alteration of the law 
on fair use. After repeating the statutory provision, he explained that 
“[w]hat is fair dealing with a work depends upon the circumstances 
of each particular case”, and quoted a paragraph from an American 
case, which he regarded as giving “an excellent summary of the law”.197
Oldfield then turned to discussing the question of abridgements, 
and concluded that “[i]t is submitted that the present Act does not 
alter the law with respect to abridgements, and that if bona fide and 
original, although made without the original author’s consent, they 
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are not infringements.”198 Earlier in the book, he even noted that the 
Copyright Bill, as introduced, contained an explicit exception for 
making an abridgement for private use, but “under the present Act 
there is no specific mention of abridgements, but any fair dealing 
with a work for the purpose of private study or research is not an 
infringement” and concluded that as a result “under this Act, the 
author of an original work cannot prevent the publication of any fair 
and bona fide abridgement which in its nature is original…”.199 The 
fact that abridgement was not mentioned in section 2(1)(i) did not 
bother him. 
G. S. Robertson’s commentary200 discusses fair dealing rather 
briefly, noting that “[t]his exception is couched in very wide terms, 
and its limits are not easy to define”201 and then contains some 
inconsistent statements. At one point he explained that “the proviso 
which permits fair dealing for [the enumerated] purposes…covers 
the cases, which have caused some difficulty in the minds of judges, 
where a reproduction of an artistic work is made by hand for the 
purpose of private study or amusement.”202 He then stated that “the 
reproduction, however, when made, must not be dealt with for any 
other purpose than one of those specified in the proviso.”203 It can be 
immediately noticed that “amusement”, which he claims to be covered 
by the proviso, is actually not specified in it.204 
In sum, if by enacting the fair dealing provision Parliament had 
intended to modify the existing doctrine of fair use by confining it to 
five enumerated categories exclusively, most of the contemporaneous 
commentators failed to notice that intention. The parliamentary 
debates do not support this view either. In Canada, the debates in 
1921 do not contain any meaningful discussion of fair dealing. 
The view that Parliament had intended to restrict fair dealing 
to the five enumerated purposes began appearing later. In 1927, the 
sixth edition of Copinger was published. This edition was no longer 
authored by Easton, but penned by F. E. Skone James and published 
by a different publisher. The sixth edition’s view about the scope of fair 
dealing was entirely different and considerably more restrictive. In 
Skone James’s view, the principle embodied in section 2(1)(i) limited 
“the right to fair use to purposes which in their nature are likely to 
differ from those of the works from which extracts are taken”. He 
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clearly regarded the enumeration of the five purposes as a “limitation 
of purposes in regard to which the defence of fair dealing can be set up”, 
a limitation that “has probably not altered the law, but it has prevented 
any attempt to extend the defence to new purposes.”205 Skone James 
provided no authority to support this restrictive interpretation and, 
remarkably, failed to acknowledge that a contrary view was expressed 
in the previous edition of the same book. Instead of grappling with 
the contrary position, he simply chose to omit it. 
Skone James’s treatment of the meaning of “private study” was 
equally deficient. While Easton, in the fifth edition, took the view that 
section 2(1)(i) narrowed the scope of the holding in Novello v Sudlow 
(“It is no defence that the copying is made for the purpose of gratuitous 
circulation, unless it be for private study or research”)206—a position 
that would include circulation to students—Skone James took the 
opposite view, asserting that “‘[p]rivate study,’ it is submitted, only 
covers the case of a student copying out a book for his own use, but 
not the circulation of copies among other students.”207 Again, Skone 
James failed to acknowledge the reversal from the position stated 
in the previous edition, and purported to support this proposition 
by reference to University of London Press, a case that, as discussed 
above, had nothing to do with gratuitous circulation among students.
Perhaps it was the status of Copinger as the leading treatise on 
copyright that entrenched the restrictive view of fair dealing, despite 
the fact that this view has misstated the meaning of the 1911 Act. 
A Canadian leading treatise has witnessed a similar inexplicable 
reversal of view on fair dealing, from one observing continuity with 
the pre-1911 case law to another emphasizing disjuncture. Writing 
in 1944, Harold Fox, in his first treatise on Canadian copyright 
law, took it for granted that a statutory fair dealing coexisted with a 
common law fair use.208 In numerous other places, he referred to fair 
use, relying indiscriminately on prior English and American cases.209 
Nowhere did he suggest that the UK 1911 Act or the Canadian 1921 
Act rendered the common law concepts of fair use obsolete, and 
nowhere did he suggest that by enacting the fair dealing provision, 
Parliament adopted a fundamentally different and more restrictive 
view of what constitutes infringement compared to American law. 
Apparently, his view was that the statutory fair dealing allowed only 
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the enumerated purposes, and that “[t]hose terms will no doubt 
be construed strictly.”210 But “[a]t the same time it would seem that 
‘substantiality’ of the amount copied is still a test for infringement and 
that the Court still has jurisdiction notwithstanding section 17(1)(i) 
[the fair dealing provision] to hold that a substantial part of the work 
has not been taken where the part or parts taken can be justified as 
fair use or fair quotation.”211 Thus, the statutory fair dealing would 
apply even when substantial part was taken,212 and “affords additional 
protection to defendants”, that is, even beyond what might be 
permitted as fair use.213 While his view of what the common law of 
fair use had permitted might be overly restrictive, the crucial point is 
that he viewed the statutory right as expanding upon it. Fox’s second 
edition from 1967 repeats the same view.214
Fox died in 1969; the third edition of his treatise, by John 
McKeown, was published in 2000.215 The discussion in the previous 
editions of the pre-1911 case law on fair use has all but disappeared. 
When discussing what constitutes infringement, McKeown stated:
Prior to the British Act of 1911, a number of cases 
took the approach that it was not an infringement for 
a compiler to refer to a preceding work or works and 
take extracts from them so long as the author expended 
skill and labour which resulted in the production of a 
new original work and the alterations made were not of 
a merely colourable character. This was referred to as 
“fair use” of an earlier work. In light of subsequent cases 
and the current provisions of the Act this approach is no 
longer appropriate.216
McKeown did not refer to any specific subsequent cases or any 
current provision of the Act that he relied on. Moreover, he failed to 
acknowledge Fox’s much richer account of fair use and his different 
view of the relevance of pre-1911 cases. Rather than explaining why 
Fox’s view might have been incorrect when it was written, or at least 
was no longer correct, he simply ignored it. 
While Fox’s discussion of the concept of “lawful use” began with 
restatement of the general common law concept of fair use before 
turning to the statutory fair dealing, McKeown’s editions address 
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only the statutory fair dealing. Again, the change of heart was neither 
acknowledged nor defended. The only hint to the possibility that 
other exceptions might apply was an assertion, in reference to Bishop 
v Stevens, that “[s]ince copyright law in Canada is purely statutory 
law an implied exception from infringement seems unlikely.”217 
To the extent that this view was defensible in 2000, it ought to be 
questioned in light of the recent Supreme Court decisions and of the 
Court’s explicit repudiation of the vision of copyright that informed 
its holding in Bishop.218 
In any event, most recent and present discussions about copyright 
and about copyright reform in Commonwealth jurisdictions have 
taken it for granted that fair dealing cannot apply beyond the explicitly 
enumerated purposes. This assumption was shared both by those 
who advocated replacing the current fair dealing regime with a non-
exhaustive provision as well as by their opponents. Proposals to amend 
the Act in this direction never came to fruition,219 and the preferred 
approach in all recent rounds of copyright reform—or maybe, more 
accurately, the political compromise—was to specify additional 
exceptions instead.220 Does that indicate Parliament’s intent to have 
a closed fair dealing regime? The answer is no. It would be tempting 
to say that Parliament did not adopt those proposals for reform 
because it correctly recognized that the existing provisions were 
never intended to be exhaustive and reform was unnecessary. But this 
would be inaccurate. The truth is that while Parliament recognized 
needs to expand exceptions, it chose not to open up the fair dealing 
provision but chose a different path. But even if this choice reflects the 
way that recent Parliaments interpreted the existing provision, this 
perception does not change the meaning of the original provisions. 
Parliament enacts laws, but it does not interpret them.221 
C. Additional Principles of Statutory Interpretation
1. The Mischief Rule
The mischief rule, traced back to the Heydon’s Case of 1584, 
instructs courts to discern and consider the following: (1) what was 
the common law prior to the enactment of the statute; (2) what was 
the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide; 
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(3) the remedy that Parliament proscribed for that mischief; and (4) 
“The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the judges 
is always to make such construction as shall supress the mischief, and 
advance the remedy.”222 
Since fair dealing had no statutory basis prior to 1911 and there 
was no case law holding that the doctrine can apply only to the 
five enumerated purposes, it must be the case that courts prior to 
1911 could expand fair dealing to new purposes that had not been 
recognized before. Therefore, the view that the 1911 Act has limited 
the power of courts to apply the doctrine to additional purposes must 
suppose that Parliament had had such intention. As the previous 
discussion makes clear, there is no indication that the way courts 
handled the doctrine was considered to be a mischief. There is no 
indication that legislation was deemed required to remedy such 
mischief by limiting courts’ discretion with regard to the purposes 
to which fair dealing might apply. Therefore, if Parliament did not 
consider the existing doctrine of fair use to cause any mischief, there 
is no reason to presume that Parliament had intended to restrict its 
application. 
2.  Presumption that an Enactment Does Not Change Existing Law 
without Clear Indication
The conclusion that Parliament had no intention to prevent the 
application of fair dealing to other purposes is further supported 
by the presumption that an enactment does not change the existing 
law without clear indication, and by the interpretative rule that an 
enactment is presumed to create absurd results. As Sullivan writes, 
“despite the constitutional primacy of the legislature…it is presumed 
that the legislature does not intend to change the common law, to 
introduce exceptions to general principles (which often originate in 
the common law), to interfere with common law rights and freedoms, 
or to take away the jurisdiction of common law courts.”223 To interpret 
an enactment otherwise requires clear indication. This principle was 
well recognized at the time of the enactment of the 1911 Act.224
Indeed, the drafters of the 1911 Act were clearly cognizant of 
these principles, because when Parliament wished to deviate from 
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the common law, it did so explicitly. For example, section 31 of the 
1911 Act was titled “Abrogation of common law rights”, and provided 
that: “No person shall be entitled to copyright…whether published 
or unpublished, otherwise than under and in accordance with the 
provisions of this Act, or of any other statutory enactment for the 
time being in force, but nothing in this section shall be construed 
as abrogating any right or jurisdiction to restrain a breach of trust 
or confidence.” This provision was meant to settle once and for all 
the uncertainty with respect to whether there existed a “common law 
copyright” independent of the statute.225 At the same time, Parliament 
clarified that “the abrogation of common law rights only applie[d] 
to the common law proprietary right”226 but did not affect other 
common law causes of action.227 The provision, with almost identical 
wording, constitutes section 89 of the current Copyright Act.228 
While section 31 explicitly abrogated some common law rights, 
section 6(1) of the 1911 Act (and the corresponding section 34(1) 
in the current Act) explicitly invite courts to resort to the common 
law when deciding the proper remedy when infringement has been 
found.229 Notably, neither section 31 nor section 6(1) limit any 
common law rights of users or any common law defense that might 
be applicable. If Parliament was interested in restricting users’ rights 
or limiting the common law defenses that may be applicable to them, 
it would have done that explicitly.
The choice of the terms “fair” or “fair dealing” also indicate the 
legislative intent to maintain continuity with the pre-enactment case 
law. Notably, in the 1937 case of Johnstone v Bernard Jones, both 
parties agreed that while the case had to be decided according to the 
statutory provision, the previous case law on what constituted “fair 
use” was relevant and helpful. The plaintiff went even further and 
maintained that “It is notorious that the Copyright Act, 1911, was an 
attempt to codify the law: and it would be strange if the Legislature 
consented to accept from the draftsman the word ‘fair’ with a different 
meaning from that which it had in the cases decided before 1911.”230 
Even though there is no indication that Parliament intended 
to restrict fair dealing and displace the common law doctrine with 
a more restrictive statutory version, it may still be unclear whether 
the intention was (1) merely to incorporate or codify the common 
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law principle without an intention to modify it, except that its future 
development will be based on the statute and not on the common law; 
(2) to supplement the common law without displacing it (in which 
case the statutory fair dealing continues to exist alongside a common 
law fair use); or, alternatively, (3) to supplement the common law 
without creating conflict, but with the intention of replacing the 
common law with an exhaustive statutory scheme.231
While Viscount Haldane’s statement that section 2(1)(i) merely 
“declare[s]…for the future the principle of fair dealing which the Courts 
have established is to be the law of the Code” seems consistent with 
the first interpretive alternative, there are some aspects in which the 
statutory fair dealing supplements the common law: first, it explicitly 
recognizes that “private study”, “research” and “newspaper summary” 
could be considered fair dealing, even though there was no previous 
case law dealing with the latter and there was case law that might 
have implied that the doctrine did not apply to the former.232 Second, 
prior case law often disposed of cases of copying of insubstantial part 
as a matter of fair use, but the statutory scheme created a distinction 
between the two concepts. Copying of an insubstantial part did not 
constitute an infringement by virtue of the definition of the copyright 
in section 1(1) (currently section 3(1) in Canada), whereas fair 
dealing would not constitute an infringement by virtue of the proviso 
in section 2(1)(i) (currently ss 29-29.2 in Canada), meaning that 
fair dealing may apply—and indeed should only be considered—if 
what has been copied is substantial.233 Therefore, the first alternative 
(codification without any modification) may not be the correct one. 
The second alternative—namely, that the statutory fair dealing 
coexists with a common law fair use—may be an attractive way of 
interpreting the current fair dealing provisions, because it allows the 
court easily to reconcile the plain language of the fair dealing provisions 
with the other considerations militating against the view that fair 
dealing is confined to the five enumerated purposes. Recognizing that 
a common law fair use continues to coexist alongside the statutory 
fair dealing allows the court to avoid two evils: one, an interpretation 
of the Act that may seem to be reading into it language that is not 
there (e.g., reading in the words “such as”, or interpreting the five 
enumerated purposes so broadly in order to capture the impugned 
134   |   THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY
use),234 and, two, the absurd results arising from an interpretation 
that views all fair dealings for purposes beyond the five enumerated 
ones as categorically infringing, no matter how otherwise fair those 
dealings are. 
The difficulty may lie in reconciling this approach with the Compo 
legacy: the Supreme Court’s statement that “The legislation speaks for 
itself and the actions of the appellant must be measured according to the 
terms of the statute,”235 and that “copyright in this country is a creature 
of statute and the rights and remedies it provides are exhaustive”.236 
Perhaps it is time to add some nuance to these statements.237
The third alternative may seem more consistent with Viscount 
Haldane’s statement, and with the Compo legacy, but it will require 
courts to either interpret each of the enumerated purposes so broadly 
as to encompass any possible use that may deem to be fair, or to 
recognize that the list of enumerated purposes is after all, and contrary 
to conventional wisdom, not exhaustive. A court may do so either 
by interpreting the list as merely illustrative of a broader principle 
that underlies fair dealing, or by acknowledging the occasional 
imperfections of statutory drafting and reading in the words “such as”. 
3. Avoiding Absurd Consequences
As noted above, the notion that by enumerating the five (now 
eight) categories, Parliament intended to exclude all possible 
other instances of fair dealing is linguistically plausible. But what 
is linguistically plausible is not determinative of the text’s legal 
meaning. “[T]he linguist inquires into what meanings the text can 
‘tolerate’ in its language, in light of the totality of potential contexts. 
… Legal interpreters build on the work of the linguists who 
determine linguistic range. Interpreters translate the language into 
law by pinpointing or extricating a single, unique legal meaning.”238 
Among other consideration, the legal interpreter is directed to 
avoid an interpretation that produces absurd consequences.239 “[A]n 
interpretation can be considered absurd if it leads to ridiculous or 
frivolous consequences, if it is extremely unreasonable or inequitable, 
if it is illogical or incoherent, or if it is incompatible with other 
provisions or with the object of the legislative enactment.”240
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A few examples will suffice to show that the view that the list of 
enumerated purposes is exhaustive leads to such absurd consequences. 
Consider, for example, the common—and indeed indispensable—
practice in judicial proceedings whereby litigants make several copies 
of the authorities they rely on and submit them to the court and to all 
other parties. There is no explicit provision in the Copyright Act that 
permits this action, and the making of such copies does not easily 
fit any of the enumerated fair dealing provisions. Interestingly, the 
current UK legislation includes explicit provisions that permit the 
making of such copies,241 but they did not exist in 1911, and cannot be 
found in the Canadian Act.242 Yet, in CCH the Court did not hesitate 
to endorse the Great Library’s practice of making copies, which 
explicitly permitted the making of copies “required for the purposes 
of research, review, private study and criticism, as well as use in court, 
tribunal and government proceedings”243 and concluded that “the Law 
Society’s dealings with the publishers’ works satisfy the fair dealing 
defence.”244 Even though Parliament never explicitly exempted this 
activity, the Court effectively recognized an additional implied fair 
dealing exception for this purpose, and rightly so. Doing otherwise 
would be utterly absurd.245
Or consider time-shifting. In 1984, the US Supreme Court ruled, 
in the landmark Sony v Universal case, that it was fair use—and 
therefore not an infringement of copyright—for individuals to use a 
video cassette recorder to tape television shows in order to view them 
at a later time. At the end of the majority opinion, after providing a 
detailed doctrinal analysis, Stevens J wrote the following epilogue:
One may search the Copyright Act in vain for any sign 
that the elected representatives of the millions of people 
who watch television every day have made it unlawful 
to copy a program for later viewing at home, or have 
enacted a flat prohibition against the sale of machines 
that make such copying possible.246
Should we assume that because time-shifting was explicitly 
recognized as non-infringing only in 2012 (and not as part of the 
fair dealing provision),247 the elected representatives of millions of 
Canadians who have watched television every day and have taped 
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TV shows for the better part of the last three decades have made it 
unlawful to videotape TV shows? Is there any valid political theory 
that would explain why Stevens J’s assumption about the American 
political process could not apply to Canada in this context? And what 
about a person who made two copies of a TV show: to begin watching 
one at home, and continue watching it on an iPad at the gym? The new 
time-shifting exception in section 29.23(c) covers only the making of 
one reproduction. Does the second one necessarily make that person 
an infringer? Do we really need to try shoehorning this activity into 
one of the enumerated purposes to avoid this absurdity?248 
Should we assume that Justin Bieber infringed copyright when, in 
2008, he posted on YouTube videos of himself singing others’ songs 
without first clearing the copyrights,249 and that this kind of activity 
was made lawful only in 2012, when section 29.21 was enacted? 
Or consider section 29.4, permitting common classroom 
activities, such as writing a poem on a blackboard or incorporating 
an image into an overhead presentation. This provision was enacted 
in 1997, meaning that until that year, there was no explicit provision 
permitting those activities. While PowerPoint presentations did not 
exist in 1911—and likely were not even contemplated then—chalk, 
blackboards and poems clearly did. It would be absurd to think that 
for the better part of the twentieth century, writing a poem on a 
blackboard in a classroom required the permission of the copyright 
owner, and that Parliament intended this result, but changed its mind 
in 1997. Likewise, it would be absurd to think that any deviation from 
the requirements of section 29.4, even after 1997 (e.g., if the copying 
is done not “on the premises of an educational institution”, but during 
a field trip, or if an image is being photocopied and distributed as 
handouts, but not displayed on a board or projected) would constitute 
infringement without the consent of the copyright owner. Strange as 
it may sound, this would have been the implication of the minority 
view in Alberta v Access Copyright, had this view prevailed.250
Fortunately, this interpretive challenge is now moot, because the 
Supreme Court confirmed that “private study” includes classroom 
instruction, and Parliament added “education” to section 29, an 
amendment that removes any doubt about the availability of fair 
dealing to these circumstances.
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Moreover, the notion that fair dealing applies only to certain 
allowable purposes implies that “[d]ealings for other purposes are not 
covered by the exception, even if they would otherwise be fair”. This 
means that when Parliament enacted in 1911 that “Any fair dealing 
with any work for the purposes of private study, research, criticism, 
review, or newspaper summary…shall not constitute an infringement 
of copyright”, it meant that dealings with works for other purposes may 
still be regarded as fair, but nonetheless shall constitute an infringement 
of copyright. As noted above, this is a paradoxical result.251 
Finally, and more generally, the notion that Parliament intended 
to exclude the possibility of applying fair dealing to non-enumerated 
purposes necessarily relies on one of the following two alternative 
assumptions: one, that Parliament believed that it had canvassed the 
entire universe of uses that were known at the time of the enactment 
as well as those that might be known and possible sometime in the 
future, and concluded that only the five (and now eight) enumerated 
purposes are capable of qualifying as fair dealing; or that Parliament 
was aware it could not foresee all potential future uses, but still 
decided in advance that no matter what those uses are, they ought to 
be categorically excluded.
The first alternative is inconsistent with the “basic assumption 
that the legislature is a competent institution acting in the public 
interest.”252 No competent legislature could believe that it could 
foresee all types of future uses and predetermine that they could not 
possibly be fair. 
The absurdity of the alternative assumption requires more 
elaboration. The absurdity of the notion that if a purpose is not 
explicitly enumerated, it is categorically excluded from the purview 
of fair dealing, stems from its incompatibility with the purpose of the 
Copyright Act. 
Fair dealing has a purpose: to allow the unauthorized use of works 
in a manner that promotes the public interest in the encouragement 
and dissemination of works of the arts and intellect, when the dealing 
does not seriously undermine the copyright owner’s opportunity 
to obtain a just reward.253 It is the same purpose identified by Lord 
Mansfield in 1785,254 Souter J in 1995255 or the Supreme Court of 
Canada in 2004 and 2012.
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Yet, even though it is possible to identify the principle that fair 
dealing stands for, articulating a precise legal rule that implements it 
is notoriously difficult, if not impossible. The Royal Commission on 
Copyright, whose 1878 report was one of the bases for the enactment 
of the Copyright Act, 1911, stated that “no principle which we can lay 
down, or which could be defined by the Legislature, could govern all 
cases that occur” and that ultimately these can be decided only on a case-
by-case basis by “the proper tribunals.”256 Almost a century later, the 
US Congress House Committee reached a similar conclusion, noting 
that “since the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally 
applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question 
must be decided on its own facts.”257 Lord Denning, in Hubbard v 
Vosper,258 and the Court, in CCH, made similar observations, as did 
the US Supreme Court in Campbell.259 
It is not surprising, therefore, that instead of precise rules, 
legislation that includes fair dealing or fair use provisions tends to 
adopt a flexible and adaptable standard,260 to be implemented by 
courts on a case-by-case basis or, more often, a combination of a 
general governing fair dealing standard, supplemented by specifically 
proscribed rules applicable to certain circumstances that were 
identified in advance. 
Similarly, at the international level, attempts to draft a precise 
rule regarding limitations and exceptions to copyright proved futile, 
and resulted in the intentionally vague three-step test, such as the one 
incorporated in the Berne Convention.261
Once the central role that fair dealing plays in calibrating the 
rights of owners with the rights of users and the public interest is 
recognized, the view that fair dealing applies only to the explicitly 
enumerated purposes becomes tenuous, because it requires one to 
believe that those five, now eight, purposes encompass the entire 
universe of dealings that could justify using a work without getting 
the copyright owner’s permission. But it is easy to identify uses that 
do not fall into any of the enumerated purposes (or any other specific 
statutory exception) and that Parliament cannot have intended to be 
regarded as categorically infringing.
But more importantly, if the purpose of the Copyright Act is to 
encourage future innovation and creativity, fair dealing must be 
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flexible and unlimited with respect to the purposes to which it could 
apply, otherwise this purpose would be undermined. Rule makers 
cannot foresee all the types of future uses that justify exemption, and 
inevitably, a system that relies exclusively on ex ante proscribed rules 
will be tailored to allow only the interests of existing users who had 
enough political clout to lobby for an exemption.262 By definition, 
however, truly new innovations in technology or in cultural expression, 
those that do not yet exist and may not even be thought of, have no one 
advocating for them.263 Without a possibility of relying on a flexible 
fair dealing standard, the law might prevent these innovations from 
ever being created. A system that permits only the uses that were able 
to bargain their way at the legislative negotiation table but excludes 
all others is doomed to cultural and technological stagnation. While 
a flexible fair dealing does not guarantee that all socially beneficial 
uses will be permitted, at least it allows the new uses, those that were 
not even thought of, or that had no one lobbying for them during 
the legislative process, to have their day in court and argue, “We’re 
fair!” It allows innovators to use their scarce resources on recruiting 
the most talented developers before they need to hire the lobbyists.264 
Not all such uses or expressions are necessarily fair, but a rule that 
categorically excludes them from the purview of fair dealing means 
that they require prior permission from either the copyright owner or 
from Parliament. If such an outcome does not constitute an outright 
unconstitutional prior restraint on speech, then it is at least very close, 
and “the traditional reticence of English, American, and Canadian 
courts to impose prior restraints on speech”265 ought to disfavour it.266 
Leaving room to individual litigants and the courts to apply fair 
dealing to circumstances unforeseen by Parliament is not a “far less 
effective, less democratic and less principled way to approach copyright 
reform”267 than the alternative. Quite the contrary: it is more effective, 
more democratic and more principled, because it enables policy 
making based on evidence and arguments that are inherently incapable 
of having a voice in the legislative process.268 It is a feature, not a bug. 
Moreover, specific rule-based exceptions, whose main advantage 
is the certainty that they are purported to promote, are vulnerable 
to rigidity, and without an overarching principle to guide them, 
their application tends to “hinge on arcane debates over taxonomy 
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[making them] perennially uncertain.”269 In contrast, an omnipresent 
flexible fair dealing avoids this rigidity, and increases certainty over 
time, as the contours of owners’ and users’ rights in unforeseen 
circumstances is determined through litigation,270 and subsequent 
legislative amendments when necessary. 
V: Conclusion
When fair dealing was codified a century ago, there was no intention 
to restrict or limit its application, adaptation and adjustment by the 
courts. Parliament sought to codify a principle, a flexible standard, 
not precise rules, yet the English courts that failed to recognize this 
point have sentenced fair dealing to a hundred years of solitude. 
Fortunately, at the turn of the twenty-first century, the Supreme 
Court of Canada declined to follow that restrictive path. Parliament’s 
decision to explicitly recognize additional purposes and add specific 
exceptions moves Canadian law in the same direction. The Court’s 
rulings and Parliament’s action have entrenched fair dealing and 
provided a necessary correction that allows fair dealing to resume the 
role it was always supposed to play. The recent developments have 
narrowed the range of potential uses that may not be found within 
the ambit of the explicit exceptions, or the more general fair dealing 
provisions, but if conventional wisdom is correct, some uses, present 
or future, are still categorically excluded. This is not a recipe for 
progress. We can easily predict that fewer new forms of expressions, 
and fewer novel ways of using, reusing and disseminating works, will 
emerge in a legal environment that outlaws them outright.
However, there is no serious indication that this is what Parliament 
intended when it legislated fair dealing, and there are very good 
reasons to challenge the view that it did have such intentions. “All 
we propose,” declared Viscount Haldane before the House of Lords 
in 1911, “is to declare that for the future the principle of fair dealing 
which the Courts have established is to be the law of the Code.”271 
All I propose is that we follow that law.
Omnipresent fair dealing is here. It always has been. 
©
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Fairness Found: 
How Canada Quietly Shifted from  
Fair Dealing to Fair Use 
michael geist1 
The breadth and scope of copyright limitations and exceptions has 
emerged as a major policy issue around the world.2 Some narrow 
limitations on copyright holders’ rights, such as quotation, remain 
uncontroversial, yet more expansive, flexible exceptions have 
generated fierce debate. Virtually all domestic copyright laws include 
some limitations and exceptions to the exclusive rights otherwise 
granted to copyright holders, typically achieved through the adoption 
of one of two models. 
One approach is a “fair use” model, which is widely viewed as the 
most flexible limitation and exception on the copyright holders’ rights, 
given its potential applicability to any circumstance or use. As further 
discussed below, fair use models, which have been implemented in 
countries such as the United States, Israel and the Philippines, provide 
an open-ended exception in which any use may qualify as a fair use 
provided that it meets criteria designed to establish reasonable limits. 
Those criteria, which seek to adhere to international copyright laws 
found in the Berne Convention, are either statute-based or developed 
through case law. 
The alternative approach is the “fair dealing” model, commonly 
5
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found in Commonwealth countries such as the United Kingdom, 
Canada and Australia. Fair dealing also incorporates fairness criteria 
to assure reasonable use of works, yet the key difference between 
fair use and fair dealing lies in the circumscribed purposes found 
under fair dealing. Unlike the open-ended fair use model, fair dealing 
models typically identify specific categories or purposes for which 
fair dealing is permitted. The model creates a two-stage analysis: first, 
whether the intended use qualifies for one of the permitted purposes, 
and second, whether the use itself meets the fairness criteria. By 
contrast, fair use raises only the second-stage analysis, since there are 
no statutory limitations on permitted purposes.
Given the need for a two-stage analysis and the prospect that some 
uses may fall outside of fair dealing by failing to qualify for one of 
the circumscribed purposes, some fair dealing countries have begun 
to consider whether to adopt fair use provisions or expand their fair 
dealing criteria. For example, Israeli copyright reform enacted in 
2007 resulted in an open-ended fair dealing provision designed to 
mirror the flexibility found under fair use.3 Moreover, countries such 
as the United Kingdom, Australia and Ireland have conducted public 
consultations that emphasized the scope and flexibility of their fair 
dealing rules.4
Fair dealing has also occupied a prominent position in Canada’s 
copyright reform debate. After the Supreme Court of Canada (the 
Court) characterized fair dealing as a “users’ right” that required a 
large and liberal interpretation in the landmark CCH Canadian Ltd. 
v Law Society of Upper Canada decision [CCH],5 Canadian copyright 
scholars began to consider the benefits of expanding the fair dealing 
clause that, at the time, was limited to five purposes: research, private 
study, criticism, news reporting, and review.6 Many argued that a 
flexible provision in which the list of enumerated purposes would 
be illustrative rather than exhaustive would be more consistent 
with the Court’s vision of fair dealing as a user’s right.7 However, 
the introduction of Bill C-32 (later Bill C-11) dashed hopes that 
statutory reform would establish a flexible fair dealing provision, as 
the government chose instead to add several additional purposes 
(education, satire and parody), but declined to open the provision to 
allow a court to identify new purposes in appropriate circumstances.8
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Ironically, weeks after Bill C-11 received royal assent in June 2012, 
the Court released the “copyright pentalogy”, in which fair dealing 
featured prominently in several of the cases. As further discussed 
below, the Court’s strong support for fair dealing may have done 
more than simply reaffirm fair dealing as a user’s right. The Court’s 
fair dealing analysis, when coupled with Bill C-11’s statutory reforms, 
may have effectively turned the Canadian fair dealing clause into a 
fair use provision. 
While Canadian copyright law still involves the two-stage analysis, 
the first stage has become so easy to meet that Canada appears to 
be inching closer to fair use. Indeed, the breadth of the fair dealing 
purposes is now so wide—eight purposes covering most imaginable 
uses—that future Canadian fair dealing analyses are likely to involve 
only a perfunctory assessment of the first-stage purposes test together 
with a far more rigorous analysis (what the Court in SOCAN v Bell 
Canada [Bell] described as “heavy-hitting”) in the second-stage, six-
factor assessment.9
This chapter will examine the emergence of a Canadian “fair 
use” provision. Part I will review the fair use and fair dealing models, 
and will examine the current analysis of fair dealing as reflected in 
the recent Supreme Court cases. Part II will argue that the approach 
adopted by the Court, together with Bill C-11’s statutory reforms, 
supports the notion that the current Canadian fair dealing regime 
now more closely resembles a flexible, open-ended fair use model.
i: The law of Fair Use and Fair Dealing
Exceptions and limitations within copyright law, whether described as 
fair dealing, fair use, fair practice, or simply enumerated exceptions, 
enjoy widespread acceptance. The Berne Convention’s Article 10 
includes a specific, though somewhat limited, fair “practice” provision 
that focuses primarily on quotation, educational use and attribution. 
The Article provides that:
(1) It shall be permissible to make quotations from a 
work which has already been lawfully made available 
to the public, provided that their making is compatible 
with fair practice, and their extent does not exceed that 
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justified by the purpose, including quotations from 
newspaper articles and periodicals in the form of press 
summaries.
(2) It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of 
the Union, and for special agreements existing or to be 
concluded between them, to permit the utilization, to 
the extent justified by the purpose, of literary or artistic 
works by way of illustration in publications, broadcasts 
or sound or visual recordings for teaching, provided 
such utilization is compatible with fair practice.
(3) Where use is made of works in accordance with the 
preceding paragraphs of this Article, mention shall be 
made of the source, and of the name of the author, if it 
appears thereon.10 
In addition to this fair practice provision, Article 9 of the 
Berne Convention features the infamous three-step test, which 
simultaneously opens the door to broader exceptions and limitations 
within national copyright law and restricts the ability for countries 
to implement such exceptions. After establishing an exclusive right 
of reproduction for literary and artistic works in Article 9(1), Article 
9(2) provides that “it shall be a matter for legislation in the countries 
of the Union to permit the reproduction of such works in certain 
special cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict 
with a normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.”11 This three-step 
test—certain special cases, no conflict with the normal exploitation 
of the work, and no unreasonable prejudice of the legitimate interests 
of the author—is generally viewed as setting the outer framework for 
national exceptions.12 
i. Fair Use Models
The fair use approach for limitations and exceptions is most closely 
associated with the United States. The US fair use provision is found 
in Section 107 of the Copyright Act, which provides that:
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[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such 
use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or 
by any other means specified by that section, for 
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), 
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of 
copyright. In determining whether the use made of a 
work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be 
considered shall include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work.13
A detailed analysis of the fair use provision is beyond the scope 
of this chapter; however, it bears noting that what distinguishes the 
US provision is its inherent flexibility. Unlike the typical fair dealing 
provision, which features an exhaustive list of purposes, the US 
provision points to criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, 
scholarship and research as illustrative fair use purposes, leaving open 
the possibility of the identification of additional purposes through 
case law. 
The US fair use doctrine has been applied to a wide range of 
activities that fall outside the boundaries of the specifically enumerated 
purposes. In those instances, US courts have engaged in an analysis of 
the four factors identified in Section 107.14 
Notwithstanding (or perhaps as a result of) its flexibility, the 
US fair use provision has drawn criticism from both sides of the 
copyright spectrum. Cary Sherman, the former President of the 
Recording Industry Association of America, has argued that the 
Consumer Electronics Association has “twisted and contorted ‘fair 
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use’ beyond its true intent, turning it into a free pass for those who 
simply don’t want to pay for creative works.”15 On the other side of the 
issue, Harvard law professor Lawrence Lessig has characterized fair 
use as the right to retain a lawyer, lamenting the need to “either pay 
a lawyer to defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down 
permissions so you don’t have to rely upon fair use rights.”16
Lessig’s perspective finds support in Will Fair Use Survive? Free 
Expression in the Age of Copyright Control,17 a 2005 report by Marjorie 
Heins and Tricia Beckles. The report concludes that artists, writers, 
historians and filmmakers are “burdened by a ‘clearance culture’ that 
ignores fair use and forces them to seek permission (which may be 
denied) and pay high license fees in order to use even small amounts 
of copyrighted or trademarked material.”18
While US fair use is often painted as a confusing and unpredictable 
doctrine, a 2007 study by Barton Beebe, a New York University law 
professor, suggests that the majority of US courts clearly identify the 
basis for their fair use analysis.19 Beebe examined 271 reported federal 
court opinions that made substantial use of the four-factor fair use 
test from 1978 through to 2005 to discover how the test operates 
practically. He found that 65 percent of the opinions identified 
whether a specific factor favoured the finding of fair use.20
The fair use approach may be most closely associated with the 
US, but it is found in many other countries around the world. Several 
have adopted a fair use principle and codified a non-exhaustive list of 
criteria to determine whether the use is fair. For example, Article 19 
of the Israel Copyright Act, 2007 provides that
(a) Fair use of a work is permitted for purposes such 
as: private study, research, criticism, review, journalistic 
reporting, quotation, or instruction and examination by 
an educational institution.
(b) In determining whether a use made of a work is 
fair within the meaning of this section the factors to be 
considered shall include, inter alia, all of the following:
The purpose and character of the use;
The character of the work used;
MICHAEL GEIST  |   163
The scope of the use, quantitatively and qualitatively, in 
relation to the work as a whole;
The impact of the use on the value of the work and its 
potential market.21
Taiwan’s Copyright Act, 2007 features a similar fair use provision 
at Article 65:22
Fair use of a work shall not constitute infringement on 
economic rights in the work.
In determining whether the exploitation of a work complies 
with the provisions of Articles 44 through 63, or other 
conditions of fair use, all circumstances shall be taken into 
account, and in particular the following facts shall be noted 
as the basis for determination:
1. The purposes and nature of the exploitation, including 
whether such exploitation is of a commercial nature or is 
for nonprofit educational purposes.
2. The nature of the work.
3. The amount and substantiality of the portion exploited 
in relation to the work as a whole.
4. Effect of the exploitation on the work’s current and 
potential market value.
The Philippines copyright law of 1997 also contains specific fair 
use language:23
185.1. The fair use of a copyrighted work for criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching including multiple 
copies for classroom use, scholarship, research, and 
similar purposes is not an infringement of copyright. 
Decompilation, which is understood here to be the 
reproduction of the code and translation of the forms of 
the computer program to achieve the inter-operability of 
an independently created computer program with other 
programs may also constitute fair use. In determining 
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is 
fair use, the factors to be considered shall include:
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(a) The purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
non-profit education purposes;
(b) The nature of the copyrighted work;
(c) The amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(d) The effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work.
While these “fair use countries” refer to their exception as fair use, 
some countries have retained fair dealing language, yet established 
the flexibility that is the hallmark of fair use. For example, Singapore’s 
fair dealing provision—with two narrow exceptions—permits the 
application of fair dealing for any purpose. Article 35(1) stipulates:
Subject to this section, a fair dealing with a literary, 
dramatic, musical or artistic work, or with an adaptation  
of a literary, dramatic or musical work, for any purpose 
other than a purpose referred to in section 36 or 37  
shall not constitute an infringement of the copyright  
in the work.24 
The provision also includes five factors to be considered in 
assessing whether the dealing is fair.
Malaysia has also retained fair dealing language, but in 2012 
adopted a more flexible approach to the purposes covered by the 
provision. As amended, section 13(2) of its Copyright Act provides,
Notwithstanding subsection (1), the right of control 
under that subsection does not include the right to 
control –
(a) the doing of any of the acts referred to in subsection 
(1) by way of fair dealing including for purposes of 
research, private study, criticism, review or the reporting 
of news or current events:
Provided that it is accompanied by an acknowledgement 
of the title of the work and its authorship, except that 
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no acknowledgement is required in connection with the 
reporting of news or current events by means of a sound 
recording, film or broadcast.25
Flexible fair use exceptions have been adopted by a growing 
number of jurisdictions. In each instance, the provision identifies 
either fair use or fair dealing purposes, but leaves open the possibility 
of expanding the list through judicial interpretation.
ii. Fair Dealing
Unlike the flexible fair use model, fair dealing is typically characterized 
by its more limited scope. The primary limitation comes from the 
requirement that the dealing qualify for at least one of a series of 
enumerated purposes. Therefore, while fair use is open-ended, the 
statutory framework for fair dealing often involves a closed list of 
purposes. 
For example, the United Kingdom’s fair dealing provision 
identifies research, private study, criticism, review and reporting 
current events as the enumerated purposes.26 The enumerated 
purposes in the Australian fair dealing provisions are research, private 
study, criticism, parody, satire, reporting news, or a legal practitioner, 
registered patent attorney or registered trademarks attorney giving 
professional advice.27
Canadian copyright law currently includes a fair dealing exception 
as well as specific exceptions for certain classes of works and certain 
users. Section 29 of the Act provides that “fair dealing for the purpose 
of research or private study does not infringe copyright.”28 Section 
29.1 adds that
Fair dealing for the purpose of criticism or review does 
not infringe copyright if the following are mentioned:
(a) the source; and
(b) if given in the source, the name of the
(i) author, in the case of a work,
(ii) performer, in the case of a performer’s performance,
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(iii) maker, in the case of a sound recording, or
(iv) broadcaster, in the case of a communication signal.29
Section 29.2 includes a similar exception for news reporting.30
As part of Bill C-11, the copyright reform bill that received royal 
assent in June 2012, the Canadian government added three additional 
purposes to the law: parody, satire and education.31
Until relatively recently, the Canadian fair dealing provisions were 
viewed as fairly restrictive, both with regard to the limited number of 
purposes that statutorily qualify for fair dealing as well as in the way 
that the Canadian courts interpreted the provision. Indeed, prior to 
2002, the leading pronouncement on copyright law from Canada’s 
highest court came in Bishop v Stevens, a 1990 decision that involved 
the recording of a song without permission.32 In that case, McLachlin 
J (as she then was) suggested that since the Copyright Act was based 
on UK law, it was adopted with a single object: “namely, the benefit 
of authors of all kinds, whether the works were literary, dramatic or 
musical.”33
That singular focus was evident in Michelin v CAW Canada, a 
1997 case involving a suit against a union’s distribution of leaflets 
during a labour dispute that included the image of the Michelin 
man logo.34 The union argued that the use of the logo was a parody 
and thus qualified as criticism under the fair dealing exception. 
The Federal Court rejected that argument, emphasizing the need to 
strictly interpret the fair dealing provision, while maintaining that 
parody was not an enumerated exception within the Copyright Act 
and that further, it was not synonymous with criticism. 
The Bishop and Michelin perspective remained firm for ten 
years—including throughout the 1997 Copyright Act reform 
process—until the Court shifted its view in Théberge v Galerie d’Art 
du Petit Champlain inc., a 2002 decision that featured explicit support 
for a copyright balance and due consideration for copyright’s effect 
on innovation.35 The case involved a challenge by Claude Théberge, 
a Quebec painter with an international reputation, against an art 
gallery that purchased posters of Théberge’s work and proceeded to 
transfer the images from paper to canvas. The gallery’s technology 
was state of the art—it used a process that lifted the ink off the poster 
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and transferred it to the canvas. The gallery did not actually create any 
new images or reproductions of the work, since the poster paper was 
left blank after the process was complete. Théberge was nevertheless 
outraged—he believed he had sold paper posters, not canvas-based 
reproductions—and he proceeded to sue in Quebec court, requesting 
an injunction to stop the transfers, as well as the seizure of the existing 
canvas-backed images. 
Although the Quebec Court of Appeal ruled in favour of the 
seizure, the majority of the Court overturned that decision, finding 
that the images were merely transferred from one medium to another 
and were not reproduced contrary to the Copyright Act. Writing for 
the majority of the Court, Binnie J stated that 
[T]he proper balance among these and other public 
policy objectives lies not only in recognizing the creator’s 
rights but in giving due weight to their limited nature…. 
Once an authorized copy of a work is sold to a member 
of the public, it is generally for the purchaser, not the 
author, to determine what happens to it.36 
Binnie J also emphasized the dangers of copyright that veers too 
far toward copyright creators at the expense of both the public and 
the innovation process. He noted that “[e]xcessive control by holders 
of copyrights and other forms of intellectual property may unduly 
limit the ability of the public domain to incorporate and embellish 
creative innovation in the long-term interests of society as a whole, or 
create practical obstacles to proper utilization.”37
Although critics of the Théberge decision suggested that it 
reflected a divide between common and civil law perspectives on 
copyright, those views were put to rest two years later in CCH, in 
which a unanimous Court strongly affirmed its support for a balanced 
approach to copyright law, and in the process breathed new life into 
the Copyright Act’s fair dealing provision.38
The case involved a dispute between the Law Society of Upper 
Canada and several legal publishers. The Law Society, which 
maintains the Great Library, a leading law library in Toronto, provided 
the profession with two methods of copying cases and other legal 
materials. First, it ran a service whereby lawyers could request a copy 
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of a particular case or article. Second, it maintained several stand-
alone photocopiers that could be used by library patrons. The legal 
publishers objected to the Law Society’s copying practices and sued 
for copyright infringement. They maintained that the materials being 
copied were entitled to copyright protection and that the Law Society 
was authorizing others to infringe on their copyright.
The Law Society emerged victorious on most counts in this 
regard, as the Court ruled that the Society had neither infringed the 
publishers’ copyright nor authorized others to do so. In its decision, 
the Court provided a detailed discussion of the fair dealing exception, 
concluding that the exception should be granted a large and liberal 
interpretation.39 In fact, the Court remarkably fashioned exceptions 
to copyright infringement as new copyright rights—users’ rights—
that must be balanced against the rights of copyright owners and 
creators:40
Before reviewing the scope of the fair dealing exception 
under the Copyright Act, it is important to clarify some 
general considerations about exceptions to copyright 
infringement. Procedurally, a defendant is required to 
prove that his or her dealing with a work has been fair; 
however, the fair dealing exception is perhaps more 
properly understood as an integral part of the Copyright 
Act than simply a defence. Any act falling within the 
fair dealing exception will not be an infringement 
of copyright. The fair dealing exception, like other 
exceptions in the Copyright Act, is a user’s right. In order 
to maintain the proper balance between the rights of 
a copyright owner and users’ interests, it must not be 
interpreted restrictively.41
Having characterized fair dealing as a user’s right that must not 
be interpreted restrictively, the Court then illustrated the appropriate 
application of a fair dealing analysis: 
The fair dealing exception under s. 29 is open to those who 
can show that their dealings with a copyrighted work were 
for the purpose of research or private study. “Research” 
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must be given a large and liberal interpretation in order to 
ensure that users’ rights are not unduly constrained. I agree 
with the Court of Appeal that research is not limited to 
non-commercial or private contexts.42
The importance of the CCH decision to the application of the 
fair dealing provision cannot be overstated. In a single decision, the 
Court elevated fair dealing from a limited exception that was viewed 
as largely ineffectual to a user right that must not be interpreted 
restrictively and cannot be unduly constrained. While the Copyright 
Act provides copyright holders with a large basket of rights, the 
CCH decision provided a powerful reminder that those rights are 
not absolute. Just as patent law balances the rights of patentees with 
the broad societal interests, so too copyright constrains the rights of 
copyright holders in favour of public access to works. 
In assessing the Law Society’s fair dealing arguments, the Chief 
Justice relied heavily on the six factors enumerated by Linden JA 
in the earlier Federal Court of Appeal decision. While these factors 
were not viewed as a strict test, the Court emphasized their value in 
gauging the fairness of the dealing. The six factors are:
1. The purpose of the dealing – The Court explained 
that “allowable purposes should not be given a 
restrictive interpretation or this could result in 
the undue restriction of users’ rights.”43
2. The character of the dealing – One should ask 
whether a single copy or multiple copies were 
made. It may be relevant to look at industry 
standards.44
3. The amount of the dealing – “Both the amount 
of the dealing and importance of the work 
allegedly infringed should be considered in 
assessing fairness.” The extent of the copying 
may be different according to the use. In some 
cases even quoting the entire work may be fair 
dealing.45
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4. Alternatives to the dealing – Was a “non-
copyrighted equivalent of the work” available?46
5. The nature of the work – “[I]f a work has not 
been published, the dealing may be more fair 
in that its reproduction with acknowledgement 
could lead to a wider public dissemination of 
the work—one of the goals of copyright law. If, 
however, the work in question was confidential, 
this may tip the scales towards finding that the 
dealing was unfair.”47
6. Effect of the dealing on the work – Will copying 
the work affect the market of original work? 
“Although the effect of the dealing on the market 
of the copyright owner is an important factor, it 
is neither the only factor nor the most important 
factor that a court must consider in deciding if 
the dealing is fair.”48
It is noteworthy that the Linden six-factor test was itself influenced 
by Hubbard v Vosper,49 a United Kingdom decision authored by Lord 
Denning. In Hubbard, Lord Denning explained that fairness would 
be determined by reference to the specific facts of the case, which he 
proceeded to assess on the basis of factors later adopted in the CCH 
decision. Lord Denning added that he did not view the factors as 
exhaustive and that others may and should be examined by the court.
The CCH decision generated considerable debate over the 
scope of the fair dealing provision, culminating in the latest round 
of Supreme Court decisions, which were viewed as an opportunity 
to clarify the scope of the provision. In those decisions, the Court 
reaffirmed that fair dealing is a user’s right that must be interpreted 
in a broad and liberal manner. When combined with the recent Bill 
C-11 reforms, the Court took a big step toward blurring the divide 
between fair use and fair dealing, effectively turning the Canadian 
fair dealing provision into a fair use provision in which virtually all 
purposes engage the second-stage fair dealing analysis. 
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ii: how Fair Dealing Became Fair Use
i. Where Fair Dealing in Canada Stands Now
The Court’s copyright pentalogy addressed a range of copyright 
issues, but fair dealing assumed a central role in two cases. In Alberta 
(Education), the Court addressed the use of fair dealing within 
education, arriving at several conclusions that expanded both the 
breadth of education-related purposes as well how such uses should 
be analyzed within the six-factor test. 
For example, the Court assessed the scope of the “private study” 
purpose, arriving at a broad definition that rejected both spatial 
limitations and the requirement for isolation. Writing for the majority, 
Abella J concluded that: “[T]he word ‘private’ in ‘private study’ should 
not be understood as requiring users to view copyrighted works in 
splendid isolation. Studying and learning are essentially personal 
endeavours, whether they are engaged in with others or in solitude.”50
The scope of the research purpose was also given a large and 
liberal interpretation in SOCAN v Bell Canada [Bell], the other major 
fair dealing case that considered whether song previews on services 
such as iTunes qualify as research for fair dealing purposes. Once 
again, Abella J adopted a strong stand in favour of fair dealing. After 
reiterating that fair dealing is a user’s right, Abella J argued for a very 
broad approach to the fair dealing research category:
Limiting research to creative purposes would also run 
counter to the ordinary meaning of “research”, which 
can include many activities that do not demand the 
establishment of new facts or conclusions. It can be 
piecemeal, informal, exploratory, or confirmatory. It can 
in fact be undertaken for no purpose except personal 
interest. It is true that research can be for the purpose 
of reaching new conclusions, but this should be seen as 
only one, not the primary component of the definitional 
framework.51
The Alberta (Education) and Bell decisions not only articulate an 
expansive approach to the enumerated purposes under fair dealing, 
but also provide guidance on the broad and liberal interpretation of 
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the six-factor test that is used to determine whether the dealing is 
fair. First, the Court reaffirmed that fair dealing is a user’s right, not a 
rhetorical device, removing any doubt that its previous references to 
user’s rights were a statement of law. The Court states in Bell:
CCH confirmed that users’ rights are an essential 
part of furthering the public interest objectives of the 
Copyright Act. One of the tools employed to achieve the 
proper balance between protection and access in the 
Act is the concept of fair dealing, which allows users to 
engage in some activities that might otherwise amount 
to copyright infringement. In order to maintain the 
proper balance between these interests, the fair dealing 
provision “must not be interpreted restrictively.”52
Second, the Court firmly entrenched the six-factor analysis as 
the test for determining whether a particular use or dealing is fair. 
Building on CCH, the Court’s guidance on the six-factor test provides 
the following:
      1.   Purpose of the Dealing
 The purpose of the dealing involves two issues: whether there is 
a qualifying purpose, and whose purpose should be considered. As 
noted above, the Court adopted a broad approach for the research 
and private study purposes. Moreover, the second issue of whose 
purposes should be considered was critically important in the Alberta 
(Education) case, with the Court concluding that the purpose of the 
student (who engages in research or private study) is relevant even 
when the copying is completed by (or under the instruction of) the 
teacher:
Teachers have no ulterior motive when providing copies 
to students. Nor can teachers be characterized as having 
the completely separate purpose of “instruction”; they 
are there to facilitate the students’ research and private 
study. It seems to me to be axiomatic that most students 
lack the expertise to find or request the materials 
required for their own research and private study, and 
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rely on the guidance of their teachers. They study what 
they are told to study, and the teacher’s purpose in 
providing copies is to enable the students to have the 
material they need for the purpose of studying. The 
teacher/copier therefore shares a symbiotic purpose with 
the student/user who is engaging in research or private 
study. Instruction and research/private study are, in the 
school context, tautological.53 
      2.   Character of the Dealing
In CCH, the Court stated the following about the character of  
the dealing:
In assessing the character of a dealing, courts must 
examine how the works were dealt with. If multiple 
copies of works are being widely distributed, this will 
tend to be unfair. If, however, a single copy of a work 
is used for a specific legitimate purpose, then it may be 
easier to conclude that it was a fair dealing. If the copy 
of the work is destroyed after it is used for its specific 
intended purpose, this may also favour a finding of 
fairness.54
The Court provided a good example of how this factor is applied  
in Bell:
SOCAN’s argument was based on the fact that 
consumers accessed, on average, 10 times the number 
of previews as full-length musical works. However, no 
copy existed after the preview was heard. The previews 
were streamed, not downloaded. Users did not get a 
permanent copy, and once the preview was heard, the 
file was automatically deleted from the user’s computer. 
The fact that each file was automatically deleted 
meant that copies could not be duplicated or further 
disseminated by users.55
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      3.   Amount of the Dealing
 The Court in both Bell and Alberta (Education) confirmed that the 
amount of the dealing refers to the individual copy, not the aggregate 
amount being copied. This will be significant for education, since it 
means that the total amount being copied by a teacher, school, school 
board or all educational institutions is irrelevant for the purposes of 
the amount of the dealing analysis. In Bell, the Court stated:
Since fair dealing is a “user’s” right, the “amount of 
the dealing” factor should be assessed based on the 
individual use, not the amount of the dealing in the 
aggregate. The appropriate measure under this factor 
is therefore, as the Board noted, the proportion of the 
excerpt used in relation to the whole work.56
The aggregate approach may also have an impact on widespread 
Internet-based uses, where the total amount being copied by the 
Internet community will not be considered within the context of 
the amount of the dealing. As Abella J warns: “[G]iven the ease 
and magnitude with which digital works are disseminated over the 
Internet, focusing on the ‘aggregate’ amount of the dealing in cases 
involving digital works could well lead to disproportionate findings 
of unfairness when compared with non-digital works.”57
      4.   Alternatives to the Dealing
 In CCH, the Court described alternatives to the dealing as 
follows: “Alternatives to dealing with the infringed work may affect 
the determination of fairness. If there is a non-copyrighted equivalent 
of the work that could have been used instead of the copyrighted 
work, this should be considered by the court.”58
In the CCH case, the Court determined that the availability of a 
licence is not a relevant alternative in deciding whether a dealing is fair. 
And in Alberta (Education), the Court ruled that purchasing books 
was not a viable alternative, given the costly nature of purchasing 
books for all students simply to access shorter excerpts.
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      5.   Nature of the Work
 The Court in CCH described the nature of the work in the 
following manner:
The nature of the work in question should also be 
considered by courts assessing whether a dealing is fair. 
Although certainly not determinative, if a work has not 
been published, the dealing may be more fair in that 
its reproduction with acknowledgement could lead to 
a wider public dissemination of the work—one of the 
goals of copyright law. If, however, the work in question 
was confidential, this may tip the scales towards finding 
that the dealing was unfair.59 
The Court’s analysis in Bell showed that musical works for 
purchase meet this standard:
SOCAN does not dispute the desirability of the sale 
and dissemination of musical works, but argues that 
since these works are easily purchased and disseminated 
without the use of previews, previews are of no 
additional benefit to promoting further dissemination. 
But the fact that a musical work is widely available 
does not necessarily correlate to whether it is widely 
disseminated. Unless a potential consumer can locate 
and identify a work he or she wants to buy, the work  
will not be disseminated.60
      6.   Effect of the Dealing on the Work
 The Court in CCH emphasized that the effect of the dealing on 
the work is an important factor, but is not the most important factor:
[T]he effect of the dealing on the work is another factor 
warranting consideration when courts are determining 
whether a dealing is fair. If the reproduced work is 
likely to compete with the market of the original work, 
this may suggest that the dealing is not fair. Although 
the effect of the dealing on the market of the copyright 
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owner is an important factor, it is neither the only factor 
nor the most important factor that a court must consider 
in deciding if the dealing is fair.61
The Court in Alberta (Education) discussed the need for actual 
evidence of economic harm in order to demonstrate a negative effect, 
noting that “other than the bald fact of a decline in sales over 20 
years, there is no evidence from Access Copyright demonstrating 
any link between photocopying short excerpts and the decline in 
textbook sales.”62 
ii. The Shift from Fair Dealing to Fair Use
Fair dealing in Canada still requires a two-stage analysis, yet the 
cumulative effect of legislative reform and the Supreme Court 
decisions is that the first stage has become so easy to meet that Canada 
has a fair use provision in everything but name only. Conventional 
fair use may require only a single test to determine fairness, but the 
Canadian fair dealing/fair use hybrid comes close by ensuring that 
virtually all uses will meet the purposes standard and proceed to the 
second-stage, six-factor analysis described above. 
There are three developments responsible for this shift. First, 
as noted above, the number of fair dealing purposes has grown as 
Bill C-11 added education, parody and satire to the current list of 
research, private study, news reporting, criticism and review. This 
list is quite broad, as many uses are likely to fit within one of the 
purposes. While a restrictive interpretation of these purposes would 
have created significant limitations on its applicability, the expansive 
approach articulated by the Court means that the existing purposes 
are increasingly likely to capture a broader range of activities. 
The research purpose alone is likely to extend to uses far beyond 
more constrained scientific research, as the Court has ruled that 
research need not be structured or formalized. Rather, “piecemeal, 
informal, exploratory, or confirmatory” research all qualifies as 
research for fair dealing purposes.63 Indeed, with the inclusion of 
consumer research and “personal interest” within the definition, 
fair dealing research covers common commercial activities as well, 
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opening the door to greater business reliance on the research purpose 
within fair dealing.
If the use in question is still not covered by the expansive approach 
to research, the broadening of the private study purpose should 
further expand the allowable purposes. The Court has removed 
the need for a structured or isolated environment for private study, 
thereby opening the door to a wide range of activities that can be 
characterized as study.
Canadian courts will also give broad interpretations to the 
remaining fair dealing purposes, including criticism, review, news 
reporting, parody, satire and education. For example, in Warman 
v Fournier, a 2012 Federal Court of Canada decision,64 the court 
acknowledged the need for a broad approach to the news reporting 
purpose. At issue was the reproduction on an Internet chat site of 
several paragraphs from opinion pieces published in the National Post 
newspaper. The court ruled that the copying was insubstantial and 
did not raise infringement concerns. In the alternative, it concluded 
that posting news reports on an Internet site could itself be regarded 
as news reporting:
The SCC stated in CCH, at paragraph 51, that the fair 
dealing purposes (in that case, research) “must be given 
a large and liberal interpretation in order to ensure that 
users’ rights are not unduly constrained.” Applying this 
large and liberal interpretation to news reporting, I find 
that the respondents’ dealing in respect of the Kay Work 
falls within this purpose. They posted the excerpts of the 
Kay Work on Free Dominion to promulgate the facts 
recounted in that article. Thus, the first criterion for 
fair dealing is met. The news reporting exception also 
requires that the source and author be mentioned, which 
is also satisfied in this case.65
The new education purpose must also be granted a wide berth. 
The government specifically rejected requests to establish a narrow 
definition of education within its copyright reform package. By 
leaving the term undefined, courts are free to follow the Court’s 
lead and adopt an expansive approach to education that extends far 
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beyond accredited educational institutions. Rather, consistent with 
a research purpose that includes personal interest, the education 
purpose may well include personal education initiatives and efforts to 
become better informed about any issue of interest.
Second, having adopted an expansive approach to the fair dealing 
purposes (and the government having added new purposes that will 
be subject to a similar expansive analysis), the Court added another 
wrinkle to the fair dealing test, stating that the first part involves a low 
threshold: “In mandating a generous interpretation of the fair dealing 
purposes, including ‘research’, the Court in CCH created a relatively 
low threshold for the first step so that the analytical heavy-hitting is 
done in determining whether the dealing was fair.”66 
Note that the CCH decision never describes the first-stage 
purposes test as having a low threshold, though a broad and liberal 
interpretation may lead to that conclusion, as it ensures that the user’s 
right of fair dealing will benefit from a full analysis of whether the 
use is fair. In that sense, the Court is right that the “heavy hitting” is 
done in wading through the six-factor analysis to determine whether 
the dealing is fair, which is consistent with a fair use approach. The 
signal from the Court is unmistakable: consistent with the exercise of 
a user’s right, potential fair dealing uses are best assessed through a 
full fairness analysis. By confirming a low threshold for the first-stage 
purposes test, the Court has ensured that virtually all purposes will 
pass the first stage and be considered on the basis of the fairness of 
the use, not the intended purpose (which is itself only one of the six 
factors in the second-stage test).
Third, the Court has opened the door to considering the copying 
purposes of not only the actual copier, but the intended recipient 
as well. This approach started in the CCH case, but was expanded 
considerably in the Alberta (Education) and song previews cases, 
adding further flexibility to the fair dealing provision by requiring 
courts to undergo more extensive analysis of the purposes of the 
copier and recipient or beneficiary. 
For example, in the Alberta (Education) case, the teacher is 
technically making the copy on behalf of the student; however, the 
Court found that their purposes are inseparable, noting that “[t]he 
teacher/copier therefore shares a symbiotic purpose with the student/
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user who is engaging in research or private study.”67 The Canadian 
Publishers’ Council, which intervened in the case, addressed this 
specific issue before the Court:
Accepting the test proposed by the Appellants that 
their purposes are the purposes of their students would 
hollow out the intended closed categories of allowable 
purposes in the Act. It would subject all unauthorized 
copying for others that might be for their research, 
private study, criticism, review or news reporting 
purposes into an allowable purpose for the copier, 
greatly expanding the scope of the fair dealing exception. 
It would require courts to ignore a copier’s actual 
purposes and pay regard only to the possible allowable 
purposes of another person. Thus the fair dealing 
provision would shelter intermediaries who act on their 
own initiative and do not themselves have an allowable 
purpose.68 
A similar expansion arose in the song previews case, where 
Apple makes previews available for the purposes of their customers’ 
research. The Canadian Recording Industry Association warned 
against this issue in their intervention in the case:
Even if it is accepted that Services are entitled to rely on 
the “research” purpose of consumers, the Services only 
purpose in dealing with Previews is not to facilitate that 
research. The Services also use Previews for their own 
economic benefit in marketing the sale of downloads 
of sound recordings and that is their predominate 
[sic] purpose for using Previews. The Services are not 
therefore in a relationship with consumers comparable 
to the very special relationship between the Law 
Society’s Great Library and library patrons.69
The majority of the Court obviously rejected this view and has 
now rendered three decisions where the intermediary copier stands 
in the shoes of the beneficiary—CCH (library copying for patron), 
Alberta (Education) (teacher copying for student), and Bell (Apple 
making song previews for customers). This flexibility will be used 
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by others to argue that their copying is conducted on behalf of a 
permitted purpose of the recipient, creating a very open approach to 
the first-stage purposes test.
While the first-stage fair dealing test should now be very easy to 
meet, Canadian fair dealing resembles US fair use in another way—
it is not a free-for-all, since merely meeting the first-stage test only 
opens the door to the full fairness analysis. This is consistent with 
a balanced copyright system that addresses both creator rights and 
user rights, since the analysis focuses on whether the use of or dealing 
with a work is fair, not whether it fits within one of the fair dealing 
categories or purposes.
Conclusion
As the debate over Canadian copyright reform captured increasing 
attention over the past decade, fair dealing moved from little more 
than an afterthought to one of the core issues, occupying a prominent 
role in legislative debates and within landmark cases at the Supreme 
Court of Canada. While the Canadian copyright community was 
divided over whether emulating the US fair use provision was the best 
course of action, the confluence of the Court articulating fair dealing 
as a users’ right in CCH, the expansion of the purposes of fair dealing 
in Bill C-11, and the fair dealing analysis in the copyright pentalogy 
has rendered much of the debate moot. Canada may remain a fair 
dealing country from a strict statutory perspective, but its approach 
points the way to a hybrid fair dealing/fair use model in which the 
two-stage analysis of fair dealing purpose (stage one) and fairness 
analysis (stage two) bears close resemblance to an open-ended fair use 
system, given that virtually all uses will meet the purposes standard 
and proceed to the second-stage, six-factor analysis. 
The Canadian model may emerge as a preferred approach for 
many fair dealing countries grappling with policy pressures to 
increase copyright flexibilities but simultaneously facing concerns 
over compliance with international norms and the value of domestic 
legal certainty. First, the Canadian fair dealing approach is unlikely 
to raise significant concerns with regard to its consistency with the 
Berne Convention, since compliance with the three-step test would 
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involve fact-specific analysis of how the Canadian courts applied the 
fair dealing provision that still features a closed list of identifiable 
purposes. Second, the uncertainty that might follow from the shift 
from fair dealing to fair use has been minimized, since Canadian case 
law has gradually evolved to support for a more flexible approach. 
This enhances legal certainty by grounding fair dealing analysis in the 
detailed guidance provided by the Court. 
The Court’s emphasis on the need for balance between creators’ 
rights and users’ rights laid the foundation for a shift away from a 
two-stage fair dealing test toward a single analysis based on fairness 
of the use of a copyrighted work. By elevating fair dealing to a users’ 
right, it made little sense for the law to premise the exercise of those 
rights on fitting within a small number of narrowly defined purposes. 
The core of fair dealing is fairness – fairness to the copyright owner in 
setting limits on the use of their work without permission and fairness 
to users to ensure that fair dealing rights can be exercised without 
unnecessarily restrictive limitations. In the aftermath of years of 
public debate and landmark jurisprudence, Canada now has a fair use 
provision in everything but name only, with analysis rightly focused 
on whether the use of or dealing with a work is fair, not whether it fits 
within one of the fair dealing categories or purposes.
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The arithmetic of Fair Dealing at  
the supreme Court of Canada
giuseppina d’agostino1 
In the 2012 Supreme Court of Canada copyright cases, the Court 
found an opportunity to redefine the law of fair dealing in Canada. 
While the Court acknowledged that fair dealing is a question of fact, 
and thereby properly adjudicated by triers of fact like the Copyright 
Board of Canada, the Court stepped in to revisit the facts all over 
again. When compared to its common law counterparts like the 
UK and the US, Canada stands alone in its willingness to rehear fair 
dealing cases, which are a matter of first impression.2 I argue that while 
it is salutary to re-emphasize the existence of users’ rights as per CCH 
v Law Society of Upper Canada [CCH], and indeed that these rights 
are here to stay, it cannot be beneficial for the Court to reinterpret 
the facts, which is the job of courts and tribunals of first instance, or 
to make policy, which is the job of government; here, unfortunately, 
the Court indulged in both. In its reasoning, the Supreme Court of 
Canada showcases rigid reliance on CCH’s six-factor framework and 
elevates the framework to the level of law.3 Ironically, in doing so, 
the Supreme Court of Canada is actually going against the spirit and 
the benefit that CCH created for copyright law in Canada and, more 
specifically, for fair dealing. 
6
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Fair Dealing and the Copyright Pentalogy
The Supreme Court of Canada released five copyright cases, 
commonly referred to as the copyright pentalogy, on the same day 
in July 2012, setting abuzz all circles in the legal community and 
beyond. Many fundamental copyright issues were raised: delineating 
the scope of various rights and the overlapping nature of rights in 
the Copyright Act, technological neutrality, questions of payment 
and, more broadly, appropriate standards of review, as each of these 
cases originated from the Federal Court of Appeal’s judicial review of 
the Copyright Board of Canada decisions. Among the five cases, two 
dealt squarely with the doctrine of fair dealing: within certain limits, 
what a user can do with a substantial part of a copyright work without 
permission of the owner.4 
In Canada, the doctrine of fair dealing is statutorily entrenched 
in the Copyright Act. As a result of the recently enacted Copyright 
Modernization Act, there are now five allowable purposes for fair 
dealing: (1) research or private study (s. 29); (2) criticism or review (s. 
29.1); (3) news reporting (s. 29.2); (4) parody or satire (s. 29); and (5) 
education (s. 29).5 Fair dealing is a question of fact and a matter of first 
impression.6 The onus is on the defendant to prove that the dealing 
(1) fits within one of the enumerated allowable purposes; (2) is “fair”; 
and (3) for “criticism or review” and “news reporting”, sufficient 
acknowledgement is given. In CCH, a unanimous Supreme Court of 
Canada ruled that fair dealing, alongside the other exceptions in the 
Copyright Act, “must not be interpreted restrictively”7 and that more 
or less six factors may be used when assessing fairness.8 In that case, 
the Law Society of Upper Canada did not infringe copyright, because 
its Great Library request-based reproduction services fell squarely 
within the allowances of the fair dealing doctrine. Lawyers carrying 
on the business of law for profit were held to be conducting non-
infringing research. Research should be accorded a “large and liberal 
interpretation in order to ensure that users’ rights are not unduly 
constrained.”9
In SOCAN v Bell [Bell], Abella J for a unanimous court agreed 
with the Board that song previews provided by Internet service 
providers for consumers constituted fair dealing for the purposes 
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of research and thus were not subject to a tariff. Consistent with the 
spirit of CCH, the term “research” should be given a “large and liberal 
interpretation”. For the Court, it would be far too restrictive to limit 
“research” to its ordinary meaning, as it can include “many activities 
that do not demand the establishment of new facts or conclusions. It 
can be piecemeal, informal, exploratory, or confirmatory. It can be 
undertaken for no purpose except personal interest.”10
On the other hand, Alberta (Education) was a heavily contentious 
case, with a 5-4 split decision over the appropriate deference afforded 
to the Board and the interpretation of fair dealing. At issue was 
whether copies made at the teacher’s initiative in Kindergarten to 
Grade 12 classrooms and provided to students with instructions to 
read the material were made for the allowable purpose of research or 
private study.11 While the matter was sent back to the Copyright Board 
for reconsideration, the Board later ruled that the copying at issue was 
fair dealing.12 For Abella J’s majority, the Board misinterpreted the six 
fair dealing factors. For Rothstein J’s dissent, the six factors are not 
statutory enactments; fair dealing is a question of fact, and deference 
should be accorded to the Board. In both cases, the Court seized the 
opportunity to clarify the interpretive framework set out in CCH.13
In Bell, Abella J clarified that a generous, “low-threshold” 
interpretation should occur for the first part of the test, with respect 
to determining the allowable purposes, “so that the analytical heavy-
hitting is done in determining whether the dealing was fair.”14 While 
the Court is quite liberal in the first part of the test—some would say 
too liberal15—it is ironically rigid in the fairness analysis. 
What follows is a discussion of the Court’s enthusiasm to rehear 
facts when it does not agree with the outcome, in specific reference to 
(1) an emerging user perspective test the Court used for determining 
both the allowable purpose to warrant fair dealing and the first 
fairness factor (i.e. the purpose of the dealing), and (2) the Court’s 
general approach to determine fairness: by methodically examining 
each of the six fairness factors proposed in CCH. I will tackle the 
latter first, as I find this development the most troubling. 
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(1) Six Factors Sequence
In every decision since CCH, the courts have embraced a wholesale, 
mechanistic and absolutist adoption of the six factors. As a result, 
each factor is interpreted each and every time and in the same 
sequence. As Rothstein J rightly points out in the dissent of Alberta 
(Education), these are not statutory requirements.16 As set out in 
CCH, and as I previously argued, CCH endorsed certain factors that 
may be more or less relevant in future fair dealing cases. Here it is 
particularly important to revisit Linden JA’s initial pronouncement 
of the interpretive fairness framework later endorsed by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in CCH:
Assessing these observations in combination with the 
American and British factors, I have compiled a list 
of factors that should influence the fairness of the Law 
Society’s dealings with the Publishers’ works on behalf 
of patrons of the Great Library. Importantly, the elements 
of fairness are malleable and must be tailored to each 
unique circumstance. None of the factors are conclusive 
or binding, and additional considerations may well apply 
uniquely in the Canadian context. However, the following 
factors are usually among the non-exhaustive list of 
considerations: (1) the purpose of the dealing; (2) the 
nature of the dealing; (3) the amount of the dealing; (4) 
alternatives to the dealing; (5) the nature of the work in 
question; and (6) the effect of the dealing on that work.17
Significantly, CCH also acknowledged that other considerations or 
unnamed factors could be used to assess the fairness of a dealing. 
The six factors emerged as indicia for that particular case, for those 
particular facts,18 drawing from the UK and US approaches.19 Yet, 
since then, each case involving fair dealing has proceeded to showcase 
a scrupulous and exclusive adherence to these six factors. 
Ironically, this six-factor absolutism all started with the Copyright 
Board. Shortly after CCH was decided, in Tariff 22.A the Board 
considered the doctrine of fair dealing even though it was not pleaded 
by the parties. The Board acknowledged that, “[a]lthough none of the 
parties addressed the legal issue directly, we must deal with it”20 to 
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ascertain whether the way in which services deal with previews was in 
fact a protected act under the Copyright Act.21 The Board found that 
streaming a musical preview with a view to deciding whether to purchase 
a download or CD constituted “research.”22 As I previously argued, “[t]he 
Board thus embraced the liberal lead of CCH and systematically applied 
its six fair dealing factors.”23 Since then, parties on either side (and here 
the Board or the Court is not alone in its unequivocal embrace) have 
argued fair dealing cases based on the six factors.
Finally, before the Supreme Court of Canada, in Bell, the Court 
acknowledged that fairness is a question of fact and similarly 
proceeded to mechanically consider each of the six factors:
(1) Purpose of the dealing: as discussed more fully later, 
the Court adopted an (end) user perspective test: the 
purpose of providing previews is primarily to facilitate 
research by consumers.24 Interestingly, similar to CCH, 
under this factor, the Court examined the Internet 
service provider’s behaviour and acknowledged that the 
Internet service provider put “reasonable safeguards in 
place to ensure that the users’ dealing in previews was in 
fact for this purpose: the previews were streamed, short, 
and often of lesser quality than the musical work itself. 
These safeguards prevented the previews from replacing 
the work while still fulfilling a research function.”25
(2) Character of the dealing: The Court played down 
the CCH observation that a particular dealing must 
be unfair if multiple copies of works are being widely 
distributed. It noted that if the use of the work was “for 
a specific legitimate purpose, or if the copy no longer 
existed after it was used, this would favour a finding 
of fairness.”26 In this case, each file was automatically 
deleted and so could not be duplicated or disseminated 
by users.27
(3) Amount of the dealing: Referring to the quantity 
of the work taken, and agreeing with the Board, the 
Court ruled that the correct interpretation is the length 
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of each preview compared to the length of the work 
(and not, as SOCAN argued, the aggregate number of 
previews streamed by consumers).28 Importantly, the 
Court noted that the character of the dealing (factor no. 
2) considers the aggregate of the dissemination already: 
that is, whether multiple copies of works are being 
widely distributed. As a result, considering the number 
of previews streamed under “amount of the dealing” 
(factor no. 3) would “deprive that factor of any utility 
in the analysis, and would erase consideration of the 
proportion of the excerpt of the entire work.”29 Also, the 
Court continued, “given the ease and magnitude with 
which digital works are disseminated over the Internet”, 
focusing on the number of previews streamed would 
lead to disproportionate and unfair findings when 
compared to non-digital works and would go against 
the “goal of technological neutrality.”30 In passing, it 
is unclear how technological neutrality can be seen 
to support the Court’s position, as the goal of “media 
neutrality” in Robertson was said not to override in any 
way authors’ rights.31 Here again, the Court focused on 
the ease of dissemination of works and had a user focus. 
(4) Alternatives to the dealing: A dealing may be less 
fair if there is a non–copyright protected equivalent 
that could have been used, or if the dealing was not 
reasonably necessary to achieve the ultimate purpose. 
While SOCAN argued that there were other methods 
available (e.g., advertising with album artwork, textual 
descriptions and return policies for buying the wrong 
work), the Court agreed with the Board that “[l]istening 
to a preview probably is the most practical, most 
economical and safest way for users to ensure that they 
purchase what they wish.”32 In other words, “short, low-
quality streamed previews are reasonably necessary to 
help consumers decide what to purchase.”33
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(5) Nature of the work: This factor examines whether the 
work is one that should be widely disseminated. Here the 
Court pointed out that just because the previews were 
widely available does not mean that they were widely 
disseminated; if consumers are unable to locate and 
identify the work they wish to purchase, the work will 
not be disseminated.34
(6) The effect of the dealing on the work: This point 
evaluates whether the dealing adversely affects or 
competes with the work. Here the Court harkened 
back to the observation in factor no. 5: because of their 
short duration and lower quality, previews are not in 
competition with downloads of the work itself. For the 
Court, there was the opposite effect, as previews increase 
the sale and therefore the dissemination of musical 
works, “thereby generating remuneration to their 
creators.”35
In sum, the Court was satisfied with the Board’s balancing of the 
purposes of the Act. Practically, consumers should not need to pay for 
previews as their free access encourages creation and dissemination 
of works while ensuring that creators are fairly rewarded. Ultimately, 
while the Court was satisfied by the Board’s application of CCH in 
finding fair dealing in Bell, it was not in Alberta (Education); in fact, 
the outcome was quite different.
Dangers Regarding the six-factor sequence: Double Counting 
The Alberta (Education) case illustrates a danger in the Court’s 
unique judicial adherence to CCH and its willingness to rehear facts. 
In Alberta (Education), Abella J had “concerns over how the Board 
applied several of those factors.”36 Among the various problems with 
the Board’s application of the CCH factors (e.g., purpose of the dealing 
factor [factor no. 1], which Abella J found problematic because it hinges 
on the user perspective),37 she took great pains to go through the six 
factors, which I will not repeat here. As an example, she indicated that 
the Board misinterpreted the factors and drew the wrong conclusions 
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under the “character of the dealing” and the “amount of the dealing.” 
Significantly, for Abella J, this double counting was an error of law 
that rendered the Board decision unreasonable. The majority found 
problematic that the “quantification of the total amount of pages 
copied” should be considered under “character of the dealing” and 
not under the “amount of the dealing”. As a result of this analytical 
framework, by the time the Board assessed the “amount of the dealing” 
factor (factor no. 3), it had already considered the quantification of 
the dissemination: “[i]n reapplying this same quantitative concern 
when assessing the ‘amount of the dealing’, it conflated the two 
factors, which had the effect of erasing proportionality from the 
fairness analysis.”38 In short, the “amount of the dealing factor” is not 
a quantitative assessment based on aggregate use, but an examination 
of the proportionality of the amount copied to the whole of the work. 
Aggregate use or quantification of the total amount of pages copied 
should be considered under the “character of the dealing”.
It is not at all clear how the Board erased proportionality from the 
fairness analysis when it made findings of fact that teachers copied 
“short excerpts”, and that these short excerpts were repeatedly copied 
by the same “class set” of books over a period of time.39 Based on 
the extensive evidence advanced by the parties, the Board concluded 
that this repeated copying tended to make the dealing more unfair. 
At what exact point in Abella J’s six-factor sequence these facts were 
found should not be seen to invalidate a relative assessment of factors 
that are not themselves the law, nor render a decision unreasonable; 
nor should any one factor be interpreted as more important than 
another. In essence, Abella J’s point-by-point analysis is perplexing. 
Why would it be necessary to ensure that factor x be examined under 
y? The importance is that it is examined. Why be mechanistic to 
the point of rendering a decision unreasonable? After all, it was the 
same court that posited that fair dealing warrants a large and liberal 
interpretation. As Rothstein J indicates, the appellants themselves 
did not dispute the Board’s findings of fact40 and its conclusions 
were derived independently through an analysis that considered all 
aspects of the dealing. As a result, “unless it is shown that the Board’s 
conclusion of fact that the books from the ‘class sets’ will be subject 
to ‘numerous requests’ was unreasonable, then the Board’s decision 
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should not be disturbed.” 41 Consequently, what we see is that undue 
rigidity in interpreting the six factors, sequentially, in the same order, 
further muddles the state of the Canadian law of fair dealing. 
What may be more consistent with CCH and its large and liberal 
interpretation of fair dealing can be seen in other case law. For 
instance, the court in Warman v Fournier (2012)42 found fair dealing 
in the context of news reporting. Free dominion, an online political 
discussion forum, posted an article first published in the National Post. 
Among the works in question was an excerpt of an eleven-paragraph 
article that consisted of the headline, three complete paragraphs and 
part of a fourth paragraph.43 Rennie J for the Federal Court found fair 
dealing for the purposes of news reporting, pursuant to s 29.2 of the 
Copyright Act. The Federal Court applied CCH and adopted a “large 
and liberal interpretation” of the use of the excerpt to constitute news 
reporting as it promulgated the facts in the article.44 The Federal Court 
noted that CCH “sets out important guiding principles in applying 
the fair dealing exception.”45 As a result, the Court did not undertake 
a mechanistic interpretation of each of the six factors, as “CCH set 
out several factors that may be relevant in determining whether the 
dealing is fair….”46
The Federal Court liberally referred to the factors and noted that an 
application of some factors militated toward a finding of fair dealing. It 
noted the purpose of the dealing to be satisfied, the amount to be limited 
and the nature of the work to favour fair dealing. Here the Federal 
Court acknowledged that the article was not currently published, and 
this finding supported fair dealing, as one of the purposes of copyright 
law is to promote wider dissemination of works.47 On the other hand, 
the Federal Court asserted that some factors weighed less strongly in 
favour of a finding of fair dealing (e.g., “alternative to the dealing”, as 
a summary could have been provided instead, and “character of the 
dealing”, as the excerpts were widely distributed on the Internet). On 
balance, while some factors were not well satisfied, the reproduction 
constituted fair dealing.48 Whether the court was correct in finding 
fair dealing is not my purpose here; rather, I want to point out that the 
Federal Court’s approach in Warman was more flexible and true to the 
large and liberal interpretation that CCH intended compared to the 
Supreme Court’s analysis in Alberta (Education).
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Of interest is that in Warman, the Federal Court also interpreted 
the doctrine of substantial part. While the test is also fact based and 
factor based, the Court found that no substantial part of the work 
in question was copied and noted that “most of the factors are not 
directly relevant in this case given the circumstances”.49 Like fair 
dealing, substantial part is a question of fact and involves a qualitative 
rather than quantitative analysis. There is no reason why the same 
liberal approach used in another long-standing copyright doctrine 
cannot also be used to interpret the factor framework set out in CCH. 
Warman is currently being appealed in a post-pentalogy, post–
Copyright Modernization Act environment. How the Federal Court of 
Appeal interprets CCH will be important and telling of whether the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s mechanical interpretation as seen in Bell 
and Alberta (Education) will prevail, or whether CCH’s more flexible 
framework will be followed.
some Observations on the six Factors
There may be various reasons to explain why the courts (and parties, 
too) adhere to a six-factor approach. For instance, an explanation may 
be that the need to address calls for more flexibility is still seen as 
required in fair dealing and, at the same time, there is a starvation 
for more certainty. Perhaps there is still a lingering view that the US 
fair use model with enumerated factors is the panacea;50 however, 
as I have already argued at length, fair use continues to confound 
common law jurisdictions, and after CCH, Canada boasted the most 
flexible approach compared to the US and the UK.51 It is doubtful 
that achieving clarity by treating the six factors as law, and ultimately 
reinterrogating the facts considered in their application, is salutary. 
Indeed, as illustrated by the recent cases, it leads to more complexity, 
ambiguity and, ironically, rigidity. It is also unfortunate that no new 
factors have been considered. Note that in the US, where the fair use 
factors are statutorily entrenched, the courts also consider others.52 
For example, in Basic Books v Kinko’s Graphics Corp,53 the United 
States Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that uses of 
copyright material for educational purposes by Kinko’s, a commercial 
enterprise, were not fair use. In making its assessment, the Court 
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found that most of the factors weighed against fair use and considered 
two other factors: “monopolistic and competitive practices” (along 
with necessity) and “industry practices and institutional policies”.54 
In Canada, previous fair dealing cases before CCH had weighed other 
factors, such as motive (i.e. good or bad faith). In Boudreau v Lin, 
no fair dealing was found for private study with regard to substantial 
use of portions of a student’s work in a professor’s paper. The court 
zeroed in on the fraudulent nature of the dealing. The defendant, 
a professor at the University of Ottawa, had “actively” deleted the 
student’s name from the paper, replaced it with his own, along with 
that of an associate, presented the paper at a conference without 
credit, and sold copies of the paper to other students.55 Because of 
the defendant’s underhanded conduct, the court mandated that fair 
dealing be “restrictively interpreted.”56 As previously argued, it will be 
important to see the extent to which future cases account for bad faith. 
In CCH, the Great Library’s closely enforced Access Policy cast the 
defendant in a positive light. It is noteworthy that UK courts account 
for bad faith as well.57 While the 2012 Canadian pentalogy cases did 
not consider this factor, it does seem appropriate that courts closely 
read the evidence and assess the good or bad faith conduct of the 
defendant. The very notion of fairness in fair dealing is antithetical to 
underhanded behaviour. Fair dealing should not be used to shield such 
conduct. At the same time, it is appropriate that good faith conduct, as 
is clear in the Great Library’s prudent practices, should weigh in favour 
of fairness or, at the very least, militate against harsher damages.58 Of 
course it is possible that good or bad faith can be accounted for in 
one of the six factors (i.e. purpose of the dealing or character of the 
dealing factors.)59 My point here is that it is less significant whether 
bad faith is treated as a separate factor or under an existing factor; it 
is important that, if relevant, bad faith should be considered in fair 
dealing cases when assessing fairness and, ultimately, damages. 
Parties pleading fair dealing, and courts ultimately deciding those 
cases, should exercise flexibility when interpreting fair dealing: raise 
factors germane to the case and assess evidence to support them. Whether 
there are six factors, or seven factors, or four factors should not be the 
driving preoccupation. And whether one piece of evidence is considered 
at the wrong part of the equation should be seen with a more flexible lens. 
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User Perspective for allowable Purpose and Purpose of  
the Dealing 
A type of user-perspective test has surfaced from the recent Canadian 
copyright cases. In CCH, while it was clear that users’ rights count, 
it was unclear whose perspective should carry more weight.60 CCH 
noted that an “objective test” should be adopted to assess the users’ 
real purpose or motive in using the copyright work (factor no. 1). 
The recent Supreme Court of Canada cases clarify that it is the end 
user’s perspective that counts. In Bell, it was the consumer’s, not the 
Internet service provider’s,61 and in Alberta (Education), it was the 
students’, not entirely the teachers’, and certainly not the copyright 
holders’ perspective that counted.62 
In Bell, the Court emphasized that the perspective of the end user 
should be the primary driver of the first part of the fair dealing analysis 
and for the allowable purpose factor.63 The consumer ultimately 
triggers meeting copyright’s objectives: “consumers used previews 
for the purpose of conducting research to identify which music to 
purchase, purchases which trigger dissemination of musical works 
and compensation for their creators, both of which are outcomes the 
Act seeks to encourage.”64 The Court’s privileging of the end user is 
important, as it signals its need to restore what it perceives as persistent 
inequities in the copyright system, where consumers are seen to be 
gouged.65 Here Rothstein J’s remarks in an IP Osgoode public lecture 
after the pentalogy are apt: “Judges don’t like double-dipping. And if 
they think someone is double-dipping, they will go into contortions 
to preclude it.”66 So, however meritorious the double-dipping claim 
(i.e. someone seen to be paying twice, or someone seems to be earning 
twice for the same thing), decision makers may well disregard other 
relevant arguments. In ESAC, statutory interpretation questions were 
trumped by double-dipping claims.67 In the context of the Alberta 
(Education) and Bell cases, similar pro-user, pro-consumer principles 
may well have informed the majority’s findings of fair dealing in 
favour of students and consumers. 
For Abella J, CCH focused its investigation on the ultimate 
user, the lawyers, whose purpose was legal research, and not on 
the librarian’s purpose.68 Without the librarians, it would have been 
GIUSEPPINA D’AGOSTINO  |   199
impossible for the lawyers to access the materials. Librarians were seen 
as integral to the research process as enablers.69 The librarians “don’t 
profit from this service.”70 In Bell, more problematic is the provider’s 
purpose (i.e. Bell, Apple, Rogers, Shaw and Telus), as its scope is less 
altruistic than a librarian’s. Yet, applying the end user perspective and, 
indeed, a relatively low threshold, allows entry into the enumerated 
allowable grounds of fair dealing, and into the second part of the 
test on fairness. The second part of the test, and in particular factor 
one, the purpose of the dealing, also adopts a user-perspective test. 
The purpose of providing previews is primarily to facilitate research 
purposes of the consumers.71 Here, the Internet service provider’s 
safeguards could be seen as akin to the librarian’s gatekeeping role in 
CCH.72 The Court examined the Internet service provider’s behaviour 
and acknowledged that it put “reasonable safeguards” in place to 
ensure that the users’ dealing in previews was in fact for research, as 
“the previews were streamed, short, and often of lesser quality than 
the musical work itself ”.73 Consequently, these safeguards prevented 
the previews from replacing the work while still fulfilling a research 
function.74
By contrast, the Alberta (Education) case was more controversial. 
While there was no disagreement that the first step of the dealing was 
for the allowable ground of research or private study,75 the end-user 
perspective as it related to the first factor caused disagreement. 
Abella J, for the majority, stated that the teachers and students 
have a symbiotic purpose: teachers are there to facilitate the students’ 
research and private study.76 Teachers have no ulterior motive 
when providing copies to students, nor do teachers make these for 
their own use. For Abella J, the Board drove an “artificial wedge” in 
distinguishing between copies made by the teacher at the request of a 
student, and copies made by the teacher on their own initiative.77 In the 
end, distinguishing between these types of copies is irrelevant to the 
ultimate end user, the student engaging in research and private study.
Rothstein J, on the other hand, stated that the Board made no 
reviewable error and that the Court should not slip into a more 
intrusive correctness review. The Board’s “detailed and extensive 
analysis and decision were intelligible, transparent and justifiable.”78 
In other words, Abella J seized on “a few arguable statements or 
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intermediate findings.”79 For Rothstein J, the Board made a reasonable 
factual conclusion and appropriately considered that the “teacher’s 
purpose was relevant and predominant on the facts in this case.”80 
The teacher’s purpose was to instruct and educate the students, “the 
essence of the job of teaching.”81 Consequently, the teacher’s role 
in selecting and photocopying excerpts is for their own use and is 
“significantly different than the role of the Great Library Staff in CCH, 
which was completely passive.”82 But for the patron requests at the 
Great Library, there would be no copies. Ultimately, the copying in 
Alberta (Education) mainly served the teacher’s purpose of teaching, 
and this was a “realistic assessment of classroom teaching.”
In Alberta (Education), there is a distinction as the majority sees 
the end user as the ultimate perspective; where there are other users 
in between (e.g., teachers), those users serve a symbiotic purpose with 
the end user. For the dissent, one cannot be at the Supreme Court 
to rehear the facts, especially where the issues are “fact-based, as in 
the case of a fair dealing analysis.”83 The Board already observed the 
teacher’s role in the copying as the predominant perspective and as 
triers of fact they were in the best position to do so. 
In the result, when both fair dealing cases are considered 
together, the end-user perspective counts (certainly in Bell). But 
the question remains: Who is the end user? And when is there a 
predominant user? Can the purpose of the in-between users, such 
as Internet service providers, teachers and librarians, be subsumed 
in the end users as a symbiotic purpose, such as consumers, students 
and lawyers? The dissent didn’t think so in Alberta (Education), yet 
in Bell, there was one end user. Curiously, Abella J disregards various 
common law precedents, as they stand for the principle that “copiers 
cannot camouflage their own distinct purpose by purporting to 
conflate it with the research or study purposes of the ultimate user.”84 
Similarly, Rothstein J suggests that the predominant purpose is the 
way to resolve this: when the in-between user is copying to fulfill their 
own distinct ends.85 Ultimately, whether one looks at the end user or 
predominant user, the answer needs to be one grounded in fact, as 
opposed to policy.
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Policy Making at the supreme Court of Canada 
When compared to Canada’s common law counterparts, such as the 
UK and the US, Canada stands alone in its enthusiasm to rehear fair 
dealing cases, which are a matter of first impression.86 So while the 
Court acknowledged that fair dealing is a question of fact and thereby 
properly adjudicated by the lower courts (or, in this case, expert 
tribunals like the Copyright Board of Canada), the Court steps in to 
revisit the facts. This Canadian interventionism is set against other 
higher courts that rarely rehear fair dealing cases. In fact, over the last 
twenty years, the UK House of Lords, the Australian High Court and 
the Supreme Court of New Zealand have heard no fair dealing cases, 
the US Supreme Court has heard two fair use cases87 and Canada has 
now heard three fair dealing cases88 and has noted its importance in 
copyright law in another.89 It seems that when common law courts 
outside of Canada do hear fair dealing cases, they are contained to 
their role of judicial interpretation and do not overreach into law and 
policy making.90
What seems to be at the core of the Court’s approach in the six-
factored fair dealing evaluation and the end-user perspective test is 
its ongoing preoccupation with users. The outcome in these cases is 
seen in Alberta (Education), where Rothstein J would like the Court 
to confine itself to its role to interpret the law, while the majority 
prefers to disregard evidence-based analysis that already occurred at 
the Copyright Board, and to reinterpret the facts so as to fit its own 
view of the law and policy. In Alberta (Education), the Court seems 
to favour a worldview of open, accessible and free collaboration 
and commerce where the end users, the students, are centre stage. 
Abella J intimates that creative content, the raw materials that can 
stimulate learning, creative thinking and, ultimately, the economy, 
should not be “locked away” in tariffs, burdened by additional fees, 
but should be given the widest possible access.91 It seems the majority 
wants to encourage dissemination from the ground up. The cases thus 
prioritize the rights of the individual and everyday user, who would 
likely have been most affected by the tariffs.
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This development continues to be expected. As I have argued in 
Healing Fair Dealing, because of the increasing expanse of owner’s 
rights (more works subject to copyright protection, and subject 
to different types of intellectually property rights), longer terms of 
protections and more grounds of (criminal) liability, there has been 
a push back to create more rights for users.92 The recent Copyright 
Modernization Act consultations and accompanying commentary in 
the online, terrestrial and media space is evidence of this push. The 
need to support user rights is equally unsurprising. As David Vaver 
has recently argued: 
It may not just be the Charter that is affecting how the 
Supreme Court views copyright today. International 
human rights law may be playing its part too. … For 
when Justice Abella spoke of achieving a “proper balance 
between protection and access”, she was partly reflecting 
how international human rights law treats IP.93 
Vaver notes that while Rothstein J dissented in Alberta (Education), 
in Bell, Abella J spoke for a unanimous court.94 And so, all the judges 
shared her position on at least some fundamental aspects of the role 
of copyright law in a modern society.
Another development that continues, and this one is unfortunate, 
is that creators are still the castaways in the copyright balance. Since 
Théberge, courts have come to see promoting the public interest as 
against rewarding the creators.95 So while the Court is correct to 
state that there has been a shift in its preoccupation toward users, 
as confirmed in CCH, I would hesitate to endorse its view that 
Canada had an author-centric view to begin with.96 In fact, authors 
have been the rhetorical stand-ins for owners since the onset of 
copyright law.97 In reality, with little adequate copyright protection, 
contract law governs authors’ rights, and they typically transfer their 
rights to new owners (i.e. publishers and others) who give little in 
return.98 As a result, what we continue to see in the jurisprudence is a 
welcome pronouncement of users’ rights and a lack of consideration 
of authors (and the unsatisfactory realities they also face), who are 
also integral to the balancing formula for copyright and an essential 
part in furthering the public interest. What may be more accurate to 
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reflect in the literature and case law is a need to limit less the author’s 
and more the owner’s rights.99 Unfortunately, in Bell, Abella J suggests 
that in privileging the user, copyright law’s objectives are met, as more 
buying will lead to more purchases and compensation to creators.100 
What the Court assumes will happen (i.e. compensation for creators) 
is a stretch for a number of reasons not limited to consumers actually 
buying the music, nor to creators ultimately receiving compensation 
from the current configuration of copyright management.
Parting Thoughts
Because of the copyright pentalogy, what we now have is, ironically, 
a fair dealing framework that is far more rigid than before. While 
fair dealing is said to be a matter of fact and impression and was to 
have been given a large and liberal interpretation per CCH, assessing 
fairness has now become arithmetic. In addition, the Court has sent 
the message that parties must avoid double counting or their case 
will be found to be unreasonable. What would be unfortunate and 
counter CCH is that if each of the six factors was not considered in 
future cases, or if fewer factors were considered, it would likely create 
grounds for appeal. If Parliament wanted each of the fair dealing 
factors to be considered as law, it would have said so in the copyright 
amendments.101 If Parliament wanted to ensure that a Berne three-step 
analysis be included in section 29 of the Copyright Act or if it wanted 
to indicate that one fair dealing factor had priority over the others, it 
would have said so as well.102 Its reticence can be taken as agreement 
that CCH’s large and liberal interpretation with its more or less six 
factors is sufficiently clear and is the correct framework. 
Rather, Parliament found it important to expand on the 
enumerated categories for fair dealing, no doubt encouraged by 
CCH’s existing large and liberal interpretive framework. Parody and 
satire are obvious additions, but it is in the new category of education 
that future controversy will reside.103 This amendment, coupled with 
the Alberta (Education) decision and the general bent of a pro-user 
Supreme Court of Canada, makes for a weary time for authors and 
owners, as they are at the “front end” of the copyright system rather 
than the “end user” end. I don’t think anyone now has doubts that 
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users have rights. Like no other commonwealth court, Canada’s 
Supreme Court has proclaimed that message loud and clear. The 
message that I hope the Court considers as well is that other players 
are also an integral part of the copyright balance. Ultimately, a way 
forward may be to go back to the ruling and spirit of CCH and weigh 
with approval Rothstein J’s dissent. 
Increasing certainty in fair dealing is important; it is a long-
standing preoccupation for all parties, not to mention the courts. 
But increased certainty will not happen in computing the optimal 
interpretive equation or by mechanically interpreting a specific set 
of factors.104 What may be more useful is to appreciate that Canada 
now boasts the legal tools to attain a large and liberal fair dealing 
interpretive framework. This flexible framework recognizes that there 
is no one-size-fits-all six-factor approach and that a more nuanced 
approach may be necessary depending on the types of uses at issue, 
over time. 
For instance, in a similar vein, Pamela Samuelson in the US 
argues for a more thoughtful and less rigid approach to deciding fair 
use cases. She suggests “unbundling fair uses” into “policy-relevant 
clusters.”105 The goal is to provide “courts with a more useful and 
nuanced toolkit for dealing with the plethora of plausible fair uses 
than can be achieved merely by focusing on the four factors set forth 
in the statute.”106 She also notes that, “given the considerable overlap 
among these uses…it makes little sense to organize fair use case law 
around each of these six uses.”107 Indeed, one of the goals of her work 
is “to embolden courts to consider additional factors, especially those 
of particular salience in certain policy clusters.”108
Parties and, ultimately, courts would do well to work within the 
current large and liberal fair dealing framework, as more complex uses 
of works will continue to arise. Aspiring toward a rigid interpretive 
structure will do little to achieve the balance sought by the Court in 
CCH, or meet the larger objectives copyright seeks. 
And above all, to ensure that more meaningful clarity is attained, 
as I argued elsewhere and as was endorsed in CCH, it is salutary for 
various groups to come together and fashion user guidelines.109 For 
instance, Patricia Aufderheide and Peter Jaszi recommend putting the 
balance back into copyright by “making a code of best practices in fair 
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use.”110 The same strategy can be applied to reach similar codes for 
specific sectors of Canada’s copyright communities that comport with 
fair dealing.111 Artists, musicians, writers and other creators (who 
are often on both sides of the issues as creators and users) and other 
individuals do not have the resources necessary to go to the court to 
obtain clarity.112 In this way, protracted litigation may be avoided and 
equally important access to justice issues addressed. 
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Fair Dealing Practices in the  
Post-secondary education sector  
after the Pentalogy
samuel e. trosow 
Now that the Supreme Court of Canada has handed down its historic 
decisions in the pentalogy1 and Parliament has enacted Bill C-11,2 
an extensive set of amendments to the Copyright Act,3 attention 
should now turn to how copyright policies will be implemented at 
local institutions. This chapter will focus on how Canada’s colleges 
and universities might respond to these developments and will 
build on my previous essay “Bill C-32 and the Educational Sector: 
Overcoming Impediments to Fair Dealing,”4 which analyzed the 
various educational provisions of Bill C-325 and identified various 
impediments to the implementation of fair dealing practices.
Taken together, the judicial and legislative events of 2012 are a 
watershed, representing a significant moment in Canadian copyright 
history. The level of activity was unprecedented, five Supreme Court 
decisions and a major legislative enactment coming within a few 
weeks of each other. At least with respect to the use of copyrighted 
materials in the educational and library context, the combined 
message from these measures is unmistakable and clear: users’ rights 
are now firmly entrenched as core principles in Canadian copyright 
law, and the central policy tool to realize this principle is fair dealing. 
7
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In the two decisions directly treating fair dealing, Alberta (Education) 
v Access Copyright [Alberta (Education)]6 and SOCAN v Bell Canada 
[Bell],7 the Court has not only reaffirmed the strong users’ rights–
oriented policy language from CCH Canadian v Law Society of Upper 
Canada [CCH],8 but has also provided further guidance in applying 
the different levels of fair dealing analysis. And in a third case, ESA v 
SOCAN [ESA],9 the Court gave a strong endorsement to the principle 
of technological neutrality, which should have positive implications 
in the educational sector where the use of emerging technologies and 
new media is prevalent.
To the extent that uncertainty was a material impediment to the 
implementation and realization of fair dealing in the period following 
the CCH decision, these concerns should now be behind us. Between 
the addition of “education” to the statutory fair dealing categories, 
and the guidance found in the case law, uncertainty can no longer 
suffice as a justification for putting off the adoption of robust fair 
dealing practices any longer. 
Yet, the full realization of the benefits of these developments still 
faces substantial barriers and obstacles at Canadian colleges and 
universities. Uncertainty aside, other problems persist and need to be 
addressed. In Overcoming Impediments, I argued that
In the increasingly complex web of Canadian 
educational copyright policy, there remain serious 
impediments, or counter-factors, to the realization of 
fair dealing as a substantive users’ right, at least insofar 
as it is formally recognized and incorporated into the 
reality of everyday practice. These impediments include 
the risk aversion of educational administrators, the 
aggressive overreaching of content owners and their 
representatives; and the general lack of understanding 
about basic copyright rights and obligations. Taken 
together, they have frustrated the implementation of a 
unanimous SCC decision for over six years.10 
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Similarly, Meera Nair conducted extensive research on the 
copyright policies of Canadian universities in the years following 
CCH and concluded that
[I]t does not appear that Canadian universities have 
placed a priority upon codifying robust fair dealing 
practices…. Some institutions have diminished the role 
of fair dealing, favouring instead a system of permission 
(and potential payment) for inclusion of material that 
would legitimately sit as fair dealing. Despite five years of 
incubation, CCH Canadian has not, to any appreciable 
degree, taken root in the Canadian university landscape.11
While there is now increasing reason for cautious optimism, the 
problems of undue risk aversion, overreaching on the part of content 
owners, and an inadequate understanding of copyright throughout the 
academy continue to persist, and so each factor must be addressed in 
an affirmative manner. The impacts of these problems are cumulative 
and mutually reinforcing; together they form a vicious cycle that 
results in an overreliance on unnecessary licences and a general 
deference to a permissions culture. This situation is not conducive to 
achieving the fair dealing policies that are justified under the current 
state of Canadian law, and they present harmful barriers to teaching, 
learning and research. The purpose of this chapter, then, is first to 
review and analyze the current state of the law, and second to apply 
this understanding to institutional copyright policies, alleviating all 
three prongs of the problem, and working toward the realization of 
reflexive and conscious fair dealing practices. 
Two interrelated actions are suggested, both of which are achievable 
on a local level. First, those schools that have entered into the AUCC-
Access Copyright Model License12 (or a similar arrangement) should 
terminate the agreement at the earliest possible opportunity. Second, 
local campus fair dealing guidelines should be crafted that provide 
useful guidance to academic staff and students about their copyright 
rights and obligations, but that also avoid bright-line rule making that 
has plagued past efforts at drafting copyright policies. Before turning 
to these measures, the July 2012 rulings will be reviewed and analyzed 
as they pertain to the issues of educational fair dealing. 
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Fair Dealing analysis under CCh and the Pentalogy
Since the Copyright Act sets out fair dealing in sections 29, 29.1 
and 29.2 as an exception to infringement,13 but does not provide 
a further definition, its interpretation has been left to the courts.14 
Historically, fair dealing had been narrowly construed by the courts 
and was generally a disfavoured concept.15 But the judicial hostility 
to fair dealing was reversed in CCH by the Court of Appeal in 200216 
and again by a unanimous Supreme Court.17 In the landmark 2004 
holding that fair dealing was an important users’ right, and not just a 
technical defense to copyright infringement, the Supreme Court set 
out a two-part analysis for determining whether fair dealing would 
apply in any particular situation. In the first stage, the party claiming 
fair dealing must come within one of the categories specified in the 
Copyright Act (which had been research, private study, criticism, 
review or news reporting). If the first step is satisfied, then the six 
fair dealing criteria are applied in order to determine whether the 
infringement should be excused. 
At the first level of analysis, the CCH court held that the category 
of research should be given a “large and liberal interpretation in order 
to ensure that users’ rights are not unduly constrained.”18 In Bell, the 
issue at the threshold level of analysis was also whether the previews 
were provided for the allowable purpose of “research” under the first 
step of the CCH fair dealing test.19
While SOCAN took the position that the provision of the previews 
did not constitute “research” within the meaning of section 29,20 the 
Copyright Board, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court all 
disagreed. SOCAN had argued that research should be limited to “the 
systematic investigation into and study of materials and sources in 
order to establish facts and reach new conclusions” and that “the goal 
of the ‘research’ must be for the purpose of making creative works, 
since only uses that contribute to the creative process are in the public 
interest.”21 SOCAN further argued that “the purpose of ‘research’ 
should have been analysed from the perspective of the online service 
provider and not the consumer [and that] [f]rom this perspective, 
the purpose of the previews was not ‘research’, but to sell permanent 
downloads of the musical works.”22 In rejecting SOCAN’s position on 
the meaning of research, the Court stated:
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Limiting research to creative purposes would also run 
counter to the ordinary meaning of “research”, which 
can include many activities that do not demand the 
establishment of new facts or conclusions. It can be 
piecemeal, informal, exploratory, or confirmatory. It can 
in fact be undertaken for no purpose except personal 
interest. It is true that research can be for the purpose 
of reaching new conclusions, but this should be seen as 
only one, not the primary component of the definitional 
framework.23
The court also rejected SOCAN’s position on the frame of 
reference issue, stating that “[t]he provider’s purpose in making the 
works available is therefore not the relevant perspective at the first 
stage of the fair dealing analysis.”24 From the end user’s perspective, 
“consumers used the previews for the purpose of conducting research 
to identify which music to purchase, purchases which trigger 
dissemination of musical works and compensation for their creators, 
both of which are outcomes the Act seeks to encourage.”25
In Alberta (Education), it was common ground that the first prong 
had been satisfied and that the issues revolved around applying the six 
fair dealing criteria.26 
Especially now with the addition of education, parody and satire 
as allowable fair dealing categories, it is increasingly likely that the 
fair dealing claimant will be successful at this first, threshold level 
of analysis. The court in Bell explicitly stated that “[i]n mandating 
a generous interpretation of the fair dealing purposes, including 
‘research’, the Court in CCH created a relatively low threshold for the 
first step so that the analytical heavy-hitting is done in determining 
whether the dealing was fair.”27 
Turning to the second prong of analysis, the Bell court had little 
trouble finding that on balance, the six factors favoured a finding of 
fair dealing. On the first factor, the purpose of the dealing, the Court 
reiterated that the relevant frame of reference is that of the end user; 
“the predominant perspective in this case is that of the ultimate users 
of the previews, and their purpose in using previews was to help them 
research and identify musical works for online purchase.”28 With 
respect to the amount of the dealing, SOCAN argued that the Board 
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should have applied an aggregate approach: that is, looking at the 
significant amount of the previews streamed by consumers in their 
totality. Again, the Court rejected SOCAN’s approach: 
Since fair dealing is a “user’s” right, the “amount of 
the dealing” factor should be assessed based on the 
individual use, not the amount of the dealing in the 
aggregate. The appropriate measure under this factor 
is therefore, as the Board noted, the proportion of the 
excerpt used in relation to the whole work. That, it seems 
to me, is consistent with the Court’s approach in CCH, 
where it considered the Great Library’s dealings by 
looking at its practices as they related to specific works 
requested by individual patrons, not at the total number 
of patrons or pages requested. The “amount of the 
dealing” factor should therefore be assessed by looking 
at how each dealing occurs on an individual level, not  
on the aggregate use.29 
With respect to the final factor, the effect of the dealing on the 
work, the Court was dismissive of SOCAN’s position. Noting that 
the previews were of short duration and degraded quality, the Court 
stated: “it can hardly be said that previews are in competition with 
downloads of the work itself,”30 and that “since the effect of previews 
is to increase the sale and therefore the dissemination of copyrighted 
musical works thereby generating remuneration to their creators, it 
cannot be said that they have a negative impact on the work.”31 The 
court was unanimous in its holding that the Board properly applied 
the fair dealing tests.
The companion case arising out of the contested K-12 reproduction 
tariff was a more difficult case. Both the Copyright Board and the 
Court of Appeal agreed with Access Copyright’s position that the 
photocopying of texts in question did not constitute fair dealing. But 
the Supreme Court majority found numerous errors in the Board’s 
approach, which rose to the level of being unreasonable and reversed 
the Board and the Court of Appeal. In this case, it was common 
ground that the first prong of the CCH test had been satisfied; the 
attention of the Court turned to the evaluation of the six fair dealing 
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factors under its second prong. The issue before the Court was the fair 
dealing status of copies of works made at the teachers’ initiative, with 
instructions to students that they read the material.32
In asserting that the first fair dealing factor, the purpose of the 
dealing, did not favour the schools, Access Copyright had relied on 
three commonwealth cases where attempts by fair dealing claimants 
to invoke private study by standing in the shoes of end users had 
been rejected. In both Sillitoe v McGraw-Hill33 and University of 
London Press v University Tutorial Press34 commercial publishers 
sought to invoke the private study prong of fair dealing on behalf of 
their student customers. The third case, Copyright Licensing Ltd. v 
University of Auckland35 involved a university providing course packs 
for students. While the Copyright Board and the Court of Appeal 
agreed with Access Copyright, the Supreme Court declined to follow 
these precedents because they “do not stand for the proposition 
that ‘research’ and ‘private study’ are inconsistent with instructional 
purposes, but for the principle that copiers cannot camouflage 
their own distinct purpose by purporting to conflate it with the 
research or study purposes of the ultimate user.”36 In rejecting Access 
Copyright’s artificial separation between the purposes of teachers and 
their students, the Court put to rest the notion that private study is 
somehow vitiated in the case of required readings. The court noted 
that “photocopies made by a teacher and provided to primary and 
secondary school students are an essential element in the research 
and private study undertaken by those students.”37 While the same 
result should apply in the post-secondary sector, the expansion of 
the fair dealing categories to include “education” renders the issue 
of the fine-line distinction between private study and instruction as 
irrelevant, since required readings would certainly come within the 
scope of “education” even if a narrow interpretation had been applied 
to “private study.” 
It is important to bear in mind that Access Copyright’s position 
on the narrow scope of “private study” was not only upheld by the 
Copyright Board38 and the Federal Court of Appeal,39 but the private 
study/instruction dichotomy was also incorporated into the Fair 
Dealing Policy issued by the Association of Universities and Colleges 
of Canada (AUCC) in December 201040 and subsequently adopted by 
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many colleges and universities.41 The AUCC policy explicitly stated 
that it “does not permit making copies for sale to students in course 
packs, making copies of required readings for library reserve, or 
posting copies on course management systems, e.g., Blackboard, or 
on course websites.”42
With respect to the first fair dealing factor, purpose of the dealing, 
the Alberta majority applied the CCH criteria in a flexible and liberal 
manner, concluding that
the word “private” in “private study” should not be 
understood as requiring users to view copyrighted 
works in splendid isolation. Studying and learning 
are essentially personal endeavours, whether they are 
engaged in with others or in solitude. By focusing on the 
geography of classroom instruction rather than on the 
concept of studying, the Board again artificially separated 
the teachers’ instruction from the students’ studying.43
Before turning to the other grounds on which the Court found 
the Board’s decision to be unreasonable, a close reading of Abella J’s 
reasoning on the first factor is warranted:
Teachers have no ulterior motive when providing copies 
to students. Nor can teachers be characterized as having 
the completely separate purpose of “instruction”; they 
are there to facilitate the students’ research and private 
study. It seems to me to be axiomatic that most students 
lack the expertise to find or request the materials 
required for their own research and private study, and 
rely on the guidance of their teachers. They study what 
they are told to study, and the teacher’s purpose in 
providing copies is to enable the students to have the 
material they need for the purpose of studying. The 
teacher/copier therefore shares a symbiotic purpose with 
the student/user who is engaging in research or private 
study. Instruction and research/private study are, in the 
school context, tautological.44
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The Board’s approach, on the other hand, drives an 
artificial wedge into these unified purposes by drawing 
a distinction between copies made by the teacher at the 
request of a student (Categories 1-3), and copies made 
by the teacher without a prior request from a student 
(Category 4).45
This passage explicitly rejects the private study-instruction 
dichotomy and demonstrates the majority’s insights into the 
educational processes of teaching and learning and its relationships with 
instructional materials. Going forward, this holistic understanding 
of teaching and learning should have significant implications for the 
development of educational fair dealing policies. Instructors and 
librarians have always understood this holistic relationship between 
teaching, learning and educational materials; these insights need to 
be better reflected in institutional copyright policies. 
The court found the Copyright Board’s decision unreasonable 
on other grounds as well. On the “amount of the dealing” factor, the 
Board found that if a teacher had repeatedly copied from the same 
book, making a set shared by more than one class or by many students 
in the same class, this tended to make the dealing unfair. The court 
disagreed with this approach because, as with the music previews 
in Bell, the relevant frame of reference is that of the ultimate end 
user, here the students. The court found that “teachers do not make 
multiple copies of the class set for their own use, they make them for 
the use of the students”46 and that in assessing the “amount” factor, the 
proper inquiry is not “based on aggregate use, it is an examination of 
the proportion between the excerpted copy and the entire work, not 
the overall quantity of what is disseminated.”47 
The court also found the Board’s approach to the “alternatives 
to the dealing” factor was unreasonable. The Board found that the 
schools had an alternative to the copying in that they could have 
purchased more books. But the Court found that “buying books for 
each student is not a realistic alternative to teachers copying short 
excerpts to supplement student textbooks” and that making copies 
of short excerpts was “reasonably necessary to achieve the ultimate 
purpose of the students’ research and private study.”48 
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Finally, the Court also disagreed with the Board’s approach to the 
final factor, “effect of the dealing on the work.” While Access Copyright 
claimed that this factor weighed against fair dealing because of the 
diminution of text sales over the last twenty years, there was no 
evidence presented linking this decline in sales to the photocopying 
practices of teachers. Nonetheless, the Board found that the impact 
of photocopies competed with the original texts enough to make 
the dealing unfair. In reversing this finding, the Court observed that 
“other than the bald fact of a decline in sales over twenty years, there is 
no evidence from Access Copyright demonstrating any link between 
photocopying short excerpts and the decline in textbook sales.”49
The court remanded the case back to the Copyright Board for 
a new determination consistent with the ruling. Access Copyright 
quite predictably tried to minimize the effect of the ruling and argued 
that the Supreme Court’s decision left open questions of fact to be 
determined in order to properly recalculate the tariff on remand. 
They even made the rather remarkable claim that “[i]n its decision, 
the Supreme Court did not conclude that the copying at issue was 
‘fair’ under the terms of the Copyright Act.”50 But the Copyright Board 
disagreed, indicating that “[t]he decision of the Supreme Court is clear 
and leaves no room for interpretations: based on the record before 
the Board and the findings of fact of the Supreme Court, Category 4 
copies constitute fair dealing for an allowable purpose and as such, 
are non-compensable.”51
Before moving on, the implications from a third case from the 
pentalogy, ESA,52 will be briefly addressed. This appeal also arose 
from a contested tariff application from SOCAN at the Copyright 
Board. SOCAN was seeking compensation for musical works 
downloaded on the Internet under the communication to the public 
by telecommunication right in section 3(1)(f) of the Copyright Act. 
The Entertainment Software Association, representing producers of 
video games that incorporate musical works into their games, objected 
to additional compensation for downloads of musical works under 
the communication right on various grounds, including that under 
general industry practice, the reproduction rights to the musical works 
are separately cleared. The Copyright Board agreed with SOCAN 
and certified a tariff,53 and the decision was upheld on appeal.54 The 
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Supreme Court reversed, holding that “the Board’s conclusion that 
a separate, ‘communication’ tariff applied to downloads of musical 
works violates the principle of technological neutrality, which requires 
that the Copyright Act apply equally between traditional and more 
technologically advanced forms of the same media….”55 
The court pointed to the disparity that had been created between 
buying a physical copy in a store and downloading the same game on 
the Internet:
there is no practical difference between buying a durable 
copy of the work in a store, receiving a copy in the mail, 
or downloading an identical copy using the Internet.  
The Internet is simply a technological taxi that delivers  
a durable copy of the same work to the end user.56
. . . 
SOCAN has never been able to charge royalties for 
copies of video games stored on cartridges or discs, and 
bought in a store or shipped by mail. Yet it argues that 
identical copies of the games sold and delivered over 
the Internet are subject to both a fee for reproducing 
the work and a fee for communicating the work. The 
principle of technological neutrality requires that, absent 
evidence of Parliamentary intent to the contrary, we 
interpret the Copyright Act in a way that avoids imposing 
an additional layer of protections and fees based solely 
on the method of delivery of the work to the end user. 
To do otherwise would effectively impose a gratuitous 
cost for the use of more efficient, Internet-based 
technologies.57 
While fair dealing was not at issue in ESA, and while the 
controversy did not arise in the educational sector, the decision could 
have broad implications for educational fair dealing analysis in the 
future. The court’s insistence that the Copyright Act be interpreted 
in such a way as to avoid additional copyright protections and fees 
based on methods of delivery was stated in the most general of terms. 
The ruling was not limited to the delivery of online video games, and 
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should be equally applicable to the online delivery of course materials 
as well as online instruction itself. Just as a different result should not 
arise between purchasing a video game at a physical retail store and 
downloading the same content from the Internet, the same principle 
should apply to photocopying course instructional materials in the 
library or over a network. The same principles should apply to a course 
pack regardless of whether a paper copy is purchased in a bookstore 
or delivered online, as well as to classroom instruction regardless of 
whether it takes place in a physical classroom or online. This is not 
to say that technology-enhanced learning or online dissemination of 
course readings should obtain any special status or privilege. But for 
the purpose of fair dealing analysis, there should be an even playing 
field with traditional instructional methods. The decision of how to 
use technology-enhanced learning should not be driven by copyright 
concerns, any more than the decision to purchase a video game online 
or in a store should be. 
Overall, the pentalogy demonstrates a strong and ongoing 
endorsement of the principles established in CCH. In addition 
to providing historical continuity to the general concept of users’ 
rights, these decisions provide further guidelines in applying the 
different levels of fair dealing analysis, which should help clarify 
and guide future fair dealing determinations. This guidance comes 
at an important juncture, as many institutions continue to exhibit 
uncertainty and undue caution in the face of continuing pressure 
from rights holders. 
To summarize, several clear principles emerge from these cases, 
which should help guide the development of educational fair dealing 
policies in the future.
First, at the initial level of fair dealing analysis, there is now a 
very low threshold in terms of coming within one of the enumerated 
statutory categories. This result will be even more pronounced with 
the addition of education, parody and satire as fair dealing categories. 
It has become clear that even without the addition of the words “such 
as” to section 29 of the Copyright Act, the “analytical heavy-hitting” 
will be done as part of the factual analysis looking at the six individual 
fair dealing factors in the second prong of fair dealing analysis. 
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Second, with respect to the first fair dealing category, which takes 
a deeper look at the purpose of the dealing, the point of view of the 
end user is the proper frame of analysis. In schools, this means looking 
at the use by the students, and in libraries it means looking at the 
use by the patrons. It is also now clear that artificial distinctions, like 
whether an instructor has required a reading, are not determinative, 
as assigning a reading does not preclude private study. 
Third, determinations about the amount of the dealing should be 
assessed by looking at how each dealing occurs on an individual level, 
not on aggregate use. The issue of whether to adopt the aggregate 
versus individual point of view has been a highly disputed point, with 
the collectives pushing for the user-disabling aggregate approach. The 
individual approach, which was endorsed in both Alberta (Education) 
and Bell, keeps the control localized in the hands of the end user, 
who is best able to make reasonable assessments under this factor. 
This user-centric approach is most conducive to the establishment of 
local fair dealing policies that are based on actual practices and are 
understandable to end users.
Like the first factor, the Court has stressed that since fair dealing 
is a users’ right, a user-centred inquiry should prevail. 
Fourth, on the alternatives to the dealing factor, fair dealing 
claimants are not expected to bear unreasonable burdens or expenses. 
In Alberta, the suggested alternative of simply purchasing more texts 
was dismissed as unreasonable. The court has been consistent on this 
factor, the CCH court having stated that the availability of a licence is 
not relevant.58 Finally, and with respect to the last factor, the effect of 
the dealing on the work, both Alberta (Education) and Bell hold that 
demonstrable harm needs to be shown in order to turn this factor 
against the fair dealing claimant. Simply making generalizations 
about lost sales due to copying will not suffice to defeat a particular 
fair dealing claim.
Finally, with respect to all of the fair dealing factors, the principle 
of technological neutrality can be used to help justify new practices 
that make use of emerging technologies and new media in a beneficial 
manner. 
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Moving Forward after the Pentalogy
As Canada’s colleges and universities move forward in their 
development of new copyright policies, a thorough understanding 
of the implications of the pentalogy, together with its relationship to 
the new provisions of the Copyright Act, are essential. At the present 
time, there are two interrelated issues that warrant the immediate 
attention of the educational community. The first involves the 
ongoing proceedings at the Copyright Board with respect to Access 
Copyright’s proposed post-secondary tariff,59 as well as the ongoing 
debate over the ensuing licences between Access Copyright and 
various individual institutions.60 While a full discussion of the scope 
of the Proposed Tariff and the ensuing licences as well as the various 
grounds of objection that have been raised,61 is beyond the scope of 
this chapter, the local decisions that are made on these issues will 
have an important bearing on how fair dealing policies will unfold on 
these campuses in the future. The AUCC Model License agreements 
have termination dates of December 2015, whereas the University 
of Western Ontario and University of Toronto agreements have an 
earlier termination date of December 2013.
The second interrelated issue concerns the development, 
implementation and evaluation of institutional fair dealing 
guidelines. As indicated earlier in this essay, AUCC released a set of 
fair dealing guidelines in December 201062; these were followed by 
a very divergent set of guidelines from the Canadian Association of 
University Teachers (CAUT) in April 2011.63 After the pentalogy, a 
new set of guidelines is emerging, including entries from Association 
of Canadian Community Colleges  (ACCC)64 and the University of 
Toronto,65 and there does seem to be a growing consensus about the 
content of the guidelines.66 Comparing these emerging policies with 
the scope of the permissions granted by Access Copyright under 
the Proposed Tariff and the various licences indicates enough of 
an equivalency to suggest that Access Copyright is simply granting 
back permission to make copies that are already permitted under 
fair dealing. The Access Copyright licence says that “[s]ubject to 
compliance with each of the conditions in Sections 4 and 5, this tariff 
entitles an Authorized Person for Authorized Purposes only, to
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(a) make a Copy of up to ten per cent (10%) of a 
Repertoire Work; 
(b) make a Copy of up to twenty per cent (20%) of a 
Repertoire Work only as part of a Course Collection; or
(c) make a Copy of a Repertoire Work that is 
 (i) an entire newspaper or periodical article or page, 
 (ii) a single short story, play, poem, essay or article,
 (iii) an entire entry from an encyclopaedia, annotated 
bibliography, dictionary or similar reference work,
 (iv) an entire reproduction of an artistic work (including 
a drawing, painting, print, photograph and reproduction 
of a work of sculpture, an architectural work of art and a 
work of artistic craftsmanship), and
 (v) one chapter, provided it is no more than twenty per 
cent (20%) of a book.
Even before the pentalogy, several institutions questioned 
the value of the AUCC Model License. Memorial University 
emphasized this point in its announcement that it would not be 
signing the license, stating, “[a] dominant theme running through all 
discussions, consultations and feedback on this issue was the absence 
of a compelling value proposition for Memorial under the proposed 
licensing terms.”67 Similarly, in its announcement rejecting the AUCC 
Model License, the University of British Columbia stated:
The AUCC model license only permits copying of up 
to 10% of a work (20% in case of course packs) and 
only with respect to a narrow repertoire that is almost 
exclusively print-based. Therefore, the license would not 
be cost-effective for UBC and does not absolve faculty 
members and students from the need to respect the legal 
rights of copyright owners.68
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In order for collective licensing to maintain relevance in the 
Canadian educational sector, collectives must offer licensing options 
that provide additional value to institutions and end users. The level of 
general permissions must clearly go beyond what is already permitted 
under fair dealing, and institutions should be encouraged to obtain 
transactional licences where they are needed. 
With the benefit of the pentalogy rulings and the passage of Bill 
C-11 with educational fair dealing intact, the task facing Canadian 
educational institutions is clear. Schools that have already entered into 
licence agreements with Access Copyright should terminate them at 
the earliest possible opportunity, and guidelines for campus copyright 
practices should be crafted. These guidelines should provide useful 
guidance to academic staff and students about their copyright rights 
and obligations, but should also be flexible enough to accommodate 
the varied instances in which fair dealing might arise.
 In March 2014 we will celebrate the tenth anniversary of the CCH 
decision. It would be fitting to have robust fair dealing policies and 
practices in place by that time that reflect the true meaning of the 
decision, and that empower academic staff and students to become 
conscious practitioners of fair copyright practices. 
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Approximately ten years ago, the Supreme Court of Canada gently 
opened the door to a more nuanced discussion of copyright. In 
Théberge v Galéries du Petit Champlain inc. [Théberge] (2002), the 
majority opinion declared: “The Copyright Act is usually presented as 
a balance between promoting the public interest in the encouragement 
and dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and obtaining 
a just reward for the creator…. [The proper balance] lies not only 
in recognizing the creator’s rights but in giving due weight to their 
limited nature.”2 A 5-4 decision, these words might have passed into 
history as nothing more than a minor aberration from mainstream 
copyright thought. Copyright policy makers of the day were fretting 
over the phenomenon of file sharing, spurred on by multinational 
entertainment corporations gripped by a fury worthy of Dodgsonian 
imagination.3 Yet, as the past decade has illustrated, Théberge marked 
the start of a shift in Canadian copyright policy, away from the 
maximalist tendencies evident at the turn of the century to broader 
recognition that copyright be maintained as a limited right, and that 
those limits be robust in order to ensure that creativity continues.
8
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Meanwhile, some 9,000 kilometres away, another country was 
also resisting the trend toward absolute copyright. In fact, Israel’s 
effort to mitigate the excesses of copyright predates that of Canada. 
Guidance came from the Israeli Supreme Court, with those 
Justices also introducing the issue slowly. While unable to excuse 
a commercial, satirical use of copyrighted work in 1993, the Court 
introduced the importance of flexibility with respect to copyright’s 
exceptions.4 The seed planted then flowered in 2007 when, with 
a nod to an earlier developing nation, Israel adopted fair use into 
its domestic law.5 Canada did not follow Israel’s inclination to an 
open-ended exception, but expanded the purposes of fair dealing 
in 2012.6 
However, the fact remains that both countries are swimming 
against the global tide. Through the ever-widening scope of trade 
agreements, the importance of future creativity is diminished by the 
greater focus placed upon protecting existing assets.7 This makes the 
Canadian and Israeli legal developments all the more important—
both countries add to diversity within the international community. 
But a more tolerant law cannot achieve balance on its own. Fulfilling 
the law’s potential requires achieving a wider understanding of 
what lies at the heart of the exception: fairness of use. Without such 
understanding, individuals, industries and institutions are timid 
to engage with the exception. And when the exception is not used, 
copyright becomes absolute by default. 
The two countries make for an intriguing study. To a layman, the 
duo could not have been more unlikely a pair. On closer inspection, 
though, there are similarities. While Canada and Israel are not identical 
in terms of cultural substance, they resemble one other in cultural 
structure. By structure I refer to the role of British Imperialism in 
shaping the two nations, the diverse social milieu that later followed, 
and the presence of more than one system of law within the borders.8 
And although both nations later came under closer influence of the 
United States, each country avoided obliging all American wishes in 
terms of domestic copyright amendment.9
Then again, similarities only take one so far. Currently, the two 
Courts show differing (but complementary) trajectories via the 
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principles of fair use. These differences may also be explained by 
recourse to culture; culture famously decreed by Raymond Williams 
as one of the most complicated words in the English language. In its 
ideal state, fair use is entirely an outcome of culture—it is shaped by the 
collective distinctiveness of each nation. Decisions of fair use should 
be guided by the principles and customs shared within a nation.
Fair use is an imperfect instrument—in and of itself it cannot 
guarantee legitimate conduct in the hands of others. Yet in a world 
of increasingly aggressive copyright control, fair use is the last 
independent space10 where some unauthorized uses of copyrighted 
material may occur. Such uses are foundational to the pursuit 
of creativity; whether one is the struggling author or engineer, 
reliance on other works is inescapable. The manner in which works 
will influence future efforts cannot be easily delineated and then 
championed—sometimes all a fair use enthusiast can do is remind 
readers of Sir Isaac Newton’s observation of “standing on the 
shoulders of giants,” or, when feeling a little donnish, quote from T.S. 
Eliot: “Immature poets imitate; mature poets steal; bad poets deface 
what they take, and good poets make it into something better, or at 
least something different. The good poet welds his theft into a whole 
of feeling which is unique, utterly different from that from which it 
was torn….”11 
If Israel and Canada are indeed seeking the benefits allowed via 
a flexible exception, it will be many years before success or failure 
is definitively pronounced. This chapter can only set the stage from 
where to examine their journeys into fairness of use. Section II 
situates the backdrop of fair use in the American context; of particular 
importance is the mid–twentieth century discussion on the merits of 
flexibility which preceded the coding of the exception into law. Israel 
and Canada enter in Section III via their Supreme Courts, as each 
Court sought to overcome the rigidity of fair dealing as it existed in 
the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, respectively. Section 
IV takes a look at the more recent guidance from each Supreme 
Court, and Section V concludes by considering the potential for each 
country to make the best of its own cultural approaches to exceptions.
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ii: Fair Use: a Complicated Youth
Fair use is best known by its American representation: 
…the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such 
use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by 
any other means specified by that section, for purposes 
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching 
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, 
or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In 
determining whether the use made of a work in any 
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered 
shall include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work.”12
Generally speaking, this language is credited to Folsom v Marsh 
(1841)13—a case concerning two biographies of George Washington. 
Presiding Justice Story offered what would lead to the four factors 
of fair use as codified in 1976: “In short, we must often, in deciding 
questions of this sort, look to the nature and objects of the selections 
made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree 
in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or 
supersede the objects, of the original work.”14 This multi-faceted 
approach to analysis emphasizes that questions of unauthorized 
use must be handled with care; there would be no easy answers. But 
flexibility of language was prized in the mid-twentieth century; it 
offered greater potential for creativity to be sheltered. 
In 1958, at the behest of the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, 
and Copyrights, Alan Latman authored a study concerning fair use 
and raised two questions: (i) should fair use should be codified into 
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law; and (ii) if so, to what detail.15 His work was circulated to an 
advisory panel of nine copyright experts; eight argued that fair use 
should not be codified with any attempt at specificity.16 Consensus 
was that the doctrine was developed by the courts, and courts should 
remain responsible for the scope of the doctrine. It may not have been 
easy for the judiciary to interpret fair use, but panel members pointed 
out that interpretation was necessary in other areas of law as well.17 
Ralph S. Brown, a staunch advocate of the rights of the individual,18 
illustrated both ends of the argument:
The dominant impression that emerges from Mr. Latman’s 
helpful study is that a statutory definition of fair use is 
inordinately difficult. Since I, for one, regard a liberal 
concept of fair use as essential to our American concept 
of copyright, it seems in one sense an abdication of 
responsibility to ignore the subject in the statute. Yet 
the history of statutory attempts in this country, and 
the examples from abroad, suggest great difficulties in 
specifying the scope of fair use for particular situations. 
On the other hand, a general statutory recognition of fair 
use seems to add nothing to the present law as a guide for 
the courts. There will always be new situations and new 
uses arising, so that a detailed statute, even if it gave some 
present guidance to the courts, would be certain to fall 
behind the times.19
It is unsurprising, then, that when the law was codified, fair 
use was framed in general terms. An instructional guide prepared 
within the Copyright Office of the Library of Congress gives additional 
explanation:
Section 107 is somewhat vague since it would be difficult 
to prescribe precise rules to cover all situations. … 
Section 107 makes it clear that the factors a court shall 
consider shall “include” [the four factors]. … [T]he terms 
“including” and “such as” are illustrative and not limitative. 
The legislative reports state that section 107 as drafted is 
intended to restate the present judicial doctrine; it is not 
intended to change, narrow or enlarge it in any way.20 
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In 1985, Brown reiterated his view of fair use as essential to the 
American concept of copyright; one cannot but wonder if he feared a 
narrowing of fair use’s scope: 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized its 
understanding of the policy that flows from the 
Constitution: the primary public interest lies in 
increasing and spreading knowledge, not in rewards to 
authors and publishers. … [C]opyright must remain 
a body of law with fairly definite limits. Copyright has 
expanded to accommodate any number of changes in 
the ways that human communications are created and 
transmitted. It is a successful way of recognizing rights 
in expressive people, freeing them from dependence 
on the bounty of a feared ruler or a capricious patron. 
Congress has limited authors’ rights, however, so that 
the use to which readers put writings is not tyrannized. 
It is significant that the most comprehensive limit on 
copyright is called fair use.21
In his article, Brown makes reference to the famed Sony decision of 
fair use lore22 as well a publication that suggested fair use be evaluated 
with an eye to resolving market failure.23 At that time, Sony appeared 
a triumph for private copying and media development, but remarks 
by the American Supreme Court gave the issue of commerciality too 
much prominence in assessments of fair use.24 Barton Beebe’s study 
of fair use case law pinpoints those remarks as the moment when 
fair use ran “off the rails,” leading to an era of overt emphasis upon 
commerciality.25 Despite the wishes of the drafters of the 1976 language, 
fair dealing’s scope was narrowed. Further damaging was the onset 
of mechanistic application of the four-factor analysis.26 Fortunately, 
Beebe’s overall assessment of the contemporary progress of fair use in 
the United States is optimistic.27 American fair use is enjoying better 
days; scholarship substantiates the robustness of the multi-faceted 
inquiry and illustrates modest patterns of predictability.28 
Yet while there is new appreciation for flexibility in systems of 
copyright,29 experts remind us that fair use cannot be summarily 
imported into another jurisdiction.30 Canadian and Israeli aspirations 
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to flexible exceptions are viable because the principle has enjoyed a 
period of domestic incubation. Key cases illustrate that the impetus 
to a more flexible exception came from the Supreme Courts of both 
countries; the Courts sought a modest, step-by-step broadening of 
fair dealing in support of socially desirable purposes. 
iii: Fair Use: eastern and Northern incubation
i. 1993: David Geva v Walt Disney Corporation31
In 1993, the Supreme Court of Israel explored the question of fair 
dealing via the work of the late artist David Geva. In his work, The 
Duck Book, Geva had created a character known as Moby Duck, 
modelled upon Donald Duck but embellished with “the Tembel hat 
and a curl on the forehead, typical Israeli features.”32 The work as a 
whole was a critique of Israeli society, with the principles of freedom 
of expression lying at the heart of Geva’s petition.
Geva argued that if the court deemed his work to be an 
infringement of copyright, then the exceptions to copyright would 
excuse his invocation of Donald Duck. He felt that his use of 
Disney’s character was in a manner consistent with the American 
treatment of fair use. Although his case was not a personal success, 
the proceedings marked two significant developments for exceptions 
in Israel: i) the establishment of a multi-faceted inquiry when 
considering unauthorized uses of copyrighted work; and ii) the 
recognition of parody and satire as legitimate purposes for exception. 
These developments shaped, and were shaped by, a transition in 
jurisprudential reliance from English law and authority to American 
guidance.33 But this cultural transition was not taking place in a 
vacuum; Israel had a newly enacted Basic Law of Human Dignity 
encompassing the protection of property, but not an explicit right of 
freedom of expression, to accommodate as well.34
The Court was careful to give freedom of expression its due, but 
observed:
We must remember that even basic principles, including 
the freedom of speech, retract in light of enacted laws. 
The instructions of the law will be interpreted in light 
of the basic principles in an attempt to express those 
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principles, but this will be the case only as long as the 
interpretation corresponds to the actual purposes 
and language of the law. As such, also the principle 
of freedom of speech is limited to the boundaries of 
enacted copyrights laws.35
The presiding copyright law was the Israeli Copyright Act of 1911 
(as set via the British Copyright Act of 1911) and contained a very brief 
fair dealing allowance: “any fair dealing of a work for the purpose of 
private study, research, criticism, review, or newspaper summary.”36 
In discussion concerning the structure of the exception came this 
observation: 
[T]he American arrangement is much more advanced 
and is, when compared to the 1911 law, a more desired 
arrangement. … It seems that the American legislator 
preferred to create a flexible arrangement, one that 
enables maximal consideration in the circumstances of 
each and every case.37
Recognizing the common heritage between the language of Israeli 
fair dealing and American fair use,38 the Court adopted the American 
four-factor analysis. With the framework of inquiry established, 
Geva’s first challenge was to be admitted to the realm of permitted 
categories. To provide Geva this opportunity required overturning a 
lower court’s view that criticism must refer in a negative capacity to 
the object copied and that general social criticism could not draw on 
the exception: 
It seems that the term “criticism” for the purposes of 
article 2(1)(1) should be interpreted in a broad sense. 
The freedom of speech and creativity, while they cannot 
change the law per se, do influence, as was mentioned 
above, the shaping of the law through means of 
interpretation. Therefore, it is recommended to accept a 
broad interpretation and to include critiques in the form 
of parody and satire in the category of artistic criticism.39
And future decisions were positioned for a broader scope of 
inquiry, with reassurance offered to would-be plaintiffs that the 
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mention of genre is hardly sufficient for an action to be deemed fair 
dealing:
Indeed, the question whether something is a satire or a 
parody (which is in fact a form of satire) is significant 
with respect to the issue of the fairness of the use. … I 
don’t see a need to differentiate between the two at the 
stage in which the purpose of the use is being examined. 
… At any rate, even if we say that the exception of “fair 
dealing” can take place in a situation of a critical parody 
or satire, we still need to examine each and every case 
and decide to which category the allegedly infringing 
work falls into. Naturally, not every comic use of a 
protected work will fall into the exception category.40
With criticism expanded, the manner by which Disney’s work had 
been used was explored via the four-factor framework of American 
fair use. Here, the first condition affected the outcome. The American 
framework of fair use was not imported in isolation; American case 
law, complete with its shortcomings, came too. The first factor’s 
consideration of purpose and character, with its bifurcation along 
commercial and non-profit lines, coupled with prevailing American 
Supreme Court tendencies to disfavour commercial uses, led to the 
denial of fair use as a whole.41
Geva was a product of its time; while extolling the virtues of 
American fair use, the Justices brought with it the American biases 
of the late twentieth century. That these biases coincided with Israel’s 
newly created constitutional protection of property explains the 
emphasis upon the property right of copyright by the Court.42 Despite 
this, Geva still opened the door to broader interpretation, as there was 
some discomfort with the idea that commerciality might become the 
blind arbiter of fair use: 
The use may be found to be fair in light of its purpose 
and character, even if those are commercial oriented, 
given that the use is found to promote important 
social values…. This is a product of our modern world, 
in which most of the activities that promote social 
values cannot be disconnected from financial motives. 
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Prohibiting any commercial use of a protected work will 
discourage activities that society would have liked to 
encourage.43
Perhaps looking for a way out of this conundrum, the Court 
offered some encouragement, again by drawing from a recently 
decided (and denied) instance of fair use by an American court:
Where courts have considered transformative, 
productive, non-superseding secondary use of the 
type that were favored in the historical development 
of fair use, they have attached little importance to the 
presence of profit motivation. Courts have recognized 
that most instructive publishing activity involves profit 
motivation.44
The consequence of Geva was that Israel’s copyright landscape was 
seeded to better serve subsequent creative development. After fair use 
reached formal codification into Israel’s copyright law, Neil Netanel 
would write: “Israel’s new copyright statute essentially completes the 
move from fair dealing to fair use that the Israeli Supreme Court had 
already initiated in 1993 in its ruling in Geva v Walt Disney Co.”45 
Noting that American jurisprudence had seen two distinct strains 
of fair use interpretation emerge—fair use as merely a means of 
resolving market failure in a regime of licensing, and fair use as means 
of enabling expressive diversity—Netanel speculates that, with Geva’s 
approving nod to American cases that favoured transformative uses 
of copyrighted works, “Israeli courts should be considerably more 
receptive to the expressive diversity approach to fair use than to 
the market approach.”46 But Geva is not the complete story behind 
Israel’s good footing today. The potential for transformative use was 
strengthened through the famed Charlie Chaplin case.
ii. 2000: Mifal Hapais v The Roy Export Establishment47
The circumstances of the Charlie Chaplin case began in 1993, when 
the Israeli national lottery released an advertising campaign featuring 
Charlie Chaplin’s character “Little Tramp.” The character was used in 
memorabilia provided to the public, newspaper advertisements and 
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television commercials that contained scenes from Chaplin’s movies.
Fair dealing was not the primary argument of the lottery 
corporation. It first argued the following: a fictional character cannot 
be the object of copyright; even if copyright existed, the ownership was 
suspect, as certain diplomatic procedures had not been carried out; 
the original airing of the movies predates the existence of Israel itself 
and thus a 1953 agreement to protect American copyright should not 
be applicable; and the amount used was insubstantial and therefore 
not a violation of copyright.48 If infringement was still deemed to have 
occurred, fair dealing was the refuge:
The appellants claim that even if their actions infringed 
on the copyrights of the respondents, their actions 
should be considered as fair use, as their usage was 
intended for “criticism” purposes…. They base their 
claim on the fact that the [lottery corporation] does 
not operate for commercial purposes, but rather for 
different public causes in the fields of education, sports 
and welfare. Moreover, the appellants believe that the 
commercials are a form of parody or satire, since they 
use the Chaplin character, which “is a cultural symbol  
of poverty, in order to make fun of that cultural symbol 
and to place it in absurd light.”49
The Supreme Court, sitting as the Court of Appeal, began by 
acknowledging the merit of a broad interpretation of fair use: 
[The exception to the law] is extremely important, and 
there is justification to interpret it in a broad manner. 
When protecting the original work we should also note 
that too much protection can halt the progression and 
development of culture and society, which essentially 
progresses out of past achievements. A certain break-
through or progression that serves society as a whole,  
by its nature occurs through the creative achievements of 
individuals who lead the way. Thus, there are situations 
in which the public interest justifies limiting the scope of 
copyright protection. Such is the case of the fair dealing 
doctrine.50
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Priority fell upon the consideration of fairness, but the lottery 
corporation promptly failed at the first factor of analysis. Again, the 
division between commercial and non-profit was stark: 
[The] appellant used Chaplin’s creations for 
advertisement purposes, in order to increase the 
revenues from the lottery raffle it conducts. Using a 
protected work in commercial advertisements does not 
constitute one of the [allowed] purposes, which include 
“criticism”, “parody” or “satire”. … Even if the appellants 
incorporated as part of their commercials, elements of 
“parody” or “satire”, these elements served, at the most, 
as means to an end, and were not the main purpose of 
the commercials.51
Although denying the claim of fair use in this instance, the 
Court offered an even more liberal interpretation of “criticism” by 
acknowledging the role of prior works as inspiration for something new:
We should thus take into consideration that certain 
artistic genres may perceive the original creation as a 
form of inspiration, and as it being a part of a wider, 
critical discourse, which includes additional creators. 
Through such perception, the use made of a protected 
work—as a base for a new, original creation, can be 
considered, under the appropriate circumstances, to 
be “fair use” for the purpose of “criticism”. This is so 
provided that the use made with the original work will 
be examined in light of the fairness of that use.52
Tony Greenman, a prominent Israeli attorney, writes that the 
broadening of interpretation of criticism precipitated more flexible 
interpretation by lower courts:
While the fair use discourse in the Donald Duck and 
Charlie Chaplin cases provided little comfort to the 
defendants at bar, those cases were followed by a number 
of lower court judgments, actually accepting by then 
the fair dealing (by then, sometimes called “fair use”) 
defense for the first time.53
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Within a few years of the Israeli Supreme Court’s expansion of 
criticism, the Canadian Supreme Court would take similar steps 
with another purpose within fair dealing and take the opportunity 
to introduce a multi-faceted framework of inquiry to examine the 
fairness of use. 
iii. 2004: CCH Canadian v Law Society of Upper Canada54
As noted at the outset of this chapter, Canada’s journey began in 2002 
via Théberge. Fair dealing was not at issue then. This case concerned 
a novel means of literally transforming legitimately purchased 
reproductions of art. The court was divided on what signals 
reproduction (and thus a breach of copyright); was reproduction the 
outcome of increasing the number of works, or was reproduction a 
new fixation of an old work?55 In the course of their deliberation, the 
majority opinion presciently saw what lay ahead for Canada:
Excessive control by holders of copyrights and other 
forms of intellectual property may unduly limit 
the ability of the public domain to incorporate and 
embellish creative innovation in the long-term interests 
of society as a whole, or create practical obstacles to 
proper utilization. This is reflected in the exceptions 
to copyright infringement…which seek to protect 
the public domain in traditional ways such as fair 
dealing….56
Two years later, fair dealing was a prominent issue for the Court. 
The Great Library of the Law Society of Upper Canada routinely 
assisted patrons with research by reproducing, upon request, single 
copies of material related to legal matters. The copies were conveyed 
in print or via facsimile. Legal publishers protested, claiming 
infringement, but the Supreme Court declared fair dealing on the 
part of the library.57
Writing for a unanimous Court, McLachlin CJ stated: 
Before reviewing the scope of the fair dealing exception 
under the Copyright Act, it is important to clarify some 
general considerations about exceptions to copyright 
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infringement. Procedurally, a defendant is required to 
prove that his or her dealing with a work has been fair; 
however, the fair dealing exception is perhaps more 
properly understood as an integral part of the Copyright 
Act than simply a defence. Any act falling within the 
fair dealing exception will not be an infringement 
of copyright. The fair dealing exception, like other 
exceptions in the Copyright Act, is a user’s right.  
In order to maintain the proper balance between  
the rights of a copyright owner and users’ interests,  
it must not be interpreted restrictively.58
According to its critics, the decision marked nothing less than the 
collapse of copyright protection for creators. The language of user’s 
rights was seized upon and condemned, even though the Chief Justice 
had indicated that a procedural illustration of fairness was essential 
to the right.59
As in Geva, CCH only addressed one element of fair dealing, in this 
case, research. Like its Israeli counterpart, the Canadian Court used 
the opportunity to give this socially desirable activity a better foothold 
of safety: “Research must be given a large and liberal interpretation 
in order to ensure that users’ rights are not unduly constrained.”60 
Regarding how to determine fair dealing, CCH resulted in an even 
broader framework by which to examine unauthorized use. Decisions 
concerning fair dealing should include inquiry as to the purpose of 
the dealing, the character of the dealing, the amount of the dealing, 
alternatives for the dealing, the nature of the work, and the effect of 
the dealing on the work, all with the added proviso that the framework 
itself must be flexible.61 
And the entry point demarking fairness of use in Canada 
came with a more precise safeguard against overt emphasis upon 
commerciality: “Although the effect of the dealing on the market of 
the copyright owner is an important factor, it is neither the only factor 
nor the most important factor that a court must consider in deciding 
if the dealing is fair.”62 Leaving nothing to chance, the Chief Justice 
emphasized that the presence of a licensing scheme did not render 
fair dealing inert: 
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If a copyright owner were allowed to license people to 
use its work and then point to a person’s decision not to 
obtain a licence as proof that his or her dealings were 
not fair, this would extend the scope of the owner’s 
monopoly over the use of his or her work in a manner 
that would not be consistent with the Copyright Act’s 
balance between owner’s rights and user’s interests.63
Without any explicit citation, one cannot be sure of the source 
of such concern, but these words appear to be aimed in rebuttal 
to the narrowing of fair use in the United States, as brought on by 
the aftermath of American Geophysical v Texaco, Inc. The Second 
Circuit Court of Appeal had affirmed the district court decision and 
emphasized that the presence of a means of licensing was reason to 
deny fair use.64 Given Canada’s pre-existing and far-reaching system 
of collective licensing,65 fair dealing was at risk to be written out of 
existence, not by legislative amendment but simply by contract. The 
guidance from the Court preserves fair dealing for all Canadians, be 
they individuals or institutions.
Following these efforts by the Supreme Courts of Israel and 
Canada to overcome the rigidity of fair dealing, both countries were 
positioned to make better use of the exception in the manner offered 
by their Justices. Since then, legislative change also broadened the 
exception in both countries.66 Which invites this question: is each 
country capitalizing upon their opportunities—has the dialogue 
of fairness become sufficiently robust such that engagement with 
exceptions is successful?
This is a large question, and many factors play into it. Investigation 
of the fuller body of case law is necessary, as is a more comprehensive 
examination of public, professional and institutional approaches to the 
exceptions; that is to say, how are people, corporations, schools and 
libraries responding to the opportunity provided? And where does 
each country sit with respect to international cooperation on matters 
of exceptions? But for the purposes described herein, focus upon 
the views of Supreme Court Justices in each country continues to be 
instructive—comparing recent decisions against their initial judicial 
history reveals opportunities available and challenges yet to overcome. 
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iV: Fairness of Use: a Recent snapshot
Since fair use’s introduction into Israeli law, and up to the time of 
this writing, fair use has appeared twice before the Supreme Court of 
Israel. One occasion was with brevity, the other with some notoriety. 
While two recent cases of fair dealing heard by the Supreme Court of 
Canada occurred before Canadian amendment of its copyright law, 
these cases were part of an unprecedented hearing of five cases in two 
days67 and thus bear scrutiny. 
i. 2011: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem v Schocken 
Publishing House Ltd.68 
This dispute involved four entities: a publisher, a student club, a 
political party and a university. Enabled in part by contributions from 
the political party, the club habitually sold copies of various books 
at healthy discounts. A district court held the university as liable for 
contributory infringement; in its appeal, the university introduced a 
claim of fair use.
The Supreme Court, sitting as the Court of Appeal, deemed 
the university not guilty of contributory infringement.69 With 
infringement set aside, there was no need to analyze fair use. 
Nevertheless, the Court probed the juxtaposition of universities and 
fair use:
[O]nce we decided that the university is exempt of 
contributory infringement liability, we do not need to 
examine the applicability of the fair use defense with 
respect to the university….
It should be mentioned that indeed with respect to 
educational institutions there is significant value to the 
application of defenses, and this is in order to enable the 
institutions to fulfill their important role of enriching 
public knowledge and distributing it as well as educating 
the future generation of creators. …
Without setting anything in stone, the fair use defense 
might permit, under certain circumstances, higher 
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education institutes to make certain use of protected 
works for the purpose of education or research. This 
would allow them to fulfill their important social role. …
However, this is not the case before us. First and 
foremost, the distribution of the readers in this case was 
conducted by a student group that has specific interests, 
of which some are political. … This case does not 
involve the usage of a specific part of a protected work 
for educational purposes during a class or for an exam. 
Rather this case involves the copying of an entire book 
for the purpose of promoting a certain student group. 
Under such circumstances there is no place to apply the 
fair use defense.70 
Here the Court acknowledges that distribution (without 
stipulating a need of transformation) is a viable activity of fair use in 
the context of education. Even more helpful is the specific language 
that the institutions will necessarily distribute works when educating 
future creators. The separation and legitimacy of the distributor could 
offer much in the future. In any event, the brief excursion into fair use 
reads as a Court inviting post-secondary institutions to engage with 
fair use. The next appearance of fair use at the Israeli Supreme Court 
induced a far more complex discussion.
ii. 2012: The Football Association Premier League Ltd. v 
Anonymous71
At issue was a website that provided streaming coverage of sports 
matches without charge. The proprietor was not shy about his activity:
Hi all! I have created this site, as my personal aim, to be 
able to watch LIVE football/soccer, basketball matches 
etc, without having to pay a cent! Now you can enjoy this 
too. With LiveFooty, you can watch all the interesting 
sporting events FREE.72 
The copyright holders claimed infringement and sought the 
identity of the website proprietor. In a controversial decision, a 
district court judge stated that streaming was not a violation under 
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the existing language of copyright, and held that the proprietor’s 
conduct was fair use.73 The support of fair use was extensive; the Judge 
invoked not only the property rights of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, but also the right of access contained within that same 
instrument. Users’ rights were declared with recourse to CCH and 
the sense of community that arises through sport was emphasized 
together with the role of copyright in a democratic society.74
This position was untenable at appeal. The Supreme Court, sitting 
as the Court of Appeal, refused the argument that streaming was not 
a protected right under copyright, stating that streaming fell within 
the ambit of broadcasting, which is a protected right.75 Infringement 
was the outcome, with commerciality prominent in the discussion.76 
Interestingly, though, the Court offered that “even if the use done 
by sports fans is fair use, that will not mean that the activities of the 
owner of the site are permissible.”77 The fact that end uses are separate 
from intermediate distribution again bodes well for the future.
But the most troubling aspect was with the very premise of 
users’ rights:
It should be clarified that this is a defense which is 
granted to users, in the appropriate cases. … [T]here 
are those who reckon that the permitted uses pursuant 
to the new law should be categorized as rights, per se, 
of the users, in the sense that the uses might serve as 
affirmative claims, as oppose[d] to claims of defense. 
I am unable to accept that argument. The language of 
the Law does not contain a clear indication that the 
legislature sought to alter the existing balance and to 
turn the defenses into rights. Even if a use is permitted, 
in that it allows users “freedom”, that is not indicative of 
the existence of a right.78
The Court continued, emphatic that there was no reason to 
refashion the defense of fair use into a right, that the purposes set to be 
achieved by fair use (to empower the public sphere and to support the 
production of new works from existing works) can still be achieved 
by a defense.79 The matter was laid to rest with these words: “The 
fair use defense, therefore, constitutes a defense claim, and as such, 
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the burden of proof lies on the defendant [who] seeks to bring up 
the claim.”80
From a Canadian point of view, users’ rights and a procedural 
illustration of fairness (said another way, proof) are not incompatible. 
Unfortunately, invoking the language of users’ rights without the 
broader explanation of its usage by the Canadian Supreme Court 
gave users’ rights the appearance of unlimited exercise.81 Fortunately, 
the rejection of fair use came with yet another reminder that creative 
pursuits have a claim to fair use:
If the use is productive use, which rests on the previous 
(protected) work, but for the purpose of producing 
a new work or expression, of a different nature and 
purpose to those of the original product, there is a 
greater tendency to recognize fair use. The concept is 
that it is easier to recognize transformative use as being 
“fair”, since it achieves the purpose of the permit—
encouraging creativity and enriching the cumulative 
reservoir of knowledge in society.82
The Israeli Court has not been offered the ideal in adjudication of 
fairness of use under the 2007 law. Neither the wayward student club 
nor the thrifty sporting enthusiast suggested a principled setting in 
which to uphold fair use. With a better roster of cases,83 the Canadian 
Supreme Court has been able to further establish fair dealing in 
Canada as a meaningful users’ right, to be applied with the care that 
is due from an exception to copyright.
iii. 2012: Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of 
Canada v Bell Canada84
In conjunction with the growth of legitimate online music 
distribution,85 a performing rights music society in Canada continued 
to look for new means of revenue generation. Curiously, though, 
this took the form of desiring compensation for the use of music file 
previews as used to facilitate sales of the music itself. The Copyright 
Board denied the argument, situating the use of previews as research in 
the hands of consumers, and in keeping with fair dealing. The Board’s 
decision was upheld by the Federal Court of Appeal. Undaunted, 
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the society sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The Court 
unanimously upheld the earlier decisions and took the opportunity to 
probe the nature of research. In doing so, fair dealing is recognizable 
now as a shelter to all Canadians engaged with inquiry, not just those 
performing scholarly undertakings:
It is true that an important goal of fair dealing is 
to allow users to employ copyrighted works in a 
way that helps them engage in their own acts of 
authorship and creativity…. But that does not argue 
for permitting only creative purposes to qualify as 
“research”…. To do so would ignore the fact that 
the dissemination of works is also one of the Act’s 
purposes, which means that dissemination too, with 
or without creativity, is in the public interest. It would 
also ignore that “private study”, a concept that has no 
intrinsic relationship with creativity, was also expressly 
included as an allowable purpose in [fair dealing]. 
Since “research” and “private study” both qualify as fair 
dealing purposes…we should not interpret the term 
“research” more restrictively than “private study”.
Limiting research to creative purposes would also run 
counter to the ordinary meaning of “research”, which 
can include many activities that do not demand the 
establishment of new facts or conclusions. It can be 
piecemeal, informal, exploratory, or confirmatory. It can 
in fact be undertaken for no purpose except personal 
interest. It is true that research can be for the purpose 
of reaching new conclusions, but this should be seen as 
only one, not the primary component of the definitional 
framework.86
While the Court acknowledged the American emphasis upon 
transformation, it also offered a reminder that transformation was 
not essential:
In urging the Court to narrow the definition of 
“research” as requiring the creation of something new, 
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SOCAN relied on American jurisprudence which looks 
to the requirement of a “transformative” purpose before 
the use is seen as fair. … Although [application of the 
four factors of fair use] includes whether the use is 
transformative, it is not at all clear that a transformative 
use is “absolutely necessary” for a finding of fair 
use: Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 
(1994), at p. 579. 87
The Court supported the earlier assessments of fairness of use,88 
but what is most compelling is the continued instruction that the 
party under consideration is the end user: 
In CCH, the Great Library was the provider, offering 
a photocopying service to lawyers requesting copies 
of legal materials. The Court did not focus its inquiry 
on the library’s perspective, but on that of the ultimate 
user, the lawyers, whose purpose was legal research…. 
Similarly, in considering whether previews are for the 
purpose of “research” under the first step of CCH, the 
Board properly considered them from the perspective 
of the user or consumer’s purpose. And from that 
perspective, consumers used the previews for the 
purpose of conducting research to identify which music 
to purchase, purchases which trigger dissemination of 
musical works and compensation for their creators, both 
of which are outcomes the Act seeks to encourage. 89
This emphasis upon the final destination of disseminated material 
lay at the heart of another fair dealing decision. 
iv. 2012: Alberta (Education) v Canadian Copyright Licensing 
Agency (Access Copyright)90
This case involves the practice of reproducing copyrighted materials in 
schools across Canada. In 2004, an educational rights society applied 
for an increase of its royalties based on the volume and content of 
the material copied in schools across Canada. As there was some 
dispute regarding the method of data gathering, the society submitted 
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a proposed tariff to the Copyright Board. At issue was a particular 
category of reproduction, namely the use of supplemental material 
(short excerpts) of copyrighted material, photocopied by teachers and 
used to enhance the understanding of core material taught through 
required textbooks. While in the music previews case the Board had 
placed emphasis upon the end user, the consumer, in this situation 
it focused upon the intermediate distributor, the teachers, and 
found their conduct was not fair dealing. The Board’s decision was 
supported by the Federal Court of Appeal. Educational institutions 
sought leave to appeal the question of fair dealing to the Supreme 
Court and gained a majority opinion favouring fair dealing. 
The society endeavoured to keep the focus upon the conduct 
of the teachers and claimed the purpose of the reproduction was 
instructional and thus outside the purposes offered by fair dealing. 
But the Justices took exception to the reliance by the society on 
analogies to defeated cases concerning course packs or study guides:
[T]hese “course pack” cases involved copiers with 
demonstrably ulterior—i.e. commercial — motives. 
They invoked the allowable purposes of “research” or 
“private study”, in effect, in order to appropriate their 
customers’ or students’ purposes as their own and 
escape liability for copyright infringement. These cases, 
then, to the extent that they are germane, do not stand 
for the proposition that “research” and “private study” 
are inconsistent with instructional purposes, but for 
the principle that copiers cannot camouflage their own 
distinct purpose by purporting to conflate it with the 
research or study purposes of the ultimate user.91
As a consequence of this reasoning, the society’s wish to focus 
on the teachers’ actions brought more than perhaps the society 
bargained for:
Teachers have no ulterior motive when providing copies 
to students. Nor can teachers be characterized as having 
the completely separate purpose of “instruction”; they are 
there to facilitate the students’ research and private study. 
It seems to me to be axiomatic that most students lack 
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the expertise to find or request the materials required 
for their own research and private study, and rely on the 
guidance of their teachers. They study what they are told 
to study, and the teacher’s purpose in providing copies 
is to enable the students to have the material they need 
for the purpose of studying. The teacher/copier therefore 
shares a symbiotic purpose with the student/user who is 
engaging in research or private study.92
And earlier efforts to recast institutional education as non-private 
study were firmly rejected:
Nor, with respect, do I accept the statement made 
by the Board and endorsed by the Federal Court of 
Appeal, relying on University of London Press, that 
the photocopies made by teachers were made for an 
unfair purpose—“non-private study”—since they were 
used by students as a group in class, and not “privately”. 
As discussed above, the holding was simply that the 
publisher could not hide behind the students’ research 
or private study purposes to disguise a separate unfair 
purpose—in that case, a commercial one. The court did 
not hold that students in a classroom setting could never 
be said to be engaged in “private study”. With respect, 
the word “private” in “private study” should not be 
understood as requiring users to view copyrighted works 
in splendid isolation. Studying and learning are essentially 
personal endeavours, whether they are engaged in with 
others or in solitude. By focusing on the geography of 
classroom instruction rather than on the concept of 
studying, the Board again artificially separated the 
teachers’ instruction from the students’ studying.93
With the purpose of the teachers’ copying firmly sheltered under 
fair dealing, the analysis of fairness began. Eschewing suggestions to 
look at the amount copied in aggregate, the Justices indicated that 
consideration more correctly falls upon the proportion of the work 
copied in comparison to that work.94 And that condition had already 
been met by the premises of the case itself. To a proposed alternative 
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that schools purchase sufficient copies of all the supplemental 
materials came this response: 
[B]uying books for each student is not a realistic 
alternative to teachers copying short excerpts to 
supplement student textbooks. First, the schools have 
already purchased originals that are kept in the class 
or library, from which the teachers make copies. The 
teacher merely facilitates wider access to this limited 
number of texts by making copies available to all 
students who need them. In addition, purchasing a 
greater number of original textbooks to distribute 
to students is unreasonable in light of the Board’s 
finding that teachers only photocopy short excerpts 
to complement existing textbooks. Under the Board’s 
approach, schools would be required to buy sufficient 
copies for every student of every text, magazine and 
newspaper in Access Copyright’s repertoire that is 
relied on by a teacher. This is a demonstrably unrealistic 
outcome. Copying short excerpts, as a result, is 
reasonably necessary to achieve the ultimate purpose  
of the students’ research and private study.95
Finally, no credence was given to the plaintiff ’s insistence that 
such copying had caused textbook markets to decline, not because 
the Court advocates interference in legitimate markets but rather 
because of the society’s absence of logic: 
[T]here was no evidence that this decline was linked to 
photocopying done by teachers. Moreover, it noted that 
there were several other factors that were likely to have 
contributed to the decline in sales, such as the adoption 
of semester teaching, a decrease in registrations, the 
longer lifespan of textbooks, increased use of the 
Internet and other electronic tools, and more resource-
based learning.96
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V: looking ahead
In terms of the case law reviewed, Canada’s dialogue on fairness of 
use seems more robust. Following its Supreme Court’s first treatment 
of the concept, a broader application of fair dealing without explicit 
restriction by way of commerciality was immediately available. In 
contrast, the Israeli Court’s introduction of American fair use made 
commerciality a prominent issue. Yet Canada’s later amendment of 
copyright would confine fair dealing to a closed set of permissible 
categories, while Israel has achieved the Holy Grail of exceptions: an 
open-ended list of possibilities. This despite the fact that the Israeli 
cases credited with expanding fair dealing were losses.97 
Recent history appears glorious for Canada—two wins at 
the highest court in the land, whereas the Israeli counterpart 
continues in a doggedly conservative approach to fair use. But on 
the issue of commerciality the Courts are of similar mindset. In 
Alberta (Education), the Canadian Supreme Court emphasized that 
commercial motives could not be shielded by using “their customers’ 
or students’ purposes as their own.” The Court takes great care when 
considering the intersection of the purpose against the amount copied 
and the effect on markets; this suggests that a Schocken-like case in 
Canada would meet with equal disapproval.
In any event, comparison across the countries is not necessary; 
the pertinent concern is how each country is faring in terms of its 
own progression. In Canada, the connective tissue from 2004 to 2012 
is the advancement of personal knowledge, whether experienced 
through formal education and research or through informal personal 
activity. Dissemination of copyrighted works as it supports such 
development was sheltered then and given added support now. 
The early focus began with the end user, and that, too, has received 
further confirmation. The Israeli Court has only recently identified 
the distinction between a provider of material and an end user of that 
material. However, the Court appears receptive to a specific realm of 
end users: those situated in institutions of higher learning. How this 
will progress, if it will progress, remains to be seen. For now, it is an 
indication of a widening of the discussion of fairness to support fair 
use to purposes that are easily seen as beneficial to society as a whole.
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The fact that the Israeli Court has been more conservative in 
its approach to fairness of use is undeniable. But it is explicable. 
The starting point in 1993 came with American emphasis upon 
the property rights inherent to the system of copyright, at a time 
when property was touted as the linchpin of Israel’s arrangement of 
rights.98 Even so, the Court remained faithful to the importance of 
transformative uses. And if the Israeli Court only follows the previous 
American path, that does not close the door on fair use in Israel, it 
only delays better engagement. But with the Court’s willingness to 
borrow from other jurisdictions,99 perhaps the examples set within 
Canada might be of assistance.
The Israeli Court has had a negative run with its case law, reduced 
to telling citizens what cannot be done, whereas the Canadian 
counterpart enjoyed the positive action of indicating what can be 
done. Fortunately, both countries are advancing in their respective 
journeys in cultivating a better understanding of fairness of use and 
thus approach better engagement with their exceptions. There should 
be no expectation that the end destinations, or even the journeys 
themselves, will be the same. Shaping conceptions of fairness relies 
on each country’s individual cultural instincts. To look for uniformity 
in the development of exceptions is as unreasonable as imposing 
uniformity in the scope of rights. What is critical is that, within 
distinct countries, the principle of exceptions exists in actual practice. 
At this stage, all that can be said is that both courts have been 
consistent in keeping an element of creativity alive through their 
dialogues of fairness of use. Dissemination toward education and 
research in Canada is on strong footing; transformation in aid of 
creativity is welcome in Israel. Taken together, dissemination and 
transformation form the two sides of creativity as per the guiding 
principles of both Newton and Eliot. 
There is something oddly romantic about better copyright 
interpretation for the Information Age emanating from regions that 
have been dismissed—one, in its infancy, as a few acres of snow, and 
the other, in its genesis, as much of it barren mountain and part of it 
waterless.100 A noted Canadian scholar of the early twentieth century, 
Harold Innis (1894–1952), might say this is not fictional romance 
but the nonfictional continuation of a well-established pattern of 
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intellectual development. He argued that ingenuity flourished in the 
margins—those areas away from the centre of an empire.101 Ingenuity 
is not limited to the arts and sciences, but is equally necessary in 
interpretation of law if a civil society is to avoid the perils that follow 
stagnancy of thought. 
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In the realm of law, neutrality is widely hailed as a fundamental 
principle of fairness, justice and equity; it is also, however, widely 
criticized as a myth that too often obscures the inevitable reality of 
perspective, interest or agenda. It should come as little surprise, then, 
that the principle of technological neutrality, recently employed by 
the Supreme Court of Canada when applying copyright law to online 
activities, seems similarly fundamental in the copyright realm—but 
also largely mythical and potentially obfuscatory. In what is now 
dubbed the Supreme Court’s “copyright pentalogy”—five copyright 
judgments released concurrently by the Court in July 20121—the 
unprecedented importance accorded by the Court to the principle 
of technological neutrality is clear; what remains unclear is precisely 
what “technological neutrality” means, why it matters, and whether 
or how it can (or should) ever be attained. 
This chapter aims to critically assess the significance of the prin-
ciple and its potential to guide the future development of copyright 
law and policy in Canada. In Part 2, I set out the various shades of 
meaning that can be attached to technological neutrality, first as a 
9
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principle of sound regulation, and then as a principle of statutory 
interpretation by the courts. I review, in Part 3, the reasons delivered 
by the Justices in three of the five cases to examine the various and 
divergent ways in which the principle of technological neutrality was 
defined and rationalized by members of the Court. I proceed to explore 
the application of the principle and its role in resolving the legal issues 
before the Court, drawing connections between conceptualizations of 
the principle and its interpretive impact, and focusing on its capacity 
to support the extension and/or circumscription of owners’ and users’ 
rights. In Part 4, I consider whether the role accorded to technological 
neutrality as a guiding principle is justifiable or appropriate in the 
context of Canadian copyright policy. Arguing that its justification is 
found in, and flows from, the concept of balance at the heart of the 
copyright system, I proceed to offer some thoughts on its potential 
significance in the future of Canadian copyright law and in light of 
the recent amendments to the Copyright Act.2 Part 5 concludes that 
the new emphasis placed by the Court on technological neutrality 
as a guiding principle is an important and positive development for 
Canada’s copyright system. The caveat, however, is that the principle 
cannot perform this role effectively if conceived (or rhetorically 
invoked) as a limited principle of formal non-discrimination that 
merely justifies the extension of copyright’s reach. Rather, I argue, it 
must be conceived in a functional sense, shaping copyright norms to 
produce a substantively equivalent effect across technologies, with a 
view to preserving the copyright balance in the digital realm. 
 2.  Understanding Technological Neutrality and its shades  
of Meaning 
2.1  Technological Neutrality as a Regulatory Starting Point
Technological neutrality is an inherently appealing concept for 
policy makers in the digital age. At its core, the concept implies that 
regulations can and should be developed in such a way that they are 
independent of any particular technology, neither favouring nor 
discriminating against specific technologies as they emerge and evolve. 
From a principled perspective, neutrality and non-discrimination in 
the law are almost always laudable goals; from a practical perspective, 
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technologically neutral regulation holds the promise of sustainable 
laws in a time of rapid technological change. No doubt owing to this 
intrinsic appeal, the principle of technological neutrality is regularly 
invoked as a regulatory starting point in policy documents from 
around the globe,3 but typically with little explanation or justification. 
This led one commentator to align technological neutrality with 
“motherhood and apple pie”4—the general wisdom being that it is an 
unquestionably good thing. Professor Reed rightly cautions that “this 
consensus among legislators seems to have developed in an almost 
complete absence of any clear understanding [of] what the term 
‘technology neutrality’ might actually mean.”5 In fact, technological 
neutrality has many shades of meaning, and, of course, different 
meanings can produce differing applications with more or less 
desirable results. Before we embark on understanding the significance 
of the principle as invoked by the Supreme Court, it is therefore worth 
exploring the various ways in which it might be employed.
Bert-Jaap Koops has expertly deconstructed the claim (or “policy 
one-liner”) that ICT regulation should be technology neutral, helping 
us to discern the divergent meanings and potential uses of the 
term.6 Koops explains that usages can be divided into three broad 
categories: those emphasizing (A) the purpose of regulation; (B) the 
consequences of regulation; and (C) legislative technique. Within 
each of these categories, Koops identifies two or more approaches, 
which are closely interrelated but stress different aspects of technology 
neutrality. 
Focusing on the substantive purpose of regulation, one 
approach (A1) stresses the need to regulate functions and effects 
of actions (technology uses), but not the actions or means of the 
actions (the technologies) themselves. This functional approach 
produces regulation that is intended to be technology neutral in its 
effects (though it may be technology-specific where the effects of 
technologies differ).7 A second and related purposive approach (A2) 
emphasizes that what holds offline should also hold online, with the 
goal of establishing functional equivalence between the online and 
offline worlds (and, again, different treatment of specific technologies 
may be necessary to realize equivalent results).8 
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A less substantive approach to technological neutrality focuses on 
avoiding potential negative consequences of regulation. One version 
(B1) stresses non-discrimination between certain technologies so that 
the rules do not favour some technologies over others. Related to this, 
a second version (B2) starts with the position that regulation should 
not hamper the development of technologies. This, too, can justify 
technology-specific regulation, where uniform rules might inhibit 
new technologies (for example, the decision not to extend traditional 
broadcasting content regulations to the Internet).
Finally, emphasizing legislative technique, another approach 
to technological neutrality derives from basic principles of law-
making. First, it might be stressed (C1) that effective laws should be 
sustainable and not constantly in flux as technologies change. The 
extent to which consistency in function or effect can be achieved over 
time and in the face of rapid technological change is, of course, open 
to challenge. A related starting point (C2) is that formal laws should 
be sustainable while other forms of regulation can more appropriately 
be used to further technology-specific aims. An alternative starting 
point in the same vein (C3) might stress that the law should be 
transparent and readily understood by those who are subject to it. 
The more technologically specific the rules, the more detailed and the 
less accessible they become (as anyone who has taken even a cursory 
glance at Canada’s new Copyright Modernization Act would likely 
attest!). 
For the purposes of what follows, the approaches identified by 
Koops can be broadly classified into those concerned primarily 
with a functional approach to copyright law (producing equivalent 
effect across technologies); the potential discriminatory or adverse 
consequences of copyright on technological development; and 
the “future-proofing” of copyright law. Importantly, none of these 
approaches necessarily entails neutrality in the sense of a formal 
equality that would preclude differentiation between technologies by 
the law; rather, different treatment can be justified as substantively 
technology neutral where overlooking technical differences would 
produce unequal results. 
CARYS J. CRAIG  |   275
2.2  Technological Neutrality as a Judicial Approach
If these various approaches describe the starting point for the 
development of technology-neutral regulation, what should 
technological neutrality mean for the judiciary and others charged 
with interpreting and applying the law? While Koops’s concern 
is with regulatory practice, he acknowledges that one strategy for 
achieving technological neutrality is for laws to be interpreted in a 
functionalist or teleological way, according more importance to their 
purpose than their precise form.9 Even where the laws as written are 
technologically specific, Koops suggests that technological neutrality 
can be advanced through their functional interpretation. The capacity 
for such teleological interpretation is enhanced, Koops notes, by the 
establishment of a legal framework that outlines the main substantive 
principles, rights and values that are at stake.10 Such a framework is, 
by nature, technology neutral and supports a functional approach to 
the application of specific rules.
In a similar vein, but focusing specifically on the role of courts in 
maintaining the media neutrality of copyright law, Deborah Tussey 
articulates three “rules-of-thumb” to keep courts “on a media-neutral 
keel.”11 First, where statutory guidance is lacking or ambiguous, courts 
should generally afford functionally equivalent technologies similar 
treatment unless there is a compelling doctrinal or policy reason that 
dictates otherwise. Tussey explains, “To the extent that the copyright 
balance of incentives and access has been appropriately set for a 
pre-existing technology, similar treatment of functional equivalents 
should maintain that balance.”12 Second, where there is no clear and 
pre-existing functional equivalent, courts should avoid emphasizing 
the details of particular technological systems and instead interpret 
copyright’s core concepts in a manner applicable across technologies. 
A good example of this approach is found in the judicial treatment of 
software infringement claims that invoke basic concepts of originality, 
idea-expression dichotomy, merger and scènes à faire to determine 
if substantial copying of code has occurred.13 Finally, courts should 
give more weight to broader policy considerations such as fairness, 
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incentives and innovation, as well as related empirical evidence, in 
determining how the law should apply to new technologies: “the 
application of text to technology should be accompanied by full and 
fair review of policy concerns and consideration of likely market 
impacts.”14
The concept of technological or media neutrality has in fact 
made quite frequent appearances in the copyright jurisprudence of 
several common law jurisdictions, but unfortunately without much 
elucidation of its meaning, or explanation as to why, or the extent 
to which, it matters. In the United States, media neutrality has been 
described as “a fundamental principle of the Copyright Act,” and has 
been endorsed by the Supreme Court as a relevant consideration in 
determining the scope of copyright, particularly in the context of 
collective works.15 The principle has remained closely tied to the idea 
(C1) that the 1976 US legislation was intentionally “future-proofed,” 
with the result that the rights it protects are generally not technology 
specific.16 The uncontroversial nature of this basic and rather benign 
proposition has allowed the principle to remain largely beyond 
critique.17 In the United Kingdom, the legislative intention to achieve 
technological neutrality has been taken into account in determining 
the broad scope of the “communication to the public” right.18 The 
concept has received more extensive consideration in the Australian 
courts, where a declared objective of the copyright law revision 
process was “to replace technology-specific rights with technology 
neutral rights so that amendments to the Act are not needed each time 
there is a development in technology.”19 As in the United Kingdom, 
the principle has been invoked to support the inclusion of point-
to-multipoint transmissions within the right of “communication to 
the public.”20 In a recent case, the full Federal Court referred more 
generally to “the desirability of technological neutrality—of not 
limiting rights and defences to technologies known at the time when 
those rights and defences were enacted.”21 The Court also explicitly 
limited the significance of the principle, however, stating: “It is not for 
this Court to re-draft [a] provision to secure an assumed legislative 
desire for such [technological] neutrality.”22 
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 3.  Technological Neutrality before the supreme Court of 
Canada
3.1 Media Neutrality in Robertson v Thomson 
While the term “media neutrality” had previously surfaced in 
Canada’s courts,23 it was in the 2006 case of Robertson v Thomson that 
the Supreme Court first explicitly addressed its significance in the 
copyright context.24 The reasons offered by the split bench in Robertson 
merit attention as a harbinger of what subsequently unfolded in the 
2012 decisions. 
The majority in Robertson found that reproduction of the Globe 
& Mail newspaper in an electronic database caused the original 
compilation work to be “fragmented, submerged, overwhelmed 
and lost”,25 with the result that the database was found to reproduce 
the individual articles as opposed to the newspaper per se, thereby 
potentially infringing the copyright of freelance authors in their 
works. The dissenting Justices invoked the concept of media neutrality 
to stress the functional equivalence of the electronic database with an 
electronic archive, itself akin to a traditional library: 
If media neutrality is to have any meaning, it must 
permit the publishers to convert their daily print edition 
into electronic form…. [T]his electronic edition…is a 
reproduction of the print edition in electronic form. 
That is precisely what media neutrality protects. … The 
analysis is unchanged if a number of these hypothetical 
electronic editions are collected together. This is simply 
the electronic analogy to stacking print editions of a 
newspaper on a shelf.26
The majority was criticized for its concern with the form rather 
than the substance of the database on the grounds that this was 
“inconsistent with the media neutral approach mandated by s 3 of the 
Copyright Act.”27
The principle of media neutrality was, however, explicitly 
acknowledged by all members of the Court. The majority judgment 
recognized that “[m]edia neutrality is reflected in s 3(1) of the 
Copyright Act which describes a right to produce or reproduce a work 
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‘in any material form whatever,’”28 and emphasized that the Justices 
were “mindful of the principle”29 in arriving at their conclusion. The 
difference between the majority and minority application of media 
neutrality to the legal issue at hand can be at least partly explained, 
however, by the divergent characterizations of the principle and the 
significance attributed to it. 
The majority defined media neutrality as meaning that “the 
Copyright Act should continue to apply in different media, including 
more technologically advanced ones.”30 This approach is focused on 
non-discrimination between different technologies (in the sense of 
Koops’s meaning B2), and is thus limited where differences between 
media produce legally significant differences in effect. The majority 
found that the electronic database was not simply an equivalent, if 
more effective, technical alternative to the traditional or even electronic 
archiving of individual issues, such that “focusing exclusively on 
input in the name of media neutrality takes the principle too far and 
ultimately, turns it on its head.”31 Given that the principle “exists to 
protect the rights of authors and others as technology evolves,” the 
majority insisted that media neutrality “is not a license to override the 
rights of authors.”32 
The minority accorded media neutrality a somewhat different 
significance. Similarly taking as a starting point the section 3(1) 
right to reproduce the work “in any material form,” the minority 
stressed that “[t]he concept of media neutrality is how Parliament 
chose to come to grips with potential technological developments”33 
(consistent with meaning C1). The minority’s emphasis on the 
functional equivalence of electronic and traditional archiving 
further invokes technical neutrality in the sense of regulating effects 
rather than means (A1) and achieving equivalency between offline 
and online activities (A2). But what comes through clearly in the 
dissenting reasons—and particularly in the passages that speak to 
the potential of new technologies—is the commitment to a principle 
of media neutrality attentive primarily to the purpose of the law 
(in the sense of meaning A, generally). Thus, the minority analysis 
begins by observing that section 3(1) of the Copyright Act has been 
substantially unchanged since 1921, just after “the first domestic 
radio sets, and many decades before the technological revolution 
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that produced, among other innovations, online databases.”34 The 
reasons proceed directly to a description of the overarching purposes 
of copyright, as articulated by the Court in the case of Théberge v 
Galérie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc.: “promoting the public interest 
in the encouragement and dissemination of artistic and intellectual 
works, and justly rewarding the creator of the work.”35 Tasked with 
maintaining an appropriate balance between these goals, the minority 
notes the significance of the public interest in the availability of 
archived newspapers.36 The link between the public purposes of 
copyright and the public interest in new technologies is brought to 
the fore in the following passage, which hints at how a purposive 
construction of copyright law aligns with a functional conception of 
technological neutrality: 
The Copyright Act was designed to keep pace with 
technological developments to foster intellectual, artistic 
and cultural creativity. In applying the Copyright Act 
to a realm that includes the Internet and the databases 
at issue in this case, courts face unique challenges, 
but in confronting them, the public benefits of this 
digital universe should be kept prominently in view. As 
Professor Michael Geist observes:
The Internet and new technologies have unleashed a 
remarkable array of new creativity, empowering millions 
of individuals to do more than just consume our culture, 
instead enabling them to actively and meaningfully 
participate in it.37 
The divergence between the minority and majority rulings 
in Robertson reveals the importance of the particular meaning or 
emphasis given to the principle of technological neutrality, and the 
bearing that this has on the results that the principle will produce. 
It also suggests, however, that even following the rules of thumb for 
media-neutral interpretations of the law could produce significantly 
different results depending on the assumptions that are brought to 
bear at any stage of the analysis. 
Consider again Tussey’s first rule of thumb, that “where statutory 
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guidance is lacking or ambiguous, courts should afford functionally 
equivalent technologies similar treatment.”38 In any case, particularly 
one involving new technologies, reasonable people may differ on the 
question of whether the law is actually clear or ambiguous, and on 
whether it is directly applicable as written or effectively silent given the 
technical specificities at issue. Opinions might also differ on whether 
an analogy to a pre-existing technology is apt or inappropriate, 
and whether technical functions are substantively equivalent or 
significantly different in nature or scope. Turning to Tussey’s second 
rule, that judges should focus on core copyright concepts rather 
than technical particularities, the core concepts of copyright law are 
famously fluid, subjective and malleable, with the result that they are 
often more useful to rationalize a conclusion than they are helpful 
in producing one. The concept of “substantial reproduction” at issue 
in Robertson, for example, provides little guidance in determining 
how much copying is too much in any particular case (as do the 
attendant concepts of “recognizability” and “essential or vital part”), 
and caused apparent confusion when applied to determine the scope 
of the owner’s right in a compilation.39 Finally, taking Tussey’s third 
suggestion that greater regard be had to policy considerations, given 
the controversy over copyright’s policy and how they ought to be 
balanced, this interpretive approach will inevitably produce different 
results depending on the policy perspective brought to bear by the 
decision maker. It is evident, for example, that the majority’s analysis 
in Robertson was guided by a concern with protecting the rights of 
authors in the digital realm, while the minority was somewhat more 
concerned with protecting the public interest in accessing the works 
at issue. 
The point I mean to make is that even a common or overlapping 
understanding of technological neutrality, coupled with a shared 
commitment to advancing a technologically neutral interpretation 
of the law, can produce very different results when law is applied in 
particular contexts. Ultimately, what matters is how decision makers 
understand the law as written, the technology as used, the core 
copyright concepts at play, and, most importantly, the larger legal 
framework—the rights and values at stake in the copyright balance. 
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3.2  Conceptions of Technological Neutrality in the Copyright 
Pentalogy
The principle of technological neutrality made a decisive appearance 
in three of the five judgments released by the Court in summer 2012: 
Rogers, ESA and Bell. This section will provide an overview of these 
cases, assessing the role played by the principle in the reasoning of the 
Court. To begin, however, it is helpful to pull back and consider the 
various definitions of, and rationales for, technological neutrality that 
were offered in the rulings.
 3.2.1 A Minimalist Approach 
The narrowest formulation of the principle is found in the 
dissenting judgment of Rothstein J in ESA, which adopted the 
statement of LeBel and Fish JJ writing for the majority in Robertson: 
“Media neutrality means that the Copyright Act should continue to 
apply in different media, including more technologically advanced 
ones…. Media neutrality is not a license to override the rights of 
authors—it exists to protect the rights of authors and others as 
technology evolves.”40 As in Robertson, this statement reflects a 
restrictive vision of technological neutrality as concerned only with 
non-discrimination between technological means in a formalistic 
sense: the law remains applicable across different technologies. The 
emphasis is, again, not on the effect of the law as such, but on its 
capacity to apply in new and unanticipated contexts. To the extent that 
broader public policy concerns are considered, the concern appears 
to be with the continued recognition and protection of authors’ or 
owners’ rights. 
This restrictive version of the neutrality principle coincides with 
a similarly constrained vision of its appropriate role in shaping the 
interpretation of the law. Continuing in the formalist vein, Rothstein 
J writes: “A media neutral application of the Act…does not imply that 
a court can depart from the ordinary meaning of the words of the 
Act in order to achieve the level of protection for copyright holders 
that the court considers is adequate.”41 The minority is prepared to 
acknowledge that “[g]enerally, a technologically neutral copyright 
law is desirable.”42 Neutrality is cast here as a typical baseline, an 
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appropriate default position that might be sound, but from which the 
law may readily depart: regarded in this way, it is far from a standard 
against which the law ought to be measured, nor even a goal to which 
the lawmakers—or those tasked with applying the law—should aspire. 
The minority’s depiction of the principle of technological neutrality 
minimizes its potential to legitimately inform, and certainly to 
determine, how the law should be interpreted and applied. 
What was essentially the position of the majority in Robertson 
became the minority approach to technological neutrality in ESA. By 
the same token, as we will see, the majority position in ESA echoes and 
builds upon the dissenting reasons in Robertson. Before we get there, 
however, it is useful to consider the approach taken by the Court to 
technological neutrality in its unanimous judgment in the Bell and 
Rogers cases, which represent, in my view, intermediate approaches 
to the principle, somewhere in between that of the minority and 
majority in ESA.
 3.2.2 An Intermediate Approach 
In Bell, Abella J references technological neutrality as a “goal,” 
and explains that the principle “seeks to have the Copyright Act 
applied in a way that operates consistently, regardless of the form of 
media involved, or its technological sophistication.”43 Interestingly, 
the majority ruling in Robertson is cited in support of this statement. 
When we consider Koops’s shades of meaning, however, we can see 
a subtle but potentially important difference between the definition 
offered here by Abella J, and that of Fish and LeBel JJ in Robertson. 
Whereas the Robertson majority wrote that “[m]edia neutrality 
means that the Copyright Act should continue to apply in different 
media,”44 Abella J emphasizes that it should be applied “in a way that 
operates consistently.” The emphasis is not on non-discrimination 
between technologies in a formal sense (B1), but rather on substantive 
equivalence of effect when the law is applied across different 
technologies. Put another way, the formulation offered by Abella J 
and accepted by the full bench in Bell hints at a more functional and 
effects-oriented vision of technological neutrality (A1).
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In Rogers, in reasons written by Rothstein J, the discussion of 
technological neutrality is largely tied, as one might anticipate, to the 
idea of the law’s “continued relevance in an evolving technological 
environment,”45 and the extension of the Act, “where possible,” to 
technologies that “were not or could not have been contemplated at 
the time of its drafting.”46 What is interesting here, however, is the 
link drawn between the concept of media neutrality and the idea of 
copyright as a balance between the public interest and authors’ just 
rewards.47 Rothstein J draws the connection when he notes that the 
copyright balance “is not appropriately struck where the existence of 
copyright protection depends merely on the business model” chosen; 
whether conveying content through traditional or new media, he 
notes, “the end result is the same.”48 Thus we have, in Rogers, a vision 
of technological neutrality articulated by Rothstein J and endorsed 
by seven members of the bench49 that captures the more substantive 
concern with the equivalent effect of technology in light of the 
law’s purpose. That said, the emphasis remains on the protection of 
copyright (and so of copyright owners) across technologies, where 
consistent with the clear wording of the Act.50
 3.2.3 An Expansive Approach 
We can envisage the principle of technological neutrality along a 
conceptual spectrum: at one end, it is a limited principle of formal non-
discrimination between technologies; at the other end, it is a broad 
and substantive principle that informs a teleological interpretation of 
the law. With each articulation of the principle so far, we have inched 
further along the spectrum. It is with the majority’s judgment in the 
ESA case, I suggest, that we reach the most expansive version of the 
principle.
Abella and Moldaver JJ begin with a simple but substantive 
expression of technological neutrality as requiring “that the Copyright 
Act apply equally between traditional and more technologically 
advanced forms of the same media.”51 Again, the emphasis is on 
functional equivalence and consistency in effect. The majority stresses 
that, when works are downloaded, the Internet is a delivery system—a 
“technological taxi”52—no different in function or effect from a store 
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clerk or a courier putting a copy of the work in the hands of the end 
user. A purposive approach to technological neutrality emphasizing 
function and effect (A1) therefore requires that equivalent delivery 
methods receive equal treatment by the law (consistent with the idea, 
in the sense of A2, that what holds offline should also hold online). 
What sets the majority’s ruling apart, however, is the explicit 
connection drawn between this functional approach and copyright’s 
policy balance, with the statement that “[t]he traditional balance 
between authors and users should be preserved in the digital 
environment.”53 This resonates with Professor Tussey’s assertion that 
where copyright has struck an appropriate balance in traditional 
media, “similar treatment of functional equivalents should maintain 
that balance.”54 It also embraces what has been called the principle 
of “prescriptive parallelism,” which conveys the notion that “the 
traditional copyright balance of rights and exceptions should be 
preserved in the digital environment.”55 In particular, Abella and 
Moldaver JJ emphasize that their application of the technological 
neutrality principle is consistent with the recognition, in Théberge, 
of the “limited nature” of creators’ rights and the inefficiency 
of “overcompensating creators.” Commitment to technological 
neutrality in effect is thus presented as a principled means by which 
to maintain the appropriate balance between owners and users in 
the digital environment; it follows that attributing insufficient weight 
to technological neutrality can tip the balance too far in favour of 
owners’ rights, to the detriment of the public interest. With this, 
the majority in ESA invokes an expansive version of technological 
neutrality as an overarching policy consideration that should inform 
the interpretation and application of copyright law in continuing 
pursuit of its broader public policy goals. 
3.3  Putting Technological Neutrality to Work in the Copyright 
Pentalogy
My final aim in Part 3 is to demonstrate how the varying conceptions 
of technological neutrality and its role informed the interpretation and 
application of the legal provisions at issue. The principle was invoked 
to achieve three somewhat distinct ends: to extend the protection of 
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owners’ rights into new technological contexts; to ensure the equal 
availability of users’ rights in new technological contexts; and to restrict 
the extension of owners’ rights into new technological contexts. As 
illustrated below, these results roughly map onto the somewhat 
distinct approaches to technological neutrality identified in Part 
3.2 above: the minimal approach, stressing non-discrimination; the 
functional approach, stressing equivalent effect; and the teleological 
approach, stressing the broader copyright balance. 
Figure 1. Approaches to technological neutrality.
Extending 
Owners’ Rights:
•  Robertson (Majority) 
[restrictive];
•  ESA (Minority)
[restrictive];
•  Rogers [intermediate].
Extending 
Users’ Rights:
•  Bell [intermediate].
Limiting 
Owners’ Rights:
•  ESA (Majority) 
[expansive];
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•  Substantive non-discrimination 
between functional equivalents;
•  The law preserves the appropriate 
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•  The law continues 
to apply in 
different media;
•  Subject to statute.
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 3.3.1 Extending Owners’ Rights 
Both Rogers and ESA were concerned with the scope and 
application of the section 3(1)(f) right of the copyright owner to 
“communicate the work by telecommunication.” In Rogers, the 
question was whether music streamed over the Internet to individual 
end users is a communication “to the public” within the meaning of 
section 3(1)(f). ESA was concerned with whether downloading video 
games that include musical works is a “communication” at all. In both 
cases, technological neutrality was raised as a basis for extending the 
protection of owners’ rights into the online environment. 
The communication right has been described as “one of the most 
clearly technology indifferent legal provisions” in the ICT field.56 In 
Canada, as Rothstein J explains, the previous “technology-specific 
communication right” that attached to “radiocommunication” was 
amended in 1988 to the “neutral language [of ‘telecommunication’] to 
encompass evolving but then unknown technological advances.”57 Yet, 
what we see in these cases is that, given the significant difference in 
the nature of offline and online communication methods, technology-
indifferent laws do not necessarily render extraneous a technology-
neutralizing interpretation.58 As Shira Perlmutter has observed: 
[E]ven rights deliberately written to be technologically 
neutral are quickly called into question by the rapidity 
of today’s technological developments. There enures a 
tremendous diversion of time and energy in debating 
the precise borders of each right. Which rights are 
implicated by a particular type of dissemination—for 
example, “making available” online? Reproduction? 
Distribution? Rental? Communication?59 
Rothstein J and the minority in ESA were of the view that the 
communication right is implicated when works are downloaded over 
the Internet.60 A means-oriented and formal non-discrimination 
approach to technological neutrality might suggest that discriminating 
between transmissions of electronic downloads and streamed 
transmissions is contrary to the basic principle. However, seen from 
a more substantive and effects-oriented perspective, the minority’s 
CARYS J. CRAIG  |   287
reasoning can be admonished for falling afoul of Tussey’s second 
rule of thumb—focusing on the technical details of the technologies 
at issue. By directing the inquiry toward the system specifics (the 
technical means of transmission) rather than the outcome of that 
technical process (the acquisition of a copy), the minority could be 
accused of pinning its judgment on “technological details rather 
than lasting principles governing rights and liabilities.”61 More 
importantly, satisfied with the “ordinary” meaning of the neutral term 
“communication” and its application to downloads by virtue of their 
“transmission,”62 the minority also falls afoul of Tussey’s third rule: 
its focus is on the black letter law, largely unencumbered, it would 
seem, by a concern with the effect of capturing downloads within the 
communication right—the substantive inequality produced between 
traditional and online distribution systems, and the resultant impact 
on copyright’s fragile balance. Attentive primarily to the need to secure 
protection for owners across new technologies, the minority’s reasons 
relegate consideration of the broader role of technological neutrality 
in securing consistency in effect and preserving the appropriate 
policy balance.
In Rogers, communication “to the public” was held to include 
“a series of point-to-point communications of the same work to an 
aggregation of individuals” on the grounds that “it matters little for the 
purposes of copyright protection whether the members of the public 
receive the communication in the same or in different places, at the 
same or at different times or at their own or the sender’s initiative.”63 The 
Court emphasized the technology-neutral language of the amended 
statutory provision64 and found, in the expanded scope of section 
3(1)(f), “evidence that the Act has evolved to ensure its continued 
relevance in an evolving technological environment.” Thus, the 
Court determined that limiting the communication rights to “push-
technologies” and so excluding “pull-technologies” would be 
“inconsistent with the neutral language of the Act itself.”65 The extension 
of neutral statutory language to afford protection in relation to online 
streaming is a good example of a non-discrimination approach at 
work, ensuring that the law does not discriminate between traditional 
broadcast and Internet communications, the effects of which are viewed 
as essentially equivalent. The approach is also in line with Tussey’s second 
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recommendation: that courts avoid technology-centred judgments 
and interpret copyright’s core concepts in terms applicable across 
technologies.66 Taking this non-discrimination approach, technological 
neutrality was employed to extend owners’ right to “communicate to 
the public” into a new technological context where communications 
occur at a place and time chosen individually by end users. 
 3.3.2 Extending Users’ Rights 
As Cameron Hutchinson has observed, the most significant 
aspect of the Bell case in regard to technological neutrality is the 
explicit extension, for the first time, of the principle beyond the rights 
of copyright owners to the rights of users.67 The issue before the Court 
was whether the streaming of short extracts or “previews” of musical 
works could benefit from the fair dealing defence. SOCAN argued 
that the “amount” of the dealing was unfair in light of the aggregate 
quantity of music heard through previews by consumers. Invoking the 
principle of technological neutrality, the Court held that the relevant 
amount is rather the proportion of each extract to the whole work 
(thus supporting the finding of fair dealing for research purposes). 
The Court explained:
[G]iven the ease and magnitude with which digital 
works are disseminated over the Internet, focusing on 
the “aggregate” amount of the dealing in cases involving 
digital works could well lead to disproportionate 
findings of unfairness when compared with non-
digital works. If…large-scale organized dealings are 
inherently unfair, most of what online service providers 
do with musical works would be treated as copyright 
infringement. This…potentially undermines the goal of 
technological neutrality….68 
The “intermediate version” of technological neutrality articulated 
in Bell, which was focused on consistent operation of the law across 
technologies, allowed the principle to expand from preserving 
owners’ rights in new environments to preserving the rights of users 
to deal fairly. While online dealings may well be different in scale 
than their offline equivalents (and the “character” of such dealing 
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may weigh against finding fairness), the Court was alert to the risk 
that assuming (or even double-counting) unfairness based on the 
potential scale or aggregate volume of digital dealings could effectively 
render the fair dealing defence severely weakened or even eviscerated 
in the online environment. Such a result would be contrary to the 
more substantive vision of technological neutrality as concerned 
with achieving consistency in the effect of the law when applied 
in different technological contexts. As the Court recognized, the 
effects of copyright law depend not only on the continued protection 
of owners’ rights, but also on the continued recognition of their 
appropriate limits.
 3.3.3 Restricting the Reach of Owners’ Rights 
It should come as no surprise, however, that it is with the ESA case, 
where the majority offered the most expansive version of technological 
neutrality as a guiding principle, that we see its most prominent and 
potentially impactful use. Finding that digital downloads implicated 
only the reproduction right and not the communication right, 
which has historically been linked to public performance, Abella 
and Moldaver JJ focused on “what the internet technology was 
functionally doing as opposed to how it was technically doing it.”69 
The majority thus explained: “Although a download and a stream are 
both ‘transmissions’ in technical terms (they both use ‘data packet 
technology’), they are not both ‘communications’ for the purposes of 
the Copyright Act…. Unlike a download, the experience of a stream is 
much more akin to a broadcast or performance.”70 
The importance of differentiating downloading from streaming 
activities—while justified through an analysis of legislative history71 
and a (somewhat controversial) interpretation of section 3(1)72—
was clearly motivated by an overarching concern with the practical 
consequences of finding otherwise. If, as SOCAN argued, the activity 
of downloading a copy of a video game can infringe on both the 
reproduction and the communication right, the effect is to permit 
“double-dipping” by copyright owners,73 requiring the payment of two 
fees to two separate collective societies.74 This result was dismissed as 
inefficient, and therefore harmful to “both end users and copyright 
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owners.”75 Moreover, it was explicitly criticized for “ignor[ing] 
the principle of technological neutrality.”76 The majority reasoned 
that permitting such double dipping in respect of copies delivered 
through the Internet would “effectively impose a gratuitous cost for 
the use of more efficient, Internet-based technologies,” as compared 
with delivery through stores or by mail. Informed by its version of 
technological neutrality, then, the majority opted quite deliberately to 
interpret the Act “in a way that avoids imposing an additional layer 
of protections and fees based solely on the method of delivery of the 
work to the end user.”77 
This use of the principle is interesting in two respects. First, 
as noted, the result is to discriminate between two kinds of online 
activities—streaming and downloading—and, in doing so, to overlook 
the technical means employed for both kinds of transmissions (data 
packet transmission that is not a “single activity” in any technical 
sense). This approach might be thought to undermine technological 
neutrality insofar as it distinguishes between technical processes and 
imposes legal consequences for using one form of transmission over 
another. Such a critique would have to rely, however, on a formal non-
discrimination–based vision of the principle. Thus, Rothstein J and 
the minority warn against “limit[ing] the scope of the communication 
right when it is applied to one such new technology.”78 However, 
taking a substantive approach concerned with functional equivalence 
and discriminatory effect, I would suggest, the majority’s conclusion 
is well supported and eminently defensible. Protecting an additional 
income stream for digital downloads that is not available for hard 
copy sales is essentially the opposite of technological neutrality, thus 
understood.79
Second, the majority’s ruling and reasons signal a willingness 
to actively limit the potential reach of the ostensibly technology-
neutral rights of copyright owners in new technological contexts 
in recognition of the broader policy balance implicated by owners’ 
claims. In this vein, the minority takes a legally formalist stance and 
criticizes the majority for “reading into the Act restrictions which are 
not apparent from and are even inconsistent with the current language 
of the Act.”80 According to Rothstein J, by “inferring limits into the 
communication right,” the majority ruling went “beyond the function 
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of the courts.”81 Indeed, the ruling has proved controversial precisely 
because the Court could easily have accorded “communication by 
telecommunication” its readily available and previously attributed 
meaning,82 and thereby protected the rights of owners to demand 
public performance fees for every digital transmission of their works. 
Instead, as Professor Hutchinson explains, the majority 
presented technological neutrality as a “principle of non-interference” 
when it sought to “avoid imposing copyright liability on technologies 
and activities that, while theoretically capable of being included under 
the Act, only incidentally implicate copyright.”83 In doing so, the Court 
took a more activist stance, unapologetically curtailing owners’ rights 
in the digital environment in the name of technological neutrality, 
thereby insulating the users of new technologies from potential 
(and doctrinally justifiable) liability—an interpretive approach 
with potentially significant consequences for future demands for 
online copyright protection.84 While the expansive version of the 
technological neutrality principle might equally support extending 
copyright or protecting user rights in particular contexts, it is only in 
this expansive form that the principle has thus far been employed to 
actively delimit owner rights. 
4.  The Promise of the Technological Neutrality Principle
Having charted the various definitions and rationales offered in 
respect of the principle of technological neutrality, and their bearing 
on the interpretation and application of the law, I want to offer, in the 
final section, some brief thoughts about the justification and potential 
implications of the principle as it emerged, fully formed, from the 
ESA case. 
4.1  On Justifications
To the extent that technological neutrality can be derived directly 
from the face of the Copyright Act, it is generally found in the wording 
of section 3(1) and the owner’s exclusive right to reproduce the work 
“in any material form whatsoever.” This provision undoubtedly 
demonstrates an ambition toward a technologically neutral copyright 
but, in itself, it demands nothing more than extending the reach of 
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owners’ rights to new media, thereby ensuring non-discrimination 
in the applicability of the law to different technologies, and, to a 
certain degree, “future-proofing” the law. What we see in ESA is a 
markedly broader, functional vision of technological neutrality as a 
guiding principle that actively distinguishes between technological 
means and restricts copyright’s reach in new contexts with a view to 
achieving consistency in effect; so, if not in the language of the Act, 
where can the principle, in this form, find its origin and justification? 
The answer, I suggest, is simple and lies in the overarching policy 
goals of the copyright system as articulated by the Supreme Court in 
the Théberge case.
In Théberge, writing for the majority, Binnie J stated that 
copyright requires “a balance between promoting the public interest 
in the encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts and 
intellect and obtaining a just reward for the creator.”85 In Bell, Abella J 
explained the significance of the case:
Théberge reflected a move away from an earlier, author-
centric view which focused on the exclusive right of 
authors and copyright owners to control how their 
works were used in the marketplace…. Théberge focused 
attention instead on the importance copyright plays in 
promoting the public interest, and emphasized that the 
dissemination of artistic works is central to developing a 
robustly cultured and intellectual public domain. …  
[B]oth protection and access must be sensitively 
balanced in order to achieve this goal.86
This principled recognition of copyright as requiring a sensitive 
public policy balance, rather than simply the protection of a 
private property right, has had a marked impact on the landscape 
of Canadian copyright law. If copyright in general requires this 
balance, then it must surely follow that copyright in the digital era 
requires the preservation of this balance, which must mean that the 
law should have the same effect (produce a similar balance of rights 
and interests) whether applied offline or online. The broad principle 
of technological neutrality, as employed by the majority in ESA, 
therefore flows naturally from the Court’s recognition of the Théberge 
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balance and its continued significance in the digital environment. 
Correspondingly, as one might expect, the most limited version 
of technological neutrality, as employed by the minority in ESA, 
aligns with a restrictive vision of balance and its role in guiding the 
interpretation of the law. Citing the same statement of balance from 
Théberge, Rothstein J continues: “While the ‘courts should strive 
to maintain an appropriate balance between these two goals,’…[i]n 
Canada, copyright [remains] a creature of statute.”87 Neither balance 
nor technological neutrality, from this viewpoint, offers a basis 
for “delimit[ing] the scope of broadly defined rights in the digital 
environment”; rather, this task is properly left to Parliament, which 
will “legislate when it considers copyright protection to be improperly 
balanced.”88
With respect, Rothstein J appears to permit the principle of 
balance to inform the extension of owners’ rights into the online 
environment (protecting owners in Rogers), but not to limit owners’ 
rights (in Robertson and ESA). My argument is that, if one begins with 
a commitment to the principle of balance as articulated in Théberge, 
then it should follow as a matter of course that the balance must be 
preserved as technologies evolve; this, in turn, demands a principle 
of technological neutrality that focuses on the effects on the law in 
new technological contexts, and that justifies (in Koops’s terms) a 
functionalist or teleological interpretation of the law with a view to 
the substantive principles at stake.89 In Tussey’s terms, technological 
neutrality is necessarily furthered by consideration of copyright’s 
broader policy goals, rather strict adherence to the black letter law.90 
The important point is that technological neutrality, as presented by 
the majority in ESA, is not a new and overarching policy parachuted 
into Canadian copyright law; rather, it is a principled interpretive tool 
mandated by the overarching policy of Canada’s copyright law—the 
preservation or continuing pursuit of an appropriate balance between 
protecting authors and promoting the public interest. As Tomas 
Lipinski writes, “The overall goal of balance in the copyright law 
between rights of copyright owners and copyright users is paramount 
and the concept of technological neutrality in the application of the 
law assists in achieving that goal.”91
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4.2 On Implications
If there is anything on which everyone can agree, it would seem to 
be that the Court’s invocation of technological neutrality in ESA is 
of potentially enormous significance when it comes to interpreting 
and applying the Copyright Act as amended by the Copyright 
Modernization Act. Exactly what significance the principle will have, 
however, and what outcomes it might produce, are less evident and 
more open to debate. As Michael Geist has argued, “the linkage 
between technological neutrality and the limited nature of creators’ 
rights could prove very significant as the court is concerned that a 
non-neutral approach may result in overcompensating creators.”92 
With this as a potential starting point, the general assumption seems 
to be that, for better or for worse, the principle may be employed 
to restrict the scope of the owner rights that have been created or 
expanded by the new Act. 
The new Act contains a large volume of technologically specific 
provisions that would appear to be inherently at odds with the guiding 
principle of technological neutrality as a regulatory strategy. It should 
be recalled, however, that as a principle of regulation, technology 
specificity is the opposite of technology independence; technology-
specific regulations may thus be said to be technologically neutral if 
it is claimed that they differentiate between technologies with legally 
relevant differences. In such instances, different treatment may be 
“necessary to realize an equivalent result.”93 Thus, the additional 
protection of digital rights management (DRM) systems, for example, 
is identified by Koops as “a technology-specific or technology-driven 
regulation, which aims to create the same copyright-law effect in 
the on-line era as it had in the off-line era.”94 Such protection may 
therefore be claimed to be functional (in the sense of Koops’s A1), by 
attempting to reinstate the norms of the analog world in the digital 
environment through a combination of technology and law. Koops 
explains: 
[T]he advent of new technologies has threatened to shift 
the power balance between copyright owners and users 
to make users more powerful: they can cheaply and 
without limit make perfect copies, which formerly they 
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could not do. Thus, the law reacts by shifting the power 
balance back towards copyright holders: it prohibits the 
circumvention of DRM systems.95 
But as Koops rightly warns, “[w]hether it achieves that aim is 
another matter; the power balance is now arguably tipped deeper 
towards copyright holders than it has ever done before.”96 Indeed, 
even the premise that new technologies represent a net threat to 
copyright owners (never mind the appropriate legal response) is 
open to dispute. As Lipinski notes, “those who have control of a 
technologically dependent medium, the digital medium for example, 
in fact control both the ownership and the access to the work, without 
heed to users’ rights.” Rather than neutrality, then, Lipinski perceives 
in digital environments “the ascendancy of ownership rights.”97 
It might be claimed that the technology-specific provisions of the 
Copyright Modernization Act are aimed at ensuring the continuing 
application and enforcement of copyright in the digital environment, 
with the intention that “what holds offline should also hold online.” 
Certainly, it seems fair to say that copyright’s balance “can no longer 
be purely internal to the legal framework of rights and limitations 
but must factor in elements of practical reality, including the impact 
of the additional risks engendered, and the additional protection 
made possible by technology.”98 Even rationalized in these terms, 
however, many of the technology-specific provisions exemplify 
the distortive potential of such efforts, especially when guided by a 
primary concern to protect the rights of copyright owners against the 
increased risk associated with the digital environment. By focusing 
on the perceived threat to copyright owners presented by digital 
technologies, Canada’s legislature has enacted technology-specific 
laws that overcompensate owners and tip the balance in their favour. 
In particular, the additional protections afforded to digital locks (the 
technological protection measures that prevent access or certain uses 
of digital content) seem largely incapable of justification when seen 
through the lens of technological neutrality. 
On their face, of course, the provisions violate the basic 
starting point of technological neutrality insofar as they target the 
technology itself: section 41.1(1)(c), for example, makes it unlawful to 
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“manufacture, import, distribute, offer for sale or rental or provide…
any technology, device or component” produced primarily for the 
purpose of circumventing a technological protection measure. Such 
device prohibitions regulate particular technologies (the means) 
rather than particular uses (the effects), discriminate between 
different technologies, and quite deliberately restrict the development 
of certain technologies. There is no sound basis on which to assert 
that the anti-circumvention provisions simply shift the balance back. 
The greatest difficulty with such an argument is that these added 
protections entirely neglect one half of the copyright balance by 
failing to safeguard in any meaningful way the rights of lawful users 
of protected works. The new Act contains no general fair dealing 
defence to circumvention liability, and no route by which to demand 
access to works for lawful purposes. By privileging digital locks and 
their protection over user rights and the public interest, the new rules 
disrupt the traditional copyright balance, “sacrificing user rights and 
privileges to the ultimate power of technical control.”99
As such, Michael Geist is right to suggest that “the biggest long 
term impact [of the ESA decision] may be felt when courts begin to 
assess the effect of the new digital lock rules. Those rules are distinctly 
non-neutral and could face a rough ride if challenged before the 
courts.”100 Geist explains, “those rules ‘impose an additional layer of 
protections’ and create ‘a gratuitous cost’ for consumers who lose their 
user rights in the shift to Internet-based technologies”—precisely the 
kinds of effects that the Court found to be contrary to its substantive 
version of the technological neutrality principle.101 
I argued above that technological neutrality is not a new principle 
suddenly imported by the Court into Canada’s copyright law; rather, 
technological neutrality is about preserving copyright’s fundamental 
balance between owners and the public as technologies evolve. By the 
same token, the digital lock protections in the Copyright Modernization 
Act do not violate the principle of technological neutrality simply 
because they are technology specific; rather, these additions to the 
rights of owners violate the principle because they fail to preserve the 
copyright balance in the digital environment. 
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With the enactment of the Copyright Modernization Act, the 
legislature has opted for an abundance of technology-specific 
provisions that establish additional protections for owners without 
corresponding protections for users. The new requirements lack 
transparency and comprehensibility for ordinary Canadians tasked 
with following the rules, and place extraordinary monitoring and 
compliance obligations on intermediaries and service providers (even 
including, for example, teachers offering distance-learning lessons). 
There is no doubt that, in doing so, the legislature has threatened 
the ability of the judiciary to keep copyright on the technologically 
neutral and balanced trajectory established by the Supreme Court 
in recent copyright jurisprudence. However, this does not minimize 
the significance of these path-breaking decisions—it suggests that 
the Court’s powerful reasoning may have come just in time to save 
Canada’s copyright balance. 
Koops writes that “within a system of functional interpretation 
of laws, technology neutrality becomes a minor issue: practice can 
deal with laws that seem technology-specific by interpreting them in 
a functional way.”102 While not always possible or sufficient to achieve 
equivalence of result, “the possibility of functional interpretation may 
often be a good way of circumventing the problem of technology 
neutrality.”103 Moreover, as Koops suggests, the effects of technology-
specific regulation can be minimized by the establishment of a clear 
framework of substantive principles such as that elucidated by the 
Supreme Court in the copyright arena over the past decade. By 
providing a clear sense of the “fundamental rights and values that are 
at stake and the rationale that underlies” Canada’s copyright system, 
the Court has established a principled framework that will, in the 
future, facilitate “the practice of interpreting…technology-specific 
laws…in a functional, teleological way.”104
It is hoped, then, that as Canadian courts grapple with the 
amended Copyright Act, and find themselves challenged with 
interpreting its dense, technology-specific provisions in new and likely 
unforeseen situations, this principled framework of rights and values 
will guide the judicial understanding and application of the law. As 
an interpretive tool, the principle of technological neutrality should 
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assist in achieving consistency in the application of copyright (and its 
limits) in furtherance of copyright’s purposes. This should mean, for 
example, minimizing to the extent possible the scope and impact of 
the anti-circumvention right on non-infringing uses, thereby giving 
substance to the Court’s repeated insistence that fair dealing is a 
“users’ right” and “an essential part of furthering the public interest 
objectives of the Copyright Act.”105 Without abandoning due regard for 
the statutory language,106 courts should strive to apply the text of the 
law in a way that advances the purposes of copyright by preserving 
the balance between authors’ rights and the public interest in the 
encouragement and dissemination of works. It is unfortunate that 
elements of the newly written law do more to jeopardize than to assist 
in this task; but it is fortunate indeed that those tasked with applying 
the law can do so with the principle of technological neutrality to 
guide them as they carve out a path for copyright in this digital age. 
5.  Conclusion
The idea that technological neutrality should be a governing principle 
in the realm of copyright law has long been present in Canada, as 
elsewhere, but has gone largely unexamined until now. The Supreme 
Court’s 2012 copyright decisions shone a light on the principle and its 
potential significance in shaping the copyright law of the digital era. 
Evident in these rulings were three distinguishable conceptualizations 
of technological neutrality: a minimalist version focused on formal 
non-discrimination and the extension of rights into new media; an 
intermediate version concerned with functional equivalence and 
consistency of effect in the application of copyright to new media; 
and an expansive version—extending beyond any previous judicial 
treatment of the principle in Canada or elsewhere—that demands a 
teleological interpretation of the law aimed at advancing the purposes 
of the copyright system as the technological landscape shifts. With 
these decisions, technological neutrality emerged as a fundamental 
and functional principle that can inform the application of copyright 
law in important and arguably unanticipated ways. Not only can it 
explain the extension of copyright protection into new technological 
contexts, but it can also be asserted as a safeguard of user rights 
and their availability in respect of novel technologically facilitated 
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consumer practices. Most importantly, however, the principle 
supports circumscribing the potential reach of existing owners’ rights 
where their extension threatens to upset copyright’s fragile balance in 
the digital domain. 
The unprecedented power of technological neutrality to shape 
the contours of copyright protection therefore depends on an 
understanding of the principle that extends beyond simple non-
discrimination in the application of copyright norms to new media. 
Rather, its power flows from a substantive commitment to the 
notion that copyright law should apply with equivalent purpose and 
effect across the technological landscape. Taking seriously the idea 
of copyright as a balance between authors and the public reveals 
the principle to be ultimately concerned with the preservation of 
this copyright balance in the digital environment. As such, the 
technological neutrality principle does not occupy a separate or 
parallel position alongside the guiding principle of balance—it is 
part and parcel of that balance. Its significance, then, will not be 
determined by the mere acceptance of technological neutrality as 
an ideal. As evidenced by the various iterations and applications of 
the principle by the Justices of the Supreme Court, the significance 
of technological neutrality will ultimately depend on the meaning 
and significance that we accord to the public policy objectives of our 
copyright system. 
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Technological Neutrality in  
Canadian Copyright law
gregory r. hagen1
i: introduction: The supreme Court of Canada adopts 
Technological Neutrality
Recently, in Entertainment Software Association v Society of 
Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada [ESA],2 Rogers 
Communications Inc. v Society of Composers, Authors and Music 
Publishers of Canada [Rogers]3 and Society of Composers, Authors 
and Music Publishers of Canada v Bell Canada [Bell],4 the Supreme 
Court of Canada dealt with the issue of how copyright law should 
treat competing disseminators of copyrighted subject matter.5 As 
the Court recognized, copyright law can impose costs on those who 
provide new forms of dissemination technology that don’t apply 
to incumbent disseminators, even where the new forms are more 
efficient.6 In order to deal with this problem, it applied a principle 
of technological neutrality, which requires, in one formulation, that, 
in the absence of evidence of contrary intent expressed by Parliament,7 
“the Copyright Act apply equally between traditional and more 
technologically advanced forms of the same media….”8 Applying 
that principle in ESA, the Court held that technological neutrality 
requires avoiding the imposition of additional copyright royalties 
 10
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“based solely on the method of delivery of the work to the end user”.9 
While this principle advances the law about how copyright applies 
to competing disseminators, the judgment raises an issue about 
whether new amendments to the Copyright Act10 that prohibit the 
circumvention of technological measures that protect copyright 
(technological protection measures, or TPMs) are consistent with 
the principle of technological neutrality, as they allow copyright 
owners to favour their own dissemination technology over that of 
competing disseminators.
The earlier case of Society of Composers, Authors and Music 
Publishers of Canada v Canadian Assn. of Internet Providers 
also concerned the dissemination function of copyright and the 
relationship between rival disseminators, members of SOCAN and 
Internet service providers (ISPs).11 Yet, in SOCAN v CAIP, the Court 
did not mention or apply the principle of technological neutrality to 
competing disseminators because of Parliament’s explicit treatment 
of those who merely provide the means of telecommunication under 
s 2.4(1)(b) of the Copyright Act. The result would have likely been 
the same had the principle of technological neutrality been applied, 
since the Court ruled, applying s 2.4(1)(b), that content-neutral ISPs 
do not communicate those works that are disseminated by others 
through their networks.12 Indeed, the Court lauded the Internet as 
a remarkable innovation, the use of which “should be facilitated 
rather than discouraged.”13 At the same time, it stated that such 
facilitation “should not be done unfairly at the expense of those who 
created the works of arts and intellect in the first place.”14 It thereby 
linked the issue of the treatment of rival disseminators to the rights 
of authors, implicitly raising the fundamental issue of how much 
authors (and other copyright owners) should benefit from new forms 
of dissemination. Later, in ESA, the Court grounded the principle 
of technological neutrality in the notion that the traditional balance 
between authors and users, as described in Théberge,15 should be 
preserved in the digital environment.16 
Théberge concerned the rights that an artist had in the poster that 
he created in relation to a gallery that chemically lifted the ink image 
from it and put it on a canvas backing.17 The Supreme Court made the 
fundamental point that authors deserve a just reward, but that their 
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copyrights are limited by the public interest in encouraging authors 
to create and to disseminate subject matter.18 In CCH Canadian Ltd. v 
Law Society of Upper Canada [CCH], a case that concerned the scope 
of the copyrights of legal publishers in edited judicial reasons, the 
Supreme Court emphasized that the fair dealing exception that users 
enjoy, as well as other exceptions and limitations to copyright, are 
users’ rights.19 Later, ESA and Rogers made it clear that technological 
neutrality is an interpretive principle that is aimed, ultimately, 
at ensuring that the public interest in dissemination is efficiently 
promoted.20
Of course, the application of the principle of technological neutral- 
ity is limited to situations where there is no legislative intent to the 
contrary, but this gives rise to the issue of whether the principle 
can be of any use given the existence of provisions that prohibit the 
circumvention of protected TPMs. These provisions present a difficult 
problem, because they potentially limit the ability of courts to give a 
technologically neutral interpretation of the Copyright Act whenever 
TPMs are used by copyright owners to favour themselves over rival 
disseminators and it is prohibited to circumvent the TPMs in the 
circumstances. 
For many, this might appear justifiable on the basis that Parliament 
should be in charge of allocating the benefits of new technology. Be 
that as it may, the problem is that whatever balance of benefits may be 
set by legislation, private actors may undermine that balance through 
their use of technology. This chapter suggests that the principle of 
technological neutrality can be used to create new exceptions to the 
prohibition on circumventing protected TPMs and to strike down some 
prohibitions (which make user rights subject to not circumventing a 
TPM) on the basis of a conflict with the rule of law.
Section II will suggest that the principle of technological neutrality, 
as enunciated by the Supreme Court, is largely an accurate description 
of copyright’s current policy of dealing with disseminators. Section 
III describes the principle of technological neutrality in the recent 
Supreme Court judgments as one that requires treating competing 
disseminators of works and other subject matter equally under 
copyright law. Section IV argues that, according to the Supreme 
Court, the principle of technological neutrality is used to ensure 
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that copyright law does not overcompensate owners of copyrights 
at the expense of users of copyrighted works. Section V points out, 
in agreement with William Patry, however, that legislated TPM 
provisions enable incumbents to favour themselves over their rival 
disseminators, leading to the question of whether the principle of 
technological neutrality can be used by courts at all.21 Finally, Section 
VI argues that a broad prohibition against circumventing TPMs is 
contrary to the rule of law because TPMs can involuntarily force 
persons to abide by “digital rights” fashioned by copyright owners 
even though no corresponding copyrights exist. It suggests that an 
effective rule of law would empower courts to create new rights to 
circumvent TPMs (and, in some cases, strike down TPM provisions) 
in order to ensure technological neutrality. 22
ii: Calls for Technological Neutrality in Copyright law
Calls for technological neutrality have been made in numerous areas 
of the law, including electronic commerce and telecommunications 
law,23 and are currently being made with a great sense of urgency 
in copyright law. William Patry demands, for instance, that “[o]ur 
copyright law must be technology neutral….”24 David Vaver exhorts: 
“Copyright law should strive for technological neutrality.”25 Howard 
Knopf argues that, in copyright law, we need to ensure “technological 
neutrality and clear, general language.”26 Francis Gurry, the Director 
General of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 
claims that “neutrality to technology and to the business models 
developed in response to technology” is a key principle that is needed 
to respond to digital technologies and the Internet.27 Canada’s recent 
Copyright Amendment Act was said to be drafted to “ensure that [the 
Copyright Act] remains technologically neutral.”28 What reasons could 
be advanced to support technological neutrality?
One possible rationale is that legislatures, rather than courts, should 
decide whether to extend the benefits of new dissemination technology 
to copyright owners. As Wu has shown, the communications policy 
of US copyright law, which developed in parallel with the growth of 
the recording industry, radio and television, and the cable industry, 
has, generally, been one where courts treat rival disseminators equally, 
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refusing to extend copyright to new methods of dissemination,29 at 
least where copyright owners sought to block the new technology 
rather than participate in the new form of dissemination.30 On his 
account, the classic legislative response to novel disseminators in the 
US (1900–1976) centred on access fees and compulsory licences.31 
The modern regime (post-1976) has created a (judge-run) immunity 
scheme concerning electronics manufacturers, a safe harbour for ISPs, 
as well as new provisions (such as concerning TPMs) that affect users.32 
Arguably, a similar policy has existed in Canada. For example, 
in response to new dissemination technology, Parliament created the 
(now abandoned) compulsory licence for the reproduction of musical 
works,33 the private copying regime for sound recordings,34 the right to 
equitable remuneration for the public performance of works or their 
communication to the public by telecommunication,35 and extended 
the communication right to cover cable transmissions while creating 
the right to retransmit television signals. 36 More recently, Parliament 
created a new form of secondary liability for enabling infringement,37 
enhanced the immunity of ISPs38 and added anti-circumvention 
provisions regarding TPMs.39 This policy is consistent with the Canadian 
Supreme Court’s proviso that a technologically neutral interpretation is 
only available absent Parliamentary intent to the contrary.40
A second possible reason is that copyright law should not be used, 
by either courts or legislators, as a means to control dissemination 
technology so as to favour incumbent disseminators over rival novel 
disseminators, such as by either blocking rivals by applying existing 
copyrights or treating them unequally by applying multiple copyrights 
(e.g., reproduction and communication rights) to them. Indeed, as 
will be discussed, the recent Supreme Court cases characterize the 
principle of technological neutrality as grounded in preserving the 
traditional balance between authors and users. According to this view, 
technological neutrality in copyright law is a means of stopping “[t]he 
proxy battle for control of technologies and markets through copyright 
law.”41 Through “proxy battles”, copyright owners have historically 
tried to extend copyright’s reach to cover new means of dissemination, 
regardless of whether copyright owners created or funded them, in order 
to undermine competing disseminators and expand their own market 
for their copyrights.42 As Francis Gurry says, technological neutrality 
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is needed to fend off copyright owners who wish to “preserve business 
models established under obsolete or moribund technologies.”43 
This second view is supported by the idea that copyright 
law should regulate competition between rival disseminators of 
copyrighted subject matter in order to promote innovation. For 
instance, the Canadian government has said that copyright law must be 
technologically neutral in order to ensure fair competition and foster 
innovation.44 It maintained that its self-described technologically 
neutral approach to drafting the Copyright Modernization Act was 
intended to “spur competition and foster innovation by ensuring 
that businesses have the flexibility to develop and offer innovative 
products and services to consumers, provided they fall within the 
permitted scope of the law.”45
As evidence for its view, the Canadian government cited the 
US Sony46 litigation, through which the motion picture industry 
unsuccessfully attempted to block the distribution of video cassette 
recorders, saying that copyright can be a barrier to innovation when 
it is used by copyright owners to attempt to prevent the development 
of innovative consumer products.47 
As mentioned above, however, the Copyright Modernization 
Act created a new form of secondary infringement liability, and 
infringement for the circumvention of TPMs.48 These two new 
forms of infringement enhance the ability of copyright owners to 
control dissemination technology for their own benefit. So, while 
technological neutrality may be viewed as desirable, to some extent, 
by Parliament, it is subject to Parliament’s power to legislatively favour 
incumbent disseminators against new rivals. 
Finally, but arguably most importantly, another view is that 
technology should not be used as a direct means of regulating our 
use of copyrighted subject matter. That is, the rule of law requires that 
“the relationship between the state and the individual be regulated by 
law.”49 While the rationale for the use of TPMs by copyright owners 
is clearly to regain some form of excludability with respect to their 
works that was lost through the information technology revolution,50 
the result of their use will be the practical displacement of copyright 
law by TPM-powered digital rights management (DRM) systems that 
enable copyright owners to define the “right to control the manner 
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in which the public apprehend the work.”51 These systems subjugate 
user rights to create a “permissions-based culture,” to access subject 
matter (whether copyrighted or not) controlled by DRM.52 Further, 
with the aid of DRM, the digital ecosystem53 threatens to evolve 
into incompatible information fiefdoms controlled by Apple, Sony, 
Microsoft and Google through their digital appliances,54 all at the 
expense of the public interest. 
iii: The supreme Court of Canada on Technological 
Neutrality and Media Neutrality
The three main cases under consideration concerned whether the 
dissemination of musical works by the Internet were an exercise of 
owners’ right to communicate to the public by telecommunication for 
the purpose of setting a tariff for copyright royalties. The underlying 
policy issue was how to split fairly the benefits of new forms of 
dissemination between incumbent disseminators (who are often 
copyright owners) as a (proxy) reward for authorship and novel 
disseminators, who want to be rewarded for creating new markets 
and more efficient forms of dissemination. In reaching its decision in 
these cases, the Supreme Court applied the principle of technological 
neutrality, which requires that, in the absence of evidence of contrary 
intent by Parliament, “the Copyright Act apply equally between 
traditional and more technologically advanced forms of the same 
media….”55 Failing to apply the principle of technological neutrality, 
it argued, could result in the imposition of additional costs on users 
of novel Internet-based methods of delivery relative to incumbent 
methods of dissemination, overcompensating authors at the expense 
of the public.56 
A. Robertson 
Prior to the use of “technological neutrality”, in Robertson v Thomson 
Corp., the Supreme Court of Canada used the phrase “media 
neutrality”.57 Later, in ESA and, especially, Rogers, it used the two 
phrases somewhat interchangeably.58 That is understandable, as 
both media neutrality and technological neutrality are interpretive 
principles that are designed to ensure that the benefits of new media 
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and technology are allocated in a way that is consistent with the 
purpose of the Copyright Act. However, I argue that they are different 
conceptions of neutrality. 
i. Media Neutrality of the Reproduction Right
In Robertson, the Supreme Court of Canada pointed to section 
3(1) of the Copyright Act, which uses the phrase “in any material form 
whatever” as a reflection of media neutrality. 59
3. (1) For the purposes of this Act, “copyright”, in 
relation to a work, means the sole right to produce or 
reproduce the work or any substantial part thereof in 
any material form whatever….
The majority of the Supreme Court said in Rogers, citing Apple 
Computer Inc. v Mackintosh Computers Ltd.,60 that it had “long 
recognized in the context of the reproduction right that, where 
possible, the [Copyright] Act should be interpreted to extend to 
technologies that were not or could not have been contemplated at 
the time of its drafting….”61 In Apple, for instance, a competitor of 
Apple etched a computer program into a silicon chip and reproduced 
that chip.62 The chips were found to be reproductions of the computer 
program notwithstanding that they were silicon chips.63
 
ii. Media Neutrality of the Copyright Act 
In Robertson, the Supreme Court defined “media neutrality”: 
“Media neutrality means that the Copyright Act should continue to 
apply in different media, including more technologically advanced 
ones.”64 Later, in Rogers, the Supreme Court noted that “in any 
material form whatever” in s 3(1) extends to the communication 
right in s 3(1)(f).65 In Robertson, the Court made it clear that such 
rights were limited by the “exigencies of the Copyright Act.”66 So, in 
Robertson, the Court found that The Globe and Mail did not reproduce 
the originality of its newspaper in all of the distinct databases that 
contained its newspaper articles.67 Similarly, in Théberge, lifting the 
ink layer from a poster and placing it on canvas was not considered to 
be a reproduction in light of the goals of the Copyright Act.68 
In ESA, however, Rothstein J, in dissent, maintained that the 
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principle of media neutrality implies that the Internet delivery of a 
musical work is a communication just as, he claimed, the work would 
be communicated by traditional broadcast technologies.69 This 
conclusion does not follow, I believe, as it assumes that delivering 
a musical work is necessarily a communication rather than possibly 
merely the delivery or dissemination of a work. It is true that, if a 
delivery of a work is a communication, then, from the media 
neutrality principle, it is a communication regardless of the form 
of media. But the delivery of a work may not be a communication, 
like shipping a compact disc via the mail. The message of ESA is 
that one cannot conclude that a new medium of dissemination, 
such as Internet delivery, is a form of communication unless that 
characterization treats incumbent forms of delivery (such as mail) 
equally under copyright law. 
B.  Entertainment Software [ESA]
The most important case on the principle of technological neutrality 
is ESA.70 In that case, the appellant, Entertainment Software 
Association (the Association), represented a group of video game 
publishers and distributors.71 The video games contained musical 
works and the reproduction of the musical works in the video games 
had been licensed by the video game publishers.72 By downloading 
the gaming software from member sites, customers reproduced it.73 
The downloaded copy is identical to a copy that could be purchased 
from the store or purchased online and then shipped to the buyer.74 
The issue was whether the members of the Association communicate 
the software (and the musical work it contains) to the public by 
telecommunication. SOCAN argued that they did, the Copyright 
Board agreed and this was upheld by the Federal Court of Appeal.75
The Copyright Board relied upon Binnie J’s observation in SOCAN 
v CAIP, that a work has necessarily been communicated when, “[a]t 
the end of the transmission, the end user has a musical work in his or 
her possession that was not there before.”76 It also relied on the more 
recent ruling in Canadian Wireless Telecommunications Assn. v Society 
of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, concerning 
the downloading of ringtones, that “[t]he word ‘communication’ 
connotes the passing of information from one person to another.” 77 
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In ESA, the Supreme Court noted that Binnie J’s comments 
in SOCAN v CAIP were obiter dicta and that the meaning of 
communication was never at issue.78 It gave an extensive legislative 
history of the communication right, characterizing it as a kind of 
performance right that “did not contemplate the delivery of permanent 
copies of the work, since such a delivery was not possible through the 
means of Hertzian radio waves.”79 The Supreme Court agreed with 
the Association and also held that the Board’s conclusion violated the 
principle of technological neutrality:80
In our view, the Board’s conclusion that a separate, 
“communication” tariff applied to downloads of musical 
works violates the principle of technological neutrality, 
which requires that the Copyright Act apply equally 
between traditional and more technologically advanced 
forms of the same media: Robertson v. Thomson Corp., 
2006 SCC 43, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 363, at para. 49. The 
principle of technological neutrality is reflected in s. 
3(1) of the Act, which describes a right to produce or 
reproduce a work “in any material form whatever”. In 
our view, there is no practical difference between buying 
a durable copy of the work in a store, receiving a copy 
in the mail, or downloading an identical copy using the 
Internet. The Internet is simply a technological taxi that 
delivers a durable copy of the same work to the end user. 
The Supreme Court says that the principle of technological 
neutrality is reflected in s 3(1) of the Copyright Act, but there is a 
subtle shift in meaning from media neutrality to technological 
neutrality because, while media neutrality may extend an existing 
communication right to new media, technological neutrality may 
require that the dissemination is no communication at all. The 
possibility that the dissemination of a work is not a communication 
at all is provided in the reasoning of David Vaver, which the Court 
cites as an echo of its own reasoning:
In principle, substitute delivery systems should compete 
on their merits: either both or neither should pay. 
Copyright law should strive for technological neutrality.
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In the past, whether a customer bought a sound 
recording or video game physically at a store or ordered 
it by mail made no difference to the copyright holder: 
it got nothing extra for the clerk’s or courier’s handover 
of the record to the customer. Now, because of the 
telecommunication right, copyright holders can and do 
charge extra for electronic delivery of identical content 
acquired off websites.81 
The Supreme Court, thus, characterizes both the function of the 
download and of shipping through the mail as delivery. Although 
the Court does not use the language of “functional equivalence”, 
downloading and mail are, on its view, functionally equivalent as 
modes of delivery, despite their technological differences. In its 
words, “[t]he Internet is simply a technological taxi that delivers a 
durable copy of the same work to the end user.”82 The principle of 
technological neutrality requires that technologically distinct (e.g., 
downloading and shipping by mail), but functionally equivalent, 
methods of dissemination should be treated identically by copyright 
law.83 As a result, it ruled, like sending a compact disc via mail, Internet 
downloading is not a communication.84
C.  Rogers
In Rogers, the issue was whether the dissemination of musical works by 
Rogers Communications and other companies were communications 
to the public by telecommunication under s 3(1)(f) of the Copyright 
Act.85 The Copyright Board had earlier agreed that a claim for royalties 
was well founded and the Federal Court of Appeal agreed.86 As 
discussed, the Supreme Court had determined in ESA that downloads 
of musical works were not communications, whether to the public or 
not. As for streaming music, Rogers and other music services claimed 
that communications over the Internet that are triggered (or “pulled”) 
by individual users are not to the public.87 The argument of Rogers was 
that if a single person initiates a single stream of music to himself or 
herself, it is not a stream to the public, but to that single person.88 Rogers 
claimed support from CCH, that single, point-to-point transmission 
of faxes of literary works were not to the public.89 
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The majority judgment in Rogers, written by Rothstein J, seemed 
to equate media neutrality and technological neutrality in section 6: 
“Section 3(1)(f) Is Not Limited to Traditional ‘Push’ Technologies; It 
Is Technology-Neutral”.90 It stated that media neutrality applies not 
only to the reproduction right, but also to the communication right.91 
Although the words “in any material form whatever” 
qualify the right to “produce or reproduce the work” in 
s. 3(1), the same principle should guide the application 
of the neutral wording of the right to “communicate…to 
the public by telecommunication”. The broad definition 
of “telecommunication” was adopted precisely to provide 
for a communication right “not dependent on the form 
of technology” (SOCAN v. CAIP, at para. 90). 
The reference to media neutrality suggests that the Supreme Court 
considered push (broadcasting) and pull (streaming) technologies 
to be different material forms of communication and applied the 
principle of media neutrality to conclude that streaming music is a 
communication to the public, regardless of whether the technology 
is one of push broadcasting technology or the newer pull technology. 
But that conclusion cannot be inferred merely from the principle of 
media neutrality since the question is not whether the communication 
right extends to streaming, which was settled in the affirmative in 
ESA, but whether that communication is to the public. The issue that 
needs to be resolved is one of technological neutrality: how to treat 
broadcasting and streaming equally as forms of dissemination. 
The answer given by the Court is that both music broadcasting and 
music streaming are characterized abstractly as making music available 
indiscriminately to anyone with access.92 The majority once again 
cites David Vaver on this matter: “If the content is intentionally made 
available to anyone who wants to access it, it is treated as communicated 
‘to the public’ even if users access the work at different times and places”. 
93 Thus, “[a]lthough they occur between the online music provider and 
the individual consumer in a point-to-point fashion, the transmissions 
of musical works in this case, where they constitute ‘communications’, 
can be nothing other than communications ‘to the public’.”94 
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D.  Bell
In Bell, the issue was whether previewing short (30- to 90-second)
excerpts of musical works by streaming them prior to purchase was 
fair dealing.95 The Supreme Court applied the test of fair dealing from 
CCH.96 For the first part of the test, the Court determined that the 
dealing was for an allowable purpose of research, since “research” 
should be interpreted generously in light of the fact that one of the 
purposes of the Copyright Act is to further the dissemination of 
works.97 In determining whether previewing was fair, it applied the 
standard factors for fairness.98 In terms of the amount of the dealing, 
SOCAN argued that the aggregate amount of dealing should be 
considered.99 The Court held, however, that, because fair dealing is 
an individual user’s right, the amount of dealing related to individual 
previews, not the aggregate number of previews.100 
The Supreme Court further commented that SOCAN’s 
interpretation of the “amount of the dealing” as the aggregate amount 
was not technologically neutral.101 
Further, given the ease and magnitude with which 
digital works are disseminated over the Internet, 
focusing on the “aggregate” amount of the dealing 
in cases involving digital works could well lead to 
disproportionate findings of unfairness when compared 
with non-digital works. If, as SOCAN urges, large-scale 
organized dealings are inherently unfair, most of what 
online service providers do with musical works would 
be treated as copyright infringement. This, it seems to 
me, potentially undermines the goal of technological 
neutrality, which seeks to have the Copyright Act applied 
in a way that operates consistently, regardless of the form 
of media involved, or its technological sophistication: 
Robertson v. Thomson Corp., 2006 SCC 43, [2006] 2 SCR 
363, at para 49. 
In Bell, the Court considers the incumbent rivals to Bell to be 
those who don’t communicate works over the Internet, such as 
disseminators of non-digital works, where dealings would not be 
found to be unfair.
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iV: The supreme Court of Canada’s Rationale for 
Technological Neutrality
The Supreme Court grounds the principle of technological neutrality 
in the principle of prescriptive parallelism: “The traditional balance 
between authors and users should be preserved in the digital 
environment….”102 This is, apparently, the majority’s response to 
Rothstein J’s claim, in dissent, that “technological neutrality is not 
a statutory requirement capable of overriding the language of the 
[Copyright] Act and barring the application of the different protected 
rights provided by Parliament.”103 For the majority, technological 
neutrality furthers the purpose of the Copyright Act and, therefore, 
for them, is justified as a principle.
In the context of the dissemination function of copyright, the 
question is: To what extent should copyright owners (who are often 
the incumbent disseminators) benefit from the development of new 
forms of dissemination—and the resultant potential new market and 
new consumers—by third parties? In Rogers, the Court said:104 
Ultimately, in determining the extent of copyright, 
regard must be had for the fact that “[t]he Copyright Act 
is usually presented as a balance between promoting the 
public interest in the encouragement and dissemination 
of works of the arts and intellect and obtaining a just 
reward for the creator” (Théberge v. Galérie d’Art du Petit 
Champlain inc., 2002 SCC 34 (CanLII), 2002 SCC 34, 
[2002] 2 SCR 336, at para 30). 
In Théberge, the Supreme Court defined a “just reward” 
to be one that would “prevent someone other than the creator 
from appropriating whatever benefits may be generated.”105 This 
might lead to the inference that all benefits deriving from new 
dissemination should accrue to the owners, hinted at in Rothstein J’s 
quip that, “[i]n many respects, the Internet may well be described as 
a technological taxi; but taxis need not give free rides.”106 Given such 
an understanding of a just reward, the principle of media neutrality 
could be interpreted extremely broadly to mean that copyrights 
should apply to all new forms of dissemination in such a way as to 
extract maximal benefits for copyright owners (which is assumed to 
be passed on to authors).107 
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But the Supreme Court has moved away from the idea that copyright 
rewards authors for authoring toward the idea that it is merely an 
economic incentive to encourage them to create so as to benefit the 
public. On this reasoning, technological taxis must provide free rides if 
they efficiently benefit the public. In Bell, the Court said:108 
Théberge reflected a move away from an earlier, author-
centric view which focused on the exclusive right of 
authors and copyright owners to control how their 
works were used in the marketplace: see e.g. Bishop v. 
Stevens, 1990 75 (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 467, at 478-79. 
Under this former framework, any benefit the public 
might derive from the copyright system was only “a 
fortunate by-product of private entitlement”: Carys J 
Craig, “Locke, Labour and Limiting the Author’s Right: 
A Warning against a Lockean Approach to Copyright 
Law” (2002), 28 Queen’s LJ 1 at 14-15.
Théberge focused attention instead on the importance 
copyright plays in promoting the public interest, and 
emphasized that the dissemination of artistic works is 
central to developing a robustly cultured and intellectual 
public domain. As noted by Professor David Vaver, both 
protection and access must be sensitively balanced in 
order to achieve this goal: Intellectual Property Law: 
Copyright, Patents, Trade-marks (2d ed, 2011), at p 60.
As the Supreme Court said in Théberge, the traditional balance 
requires recognizing the limited nature of creators’ rights.109 It 
identifies the “proper” balance with efficient compensation for the 
public benefit, which requires that authors not be overcompensated.110
The proper balance among these and other public policy 
objectives lies not only in recognizing the creator’s 
rights but in giving due weight to their limited nature. 
In crassly economic terms it would be as inefficient 
to overcompensate artists and authors for the right 
of reproduction as it would be self-defeating to 
undercompensate them. 
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Overcompensation can occur in a number of ways. First, collective 
societies were created to efficiently manage copyrights; the Court 
cites Ariel Katz for the observation that a situation where multiple 
rights are managed by distinct collective societies that apply to single 
activities “can lead to inefficiency…. The result is that the total price 
the user has to pay for all complements is too high.”111 
Second, the provider of more efficient Internet delivery could 
bear additional costs (by paying the royalty for communicating the 
musical work) compared to offline delivery: 
The principle of technological neutrality requires that, 
absent evidence of Parliamentary intent to the contrary, 
we interpret the Copyright Act in a way that avoids 
imposing an additional layer of protections and fees 
based solely on the method of delivery of the work to 
the end user. To do otherwise would effectively impose 
a gratuitous cost for the use of more efficient, Internet-
based technologies. 112 
Equal treatment also implies that novel disseminators won’t be 
accorded favourable treatment in comparison to incumbents by 
copyright law. Thus, in Rogers, the Supreme Court concluded that the 
communication right would apply to both traditional broadcasters 
and on-demand streaming services.
This balance is not appropriately struck where the 
existence of copyright protection depends merely on 
the business model that the alleged infringer chooses 
to adopt rather than the underlying communication 
activity. Whether a business chooses to convey copyright 
protected content in a traditional, “broadcasting” 
type fashion, or opts for newer approaches based on 
consumer choice and convenience, the end result is the 
same. The copyrighted work has been made available to 
an aggregation of individuals of the general public.113
By grounding the principle of technological neutrality in the 
goal of efficient compensation of authors for the benefit of the 
public, however, it leaves itself open to the criticism that efficient 
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compensation is not the same as a just reward, as described in 
Théberge, and that abandoning a “Lockean” justification of copyright 
does not require the abandonment of a deontological theory of justice 
in favour of economic efficiency.
V: Technological Protection Measures
A. TPMs Can Control Dissemination
One might argue that, faced with copyright owners who employ TPMs 
to control access to, and dissemination of, works, the principle of 
technological neutrality is, practically speaking, irrelevant. Whatever 
balance is set legislatively by Parliament, that balance can be undone 
through the use of TPMs by copyright owners. Their effectiveness is 
legally guaranteed, subject to exceptions, by the prohibition against 
circumventing TPMs that control access to a work, as well as against 
their manufacturing, distribution, offering for sale or rental, or 
providing circumvention services.114 So, whereas copyright law used to 
control dissemination activity through the application of copyrights, 
as interpreted by courts, now it can substantially control TPMs 
independently of copyrights in the Copyright Act. As William Patry 
complains: “Previously, the copyright laws were technology neutral: 
They did not regulate technologies, but rather they regulated uses of 
copyrighted material, regardless of the technology employed.”115 
B. TPMs Can Undermine Competition Amongst Disseminators
TPMs can create an uncompetitive dissemination environment in 
a number of ways. TPMs can be used by copyright owners to limit, 
prevent or control the emergence of new devices (e.g., tablets, smart 
phones, personal video recorders, game consoles, smart television) 
by ensuring that works can be disseminated and displayed only on 
devices that are authorized to be used by the owner of the work. For 
instance, the owner of a copyright in a TPM-protected work can 
require a device manufacturer to license the digital key—which would 
allow a media player to unlock the digital lock (i.e. TPM) protecting 
the work—from the copyright owner for a fee.116 Similarly, a gamer 
might download a game, as in ESA, but the game could be protected 
by a TPM that could require, in effect, the payment of a fee to the 
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copyright owner that is equivalent to or greater than the royalty that 
was denied by the Supreme Court. 117 
C. TPMs Are Contrary to the Rule of Law
Numerous observers have criticized the prohibition on circumventing 
TPMs because it “undermines the balance between copyright owners 
and other parties that [copyright law] purports to achieve.”118 Others 
have criticized TPMs as eliminating autonomous choice to such an 
extent that their use undermines moral decision making.119 It might be 
countered, however, that, even if these moral critiques are sound, they 
do not undermine the legal validity of anti-circumvention measures 
that are explicitly enacted by Parliament. Law is one thing; its merits 
or demerits are another. So, if Parliament enacts copyright laws that 
give copyright owners a competitive advantage against competing 
disseminators, then courts appear to have no legal power to interpret 
copyright law in a technologically neutral manner. Does this entail 
that the principle of technological neutrality is effectively useless as an 
interpretive principle that can help to ensure that the public benefits 
from copyright law when TPMs are involved? 
Arguably not, because the use of TPMs has deeper legal problems 
than are often acknowledged, as their use can come at a great cost 
to the rule of law, a fundamental norm of our legal system. 120 One 
aspect of the rule of law is that “the relationship between the state and 
the individual be regulated by law.”121 As H. L. A. Hart showed, law is 
not the command of the sovereign backed by force, but is a form of 
epistemic guidance.122 To be guided by a legal rule is to understand 
it and conform to the rule on the basis of its meaning, not merely by 
force.123 Following a rule requires the possibility of understanding it, 
which is not necessary (or often possible) when technology compels 
behaviour. Unlike technology, legal norms are designed to be followed 
because their semantic content can be understood and internalized 
by persons as authoritative reasons for action,124 perhaps even as a 
justification of both the decisions of courts125 and the application of 
coercive force by government.126 The law may coerce if necessary, of 
course, but coercion is not the reason for conformity; rather, it is a 
response to non-conformity and is itself governed by law. Likewise, 
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the rule of law does not itself prohibit TPMs but, to satisfy the rule 
of law, digital rights (in a DRM system) must mirror the underlying 
substantive values and rules of copyright law (that we can understand) 
rather than conflict with them. The absence of a right to circumvent 
TPMs127 that control access to a work in order to exercise a user right 
(or for another lawful purpose) is inconsistent with the rule of law. 
The rule of law requires that user rights in law are mirrored by digital 
user rights in DRM systems.
Vi: how to Neutralize TPMs 
The Copyright Act provides that additional exceptions to the 
prohibition of circumvention may be made through regulation by 
the Governor in Council.128 It envisages making regulations where 
the prohibition would unduly restrict competition in the aftermarket 
sector but also under additional circumstances.129 Several factors 
are given, such as whether the prohibition could adversely affect 
criticism, review, news reporting, and similar dealings with subject 
matter; but any relevant factor may be considered.130 Given that there 
is a power to make such regulations under the Copyright Act, can 
Canadian courts do anything to ensure that TPMs don’t undermine 
copyright’s balance? 
Although there is a lot of talk about the value of the rule of law, 
courts may be wary of enforcing it in the face of anti-circumvention 
provisions. Yet, in cases such as fair dealing, given the requirement 
for a purposive interpretation under the Interpretation Act131 and 
case law, an effective rule of law would empower courts to make 
new exceptions to the prohibition, at least given the failure of the 
regulatory regime to do so. The absence of a right to circumvent a 
TPM in order to exercise a user right creates a gap between the goals 
of copyright law and the legislation. It has often been objected, of 
course, that courts cannot fill gaps, unless such gaps are the result of 
a mistake,132 but this is a very strict idea of purposive interpretation 
that does not accord with judicial practice. In practice, courts 
sometimes refer to a principle, which best fits and explains the 
existing law, as a kind of law.133 A (technological) disconnection is 
a gap that exists between the legislation and its purpose resulting 
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from a change in technology (or a misunderstanding of its 
implications during enactment) that undermines the ability of the 
provisions of an act to attain its objective.134 In ESA, the principle 
of technological neutrality was applied so as to “reconnect” the 
Copyright Act to its purpose.135 
The more difficult case is where a particular user right is explicitly 
subject to the user not circumventing a TPM to exercise it, such as 
the case with the right to reproduce for private purposes.136 In such 
a case, while there is no right to make a reproduction for a private 
purpose per se (and so no inconsistency with a digital prohibition in 
a DRM system), there is a conflict between the aim of the Copyright 
Act and the aim of the circumvention prohibition (which is to enable 
private actors to create private digital rules embodied in technology 
for their own benefit). An effective rule of law would empower 
courts to further the purpose of the Copyright Act when the effect 
of the circumvention prohibition is to undermine the purpose of the 
Copyright Act. Some might still object that courts have no business 
making law, but the answer is that courts would merely be engaged 
in interpreting and applying the rule of law. The rule of law is a legal 
principle that is contained in the Charter, an act of Parliament. Of 
course, judicial review might force Parliament’s hand to explicitly 
change the purpose of the Copyright Act to accord with the goals of 
the TPM provisions, but as long as it does not, an effective rule of law 
would require judicial action.137
Vii: Conclusion
This chapter argued that the new principle of technological neutrality 
is an interpretive rule that regulates competition between incumbent 
and new disseminators and, thereby, aims to further the goals of 
the Copyright Act. The principle of technological neutrality requires 
that copyrights are to be interpreted so that incumbent and new 
disseminators are treated equally, unless otherwise provided by 
Parliament. This principle of legislative interpretation is grounded by 
the Supreme Court in the principle that the author’s incentive must 
efficiently further the public’s interest in dissemination. The problem 
that this chapter identified is that while, absent Parliamentary intent 
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to the contrary, disseminators must be treated equally by copyright, 
Parliament has intervened to create a prohibition against circumventing 
TPMs, which can be used to treat disseminators unequally. These 
provisions permit copyright owners to define digital access rights 
as they please, privileging themselves as disseminators over rival 
disseminators. The lack of digital user rights as well as a general 
permission to circumvent TPMs for lawful purposes creates a conflict 
between copyright’s purpose and the purpose of the prohibition. It 
was suggested that an effective rule of law would empower courts to 
create a remedy where the effect of the circumvention prohibition is 
to undermine the purpose of the Copyright Act.
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Canadian copyright law evolved more in 2012 than in any other year 
in recent memory. Parliament substantially amended the Copyright 
Act, and the Supreme Court of Canada decided a quintet of landmark 
copyright cases.2 This chapter addresses the issue of copyright royalty 
stacking, connecting recent developments with broader legal and 
economic principles.
By copyright royalty stacking, I mean the layering of multiple 
payments for permission—through a certified tariff, collective blanket 
licence or individual contract—to use copyright-protected subject 
matter. Stacking is related to, but different than, the fragmentation 
of copyright through legislative changes, court decisions or licensing 
transactions. Fragmentation may or may not lead to royalty stacking; 
royalty stacking depends more directly on market structures than 
legal rights, although one does influence the other. Moreover, royalty 
stacking may result not only from the fragmentation of copyrights, 
but also from the multiplication of rights holders, through new 
neighbouring rights or paracopyright protections for technological 
measures. While the term “royalty stacking” may have pejorative 
 11
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connotations, I use it neutrally in this chapter to describe a phenomenon 
commonly encountered in copyright licensing transactions. Normative 
conclusions about royalty stacking are based on underlying legal and 
economic principles, not the phenomenon per se.
My legal analysis of key Supreme Court decisions and 
amendments to the Copyright Act interpreted in light of the copyright 
quintet indicates that Canadian jurisprudential developments 
will probably reduce copyright royalty stacking. The potential 
implications discussed in this chapter are substantial. Changes in 
Canadian copyright law could reduce royalties flowing to or through 
certain collective management organizations in the foreseeable 
future. However, according to established economic theory, a more 
streamlined system of copyright licensing would increase certainty 
and reduce transaction costs, thereby growing the market for 
copyright-protected content. In the long run, this would lead to more 
commercial opportunities for entrepreneurial upstarts seeking to 
establish new businesses offering innovative products and services 
in creative industries, more choices for consumers in the legal 
market for creative content and, ultimately, more money for creators 
individually and in the aggregate. While only time will tell if legal 
economic theory will prove true in practice, aspects of the copyright 
quintet and statutory reforms that reduce royalty stacking set up a 
conceptually sound structural framework for continued economic 
development of Canadian cultural industries.
I begin this chapter by defining the concept of copyright royalty 
stacking, setting out core features and practical examples of this 
phenomenon. Next, I analyze aspects of the Supreme Court’s recent 
decisions that are directly or indirectly relevant to copyright royalty 
stacking, and synthesize implications in the historical context of 
Canadian copyright law and in light of very recent legislative reforms. 
Royalty stacking is related to several basic theoretical problems with 
property rights, including intellectual property rights, which become 
apparent in this chapter through the lens of law and economics. 
After explaining the theoretical implications of unstacking copyright 
royalties, I conclude the chapter by examining ongoing developments 
at the Copyright Board of Canada, the quasi-judicial tribunal 
addressing royalty stacking most immediately and directly.
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What is Copyright Royalty stacking?
To understand copyright royalty stacking, one must understand the 
complex structure of copyright protection: What subject matter is 
protected, and how? Authors’ original works are the conceptual core 
of copyright-protected subject matter.3 Rights also exist in subject 
matter related to original works, such as performances, recordings 
or broadcasts. Music offers a practical and prevalent example. What 
a layperson hears as a “song” on the radio is to a copyright lawyer 
a package of four separately protected elements: (1) a musical work, 
including the composition and often lyrics; (2) a performance of the 
work by a singer and/or a band; (3) a recording of the performance 
of the work, recorded usually in a studio but sometimes at an 
event; and (4) a broadcast of the recording of the performance of 
the work. Copyright and related rights, also called neighbouring 
rights, are layered around one another, as shown in Figure 1. 
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The work, performance, recording and broadcast are each 
protected separately, and often licensed separately, despite the 
fact that the same person or legal entity could control the rights to 
each. For instance, a singer/songwriter could own both the author’s 
copyrights in the musical work and the performer’s related rights in 
the performance. Or, the singer/songwriter could assign copyright 
to a music publishing company affiliated with or controlled by the 
record company that owns the related rights in the recording of the 
work performed.
In a digital context, an additional layer of legal rights may also 
protect technological protection measures (TPMs) that control access 
to or copying of works and other subject matter, or information used 
to manage rights.4 Notably, these rights typically belong not to the 
author or performer, but to the record producer, broadcaster, retailer 
or other distributor that applies the TPM to the work or related 
subject matter. Geo-fencing technologies that prevent music from 
being streamed or purchased outside of certain jurisdictions, applied 
by services such as Pandora or Spotify or retailers like Apple iTunes, 
are good examples. 
Through a progressive series of international treaties, countries 
have agreed to create laws that protect works with copyright,5 other 
subject matter with related rights,6 and technologies applied to both 
works and related subject matter with prohibitions on circumvention 
and tampering. Consequently, Canada’s Copyright Act establishes 
protection for works in section 3; related rights in sections 15 
(performances), 18 (sound recordings) and 21 (communication 
signals); and technological measures and management information 
in newly amended sections 41.1 to 41.21.7
That explains what is protected, and by implication who is 
protected—the owners of works and related subject matter. How are 
they protected? Copyright is usually understood to consist of a bundle 
of rights. In conventional property discourse, the bundle of rights 
metaphor captures multiple and various incidents of ownership, 
including, among other things, use rights and transferability.8 Other 
kinds of intellectual property rights focus protection especially on 
“use.”9 Copyright, by contrast, is not framed around the right to use 
a work or other subject matter. Rather, use rights are subdivided into
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several categories. The precise contours of these categories vary from 
country to country, but basically follow four general themes: (1) the 
right to copy; (2) the right to perform live or transmit technologically; 
(3) the right to physically or electronically distribute copies; and (4) 
the right to adapt, derive or transform, as shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2. Taxonomy of protected rights
While not every enumerated right in every country aligns 
perfectly with this thematic classification scheme, and leaving aside 
the complex categorization of moral rights, these themes generally 
correspond to different methods of extracting economic value from a 
work or other protected subject matter. A musical work, for example, 
may be produced and sold as sheet music, which constitutes copying 
and distribution; made into a sound recording, which is usually 
understood as a copy, which is then distributed for sale, or rented 
out, which is also a form of distribution; performed live in concert 
or via broadcast, cable or Internet transmission, each of which are 
kinds of performances; translated into other languages or rearranged 
for different instruments or musical styles, which are examples of 
adaptation; or synchronized with other audiovisual content such 
as a television program, advertising commercial or motion picture. 
My examples here are not exhaustive or categorical, but rather are 
illustrative of the application of various aspects of copyright and 
related rights to particular activities. How precisely these rights and 
uses should and do align is one of the central issues with copyright 
royalty stacking.
Not every right holder is granted every one of these protections, 







340   |   THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY
musical composition and lyrics) has the exclusive right to use that 
work in all of the ways listed above. An owner of related rights in a 
performance, recording or broadcast does not necessarily have all of 
the same rights. And the related rights the owner does have may not 
be exclusive rights to prevent others from using their subject matter, 
as a copyright owner could, but rather, rights to receive remuneration 
if and when their subject matter is used.10
So, in Canada, for example,11 an owner of copyright in a work has 
under section 3 of the Copyright Act the sole right to copy (produce 
or reproduce) the work, to perform (or communicate or exhibit) the 
work, and to adapt (or translate or convert) the work. The owner 
of related rights in a performance or recording, by contrast, has, 
among other things, the sole right under sections 15 and 18 to copy 
the recorded performance,12 but under section 19, the right only to 
receive equitable remuneration for a performance or communication. 
In effect, performers and record makers can prohibit others from 
copying recorded performances without an individual licence, but 
cannot prohibit others from broadcasting recorded performances; 
they can only claim equitable remuneration for broadcasting music 
through a Copyright Board–certified tariff. Whether a performer or 
record maker could prohibit or merely claim remuneration for the 
transmission of a recorded performance via the Internet would de- 
pend on whether Internet transmission involves copying, 
communicating or both—that is the kind of practical question that 
my analysis of copyright royalty stacking in this chapter helps answer.
The issue with copyright royalty stacking starts to become clear 
when one combines the many different elements of protected subject 
matter—a musical work, performance, recording and broadcast, for 
example—with the many different rights protected in some or all of 
those elements—copying, performance, distribution, adaptation and 
potentially more. To “use” a “song” could require a dozen licensing 
transactions, perhaps more if there are jurisdictional, temporal or 
technological complexities.
Matters are even more complicated by the various systems 
a prospective licensee might need to navigate in order to obtain 
permission. Some rights are administered collectively, while others 
are dealt with individually. Most collective societies represent a 
majority of rights holders in their respective domains (authors, 
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performers, record makers or broadcasters, for example), but 
none represent 100 percent of available repertoire. So a mixture of 
collective and individual licensing is almost always necessary. Some 
collectively administered rights require payment of a tariff certified 
by the Copyright Board of Canada, while others require payment or 
negotiation with a particular collective society. And furthermore, the 
collective societies that a prospective licensee must deal with are not 
always the same in Quebec and the rest of Canada. Table 1 presents 
a simplified example of the licensing requirements for most English-
language music in Canada, excluding Quebec. 
Table 1: Simplified matrix of protected subject matter and rights
* Canadian Musical Reproduction Rights Agency
** Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada
*** Audio-Video Licensing Agency
Which royalty payments are required would depend on the 
prospective licensee’s precise activities. The more rights holders from 
whom permission is required or to whom compensation must be 
paid, and the more rights belonging to each rights holder that are 
implicated by a prospective licensee’s activities, the more complex 
and costly the transactions and the activities become. And whether 
payment of a tariff or a licensing transaction with a collective society 
listed in the Table is sufficient for a licensee depends on that collective’s 
repertoire, which is never exhaustive.
Copy Perform Distribute adapt
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Not every user of music would require copyright clearance for 
every right or rights holder referenced in Table 1. But some would. 
Websites that host and transmit remixed user-generated content, for 
instance, could have especially complex licensing requirements. The 
key question for copyright policy makers and practitioners is not 
which services currently exist that require all of the above copyright 
clearances, but rather, which innovative new services do not exist 
now but might emerge if copyright systems were simpler. 
Copyright royalty stacking is the layering of payments for 
permission—through a certified tariff, collective blanket licence or 
individual contract—to use copyright-protected subject matter. While 
the system that enables copyright royalty stacking may seem, on first 
impression, inherently problematic, the normative implications of 
this issue are complex.
Permission or payment requirements to different parties for 
different things are understandable. Even though a song on the radio 
may not be perceived as a separate work, performance, recording 
and broadcast, many people can appreciate the value of these distinct 
contributions. The practical challenges are coordinating and pricing 
the licensing transactions that are part of the value-added supply 
chain from creators to consumers.
Some royalty stacking is caused by the fragmentation of copyrights 
into sub-components that can be licensed separately, based on the 
territorial, commercial, technological or other demands of licensees. 
In many contexts, licensees first demanded such fragmentation.13 For 
example, a licensee may not want to pay for worldwide rights when 
they do business only in one country, or pay to put sound recordings on 
the Internet when their business is selling only lyrics or musical scores, 
or pay to transmit content when their business is based on storage 
alone, and so on. Many of SOCAN’s tariffs are structured to meet users’ 
demands, while mechanical licences are issued separately because that 
is what licensees had required.14 In this way, fragmentation facilitates 
the efficient market exploitation of protected content.15
Prospective licensees’ practical problem is that the way markets 
were structured to respond to past licensing demands may no longer 
be suited to modern technological or commercial circumstances, 
which licensees say is inconvenient. Their principled objection to 
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copyright royalty stacking is that, in some cases, owners’ rights now 
seem redundant—multiple payments are occasionally routed through 
different intermediaries to the same party for the same activity, which 
licensees say is unfair. 
Copyright owners’ basic justification for royalty stacking is that 
what might seem at first glance like redundant payments are actually 
not; ostensibly overlapping payments are required not for the same 
use of the protected subject matter, but for different uses. For instance, 
radio broadcasters argue that they simply use music, and should 
accordingly pay once for this single input. Rights holders claim, to the 
contrary, that radio broadcasters’ standard practices constitute both 
reproduction and communication—not just use—of musical works, 
performances and sound recordings, and that multiple payments to 
multiple parties are therefore warranted. 
Legislative reforms discussed below have a major impact on that 
specific issue, and similar conceptual arguments were at the heart 
of several of the cases in the Supreme Court quintet. These cases 
provide useful practical examples to further explore the theoretical 
and practical aspects of copyright royalty stacking.
interpreting the Copyright Quintet and statutory Reforms
There are many ways to interpret and analyze the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s 2012 copyright quintet. Some scholars have seized upon the 
principle of technological neutrality, which influenced the Court’s 
decisions in at least two of the cases.16 Some have emphasized the 
Court’s unequivocal endorsement of users’ rights, which were at 
the heart of another two of the five cases.17 Some have assessed the 
impact of the Court’s decisions on the collective administration of 
copyright.18 And some have focused on issues of administrative law, 
specifically the standard of judicial review.19
selling and streaming Music Online
The Context of Tariff 22
Considerable historical context is required to fully appreciate the 
companion cases ESA and Rogers. While that history is probably 
worthy of its own book, this chapter introduces only the basics. These 
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cases are the latest episodes in the long and winding saga of SOCAN’s 
Tariff 22, which seeks to establish royalties for the communication 
of music via the Internet. SOCAN is the collective society that 
administers the performing rights of composers, authors and music 
publishers in Canada, including their rights to communicate musical 
works to the public by telecommunication. 
SOCAN first proposed Tariff 22 in 1996, applying to the Copyright 
Board of Canada for certification of a tariff targeting Internet 
service providers (ISPs), which SOCAN alleged were involved in 
communicating works to the public in Canada and/or authorizing 
their subscribers’ communications. The Copyright Board divided its 
proceedings into two phases, dealing with purely legal issues first. 
Among other things, the Board decided that the passive transmission 
of digital content via the Internet would not trigger application of 
the proposed tariff because such action neither communicated nor 
authorized communication of SOCAN’s repertoire.20 The Federal 
Court of Appeal affirmed most but not all of the decision of the 
Board.21 On the main issue of copyright liability, the Supreme Court 
of Canada agreed with the Board’s original ruling that ISPs are not 
liable to pay a tariff when they act as neutral intermediaries.22
Following the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision, SOCAN asked 
the Board to certify a revised Tariff 22. Like everything else on the 
Internet, online music transmissions had changed dramatically 
during the years since SOCAN’s original proposal. Walled gardens 
of content like America Online became less popular; few Internet 
subscribers hosted music on their ISP’s servers, preferring peer-to-
peer file sharing; and the World Wide Web became a platform for new 
music sites such as MySpace. Many other personal and commercial 
websites began to include background music, traditional broadcasters 
began simulcasting, and new companies sold subscriptions to music 
streaming services. The most profound change came via Apple’s 
iTunes music store, which has quickly become the digital substitute 
for traditional record retailers. 
SOCAN’s restructured tariff proposal tracked commercial and 
technological developments. Proceedings before the Copyright 
Board were bifurcated to deal separately with Tariff 22.A and 22.B-G, 
backdated to the period of 1996 to 2006. Tariff 22.A proposed to target 
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online music services that stream or sell copies of music;23 Tariff 22.B-G 
proposed to target websites that use music in other ways, including 
Internet simulcasting and video gaming.24
The reason that the tariffs and corresponding Board decisions 
were divided this way is at least indirectly related to copyright royalty 
stacking. CMRRA and SODRAC are the collecting societies that 
administer reproduction rights in musical works in Canada and 
Québec. Through a joint venture, CMRRA/SODRAC Inc. (CSI), 
these collectives filed a tariff targeting many of the same online music 
services as SOCAN’s Tariff 22.A—companies that stream or sell 
copies of digital music via the Internet. In 2007, the Board certified 
CSI’s first “Online Music Services” tariff.25 Perhaps because of interim 
agreements that had been negotiated between the collectives and 
services already operating in Canada, including Apple, there was no 
apparent disagreement among the parties before the Copyright Board 
about the legal requirement to pay royalties for reproducing musical 
works as part of streaming or sales transactions.26
When, in 2007, the Board also certified SOCAN’s corresponding 
Tariff 22.A, it addressed several important legal questions. Among 
them was the issue of royalty stacking that would eventually reach 
the Supreme Court of Canada.27 (Whether previews of music offered 
for sale online are fair dealing for the purpose of consumer research 
was also addressed at this point in the decision.28) Objectors argued 
that transmissions of music from online music services are not 
communications, and if they are communications, are not to the 
public, so fall outside the scope of the rights SOCAN administers. For 
reasons discussed later in this chapter, the Copyright Board rejected 
the objectors’ arguments and certified Tariff 22.A.29  
With that decision, it became clear that online music services 
selling subscription services or digital downloads were required to 
pay CSI for the right to reproduce musical works and SOCAN for the 
right to communicate those works to the public. This arrangement 
resulted in precisely the kind of copyright royalty stacking described 
in the first part of this chapter, since both SOCAN and CSI represent 
authors, composers or music publishers to whom copyright has been 
assigned. Table 1, above, shows the rights at issue in the two left 
columns of the first row.
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In effect, based on these tariffs, licensees argued they would pay 
the same creator twice, through different collective societies, to use 
the same copyright-protected work. The ostensible justification for 
that arrangement was that the same licensee is “using” the same 
work differently, both copying and communicating it, for which the 
Copyright Act requires separate payments. The Board wrote:
SOCAN members are not double dipping. The 
communication and reproduction rights are separate 
rights, often owned by separate persons, administered 
through separate channels and subject to separate 
regimes. The person who copies a work to effect a 
broadcast of that work “commits two torts” and should 
pay for both acts. The same should hold true when the 
sequence is inversed and someone communicates a work 
to a member of the public with a view to providing that 
person with a copy of the work.30
When the Board dealt a year later with SOCAN Tariff 22.B-G, 
it implicitly applied the same legal reasoning to certify a tariff for 
online simulcasting by radio and television broadcasters, and for 
audio content transmitted by other websites, including websites for 
downloading or playing video games.31
Applications for judicial review of the Board’s decisions in both 
Tariff 22 cases were practically inevitable; it is standard for Copyright 
Board proceedings. Procedurally, the Copyright Board’s certification of 
Tariff 22.A gave rise to the Rogers case in the Supreme Court, while its 
certification of Tariff 22.B-G triggered the ESA case. But because the 
Board’s 2007 decision on Tariff 22.A laid the legal foundation for both 
certified tariffs, only its reasons in that case were formally reviewed. 
Also, even though the Board had reached its decisions over a year apart, 
the Federal Court of Appeal dealt with both applications simultan- 
eously. In both Bell Canada et al. v SOCAN (which became the Rogers 
case in the Supreme Court)32 and Entertainment Software Association 
v Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada,33 the 
Court of Appeal upheld the Copyright Board’s decision. 
To appreciate why the Federal Court of Appeal agreed with the 
royalty stacking arrangements established at the Copyright Board, 
JEREMY DE BEER   |   347
it is necessary to mention another case that was decided around 
the same time as the Board’s Tariff 22 cases: Canadian Wireless 
Telecommunications Association v SOCAN.34 In that 2008 decision, 
the Federal Court of Appeal considered whether the Board correctly 
certified SOCAN’s tariff for the communication of ringtones from 
mobile service providers to their subscribers. The Court rejected CWTA’s 
legal argument that transmitting a ringtone does not “communicate” the 
work “to the public”. In doing so, it also rejected the premise on which 
that attempted legal argument rests—that splitting reproduction and 
communication rights in the same work creates double compensation 
of the same copyright owners by the same licensees.35
While the Supreme Court of Canada refused to hear an appeal of 
the CWTA case in 2008,36 it agreed to consider similar royalty stacking 
issues when it granted leave three years later in ESA and Rogers.
supreme Court Consideration of Royalty stacking
The last time the Supreme Court of Canada dealt explicitly with 
copyright royalty stacking was in 1990, in Bishop v Stevens.37 The 
Supreme Court held then that the right to broadcast (perform/
communicate) a work did not include the incidental right to reproduce 
it in preparation for the broadcast. Performance and reproduction, 
the Court explained, “are distinct rights in theory and in practice”.38 
This remark was central to the Copyright Board’s ruling in the 
Tariff 22.A decision, to the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in 
CWTA, and to both the majority and dissenting opinions in ESA. In 
CWTA, the court relied on Bishop v Stevens for the proposition that: 
“the right to reproduce a musical work and the right to communicate 
it to the public by telecommunication are separate statutory rights.”39 
Four days before that case was heard—which is when the Board 
released its reasons for Tariff 22.A—the Board had made much the 
same point: “The communication and reproduction rights are separate 
rights, often owned by separate persons, administered through 
separate channels and subject to separate regimes.”40 This reasoning, 
which has dominated Canadian copyright licensing discourse for 
nearly twenty years, raises two problems.
First, referring to licensing and administration practices is not 
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particularly helpful, because licensing and administration practices 
evolve and adapt to legal interpretations of the underlying rights. Had 
the Court held in Bishop v Stevens that performance and reproduction 
rights are fundamentally similar, licensing practices would probably 
now reflect that understanding through combined collective 
administration of both rights. Since the Court decided the rights are 
distinct, they are now unsurprisingly administered separately.
Moreover, the basic reason that performance and reproduction 
rights have historically been administered separately is because each 
system catered to different kinds of licensees, requiring different 
licences based on the different activities in which licensees engaged. 
Performing rights societies typically licensed establishments where 
music is performed or entities using telecommunications technologies 
to communicate music at a distance. Reproduction rights agencies 
typically licensed companies to make sound recordings or synchronize 
musical works with other audiovisual content, such as films or 
television programs. Each kind of licensee had distinct licensing 
needs, which separate administrative regimes served well. However, 
the bare fact that separate licensing systems exist now is alone an 
insufficient reason to preserve this administrative arrangement if it is 
no longer efficient or otherwise justified.
Second, conceptually, saying that communication and repro- 
duction rights are separate or distinct does not tell us much about 
the scope of either right, except perhaps vis-à-vis the other right. 
Indeed, the distinction highlighted in Bishop v Stevens was invoked 
to support directly contradictory opinions on the communication 
right in the 5-4 split decision in ESA. 
Rothstein J, in dissent, reasoned that a copyright holder is entitled 
to both reproduction and communication royalties in respect of an 
online transmission because these are separate rights. “The fact that 
there are two protected rights,” wrote Rothstein J, “does not restrict 
the protection afforded by each right.”41 He wrote that this answer 
to ESA’s royalty stacking argument was “straightforward”, but the 
majority opinion suggests that the legal reasoning is not so simple.
 Indeed, the majority drew the exact opposite interpretative 
inference from the same principle. Because of the recognized 
separation and distinction between reproduction and performance 
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rights, Abella and Moldaver JJ held that “[p]erforming a work is 
fundamentally different than reproducing it.”42 Interpreting the 
reproduction right to encompass activities traditionally linked to 
the performance right “would result in abandoning the traditional 
distinction in the Act between performance-based rights and rights of 
reproduction.”43 In other words, because these rights are distinct, they 
must cover different activities.
In my view, the majority’s interpretation of the principles described 
in Bishop v Stevens is sensible. That reproduction and communication 
rights are separate and distinct does restrict the protection afforded by 
each right. Each right protects an activity that the other right does not.
However, even accepting that point will not entirely resolve most 
cases. That is, we can say a communication is not a reproduction, 
and a reproduction is not a communication, but beyond that, the 
distinction between the two rights offers little help in defining either 
of them. Defining what is a communication was the heart of the issue 
facing the Supreme Court. 
On that point, basically, the dissenting judges preferred a literal 
interpretation, and the majority of the Court took an historical, 
contextual and purposive perspective. While the dictionary definition 
of communication could suggest that the right covers any transmission 
of information,44 the majority held that such an interpretation would 
be inconsistent with the historical introduction and evolution of 
communication rights in Canada,45 the statutory context of section 
3 and other parts of the Copyright Act,46 and the legislative purpose 
of protecting copyright in a balanced, efficient and technologically 
neutral way.47
The law in Canada is now clearer about what activity is and is 
not a communication. “Internet delivery of copies”48 or “the Internet 
delivery of a permanent copy”49 or a “durable copy”50 is not a 
communication.51 The ESA case ruled out collecting communication 
royalties in these circumstances. “[T]he streaming of files from the 
Internet,” however, is a communication “by online music services 
who make the files available.”52 The Rogers decision states that in 
circumstances where “musical works are indiscriminately made 
available to anyone…requesting the streams…the transmission of 
any file…constitutes communicat[ing] the work to the public by 
telecommunication.”53 Ambiguity remains, however, around the 
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definition of “durable” copies.
Returning to royalty stacking, the principle of separate and 
distinct rights basically converts an issue of legal interpretation into 
a matter of factual application. None of the judges in ESA seemed 
to disagree that there may be circumstances where two licences 
for two separate rights are needed. Rothstein J was explicit that “if 
two protected acts occur without authorization of the copyright 
holder, there are two infringements.”54 The inference that explains 
the majority’s views on royalty stacking is that if one protected act 
occurs, there is one infringement. According to Abella and Moldaver 
JJ’s majority reasons, “Bishop does not stand for the proposition that 
a single activity (i.e., a download) can violate two separate rights 
at the same time.”55 Underlying the decision, therefore, is the clear 
impression that “Internet delivery of copies” constitutes a single 
act, which could implicate either but not both separate and distinct 
reproduction and communication rights.
Unfortunately, both the majority and the minority opinions on 
the relationship between the number of “protected act[s]” and the 
number of infringements are tautological. On either analysis, almost 
everything hinges on the characterization of the “act” in question. 
The central determination that courts or the Copyright Board 
must now make about future royalty stacking cases is whether the 
fundamental nature of a potential infringer or prospective licensee’s 
activity implicates one or more rights.56 The Court did not provide an 
analytical touchstone for characterizing any particular use (or uses) 
as a single activity or multiple distinct activities, but it did offer two 
guiding principles—technological neutrality and economic efficiency.
The principle of technological neutrality does not mean that 
technologically similar activities must always be legally characterized 
the same. Rather, the principle means that essentially similar activities 
involving different technologies should be treated equally. As David 
Vaver put it in a passage quoted by the Supreme Court, “substitute 
delivery systems should compete on their merits: either both or 
neither should pay.”57
So the Board’s statement that “[s]ending a music file over the 
Internet is protected by the Act; sending a music CD in the mail is 
not”58 should have been the question in the case, not the answer. 
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According to the Supreme Court, “there is no practical difference 
between buying a durable copy of the work in a store, receiving a copy 
in the mail, or downloading an identical copy using the Internet. The 
Internet is simply a technological taxi that delivers a durable copy of 
the same work to the end user.”59 The Court therefore overruled the 
Copyright Board’s decision that “Internet transmissions are not just 
another form of delivery.”60
Even Rothstein J, writing for the majority in the Rogers case, held 
that what matters is not the business model but rather the underlying 
activity. “Whether a business chooses to convey copyright protected 
content in a traditional, ‘broadcasting’ type fashion, or opts for newer 
approaches based on consumer choice and convenience, the end result 
is the same.”61 He made this remark to equate on-demand streaming 
with conventional broadcasting activities, but his emphasis on practical 
results, rather than technical processes, is perfectly consistent with the 
majority’s decision in ESA, despite his dissent in that case.
So the Copyright Board’s finding of fact that a “download” 
and a “stream” are technologically similar transmissions, except 
for their relative permanence, does not mean that they have the 
same essential character and, therefore, legal implications. And the 
judgments in ESA and Rogers are easily reconcilable because, as it 
was put in arguments: “The sale and transmission of a work from 
an online retailer is, essentially, like the sale and conveyance of 
physical media from a conventional retailer. The transmission of a 
stream from a webcaster is, however, essentially like the transmission 
of a signal from a conventional broadcaster.”62 The Supreme Court 
accepted this argument, writing: “Although a download and a 
stream are both ‘transmissions’ in technical terms…they are not 
both ‘communications’ for purposes of the Copyright Act. … Unlike 
a download, the experience of a stream is much more akin to a 
broadcast or performance.”63
The key to determining which activities implicate which rights is 
assessing the essential character of the impugned use. Is the essential 
character of the use akin to a traditional performance, or is it more 
like conventional copying? Answering that question will help to 
resolve the issue of which rights apply. Analytically, the exercise 
seems similar to the process of characterizing the pith and substance 
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of impugned legislation when assessing the validity of legislation 
within Canada’s constitutional division of powers. Such reasoning is 
not entirely foreign to contemporary thinking about other intellectual 
property issues.64
The second principle relied on by the Supreme Court in 
characterizing the essence of ESA’s activities—economic efficiency—
received relatively less attention. Though undoubtedly important, it 
was touched upon only briefly in the Supreme Court’s reasons in ESA, 
citing the work of Professor Katz: “When a single economic activity 
implicates more than one type of right and each type is administered 
by a separate collective, the multiplicity of licences required can 
lead to inefficiency.”65 In support of the Supreme Court’s judgment, 
and to guide decision makers applying its principles in the future, 
later sections of this chapter elaborate on the economic theoretical 
implications of royalty stacking.
stacking Rights in Movie soundtracks
Before examining conceptual issues around legal coherence and 
economic efficiency, it is worth highlighting one other case from the 
Supreme Court’s quintet that implicated copyright royalty stacking: 
Re:Sound v MPTAC.66 This case was ostensibly about statutory 
interpretation, like ESA and Rogers, but in a broader context, it raised 
a potential royalty stacking problem.
Re:Sound Music Licensing Company (Re:Sound) is a collective 
society administering the neighbouring rights of performers and 
record makers. It plays roughly the equivalent of SOCAN’s role for 
authors of musical works, administering performing/communication 
rights but not reproduction rights. Unlike authors, however, 
performers and record makers do not have the exclusive right to 
communicate their protected subject matter to the public. The 
way that performers and record makers get paid for performance/
communication rights in Canada is through a Copyright Board tariff 
certifying “equitable remuneration.”67
A growing number of tariffs have been certified by the Copyright 
Board, establishing equitable remuneration for playing sound 
recordings on radio; during dances and fitness classes; at bars, festivals, 
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parks, parades and similar places; and more. The two tariffs at issue 
before the Supreme Court in 2012 claimed equitable remuneration 
for the performance/communication of the recorded music in movie 
soundtracks when movies are played in a theatre or on television. 
Theatre operators and television broadcasters objected, on the 
grounds that movie soundtracks are specifically excluded from the 
Copyright Act’s definition of a “sound recording,” which is what 
Re:Sound members own. While this legal technicality provided the 
basis for arguments and the bulk of the Supreme Court’s judgment, 
another of the objectors’ underlying concerns was that they already 
pay for the recorded music in movie soundtracks when they negotiate 
contracts to exhibit or broadcast the entire movie. 
A common entertainment industry practice is for movie 
producers, music performers and record makers68 to individually 
agree on the royalties to be paid for so-called synchronization rights, 
such as the right to put music in a movie soundtrack.69 These may 
be “bare synchronization” agreements, or “through-to-the-viewer” 
licences, which, as the label suggests, clears rights for the production 
as well as downstream uses. Licences may provide for upfront buyouts, 
or contain clauses setting out the residual royalties that will be paid to 
various parties involved in making the movie, including sometimes 
the soundtrack, when the movie is later exhibited, broadcast or 
franchised into sequels, merchandise, amusement park rides and 
various other spin-offs. Objectors’ alleged that enabling Re:Sound’s 
members to negotiate payment terms and conditions up front, when 
movies are made, and then collect more remuneration later, when 
movies are exhibited or broadcast, would be double dipping.
That explanation is among the most plausible reasons why 
Parliament defined a “sound recording” to exclude “any soundtrack of 
a cinematographic work where it accompanies the cinematographic 
work.”70 Performers and record makers would get paid when 
soundtracks are played separately from the movie, but not when they 
are packaged together.
The Supreme Court did not discuss the contextual problem of 
royalty stacking, preferring to base its decision on the plain language 
of the statute. But the case nonetheless provides an excellent example 
of the structural features of copyright protection that make royalty 
354   |   THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY
stacking a challenge. Unlike ESA and Rogers, which presented royalty 
stacking problems involving separate and distinct rights of authors 
of musical works—reproduction and communication—Re:Sound 
involved the potential stacking of collectively administered equitable 
remuneration rights on top of individually negotiated licensing 
contracts. Given that theatre operators and television broadcasters do 
pay royalties for the performance/communication rights of authors 
of musical works (despite similar pre-clearance procedures), the 
Re:Sound case also illustrates the potential complexities of layering 
additional protection for neighbouring rights holders.
The implications of Unstacking
Earlier in this chapter I explained how different categories of 
copyrights and related rights generally correspond to different 
methods of extracting economic value from a work or other protected 
subject matter. More accurately, these rights evolved as changing 
technological capabilities and consumer behaviours led to new 
business models exploiting content, and lawmakers responded with 
corresponding protection through new rights. Whether and how 
evolving copyrights and related rights align with the realities of new 
technologies, behaviours and business models is one of the central 
issues around copyright royalty stacking that this chapter addresses.
Royalty stacking is not always, on a balance, unjustified. 
Indeed, there are some good reasons why royalty stacking might be 
permitted. The arguments made to the Supreme Court in ESA and 
Rogers were, basically, that the plain language of the statute suggests 
that any transmission of information is a communication, and 
that this is appropriate because that is the way Canadian copyright 
administration and Copyright Board tariffs have been structured in 
practice. Those arguments are unconvincing.
A much better point, which was not clearly articulated to the 
Court, could have been that the creators of musical works should 
fairly share in the economic benefits of technological progress that 
enables prospective licensees to communicate protected content 
more cheaply; that the demand for content contributes directly to the 
economic success of telecommunications companies and supports
their cost-saving delivery systems. This principle might explain 
JEREMY DE BEER   |   355
why the communication right would cover digital but not physical 
distribution. Such arguments would not automatically win the 
matter, but they would be a consideration against which to balance 
counterarguments about legal coherence and economic efficiency.
The main complaints about copyright royalty stacking are that 
it adds costs and complicates transactions. Adding costs is not a 
policy problem per se; if those costs are justified on a principled basis, 
imposing them simply transfers wealth from one party to another. 
Moreover, as Rothstein J correctly reasoned in dissent in ESA, the 
Copyright Board can mitigate the impact of royalty costs on licensees 
by setting reasonable total combined rates.71
Transactional inefficiencies, uncertainties and complications 
are more serious challenges, however. These can undermine 
functioning of the market for copyright-protected content, inhibit 
the introduction of innovative products and services, and cause 
economic losses to all parties involved. To understand how, we can 
consider the fundamental economic theories underlying all property 
rights, including intellectual property rights.
Judge Richard Posner, a godfather of law and economics 
scholarship, points out that property law is most efficient when rights 
are exclusive, universal and transferable.72 The last of these features is 
most relevant to royalty stacking. In an enormously influential and 
widely cited article, economist Ronald Coase explained how, in a 
world without transaction costs, rights will be exchanged in markets 
that efficiently allocate entitlements to those who value them the 
most.73 This concept is central to welfare economics, and a primary 
reason that people believe intellectual property protection is capable 
of driving economic growth.
Although rarely articulated as such, the Coase theorem 
underpins the utilitarian concept of intellectual property rights 
as incentives. Intellectual property provides incentives to invest 
time, effort and money into intellectual endeavours because rights 
can be exploited in the market to make profit. Take away market 
transactions and you are left with a purely psychological theory of 
incentives or deontological theory of intellectual property protection. 
 Since Coase’s path-breaking article was published in 1960, scholars 
have sought to better understand the factors that interfere with efficient 
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bargaining. One such factor is the fragmentation and/or layering of 
rights—the conceptual issue at the heart of ESA, Rogers and Re:Sound. 
Michael Heller identified the problem of property fragmentation in 
a seminal article published in the Harvard Law Review in 1998.74 
He called this the “tragedy of the anticommons,” mirroring Garrett 
Hardin’s famous parable of the “tragedy of the commons” that had 
been published forty years earlier.75 Hardin initially presented private 
property rights as a solution to the tragic overuse of resources that 
would occur in a world of open access. Heller did not dispute Hardin’s 
claim, but countered that private property can also be a problem. Too 
much property is as inefficient as too little.
He and Rebecca Eisenberg applied this insight to intellectual 
property rights specifically: “In theory,” they wrote, “in a world 
of costless transactions, people could always avoid commons or 
anticommons tragedies by trading their rights. In practice, however, 
avoiding tragedy requires overcoming transaction costs…. Once an 
anticommons emerges, collecting rights into useable private property 
is often brutal and slow.”76 This phenomenon has also been discussed 
as a “thicket, a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights 
that a company must hack its way through in order to actually 
commercialize new technology.”77 Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro 
have also studied the interconnected problems of patent holdups and 
royalty stacking when a patent covers one important component of a 
complex product.78
Thickets are not just a patent problem; such concerns apply 
to copyright as well. Daniel Gervais and Alana Maurushat 
have described, for example, the fragmentation of collectively 
administered copyright in Canada, explaining how “the rights 
contained in section 3 are no longer useful in mapping out the real 
world.”79 While their focus is on the practical rather than theoretical 
problems of fragmentation, they effectively highlight the complexities 
of copyright licensing transactions.
The Supreme Court has also acknowledged that too much copyright 
protection can cause adverse consequences, ruling in Théberge: “In 
crassly economic terms it would be as inefficient to overcompensate 
artists and authors for the right of reproduction as it would be self-
defeating to undercompensate them.”80 While the Supreme Court did 
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not elaborate in Théberge on the reasons that overcompensation is 
inefficient, which may be related to transaction costs or other factors, 
in ESA it took an important step toward a legal interpretation of the 
Copyright Act that slightly reduces royalty stacking.
One argument to counter concerns over transaction costs is 
that the licensing needs in ESA and Rogers were actually not all that 
complicated. The only question was whether licensees had to pay one 
tariff or two. In fact, ESA’s members might not have paid any tariff, 
if they pre-cleared the entire bundle of rights through pure buyouts, 
as is sometimes done in the film and television industries. One could 
also argue that combining tariff-setting procedures helped mitigate 
the burdens of participating in Copyright Board hearings. That 
reasoning, however, would overlook other aspects of the copyright 
anticommons problem.
Just paying two tariffs is not enough to legally operate an online 
music service in Canada. The two tariffs in question would have 
covered only authors/owners’ rights in musical works; they would not 
have provided licences to reproduce or communicate neighbouring 
rights holders’ performances or sound recordings. Those reproduction 
rights must mostly be negotiated directly with record companies, 
while remuneration for communicating sound recordings may be 
the subject of another tariff scheme. In such deals, the costs of legal 
advice and licensing transactions are not the only concerns. These 
are compounded by a potential holdout problem—even if an online 
music service provider pays the certified tariffs covering musical 
works, any particular copyright owner could withhold permission to 
use its performances and sound recordings.
Another counterargument that suggests royalty stacking is not 
inappropriate is the explicit statutory recognition in subsection 
13(4) that rights holders may carve up copyrights in any manner 
they please: “The owner of the copyright in any work may assign the 
right, either wholly or partially, and either generally or subject to 
limitations relating to territory, medium or sector of the market or 
other limitations relating to the scope of the assignment, and either for 
the whole term of the copyright or for any other part thereof, and may 
grant any interest in the right by licence…”. However, it is important 
to distinguish particular licensing practices from established legal 
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rights. Although contracts might contain a wide variety of unique 
clauses on payments or permissions, courts need not compound the 
legal complexity by reinforcing the fragmentation of copyrights.
In real property law, the notion that rights should not be 
fragmented beyond a stable set of fixed entitlements is known as the 
numerus clausus principle. Its origins lie in the civil law system, but 
the label has also been applied to similar common law concepts.81 As 
applied in the well-known case of Keppell v Bailey, the principle holds 
that private parties cannot through property transactions or licensing 
practices create new incidents of ownership.82 Parties may generally 
structure contractual relationships however they wish, but cannot by 
doing so transform the nature of the underlying property rights vis-
à-vis third parties.
Merrill and Smith note that the numerus clausus principle 
applies not only to real property, but is also reflected in other areas 
of property law, including intellectual property.83 They remark that 
the numerus clausus is “an extremely important qualification on the 
principle of freedom of contract—a principle widely regarded by 
law-and-economics scholars as promoting the efficient allocation 
of resources”.84 It is particularly useful for limiting adverse effects of 
excessive fragmentation, i.e. an anticommons.85 While Merrill and 
Smith’s work centres on the limited forms that intellectual property 
rights in general may take, other scholars have explained how the 
same principles should prevent fragmentation within intellectual 
property rights, such as copyrights.86 The concept has been applied 
most specifically to digital copyright cases.
The numerus clausus serves several important functions required 
equally, if not more, for intellectual property than for real property. It 
facilitates transferability of rights, increases certainty of transactions, 
aids identification of owners, and more. Bruce Ziff points to another 
rationale for the numerus clausus principle: “[I]mpediments to 
the termination of property rights suggests the need for caution in 
their initial recognition, because doctrinal mistakes cannot easily 
be corrected.”87 In other words, once a new right is recognized, it is 
very difficult to reverse. The one-way ratchet of intellectual property 
measures that fragment existing rights or add new ones is a well-
documented problem.88 Courts should be reluctant to contribute to 
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this phenomenon by recognizing new fragments of copyright.
So, based on the numerus clausus principle, even if it is true that the 
Copyright Act permits owners to structure licensing and administration 
in creative ways, it does not follow that courts should recognize such 
arrangements as creating or reinforcing legal entitlements. This 
reasoning supports the Supreme Court decision in ESA, even though 
the Court did not discuss such theories. In sum, based on the well-
established economic theories underpinning copyright and other 
property rights generally, the Supreme Court was right to be wary of 
an interpretation of authors’ reproduction and performance rights that 
could compound the problem of copyright royalty stacking.
The final section of this chapter considers the early impact of the 
Supreme Court rulings in practice, and the potential significance of 
statutory reforms that have or soon will come into effect in Canada.
statutory “Modernization” and early impacts in Practice
The immediate aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decisions in ESA 
and Rogers was a Copyright Board decision certifying SOCAN Tariff 
22.A for the years 2007 to 2010, covering only online music services 
that stream music, not services that distribute copies.89 SOCAN is 
not entitled to collect performance/communication royalties from 
companies that distribute copies. 
It does not necessarily follow from the Supreme Court decisions 
that reproduction royalties cannot be collected from companies that 
stream songs. The factual question would be whether online music 
services that stream musical works are engaged in one activity or two. 
Copying digital files and storing them on computer services might 
seem like a separate and distinct activity from streaming, and hence 
trigger multiple royalty payment obligations. This scenario is almost 
exactly like that in Bishop v Stevens, where the Supreme Court ruled 
that both reproduction and performance royalties were payable. 
Nevertheless, reproduction tariffs purporting to cover online music 
streaming will almost certainly be challenged before the Copyright 
Board, likely leading to a judicial review of this issue by the Federal 
Court of Appeal in coming years.
The Board has also indicated that it is interested in hearing 
360   |   THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY
arguments about the impact of the Supreme Court’s decisions on 
applicable tariffs for satellite radio transmissions—presumably 
contemplating whether one or both of the performance and 
reproduction rights are implicated in that context.
Statutory reforms will complicate these analyses. In Bill C-11, the 
Government of Canada introduced a provision governing “temporary 
reproductions”:
30.71 It is not an infringement of copyright to make a 
reproduction of a work or other subject-matter if:
(a) the reproduction forms an essential part of a 
technological process;
(b) the reproduction’s only purpose is to facilitate a use 
that is not an infringement of copyright; and
(c) the reproduction exists only for the duration of the 
technological process.
It is easy to imagine a convincing argument that reproducing 
musical works is an “essential part” of the technological process of 
streaming, which would not be infringing if appropriate performance 
royalties were paid. The challenge would be that most music providers 
streaming music require permanent, not temporary, reproductions 
that endure longer than the technological process requires. Reasonable 
counterarguments could be made in favour of a broad interpretation 
of the technological process of streaming. But time will tell whether 
such arguments are successful.
There are similar statutory reforms in Bill C-11 exempting 
broadcast undertakings from liability for ephemeral reproductions 
of sound recordings.90 Such new provisions will save costs for radio 
and television broadcasters, but they are unlikely to apply to online 
music services. Online services are, so far, outside of the scope of 
this exemption because they are not regulated as broadcasters by the 
Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission 
(CTRC). How the links between the CRTC and Copyright  Board 
proceedings might evolve in coming years is the subject of 
another paper.91
Another practical issue already raised before both the Copyright 
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Board and the Federal Court concerns the impact of the new “making 
available” provision in Canada. Implementing the WIPO Internet 
Treaties required providing authors, performers and record makers not 
only with the right to perform/communicate their protected subject 
matter, but also with the right to make the subject matter available to 
be communicated. Accordingly, section 2.4 of the Copyright Act has 
been amended to add the following clause:
(1.1) For the purposes of this Act, communication 
of a work or other subject-matter to the public by 
telecommunication includes making it available to the 
public by telecommunication in a way that allows a 
member of the public to have access to it from a place 
and at a time individually chosen by that member of  
the public. 
David Fewer has analyzed previous proposals to introduce this 
right in Canada, cautioning that the wrong approach could result in 
additional copyright royalty stacking.92 The question is whether this 
new provision clarifies or supplements the common law interpretation 
of existing rights in the Copyright Act. One possibility is that this 
legislative amendment supplements Canadian law by creating a new, 
additional making available right.93 Another possibility, however, 
is that Bill C-11 merely clarifies or codifies existing law.94 The more 
legally, purposively and practically sound interpretation of the making 
available right in Canada is that it is not a separate right, but is subsumed 
within the communication right as interpreted by the Supreme Court.
First, Rothstein J’s dicta in the Rogers case leaves little doubt that 
the Supreme Court believes making available is already protected as 
part of performance and communication rights in Canada. On-demand 
streaming constitutes a communication for which SOCAN is entitled to 
a tariff regardless of the fact that each stream is separately transmitted 
to a single recipient at the times and places of the recipients’ choosing. 
The Rogers decision elaborates on the Federal Court of Appeal’s ruling 
about facsimile transmissions in the case of CCH v LSUC, which 
had been subsequently confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada: 
“Merely evincing a willingness to accept requests by patrons of the 
Great Library for copies of the Publishers’ works is not an infringement 
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of the Publishers’ right to communicate their works to the public.”95 
In Rogers, Rothstein J (who had concurred in the CCH Canadian 
Ltd. v Law Society of Upper Canada judgment when he sat on the 
Federal Court of Appeal) distinguished the facts of CCH and explained: 
“Following the online music services’ business model, musical works 
are indiscriminately made available to anyone with Internet access 
to the online music service’s website.” He ruled that interpreting the 
communication right to include making content available for on-
demand streaming is “not out of step” with international treaties that 
Canada had not and has not ratified—but soon will ratify.
Second, the basic structure of subsection 2.4(1.1) precludes the 
possibility that making available is a “right” at all. At most, placed 
where it is among definitional provisions, subsection 2.4(1.1) 
delineates the scope of the communication right in paragraph 3(1)(f). 
Furthermore, in ESA, the majority of the Supreme Court was clear 
that the communication right enumerated in paragraph 3(1)(f) is itself 
not a “sui generis right in addition to the general rights described.”96 
The three rights of reproduction, performance and publication 
“provide the basic structure of copyright”, while communication is 
“simply illustrative” of a kind of activity that falls within performing 
rights generally. In arriving at this interpretation, the Supreme Court 
relied on the precise statutory language (in English, at least) of the 
subsection: copyright “means” the rights stated in the introductory 
paragraph, and “includes” the various rights subsequently 
enumerated.97 Based on that principle, the language in subsection 
2.4(1.1) that communication “includes” making available confirms 
that making available is not a new right.
The practical effect, if not the explicitly stated intent, of the Supreme 
Court’s rulings is that making available was already a protected right 
under the umbrella of communication, irrespective of implementation 
of the WIPO Internet Treaties. Copyright means the rights of 
publication, reproduction and performance; performance includes 
communication; and communication includes making available.
Although making available is not a new right, but is rather 
subsumed within the communication right, do recent statutory reforms 
override the practical outcome of ESA? This question matters because 
licensees are trying to avoid copyright royalty stacking in the future. 
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Also, telecommunications firms in particular are trying to claim back 
from SOCAN about a decade’s worth of ringtone royalty payments 
they say were paid improperly, because ESA implicitly overruled the 
CWTA v SOCAN decision that had upheld the ringtones tariff. These 
firms argue that if video game downloads are not communications, as 
per ESA, neither are (or were) ringtone downloads. They have sought 
to pursue this argument simultaneously before both the Copyright 
Board and the Federal Court.98
In recent submissions to the Copyright Board of Canada, SOCAN 
said statutory reforms override the Supreme Court’s recent rulings:
It is SOCAN’s position that with the coming into force 
of Bill C-11, the introduction of the [making available 
right] re-establishes SOCAN’s right to require licences – 
and the Board’s jurisdiction to certify tariffs – in respect 
of the downloading of musical works made available 
to the public in such a way that members of the public 
may access the musical works from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them. This would cover ringtones 
and ringbacks, as well videogames and full-length 
musical tracks.99 
At the time of this chapter’s publication, the Copyright Board 
had just decided that the court is the better arbiter of questions about 
retroactive ringtone royalties, so refused to vary or vacate a previously 
certified tariff.100 But the Board will prospectively consider SOCAN’s 
argument that statutory reforms proclaimed into force on 7 November 
2012, roughly five months after the decision in ESA, re-establish its 
right to collect communication royalties when downloads are made 
available. That issue will be alive in proceedings over ringtones, and 
in the next sequel to the never-ending saga of Tariff 22.
In these circumstances, the usual devices of statutory interpret- 
ation are not particularly helpful. References to legislative history 
and debates to infer Parliamentary intent are pointless, because 
this particular problem only became apparent after the substance 
of Bill C-11 was well settled. The Bill had already received Royal 
Assent roughly two weeks before the Supreme Court’s decisions 
were released.
One way to address the issue is, therefore, based on the plain 
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language of subsection 2.4(1.1). Offering for sale a permanent 
download seems, on its face, to constitute making a work available 
“in a way that allows a member of the public to have access to it 
from a place and at a time individually chosen by that member of 
the public.” This interpretation would suggest that SOCAN’s rights 
to collect communication royalties are indeed re-established. That, 
however, would also reintroduce all of the problems that a majority of 
the Supreme Court sought to avoid through its ruling in ESA.
A contextual interpretation of subsection 2.4(1.1) would suggest 
that the phrase “allows a member of the public to have access” must 
be read with specific reference to the communication right that the 
clause defines. Making a work available in a way that allows access 
to on-demand streaming would, relying on the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Rogers, implicate the communication right. Making a 
work available in a way that allows access to a permanent download 
would, relying on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in ESA, implicate 
the reproduction right but not the communication right.101
Reading subsection 2.4(1.1) contextually, to apply only to making 
available for communication, not reproduction (i.e. streaming, not 
downloads), would also be supported by a purposive interpretation 
that aims to avoid the inefficiencies of overcompensation, consistent 
with the Supreme Court’s statements in Théberge about the purpose 
of copyright law. When purposively deciding these difficult questions, 
decision makers at the Board and eventually the courts might also bear 
in mind this chapter’s cautionary analysis of copyright royalty stacking.
Conclusion
The legal changes brought about in 2012 by several important 
Supreme Court decisions should help to alleviate aspects of the 
problem of copyright royalty stacking. The Court has confirmed that 
communication and reproduction rights are separate and distinct, 
and more importantly that this principle means a single activity will 
normally not infringe both rights. The key question going forward, 
therefore, is whether in any particular case, a potential infringer or 
prospective licensee in fact engages in a single activity or multiple 
separate activities. Before ruling that multiple rights are implicated, 
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adjudicators should be cautious about the implications on transaction 
costs that might undermine economic efficiencies in the market for 
copyright-protected content. Early indications in practice suggest 
that there will be less royalty stacking in Canada following the 
Supreme Court’s recent decisions. Given the Court’s decisions and the 
sound legal and economic principles supporting them, new statutory 
amendments to the Copyright Act should not be interpreted to undo 
the structural simplification of Canadian copyright law. 
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The internet Taxi:
Collective Management of Copyright  
and the Making Available Right,  
after the Pentalogy
daniel gervais
In many respects, the Internet may well be described  
as a technological taxi; but taxis need not give free rides.  
(Rothstein J in Entertainment Software Association  
v SOCAN1)
introduction
Just after the adoption of Bill C-11,2 the Supreme Court of Canada 
handed down five decisions, which are now referred to as the 
“pentalogy”, to follow the heretofore famous trilogy.3 The pentalogy, 
like its three-legged predecessor, marked a significant shift in 
Canadian copyright policy. The five cases dealt in one form or another 
with collective management of copyright in that they originated from 
appeals of decisions made by the Copyright Board of Canada.
Of the five cases, two do not seem particularly controversial. 
In the first case, Re:Sound v Motion Picture Theatre Association of 
Canada,4 which involved the 1961 Rome Convention,5 a unanimous 
Court agreed with the Copyright Board that sound recordings 
embedded in movie soundtracks were not (or were no longer) to be 
treated as sound recordings under the Copyright Act,6 thus rejecting 
 12
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the application in Canada of an Australian precedent based on a 
similar fact pattern but on very different statutory language. Given 
the wording of section 2 of the Act, the outcome seems reasonable. 
While the Rome Convention might have led the Court to take a longer 
look at the appellants’ arguments that a pre-existing sound recording 
reproduced in a soundtrack is still a sound recording and/or that a 
new sound recording is created by ripping the soundtrack—based on 
the principle that statutes should be interpreted in accordance with 
treaties ratified or adhered to by Canada7—the statute seems rather 
unambiguous in defining a soundtrack as something other than 
a phonogram because it is not exclusively “aural”.8 The idea that an 
existing sound recording ceases to exist under Canadian copyright 
law when (while) it is embedded in a soundtrack and re-emerges 
when ripped would deserve a longer comment, but the point is not 
one I wish to belabour here.
In the second case, Rogers v SOCAN,9 the Court decided 
(unanimously on this point10) that a series of point-to-point on-
demand transmissions of works constituted a form of communication 
to the public (covered by an exclusive right) even if each individual 
transmission was not, at least colloquially, public. The Court referred 
to the WIPO Copyright Treaty11 and the making available right in 
that context. That case was, I believe, rightly decided if the normative 
basis for the definition of “public” that has applied to signals sent to 
groups of private homes, hotel rooms, etc. (which, together, constitute 
a “public”) is to be followed. 
Two of the three other cases in the pentalogy were 5-4 splits. Not 
surprisingly, they are controversial. I return to those two cases below. 
I will also mention the fifth (and last case) of the pentalogy, namely 
SOCAN v Bell, later on. It is not particularly controversial but it needs 
to be contextualized. However, before embarking on our review of 
the cases, I wish to take the reader for a quick a tour of ancient China 
and Greece. 
a Binary Worldview
In a binary worldview, as in the three great monotheistic religions, 
there is good, and the opposite of good, to which many names have 
been given (the devil, Satan, etc.). Had the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
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five-part intervention in copyright policy been a movie, the role 
of Rosemary’s baby (in the majority opinions and perhaps also in 
some of the other chapters in this book) would have been played 
by Collective Management Organizations (CMOs) such as Access 
Copyright and SOCAN. 
Binary—in the dominant culture—is simple to understand: good 
v bad, Alouettes v Argonauts (for those in Eastern Canada), Lions v 
Rough Riders (for those in the West), or, in the copyright world, 
exclusive rights v exceptions. One must win and one must lose; one 
must be the slave to copyright owners’ control, or one can be “free”, 
both as in free beer and free expression (that is, without payment 
and without any use limitation or restriction). However, thinking 
in binary terms of this sort is but one way to see the world. Indeed, 
a significant part of the rest of the world has tended to see things 
somewhat differently. I will use China as a flag-bearer, but most of 
Asia would do. This was just as true in the cradle of now apparently 
binary-happy Western culture (that is, ancient Greece). 
Yin and Yang are notions that will be familiar to most readers. 
Those notions are a “couple”, yet they work together.12 Winter may be 
the opposite of summer, but it is just as necessary. In other words, 
spring is not good to autumn’s bad. In Chinese philosophy, pairs are 
seen exactly as that, pairs: night/day; male/female; earth/sky; not one 
good and one bad. Elements of a pair do not annihilate one another; 
they complement each other. Some Chinese philosophers saw this as 
a reflection of nature because the world comes in pairs, as do we.13
Many of the ancient Greeks were, surprisingly, in agreement 
with Chinese thinking on this point. Heraclitus wrote, somewhat 
enigmatically (that is, until one reads those statements along yin/yang 
lines): “The way up and the way down are one and the same”.14 He also 
wrote that “[i]n the circumference of the circle the beginning and the 
end are common”.15
We are very far from our Supreme Court pentalogy. Or are we?
The Greeks, Plato first among them, perhaps, stressed a way 
(technè) to attain the Truth: dialectic (from dia-logos, the art of 
dialogue). I always thought that law was also a way to get to the 
“Truth”. Conversely, the way not to get there is to adopt an ideological 
filter instead of adjudicating on the facts. As Plato noted, “the virtue 
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of each thing, whether body or soul, instrument or creature, when 
given to them in the best way comes to them not by chance but as the 
result of the order and truth and art which are imparted to them”.16 
He also noted that, in dealing with the intersubjectivity issues of 
dialogue and language (logos), a dialectic approach implies that an 
organized dialogue was the best, and perhaps the only, true way 
forward.17 It is worth noting that it can also be entertaining. Indeed, 
one of the dominant art forms in ancient Greek was “dialectic” 
theatre; Sophocles and Euripides come to mind. 
Plato was not alone. Aristotle’s Metaphysics are similarly based 
in part on the notion of using opposites (antikeiména) to arrive at 
a better understanding.18 He also spent a considerable amount of 
time explaining the distinction between contradiction (antiphasis) 
and opposites (ta énantia).19 Opposites are what allow one to define 
proper boundaries such as black and white, neither of which is right or 
better, but rather both necessary to understand an issue. 
I could go on, but I think I made my point. As we can explain 
our world and see Truth by looking at pairs of opposites but reality as 
a continuum (think of all shades between black and white) explained 
using such pairs, so we may be better able to enter into a respectful 
and necessary dialogue as opposed to a war of ideas where one must 
win—and one does—not by analysis but by ideological assertion. 
Must copyright be either a full exclusive right or nothing at all? I 
argue that it can be both and neither of those. And in the copyright 
system, it also means that more than one right may apply to a single 
act. From that perspective, the two most controversial opinions of 
the pentalogy strike me as informed by a very, and unnecessarily, 
binary worldview.
a Binary Pentalogy
The reasons of the Court’s majority opinions in the two most 
controversial cases of the pentalogy can be seen as a frontal assault 
on collective management of copyright. Indeed, both opinions 
were praised precisely for that reason—including in other chapters 
contained in this book. In that narrative, CMOs are depicted as 
mere tax collectors, des empêcheurs de tourner en rond, as the French 
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expression has it. Absent CMOs, “right holders” may license their 
works directly to users (whether they be individuals, or CTV, or 
Google) or make their material available for free just like academics 
do.20 The Court’s majority was thus in line with l’air du temps. Indeed, 
it seems trendy these days to battle CMOs, or even to challenge the 
very concept of collective management. For example, documents 
are being circulated showing abuses and mismanagement by certain 
CMOs.21 The intellectual heft of this broad anti-CMO rhetoric strikes 
me as questionable. Would a report on a brokerage house responsible 
for the 2008 worldwide financial meltdown justify the elimination of 
capitalism or of Wall Street? Most observers would agree, I suspect, 
that what is needed is proper regulation and swift legal action against 
criminal acts, including appropriate sanctions and ways to ensure 
it does not happen again—which brings us back to regulation.22 
Unfortunately, when it comes to CMOs, it seems that rotten apples 
(real or not) are used as evidence that all apples are bad and even lead 
to proposals to get rid of all apple trees. Put less metaphorically, the 
very model—in which authors pool their rights to generate income and 
make licensing as painless as possible (other than paying, which, as I 
argue below, is the whole point of this)—is presented as unacceptable 
because major users (CBC, CTV, Google, etc.) cannot (or should not) 
be expected to pay for copyright works. 
In the binary worldview that leads to the conclusion that 
everything must be free, as in free beer (the good) because otherwise 
the only other option is full right holder control of every use (the 
bad), it is necessary, rhetorically, to paint licensing as suboptimal, 
or worse. Indeed, a majority of the Supreme Court came close to 
describing collective management as abusive per se.23 Unfortunately, 
what is often forgotten in that narrative is that CMOs are also the 
main source of revenue for several categories of professional creators 
whose works are used consumptively. In Churchillian terms, it may 
be the worst solution to make copyright work, except for other forms. 
It is patently false to say that collective management is the 
opposite of fair dealing. This is a clear error in logic. The opposite 
of fair dealing is infringement. In the presence of a CMO licensing 
scheme, this does not happen. A CMO would not refuse a licence 
to one who wishes to pay. Hence, as I demonstrate in greater detail 
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below, the issue is not about what material someone can use (or not). 
That is mere rhetorical artifice. The real issue is about which users 
should pay, and how much. 
Let us now turn to three cases of the pentalogy not reviewed 
above in greater detail, including the two controversial ones just 
mentioned.24
ESA v SOCAN
In the first and probably most controversial case, Entertainment 
Software Association v SOCAN [ESA], the majority held that music 
downloads did not implicate the right of communication to the public 
by telecommunication. Abella J wrote:
Although a download and a stream are both 
“transmissions” in technical terms (they both 
use “data packet technology”), they are not both 
“communications” for purposes of the Copyright Act.  
This is clear from the Board’s definition of a stream  
as “a transmission of data that allows the user to listen or 
view the content at the time of transmission and  
that is not meant to be reproduced” (para. 15).25  
Unlike a download, the experience of a stream is  
much more akin to a broadcast or performance.26
According to the opinion, simultaneity in the auditory or 
audiovisual experience (or at least contemporaneousness) seems to be 
required for a transmission to be a communication. If the perception 
is not contemporaneous with the transmission, then a more or less 
durable27 copy is made and then, because of the binary view of the 
majority,28 that reproduction cannot be also a communication. 
The Court more or less correctly joined the communication by 
telecommunication right and the right of public performance at the 
hip, arguing that the latter began its existence with the (unavoidable) 
simultaneity of a live performance, and evolved to the near-
simultaneous perception of live radio or television broadcast. It is 
also true that a similar path was followed by US courts, but on a very 
different statutory basis.29 
The linkage between performance and communication is one thing. 
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The separation of communication and reproduction is quite another. 
As a result of ESA, the Copyright Board must now eliminate the portion 
of their payments to songwriters and composers that was paid (via 
SOCAN) for the right of communication to the public on downloads.30 
What is less clear is what happens after that. If the Supreme Court’s 
decision is seen as a legal/technical one (that is, dealing strictly with 
the right(s) involved, but not the value of the use, which is an economic 
issue), the Board could say that the same total amount as before should 
be paid for the use of music, but all as mechanicals. While this sounds 
better for songwriters than a forced reduction in payments to them, 
it would still not be a benign change because it would substantially 
alter current financial flows. While some of the funds would end up 
in the hands of songwriters and composers, unlike with the SOCAN 
arrangement, the funds would go through music publishers (many of 
whom now belong to the major record labels). Then the payments to 
the labels (via publishing houses they now own) might be subject to 
so-called 360 contracts that allow the music labels to keep part of the 
payments owed songwriters and composers.31 By contrast, SOCAN 
pays songwriters directly and transparently. 
A “total amount” approach (keeping the sum paid for music 
the same, but apportioning differently among CMOs) would be 
consistent with the Board’s practice in recent years to hear certain 
tariffs that involved both reproduction and communications together 
to establish a “total value” of music that was then apportioned among 
the collectives.32 From this perspective, the Board could change the 
allocation but not the value/payment equation. Indeed, nowhere does 
the Court actually say that songwriters and composers in Canada are 
overpaid (though it may be seen as implying that they are). 
Major commercial users and those who support their cause will 
no doubt argue that what the Court did was normative in nature 
and must imply that music was overvalued—and songwriters 
overpaid. They will argue before the Board that, by eliminating one 
right (communication), the Court specifically intended to reduce 
payments to songwriters and composers. In support of that view, 
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the five-member majority seemed moved by the (in my respectful 
submission, unsupported) assertion that having to pay two collectives 
was inefficient and led to too high a payment.33
Indeed, we already can see34 that the first signs of the shift in 
financial flows were ordered by the Supreme Court in a decision 
published by the Copyright Board of Canada on 6 October 2012 
concerning Tariff 22.A (online music).35 Following ESA, the Board 
eliminated payments to SOCAN (that is, songwriters and publishers) 
for permanent and limited music downloads (the latter being described 
as a form of rental).36 It increased the undiscounted “mechanical 
rate” from 8.8 percent to 9.9 percent for permanent downloads and 
from 5.9 percent to 9.9 percent for limited downloads, which will 
likely result in a diminution of overall payments to songwriters or, 
in economic terms, a mandated transfer of wealth from songwriters 
to major corporate users.37 For streaming, the Board let the existing 
SOCAN rate stand but increased mechanicals by 12.5 percent.38 In 
a rather interesting passage foreshadowing future developments, the 
Board noted the following:
Absent any relevant evidence, it is not possible 
to determine whether the non-existence of the 
communication right for downloads may influence 
the price of the communication right for streams. For 
example, what if the ability to transmit downloads and 
streams were ‘joint products’ in the economic sense 
of the term, i.e. that costs are shared in developing the 
ability to communicate? Economic theory suggests that 
if the market for one of the joint products is eliminated 
(arguably, declaring that a product does not exist 
eliminates the market for the product), the price of all 
other joint products should rise, all other things being 
equal. We leave this and other valuation issues to  
later proceedings.39
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Questioning ESA’s Findings
The issue in the case was, as far as I can see, simply one of deciding 
whether/when a transmission is a “communication”. The Court may 
have done that, but it did a whole lot more. As I see it, the majority’s 
approach is open to criticism on several fronts. 
First, I believe that it misapplied the notion of technological 
neutrality. To demonstrate this, let me begin by quoting from the 
majority opinion: “The question in this appeal is whether the rights 
are nonetheless revived when the work is sold over the Internet instead 
of in a store. In our view, it makes little sense to distinguish between 
the two methods of selling the same work.”40 Yet the difference between 
physical copies sold as goods and digital copies as “transmissions” 
is plain in the statute: notions of communication and transmission 
are applicable to intangible acts, not to sales of physical copies. The 
majority position is even harder to understand when considering that 
they found that the sale of physical copies and downloads must be 
treated equally as a matter of technological neutrality but, in the same 
breath, that downloads and streams must be considered as separate acts. 
The majority view strikes me as incorrect also because the lines 
between streams and downloads are increasingly hard to draw. In a 
number of new and emerging business models, people use devices to 
stream content. However, while they may begin with a stream, they 
might store the file and view the rest later. Put differently, the timing of 
the consumption made of the protected “content” on a suite of devices 
that the user may have access to is the heart of the majority opinion, 
but it does not strike me as convincing because technology need not 
distinguish between copies stored on the device or streamed (but then 
likely stored on the device temporarily in any event). The majority 
opinion forces these to be considered as separate acts—and thus 
separate licensing transactions—rather than one set of pooled rights, 
depending on whether the act is a stream or download, and then 
ignoring the fact that “access” may imply both rights. As Rothstein 
J noted, in pronouncing this divorce of the rights of communication 
and reproduction, Abella and Moldaver JJ’s approach “sweeps away 
these well-established principles.”41 
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A second major critique I would level at the majority opinion is 
that it will force the Copyright Board to reorient financial flows without 
clearly spelling out it why it did so. The Board had unified tariffs and 
hearings so that it could determine the overall value of music to the 
user and the apportionment of that value among collectives all at the 
same time.42 As the Board explained in its Tariff 22.A 2012 decision:
[A] bundled approach is easier to justify when the Board 
is able to deal with all the relevant rights at the same 
time, as is always the case with retransmission. This 
allows the Board to determine not only what a fair price 
for the user is, but also what a fair allocation among 
copyright owners is.43
The majority referred to the existence of a “multiplicity of 
collectives” as a kind of malum in se, but the issue that the Court’s 
majority was trying to remedy strikes me as theoretical or indeed 
non-existent. Unlike with patents, where multiple patents on a single 
product can lead to stacking, it has been part of copyright law and 
policy that the bundle can be split, and that some uses can require more 
than one right fragment. I have not seen evidence that multiplicity 
of CMOs is actually an issue for major users, other, of course, than 
the money they have to pay for music. I am not implying that this is 
an illegitimate argument on their part. Any business wants to reduce 
its costs. However, it must just be seen for what it is. For users, the 
existence of two rights and the obligation to clear both was and is 
essentially a financial issue because the Board unified tariff hearings 
and aimed to determine the total value of music.
A third critique I would offer is that the majority interpretation 
is singularly difficult to reconcile with the French version of the 
Copyright Act.44 Rothstein J noted (correctly, in my view) that 
the French version could serve as a guide to understand whether 
Parliament intended for different rights in the copyright bundle to 
be separate. As he wrote, his interpretation of the English version 
of s 3(1) “is consistent with the French version of the text, which 
states that “[l]e droit d’auteur sur l’œuvre comporte le droit exclusif 
de produire ou reproduire, [représenter ou publier] l’œuvre; ce droit 
comporte, en outre, [les droits énumérés aux alinéas (a) à (i)].” The 
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use of the phrase “en outre”—in addition—indicates paras. (a) to (i) 
are in addition to those in the opening words.45 One could say even 
more. Section 3(1) uses the word “comporte” (comprises) twice to 
refer to the reproduction right on the bundle and then says that “in 
addition” copyright includes other rights listed in section 3, including 
communication to the public. 
A fourth flaw is the interface with Bill C-11. Of course, the Court 
cannot be blamed for this because the amended Copyright Act was not 
in force. However, the Board cannot escape addressing it in the near 
future. The new section 2.4(1.1) is part of the measures designed to 
make Canada’s legislation compliant with the WIPO Copyright Treaty. 
The Treaty requires that countries party to the treaty provide “authors 
of literary and artistic works…the exclusive right of authorizing any 
communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means, 
including the making available to the public of their works in such a 
way that members of the public may access these works from a place 
and at a time individually chosen by them.”46 A lack of simultaneity (or 
the necessary evanescence of a transmission sans download) implies 
a download (otherwise, how will the user access it later than the 
transmission?). According to ESA, it cannot be a communication, but 
article 2.4(1.1) reads as follows:
[C]ommunication of a work or other subject-matter to 
the public by tele-communication includes making it 
available to the public by telecommunication in a way that 
allows a member of the public to have access to it from a 
place and at a time individually chosen by that member  
of the public.47
If one overlays the simultaneity/temporariness requirement 
imposed in the Court’s majority opinion on this new section, then 
the access to the public must logically be contemporaneous with the 
act that makes it available; otherwise, it isn’t a “communication”. This 
seems rather difficult to reconcile with the text of the amended statute 
for two reasons.48 First, “having access” does not necessarily imply 
simultaneous perception. Second, the section specifically mentions 
that the user may choose the time of access. 
From this perspective, one way to read ESA might be to say that 
the case affects the past (including past tariffs) but not post Bill C-11 
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“making available” uses. Another way to read it is to say that the 
owner of the making available right would be owed a payment under 
an applicable tariff, independent of whether a reproduction also takes 
place. Bill C-11 would thus get us back in line with (for the future) long-
standing principles and a well-known licensing modus operandi,49 
because frequently more than one right in the bundle of copyright 
rights has applied to a single activity. For example, one can listen to 
a stream and make a copy. Broadcasters copy music on computers 
and then broadcast it; they still have to pay for both.50As the Board 
noted in the most recent Commercial Radio tariff: “A Canadian radio 
station that broadcasts recorded music off a server reproduces and 
communicates musical works, performers’ performances and sound 
recordings. Four copyrights and two remuneration rights must be 
accounted for.”51
Most other countries that have working collective management 
systems do something similar.52 As long as the tariffs are set in 
recognition of this—by taking account of the economic value of the 
music to the user—then the user should not much care how the funds 
are apportioned, provided the total amount paid is fair. This is precisely 
what the Board did, noting in the same decision: “[T]he Board has 
been asked to set tariffs for all those rights at the same time.”53
Naturally, as a matter of principle no one is opposed to a 
simplification of copyright. Indeed, the bundle of rights may be ripe for 
such a simplification and I previously argued precisely that it should be 
simplified.54 However, I tend to agree with Rothstein J, who noted that 
this should be done by Parliament, not courts, with proper transitional 
measures, for at least two reasons.55 First, copyright contracts are made 
to reflect the bundle of copyright rights, and that bundle is fragmented 
just as much through the choices of copyright users as through those 
of copyright owners in their licensing decisions (by territory, language 
rights, versions, type of media, etc.). Second, most digital uses require 
a reproduction followed by a transmission, and ESA does not come 
into play when protected uses occur in that sequence: the transmission 
that precedes a permanent copy is not a communication, but the copy 
that precedes a communication remains a reproduction. Whether this 
somewhat uneven outcome is optimal is probably a matter on which 
reasonable people might apparently disagree.
Let us now turn briefly to SOCAN v Bell, a case related to ESA in 
a number of ways. 
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SOCAN v Bell
In SOCAN v Bell [Bell],56 a unanimous court agreed with the Copyright 
Board of Canada that listening to previews of a song in deciding 
whether to make a purchase was fair dealing for research. The decision 
is interesting, in my view, not so much on substance (because I agree 
with the outcome) but in that it proceeds formulaically, in a way that 
may seem familiar to US readers. It does so along the lines drawn in 
CCH Canadian [CCH] , in determining whether a use argued to be 
fair falls under one of the purposes of fair dealing and then, as a factual 
matter, whether this use is fair based on the CCH factors. Interestingly, 
the Court also noted that US cases on fair use were not particularly 
helpful in a Canadian context.57 The Court’s statement about US law 
may have more to do with substantive law than methodology.
Then, while the outcome strikes me as fair, I am also not sure 
how the opinion sits with the elimination of the communication 
right from the download equation. Even though SOCAN eventually 
pays the authors and publisher, the two rights (communication 
and mechanical reproduction) typically belong to different entities 
(SOCAN v music publishers). As a technical matter at least, one could 
ask whether it is really “fair” to use the communication right owned 
by A to increase the sales of the mechanical right owned by B. 
This leaves the second of the two most controversial cases in the 
pentalogy, a case dealing with reprographic licensing.
Alberta (Education) v Access Copyright
In Alberta (Education) v Canadian Copyright Licensing (Access 
Copyright) [Alberta (Education)],58 a split (5-4) court interpreted 
the Copyright Act in a way that (including in other chapters of this 
book) is seen as basically saying that any copying by teachers in a 
K-12 setting is for private study or research—ignoring what I read in 
even Abella J’s note of caution about the need to show the fair nature 
of the copying. Some of the key parts of the majority opinion read 
as follows:
Teachers have no ulterior motive when providing copies 
to students. Nor can teachers be characterized as having 
the completely separate purpose of “instruction”; they 
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are there to facilitate the students’ research and private 
study. It seems to me to be axiomatic that most students 
lack the expertise to find or request the materials 
required for their own research and private study, and 
rely on the guidance of their teachers. They study what 
they are told to study, and the teacher’s purpose in 
providing copies is to enable the students to have the 
material they need for the purpose of studying. The 
teacher/copier therefore shares a symbiotic purpose with 
the student/user who is engaging in research or private 
study. Instruction and research/private study are, in the 
school context, tautological.59
And later:
[P]hotocopies made by a teacher and provided to 
primary and secondary school students are an essential 
element in the research and private study undertaken by 
those students. The fact that some copies were provided 
on request and others were not, did not change the 
significance of those copies for students engaged in 
research and private study.60
Beyond the nature of the limits that the majority may or may 
not have imposed on fair dealing, a number of the points made by 
the majority strike me as questionable. First, it is, as I understand 
it, the practice of students, schools and school boards to purchase 
textbooks and other materials (including digital materials) from 
private publishers. Now, school boards and schools will be allowed to 
copy existing books for free because their purpose is not profit, but 
instruction. One can easily understand the appeal of this view, for it 
would indeed be good if all educational material were available for 
free worldwide. Perhaps one day that will be the case, as foundations 
and other institutions decide that they will make all of this happen 
without the help of commercial textbook publishers. That said, 
whether the decision to eliminate or severely restrict commercial 
publishing in the educational sector is desirable is another 
matter on which I believe that reasonable people might disagree. 
I will come back to the empirics of the situation below.
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Another interesting finding in the majority opinion reads 
as follows: “[T]he word ‘private’ in ‘private study’ should not be 
understood as requiring users to view copyrighted works in splendid 
isolation. Studying and learning are essentially personal endeavours, 
whether they are engaged in with others or in solitude.”61 As the 
dissent rightly asks, if copies made for a classroom are not public, 
then what is? To quote Rothstein J, “‘private study’ cannot have been 
intended to cover situations where tens, hundreds or thousands of 
copies are made in a school, school district or across a province as 
part of an organized program of instruction.”62 The majority simply 
read the word “private” out of the statute, at least as far as education 
is concerned. I would not be surprised if attempts were made to 
convince lower courts or the Board that widespread copying within 
corporations or governments is also private by the same logic. 
As was shown in a US case (dealing with higher education, not 
K–12), authors and publishers make a lot of revenue by licensing some 
incidental but systematic types of uses.63 This revenue stream will be 
greatly affected by the Supreme Court’s decision. While there would 
be much more to say, I will leave the detailed analysis of fair dealing 
per se to Professor d’Agostino in her chapter in this book. However, a 
few additional comments are in order before moving on.
First, here, as with the previous case, it is unclear how the decision 
will interface with Bill C-11. The amended Copyright Act contains a 
new section (30.02), which provides a specific exception for copying 
by educational institutions, and it seems to require a licence. The new 
section reads in part as follows:
[I]t is not an infringement of copyright for an 
educational institution that has a reprographic 
reproduction licence under which the institution is 
authorized to make reprographic reproductions of works 
in a collective society’s repertoire for an educational or 
training purpose (a) to make a digital reproduction—of 
the same general nature and extent as the reprographic 
reproduction authorized under the licence—of a paper 
form of any of those works.64
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If all copying in schools is fair dealing, then no educational 
establishment should need or have a “licence under which the 
institution is authorized to make reprographic reproductions.” 
Read in this fashion, s 30.02 would be rendered utterly inapplicable. 
Perhaps s 30.02 is simply no longer required because all or most 
educational uses are fair dealing? If that is the case, that begs the 
question whether, if indeed that was the law in Canada and that law 
was merely explicated by the Supreme Court (that is, fair dealing for 
private study was in the statute while Bill C-11 was being debated), 
shouldn’t Parliament have known that and taken that into account? 
Clearly, it will not be easy to reconcile Alberta (Education) with the 
outcome of the democratic debate in Parliament embodied in part 
in new section 30.02. The key, if there is one, may be in the note of 
caution sounded by Abella J on the fairness of the copying rather than 
a sole and myopic focus on its purpose. Perhaps the Copyright Board 
will be able to, on application from the CMOs concerned, set a limit 
on educational copying not by limiting the uses that are “private” but 
those that are fair under the CCH test.65
Alternatively, provincial governments, or some of them, that 
no longer need to pay Access Copyright (and the Quebec copyright 
collective, COPIBEC), or pay them lesser amounts, may decide to shift 
those funds to subsidize their private publishers more.66 Yet another 
option is that the price paid for books to commercial publishers (by 
provinces for public schools) will go up to compensate for the lack 
of reprographic income. That may work for major textbooks, but for 
secondary materials primarily used in education and regularly used 
in the curriculum, this option will not be available. 
Provincial governments can also choose to pay to have textbooks 
prepared and made available online for free to everyone. If this is 
done without DRM, the textbooks will indeed be free for all (even 
outside the province) to use. However, governments could have done 
so anytime in the past. No one is prevented by copyright law from 
donating a work she owns to the public domain, as academic authors 
(who are otherwise remunerated for their work) often like to do.
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Whichever path is chosen, there are three interesting empirical 
questions that deserve further examination. First, will students and 
educators massively use their “right” to copy everything and anything 
for educational purposes, or will they still prefer to rely on textbooks 
(whether paper or digital)? Second, will copying for free actually 
save money as compared to using commercial publishing and 
paying CMOs, or will it simply result in a shift to higher publishing 
subsidies67? Third and, in my view, more importantly, will educators 
and students think it works better overall? This, only time will tell.
Beyond Binary Copyright Policy
As mentioned above, the traditional policy view of the exercise of 
copyright is binary (good/bad; control/free). This was extended by 
the Supreme Court to a perceived need to artificially separate rights in 
the copyright bundle. Everything must thus now be seen from “either/
or” glasses: full right to exclude or full exception. Reality, I suggest, 
is more like a kaleidoscope. True, it might be a bit more messy and 
unstructured. As alluded to above, however, one could learn a thing 
or two from China and ancient Greece in that regard as we attempt 
to move forward. In other words, the binary worldview is convenient 
and beguilingly simple as an explanatory tool, but it should not be 
confused with reality. The binary nature of copyright seems facially 
reflected in many national laws and in European directives, because 
they contain rights and exceptions. However, in reality, laws put in 
place systems of rights and exceptions. Application of laws by courts 
should thus be more typically informed by the search for a systemic 
equilibrium.68 
As the Chinese and the ancient Greeks told us millennia ago, 
the world does not work in a binary way. In other words, there is 
a very important and substantial middle ground in copyright, an 
area comprising compulsory licences and collective management, in 
which right holders have, de jure or de facto, lost the ability to say no 
(that is, control uses), but not the right to be paid for some uses of 
their works.69 The picture looks like this (Figure 1):
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Figure 1. The traditional view (corrected)
This middle ground is much more than an aberration, an oversight 
or some species of de minimis case that one can proceed to ignore or 
relegate to a policy footnote. That middle ground is an integral part of 
what makes copyright work. We should not ignore it, as the majority 
of the Supreme Court arguably did in the pentalogy. Instead, we 
should increase the scope and reach of this middle ground if we want 
copyright to work for online uses while ensuring healthy financial 
flows to professional Canadian (and other) creators.70 Users who 
pay the required fee or tariff in this middle zone can use the licensed 
works usually with little or no constraints, because it is contained in 
the repertory of a voluntary licence administered by a CMO and/or 
covered by a statutory or compulsory licensing scheme (Figure 2).71
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*The “exclusive right” as exercised by the CMO may lead to order preventing use in case of non-payment.
Figure 2. The traditional view (co pleted): use with remuneration
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My underlying premise is simple. Those who believe that 
YouTube can or should replace Denys Arcand and Neil Young and 
that self-published books should replace Marie-Claire Blais or 
Margaret Atwood have not discharged their burden of proof. Nor am 
I seeing credible evidence that Arcand, Young, Blais or Atwood would 
have created what they did had they not been able to live from their 
work or, alternatively, that they could have replaced their income by 
selling mugs and t-shirts. Let me be clear: I am not making a case 
against user-generated content or somehow arguing that creators are 
somehow “owed” a living.72 I am simply suggesting that professional 
creativity increases general welfare and that we will be better off if 
we find a way to retain financial flows to professional authors whose 
works people want to watch, read or listen to, rather than merely 
focusing on access restrictions and enforcement, on the one hand, 
and free content, on the other.73
I simply do not accept the view that the real concern in eliminating 
CMOs is somehow about authors’ welfare. That highly cynical view 
ignores the fact that licensing via CMOs actually empowers forms 
of disintermediation (or, more accurately perhaps, reintermediation) 
where more of the funds paid get to creators and less to industrial 
intermediaries, so that, even if overall user payments may indeed 
diminish, professional authors can still make a decent living.74
A proper licensing structure can ensure proper financial flows and 
may set some acceptable limits on copying and use. It can easily allow 
for the type of spontaneous copying that is usually mentioned as an 
example of what should be fair dealing in education or as previews 
on downloads sites.75 Indeed, I would suggest that a world in which 
spontaneous or similar copying is allowed, but systematic copying is 
licensed and materials thus freely available to educators and students, 
is preferable to one where educators are forced to deal with heavier 
DRMs to avoid the overreach (from the publishers’ perspective) of 
fair dealing. 
I am not arguing that existing CMOs are a panacea. Indeed, 
necessary efforts are afoot to establish rules to ensure more uniform, 
transparent, fair and efficient collective management.76 There may 
be a case for some CMOs to merge or work more closely together, 
and there is undoubtedly a need in some quarters to achieve greater 
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efficiency. This is (in part) precisely due to the increased frequency 
in the use of more than one right in the copyright bundle, and it has 
already led some CMOS down that path.77 Beyond these immediate 
concerns, it may very well be that new entities and indeed new forms 
of collective management will emerge.78 I also see a greater role in the 
future for multilateral cooperation, possibly on the regulatory front (or 
as guidelines), but specifically in the area of rights documentation.79
Making the normative case for “it should all be free” a little 
harder, free “content” in all forms and shapes is used as an input in 
major for-profit business models. The fact that content is free (as in 
free beer) increases bottom lines and shareholder value for online 
intermediaries, but not necessarily general welfare. By the same token, 
however, I see most efforts to control the Internet and restrict access 
as misguided because they irritate users and have not been shown to 
increase financial flows. In practical terms, I thus prefer models in 
which content is free (as in free expression) but in which professional 
authors can pool their rights to deal with professional users, whether 
through existing CMOs or otherwise. Such pools should be fair to 
them (which usually presupposed that they have a say and some 
form of control over the organization representing their interests). 
Pools should also be fair and provide benefits to users, principally in 
the form of full legal access to, and use of, a vast repertory of works 
(which could be virtually everything if extended repertoire licensing 
is added to the mix), with some form of payment for non-exempt uses 
adjudicated by a neutral third party (in this case, the Copyright Board). 
What happened to “Precedents”?
Another matter that deserves mention is that the pentalogy rewrote 
a number of lines of Canadian copyright policy beyond collective 
management, not the least of which was to change the status of 
precedents that scholars and practitioners can rely on. 
First, the concurrence by the Chief Justice in the two controversial 
majority opinions lends credence to the definitive burial of Bishop v 
Stevens.80 Not much of a surprise.81
Second, one can reasonably wonder whether another Canadian 
classic, Boudreau v Lin,82 is still good law. The Copyright Board relied 
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on the case, but the Supreme Court’s majority opinion does not even 
mention it, and seems incompatible with the findings they had based 
on the case.83 
Even the very recent SOCAN v CAIP84 now looks lame, a significant 
change of direction within a relatively short time frame, and perhaps 
a reflection of recent changes in the high court’s composition. I, for 
one, would certainly hesitate to say that SOCAN v CAIP is still good 
law in Canada.
Above all, however, I was struck by the fate of the venerable 
University of London Press, Ltd. vs. University Tutorial Press, Ltd. 
[ULP].85 This case was cited in at least 55 Canadian copyright cases.86 
Of course, in a common law world one expects cases—even old 
classics—to be replaced (or updated) from time to time. That is part of 
our dynamic and flexible legal system, and I certainly do not dispute 
that process in any way here. However, one might expect a sentence 
or two to explain such major departures from precedent.87 
In ULP, a publisher had issued a publication reproducing old 
exams and sold it to students who were preparing for their own exams. 
The publisher argued that the publication amounted to fair dealing 
“for the purposes of private study” by university students preparing 
for exams. The ULP court had held that the company could not bring 
itself within the fair dealing exception, rejecting the argument that 
the purpose of the publication was “private” study.88 The case, was, 
therefore, relevant. It is now ostensibly in the dustbin of copyright 
precedents, but unfortunately without a clear explanation.
Conclusion: Going Forward
The controversial cases in the pentalogy will significantly affect 
financial flows to creators. In fact, the cases were not primarily about 
what copyright material one is allowed to use because, in a collective 
management context, permission is granted to users who pay the 
applicable tariff.89 The false dichotomy between fair dealing and 
collective management must be seen for what it is, and it is not about 
access, and least by major commercial users. Most people would agree 
that as much material as possible—from in-print and out-of-print books 
to TV shows from the 60s, 70s and 80s (and up to today’s show I just 
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missed) to music from every corner of the globe—should be available 
online, for then we all benefit. But why should it all be at the expense 
of creators and for the benefit of major for-profit business models?
The pentalogy was about money that (some) users don’t want 
to pay, because its main impact, at least in the short term, will be 
about whether users, including professional ones, should pay for 
uses of copyright material (“content”). In some cases, such as the 
case concerning previews, there were very good arguments to say 
that users should not have to pay. In the case of embedded sound 
recordings, the statutory text supported the Court’s conclusion. In the 
two 5-4 cases, however, reasonable people may well disagree with the 
outcome. 
One could argue that, normatively, there are other issues (like 
obligations to keep track and report some uses) that separate collective 
management from fair dealing. I don’t necessarily disagree, but those 
were not the issue in the cases in the pentalogy. The issue was and is 
payment, or the absence thereof. Moreover, reporting of online uses 
by major commercial intermediaries can often be done automatically 
and in an aggregate form that protects end users’ privacy.
The pentalogy creates more uncertainty, not less, in copyright 
tariffs. The Copyright Board had navigated a middle way between a 
bundle of exclusive rights and users who want maximum access at a 
fair price. Perhaps everyone was unhappy with the Board’s decisions: 
rights holders because they weren’t getting enough; users because 
they had to pay. Yet, as a rule of thumb, isn’t generalized and equal 
discontent precisely a sign that the Board got it right?
There are a host of additional concerns that Canadian copyright 
policy makers and courts must now address: in particular, the difficult 
interface with Bill C-11 and the WIPO Copyright Treaty, both of 
which now look somewhat shambolic, just months after years of 
debate on the matter ended in Parliament. 
As I close, let me suggest a simple view of the aims of copyright: 
authors want their books to be read (and songwriters their music 
to be heard, etc.), and users want to access and read/listen to them. 
Hence, in the grand copyright policy equation, only authors and 
users are, in fact, necessary. Beyond this, only CMOs, as agents of 
the authors, also may have some claim to being necessary: without 
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them, many users would find it impossible to conduct their business. 
By contrast, commercial intermediaries, whether they be publishers, 
record companies or online service providers of various kinds, are 
all contingent, because no individual intermediary or business model 
is essential. 90 Yet, commercial intermediaries of all stripes seem to 
dominate the policy and scholarly discourse. My hunch is that this 
is so precisely because commercial intermediaries know they are 
replaceable. They have an incentive to use judicial, regulatory and 
other processes to artificially heighten their importance and to protect 
or increase their position and market shares.
Then one must also recognize that there is, and should be, room 
for both authors who “just want to be read” (e.g., authors of op-ed 
letters and academic writers who are otherwise remunerated) and 
dedicate their work to others for free (though they often insist on 
attribution, another feature of copyright, lest we forget). This was true 
before the pentalogy and remains true now. However, I am not sure 
on what authority one can argue that, because the model is good for 
bloggers and university professors, it should therefore be imposed 
on all other creators. As previously explained, I firmly believe that 
general welfare is maximized when our best songwriters, novelists 
and filmmakers can hope to make a living from their craft, which 
presupposes reasonably healthy financial flows. In more ways than 
one, this debate reminds me of fair trade for coffee.91 
It may seem too basic to state the point this way, but at bottom it 
is about money and not control, because, from a creator’s perspective, 
a viable solution often does not require limiting or controlling 
the quality or quantity of uses, but it does require finding ways to 
compensate professional authors whose works are successful in the 
marketplace. Open and unlimited access, with author compensation 
in appropriate cases, is not only possible; in many cases it is desirable. 
In other words, the best guidepost in mapping a way forward in the 
online environment may not be “free” as in free beer; but rather “free” 
as in free expression. This is what well-regulated, transparent and 
efficient collective management can help provide. 
Collective management, whether in its present form or in some 
future new and improved incarnation—that regulators may help 
prod into existence—has thus far been the best way for creators to get 
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paid for the ongoing uses of work, whether they self-publish or work 
with or through major commercial disseminators. To quote Francis 
Gurry, Director-General of WIPO: “Collective management is the 
best option that we know for returning value to creators.”92 Yes, there 
is undoubtedly room for greater transparency and efficiency in the 
operation of some CMOs, and greater international coordination of 
rights information, but that is not a reason to reject the entire model, 
nor a reason to impose an unwarranted separation of rights in the 
copyright bundle. This is throwing the baby—indeed, the entire 
nursery—out with the bathwater. 
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Righting a Right: 
Entertainment Software Association  
v SOCAN and the Exclusive Rights  
of Copyright for Works
elizabeth f. judge
i: introduction
In Entertainment Software Association v SOCAN [ESA], in a 5-4 
decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the delivery of a copy of a 
video game containing musical works over the Internet did not 
implicate the section 3(1)(f) right to communicate to the public by 
telecommunication under the Copyright Act.1 The practical result of the 
decision is that video game publishers and distributors are not required 
to pay royalties to SOCAN, the collective society that administers the 
right to public performance and the right to communicate a work 
by telecommunication for musical works, for the communication 
of the musical works included in video games. Such a royalty would 
have been in addition to the royalties that are paid for permission to 
reproduce the musical works in the video games. 
The more far-reaching implications of the decision, however, lie 
with its debate over the nature of the exclusive rights of copyright 
for works. As Rothstein J noted in his dissent, in this decision he 
and the majority “part company…on some fundamental principles 
of copyright law.”2 The central disagreement between the majority 
and dissent goes to the core of the definition of “copyright” and 
 13
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the relationship between the general rights that are set out in the 
introductory paragraph of section 3(1) and the more specific 
rights listed in sections 3(1)(a)-(i). The majority concludes that the 
exclusive rights of copyright are exhaustively defined by the rights 
set out in the introductory paragraph of section 3(1)—namely, 
reproduction, performance and publication—and that subsections 
3(1)(a)-(i) are merely illustrative of those general rights. The dissent 
conversely argues that the rights set out in section 3(1) are all separate 
and distinct. Whereas the majority argues that the communication 
right is a subset of the performance right, the dissent argues that the 
performance right and the communication right are independent. 
Both the majority and the dissent invoke the principles of balance 
and technological neutrality in support of their reasoning.3
Although the judgment’s discussion of the principle of technological 
neutrality and the decision’s financial import of rejecting the 
communication tariff have received the most attention in the immediate 
aftermath of ESA, the majority’s interpretation of the exclusive rights of 
copyright for works is arguably its most noteworthy pronouncement 
and one that rebalances (again) the relationship between authors and 
the public interest. The majority’s conclusion that the section 3 listed 
rights are not independent is a striking interpretation of the precedents 
with important implications in practical terms for the administration 
of copyright through licensing and collective societies, but also in 
theoretical terms for the definition of copyright itself. The nature of 
the disagreement in the closely split Supreme Court arguably goes to 
the most central principle of copyright law: the nature of the exclusive 
rights of copyright, which defines how many rights an owner has, how 
many rights an owner can simultaneously assert, and when the exercise 
of a right pre-empts other rights.
ii: ESA v SOCAN 
A.  Justices Abella and Moldaver’s Majority Reasons for Judgment
The majority’s reasons for judgment, written by Abella and Moldaver 
JJ (and joined by McLachlin CJ and Deschamps and Karakatsanis 
JJ), concludes that the communication right cannot apply to the 
downloading of a video game containing musical works, where the 
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reproduction of the musical works has already been cleared and a 
reproduction royalty paid. This conclusion rests on a chain of reasoning 
for which the definition of copyright is a central component. Although 
the majority does not explicitly spell out the progression of their 
argument in this fashion, it rests on the following chain of logic. First, 
each of the “illustrative” rights tracks back to one of the three categories 
in section 3(1), i.e. reproduction, performance and publication.4 For 
example, the section 3(1)(i) rental right is within the general category 
of reproduction rights and the section 3(1)(f) communication right is 
within the general category of performance rights. Second, there is a 
“traditional distinction” between “performance and communication 
rights on the one hand and reproduction rights on the other.”5 Third, 
any “single activity” cannot violate two separate rights at the same 
time.6 Fourth, here there is “only one activity at issue: downloading 
a copy of a video game containing musical works.”7 Fifth and finally, 
the communication right cannot apply to the downloading of a video 
game because that single activity has already been covered by the 
reproduction right and therefore there should not be more than one 
type of royalty. 
According to the majority, copyright is exhaustively defined in 
the introductory paragraph to section 3(1), and the rights in sections 
3(1)(a)-(i) are “simply illustrative”:8
Nor is the communication right in s. 3(1)(f) a sui 
generis right in addition to the general rights described 
in s. 3(1). The introductory paragraph defines what 
constitutes “copyright”. It states that copyright “means” 
the sole right to produce or reproduce a work in any 
material form, to perform a work in public, or to publish 
an unpublished work. This definition of “copyright” is 
exhaustive, as the term “means” confines its scope. The 
paragraph concludes by stating that copyright “includes” 
several other rights, set out in subsections (a) through 
(i). As a result, the rights in the introductory paragraph 
provide the basic structure of copyright. The enumerated 
rights listed in the subsequent subparagraphs are 
simply illustrative: Sunny Handa, Copyright Law in 
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Canada (2002), at p. 195; see also Apple Computer Inc. v 
Mackintosh Computers Ltd., [1987] 1 F.C. 173 (T.D.), at 
p. 197. The rental rights in s. 3(1)(i) referred to by Justice 
Rothstein, for example, can fit comfortably into the 
general category of reproduction rights.
The majority thus contends not only that applying a communica-
tion right in addition to the performance right would constitute 
double counting, but that applying a right from the broad category of 
“performance and communication rights” to the “same activity” that 
is already covered by a reproduction right would constitute double 
counting. To phrase the majority’s position more generally, a right in 
the lettered list cannot apply in addition to another right that is part 
of the same category of general rights in the introductory paragraph; 
presumably, that rule means not only that a general right and a lettered 
right from the same category cannot apply at the same time, but that 
more than one right in the lettered list cannot apply if they fall within 
the same category of rights in the introductory paragraph. Moreover, 
for any single activity, the rights are effectively exhausted once any 
copyright right applies to it. 
As further support for their position, the majority emphasizes 
that the interpretation of section 3 should adhere to technological 
neutrality, a principle that underlay the judgment in Robertson v 
Thomson Corp.9 Under technological neutrality, they argue, there 
should be no difference between an end purchaser who buys a physical 
copy of the video game and one who elects to receive it as a digital 
download because “[t]he Internet is simply a technological taxi that 
delivers a durable copy of the same work to the end user.”10 Hence, 
they reason, a “separate, ‘communication’ tariff applied to downloads 
of musical works violates the principle of technological neutrality.”11 
As the majority defines that term, it “requires that the Copyright Act 
apply equally between traditional and more technologically advanced 
forms of the same media.”12
B.  Justice Rothstein’s Dissenting Reasons for Judgment
By contrast, Rothstein J, in his dissent (joined by LeBel, Fish and 
Cromwell JJ) argues that all the rights in section 3, whether in the 
introductory paragraph or in the lettered list, are independent, and 
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that the majority’s “propositions pre-empt the application of other 
rights of the copyright holder to this set of facts and divest these rights 
of their independent content.”13 Rothstein J invokes first principles of 
copyright law, including the traditional metaphor of copyright rights 
as a bundle of sticks:14 
Copyright is a creature of statute (Théberge v Galérie 
d’Art du Petit Champlain inc., 2002 SCC 34, 2002 SCC 
34, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336, at para. 5; Compo Co. v Blue 
Crest Music Inc., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 357, at p. 373; Bishop 
v Stevens, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 467, at p. 477). Copyright is 
comprised of a bundle of independent statutory rights 
(Bishop v Stevens, at p. 477; Compo Co. Ltd. v Blue 
Crest Music, at p. 373). Courts must give effect to these 
independent rights as provided by Parliament. While 
courts must bear in mind that the Copyright Act “is…a 
balance between promoting the public interest in the 
encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts 
and intellect and obtaining a just reward for the creator” 
which balance requires “not only…recognizing the 
creator’s rights but in giving due weight to their limited 
nature” (Théberge, at paras. 30 and 31), courts must 
still respect the language chosen by Parliament—not 
override it.
Rothstein J, like the majority, remarks the bi-partite structure 
of section 3 but interprets that as supporting, rather than detracting 
from, the status of the communication right as a “self-standing right” 
that is independent of the general rights:15 
I digress briefly to point out that the structure of s. 3(1) 
implies that the communication right in paragraph (f) 
is a self-standing right independent of the performance 
right in the introduction of the section. The first lines of 
the English version of s. 3(1) provide that “‘copyright’…
means the sole right to produce or reproduce the 
work…, to perform the work…in public or…to publish 
the work…and includes the sole right”….
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There then follow specific rights listed as paragraphs  
(a) to (i). Paragraph (f) provides for the sole right to 
“communicate the work to the public by telecommunication”.
Parsing the listed rights, Rothstein J rejects the idea that they 
each could “fit comfortably”, as the majority put it, within one of the 
general rights in the introductory paragraph:16 
While the use of the word “includes” could indicate that 
the rights listed in subparagraphs (a) to (i) are instances 
of one of the rights in the opening words of s. 3(1), the 
context indicates otherwise. Several of the listed rights 
are clearly outside of the right to produce or reproduce, 
perform or publish. For example, paragraph (i) provides 
for the right to rent out a sound recording embodying 
a musical work. It is difficult to see how this right fits 
within the right to produce or reproduce, perform 
or publish the work. Indeed, it would be contrary to 
Théberge, in particular at paras. 42 and 45, where the 
majority of this Court held that a “reproduction” within 
the meaning of the Act requires a multiplication of 
copies. All the prerogatives of the copyright holder in s. 
3(1) are better considered as separate and distinct rights 
(Bishop v Stevens, at p. 477, per McLachlin J.; Compo Co. 
v Blue Crest Music Inc., at p. 373, per Estey J.).
Finally, the dissent turns to the French version of section 3 as 
support for the interpretation that the listed rights are in addition to, 
and not mere illustrations of, the general rights in the introductory 
paragraph:17 
This interpretation of the English version of s. 3(1) is 
consistent with the French version of the text, which 
states that “[l]e droit d’auteur sur l’oeuvre comporte le 
droit exclusif de produire ou reproduire, [représenter ou 
publier] l’œuvre; ce droit comporte, en outre, [les droits 
énumérés aux alinéas (a) à (i)].” The use of the phrase 
“en outre”—in addition—indicates paras. (a) to (i) are in 
addition to those in the opening words.
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Hence, as the rights are all independent and can be separately 
exercised, Rothstein J avers it “cannot be inferred that the independent 
right of communication to the public by telecommunication in s 3(1)
(f) cannot be engaged where, at the same time, copies of a work are 
made available.”18 In other words, the reproduction right and the 
communication right may both apply. 
The dissent likewise supports a principle of technological 
neutrality but disagrees with the majority’s application of the 
principle, instead observing that “technology neutrality is not a 
statutory requirement capable of overriding the language of the Act 
and barring the application of the different protected rights provided 
by Parliament.”19 As Rothstein J points out, the passage in Robertson 
that referenced technological neutrality was protective of the author’s 
(and the public’s) rights. As that decision put it, “Media neutrality is 
not a licence to override the rights of authors—it exists to protect the 
rights of authors and others as technology evolves.”20 In the dissent’s 
reading, technological neutrality requires that the Copyright Act 
apply to different media, but it does not dilute the exclusive rights. 
Technological neutrality, according to the dissent, ensures that 
reproduction rights apply to digital copies and that communication 
rights apply to technologies other than broadcasting, but it does not 
vitiate the application of section 3(1)(f).21 Attacking the majority’s 
technological taxi metaphor, Rothstein J counters that though “the 
Internet may well be described as a technological taxi…taxis need not 
give free rides.”22 The dissent instead suggests that if the application 
of statutory rights results in an imbalance, the appropriate recourse is 
Parliamentary amendment or for the Copyright Board to exercise its 
discretion to adjust the tariff rates.23 
iii: Defining Copyright’s exclusive Rights 
A.  Section 3
Section 3, the interpretation of which is the focus of ESA, defines 
copyright’s exclusive rights for works: that is, the economic rights. 
The Copyright Act defines “copyright” in section 2, which states, in 
part, that it “means the rights described in…section 3, in the case of 
a work.”24 Section 3 in turn defines “copyright” in relation to works. 
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For ease of reference, section 3 provides: 
3 (1) For the purposes of this Act, “copyright”, in relation 
to a work, means the sole right to produce or reproduce 
the work or any substantial part thereof in any material 
form whatever, to perform the work or any substantial 
part thereof in public or, if the work is unpublished, to 
publish the work or any substantial part thereof, and 
includes the sole right
(a) to produce, reproduce, perform or publish any 
translation of the work,
(b) in the case of a dramatic work, to convert it into a 
novel or other non-dramatic work,
(c) in the case of a novel or other non-dramatic work, or 
of an artistic work, to convert it into a dramatic work, by 
way of performance in public or otherwise,
(d) in the case of a literary, dramatic or musical work, 
to make any sound recording, cinematograph film or 
other contrivance by means of which the work may be 
mechanically reproduced or performed,
(e) in the case of any literary, dramatic, musical or 
artistic work, to reproduce, adapt and publicly present 
the work as a cinematographic work,
(f) in the case of any literary, dramatic, musical or 
artistic work, to communicate the work to the public by 
telecommunication,
(g) to present at a public exhibition, for a purpose other 
than sale or hire, an artistic work created after June 7, 
1988, other than a map, chart or plan,
(h) in the case of a computer program that can be 
reproduced in the ordinary course of its use, other than 
by a reproduction during its execution in conjunction 
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with a machine, device or computer, to rent out the 
computer program, and
(i) in the case of a musical work, to rent out a sound 
recording in which the work is embodied,
[(j) in the case of a work that is in the form of a tangible 
object, to sell or otherwise transfer ownership of the 
tangible object, as long as that ownership has never 
previously been transferred in or outside Canada, with 
the authorization of the copyright owner,]
and to authorize any such acts.
The Copyright Modernization Act, 2012, which came into force a 
few months after the Supreme Court’s decision in ESA, added section 
3(1)(j), which provides first distribution rights.25 It did not otherwise 
change the structure of section 3. Thus, if the majority’s interpretation 
applies, section 3(1)(j), like section 3(1)(f), is illustrative of one of the 
three general rights. If the dissent’s interpretation applies, section 3(1)
(j), like section 3(1)(f), is a separate right that applies independently. 
The structure of the Canadian Copyright Act thus has an 
introductory paragraph that describes copyright as comprising three 
rights (copyright “means” the sole right “to produce or reproduce”, 
“to perform” and, for unpublished works, “to publish” the “work or 
any substantial part” of it). The right “to produce or reproduce” is the 
only one of the three rights for which the more expansive language 
“in any material form whatever” applies.26 Further, it is only in the 
introductory paragraph that the language “or any substantial part 
thereof ” appears; that phrase is not repeated anywhere in the list of 
lettered rights. 
The introductory paragraph states that copyright “means” those 
rights, but then concludes by stating that copyright “includes the 
sole right”, followed by a list of several rights, many of which are 
particular to only certain kinds of works. According to legislative 
drafting practice, the term “means” conventionally signals that a 
statutory term of art has been exhaustively defined, while “includes” 
conventionally signals a non-restrictive definition.27 Thus the use of 
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both “means” and “includes” in statutory definitions, as in section 
3, has been discouraged as contradictory. For example, the Drafting 
Conventions of the Uniform Law Conference of Canada provide:28 
 
 “Means” and “includes”
(4) “Means” and “includes” have different uses.
Note that the French version of this subsection is 
different.
“Means” is appropriate for exhaustive definition (where 
French uses s’entend de, or no linking word at all). 
“Includes” is appropriate for two kinds of definitions; 
those that extend the defined term’s usual meaning (here 
French uses techniques such as assimiler à), and those 
that merely give examples of the defined term’s meaning 
without being exhaustive (here, French generally uses 
s’entend notamment de). When a bilingual Act is being 
prepared, the two drafters must consider the issues 
together. The drafter should exercise caution when 
using “includes”. It should not be used in exhaustive 
definitions, and the contradictory “means and includes” 
should never be used. 
The conflict between the majority’s and dissent’s approaches to 
interpreting section 3 may be attributed in great part to the ambiguity 
of a statutory definition that employs both “means” and “includes”, 
a conjunction that “inevitably raises a doubt as to interpretation.”29 
The majority and the dissent agree that the issue turns on statutory 
interpretation, but part ways on the preferred interpretation. The 
majority’s approach characterizes the individual listed rights as 
mere illustrations constituting a sub-category of an exhaustively 
defined term. In effect, the majority partially adopts the second 
sense of “includes” referred to by the Uniform Law Conference of 
Canada’s drafting conventions—to merely give examples—but then 
adapts it for the context of a restrictive definition. The dissent’s 
approach characterizes the individual listed rights as an extension 
of the defined term’s usual meaning, consistent with the first sense 
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of “includes” referred to by Uniform Law Conference of Canada’s 
drafting conventions, but interprets the overall definition to be non-
restrictive. 
The complication with the majority’s approach to section 3 is that 
the particular rights in the lettered list after “includes” sometimes, 
but not always, map neatly onto one of the three main rights in the 
introductory paragraph. For example, translating a work may be 
seen as a form of reproduction, albeit one that is metaphorical rather 
than literal. But section 3(1)(a), which refers to translation, more 
comprehensively covers the rights to “produce, reproduce, perform 
or publish” any translation of a work, and thus cannot be contained 
solely within the category of reproduction rights. Section 3(1)(j)’s 
distribution right, which had been introduced in a bill at the time 
of the ESA decision but which came in force a few months later, is 
also convoluted to map onto one of the general rights. If one had 
to choose from among the majority’s three broad rights, the closest 
analogy to the right to the first sale or other transfer of the ownership 
in the tangible object would seem to be publication. But this poor fit 
underscores the dubious exercise of trying to map all the listed rights 
back onto the general rights. Indeed, the very existence of some of the 
explicitly stated rights may fairly be attributed to conflicting judicial 
interpretations or ambiguities, often occasioned by new technological 
developments, as to whether a given act was already encompassed, 
or potentially encompassed, by one of the three main rights.30 As 
Rothstein J summarizes, the “legislation has evolved to recognize the 
evolution of technologies.”31 Some section 3 rights were motivated by 
the development of new technologies; both the majority and dissent 
explain that this was the reason for amending section 3(1)(f) to refer 
to telecommunication rather than broadcasting, making it a more 
technologically neutral right.32 In other cases, rights were added to 
satisfy treaty obligations (e.g., section 3(1)(f) was added in 1931 to 
implement the Rome agreement),33 which suggests that it was not 
obvious that all the particularized rights were implicit in one of the 
general rights, and that the uncertainty merited at least a “for greater 
clarification” amendment. 
Thus, the rights in the lettered list are more than what might 
be assumed to be in reproduction, performance and publication; 
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conversely, they are also less than the universe of what reproduction, 
performance and publication might conceivably include, leaving 
room not only for courts to interpret a right in the introductory 
paragraph to include acts that are not in the lettered list but also for 
Parliament to add other individual rights (as was in fact done in the 
2012 Copyright Modernization Act). Under this interpretation, the 
listed rights are part of, and within, the definition of “copyright”, but 
not necessarily a foreseeable subset of one of the three main rights 
nor the only analogous and historically related rights that might be 
envisioned. That is, in contrast to the majority’s reading and consistent 
with the dissent’s reading, section 3(1) can be interpreted as stating 
that “copyright” means the sole right to produce or reproduce the 
work…to perform the work…in public…to publish the work…and 
[also] includes the sole rights” in the list that follows, including the 
right to communicate to the public by telecommunication. In that 
interpretation, each of the rights, including the rights in sections 3(1)
(a)-(j), is separate, distinct and independent, and the rights owner 
can exercise any and all of those rights. This interpretation seems 
most consistent with the French version of the text and with Elmer 
Driedger’s sole principle for statutory interpretation: “namely, the 
words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their 
grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of 
the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.”34
Confusingly, the ESA majority acknowledges that the “rights 
enumerated in section 3(1) are distinct”, but then states that the 
communication right in section 3(1)(f) is not a “sui generis right in 
addition to the general rights described in s. 3(1).” The majority thus 
contends that the listed rights, although “distinct”, are not “sui generis” 
rights and are not additional to the three general rights.35 Although 
the majority rejects the idea that the listed rights are “sui generis”, that 
is not really the key point; rather, it is whether all the rights (general 
and listed) may be exercised independently. Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines “sui generis” as “of its own kind or class; unique or peculiar.”36 
Both the dissent and the majority agree that the right to communicate 
to the public by telecommunication historically derived from the right 
to public performance;37 thus, both sides may be taken to agree that 
the communication right is not “sui generis”, if the use of that term 
ELIZABETH F. JUDGE   |   415
suggests that a “sui generis” communication right would have no 
historical linkage to one of the three main rights. The most important 
question, however, is whether the listed rights and general rights are 
distinct rights that may be exercised independently, regardless of their 
historical connections, and on that point Canadian case law, including 
the Supreme Court’s own precedents, gives credence to the dissent’s 
position that the listed rights be treated as independent rights. 
B.  Canadian Case Law
As Rothstein J outlines, an alternative interpretation of the structure 
of the Copyright Act to the one put forward by the majority is that 
copyright is defined as all the rights in section 3, each right is 
independent of the others, and an owner may exercise any and all 
of the rights. This seems to be what La Forest JA intended when he 
wrote: “Section 3(1) defines the rights comprised in a copyright in 
a non-exhaustive way. Generally it is the sole right to produce or 
reproduce the work or a substantial part of it in any form, but as will be 
seen later the law also affords protection to the author against certain 
interferences with the right.”38 In other words, copyright generally 
consists of a reproduction right, but it is not confined to that right.
Copyright also protects against other interferences, for example, the 
unauthorized communication to the public by telecommunication.
The difference between the majority and dissent in ESA lies in 
whether the listed rights are all individual rights that a copyright 
owner may separately exercise or whether a copyright owner for any 
given act is effectively limited to reproduction, performance and 
publication. Under the latter interpretation of the Supreme Court 
majority, for a given activity, a copyright owner may exercise one, and 
only one, of the three major rights. Under the former interpretation, a 
copyright owner may exercise more than one of the general rights and 
particular rights, and thus could exercise both public performance and 
communication to the public rights, as well as reproduction rights. The 
Supreme Court’s own precedents repeatedly characterize the rights as 
separate and distinct and thus support the former interpretation.
In Compo Co v Blue Crest Music Inc., Estey J, for a unanimous 
Court, concluded that a person pressing phonograph records 
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infringes the exclusive section 3 rights of the copyright holder of 
the musical work. Notably, the decision characterizes one of the 
listed rights (in that case, section 3(1)(d)), one of the general rights 
(performance or reproduction), and the authorization right as 
“separate and distinct rights”:39 
The sole right to perform the work resides in the owner 
of the copyright therein (s. 3(1)).The sole right to make 
such contrivance is in the copyright owner (s. 3(1)(d)). 
The sole right to authorize either performance or the 
making of the record is in the copyright holder (s. 3(1)). 
Sections 3 and 19(9)(c) very clearly establish these rights 
as separate and distinct rights, exclusive to the owner of 
the copyright in the work.
The same pattern held in Bishop v Stevens, where then McLachlin 
J, for a unanimous court, described section 3(1) in total as listing “a 
number of distinct rights belonging to the copyright holder” and went 
on to characterize one of the general rights and one of the listed rights 
as “distinct rights”. As she continued, “The right to perform (including 
radio broadcast), and the right to make a recording, are separately 
enumerated in s 3(1). They are distinct rights in theory and in practice, as 
is evident from a description of the licensing system by which musicians 
obtain payment for use of their works.”40 As Rothstein J summarizes these 
precedents, “the rights of copyright holders under s. 3(1) are distinct and 
separate rights. Bishop v Stevens re-affirmed…the holding in Compo…
that the rights listed in s. 3(1) are distinct and separate rights.”41 
That idea was reaffirmed in the Supreme Court’s 2004 ruling in 
SOCAN v CAIP, which specifically used section 3(1)(f) to illustrate 
the principle that the exercise of any right exclusive to the copyright 
owner infringes copyright.42 
It is an infringement for anyone to do, without the 
consent of the copyright owner, “anything that, by this 
Act, only the owner of the copyright has the right to 
do” (s. 27(1)), including, since the 1988 amendments, 
the right “to communicate the work to the public by 
telecommunication…and to authorize any such acts” 
(s. 3(1)(f) [emphasis added]). 
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Further support is provided by CCH Canadian v Law Society of 
Upper Canada [CCH], which established that the authorization right, 
which is part of section 3(1) but not part of the list of particularized 
rights, was a separate right.43 
Following a recent pattern in Supreme Court decisions of moving 
away from Bishop v Stevens, especially its “author-centric view”, the 
ESA majority here distinguishes Bishop v Stevens on the ground that 
it involved “two activities”—making an ephemeral copy of a musical 
work for a broadcast and the broadcast of the work.44 By contrast, the 
facts in ESA, according to the majority, involved only one activity—
downloading a copy of a video game containing musical works. The 
practical implication of the majority’s reasoning is that there is only 
one tariff (based on reproduction), and SOCAN is not entitled to an 
additional royalty based on the section 3(1)(f) communication right. 
But even if one were to allow the majority’s argument that the 
communication right is a subset of performance rights, and that by 
implication it would be a form of double counting to allow both, that 
does not explain why the reproduction right and the performance 
right could not both apply to this situation. Indeed, in Bishop v 
Stevens, a variant of the reproduction right and the performance right 
both applied. Nevertheless, the ESA majority distinguishes Bishop v 
Stevens on the grounds that it stands for the proposition that there 
may be only one right per one “activity”. But that reading deviates 
from the language in the Bishop v Stevens excerpt that is quoted in 
support. Bishop v Stevens approvingly quotes an English Court of 
Appeal decision that refers to “acts”, not “activities”. Moreover, the 
term “acts” is used synonymously with “rights”, not with “activities”, 
in that excerpt by the English Court of Appeal:45
It is clear from an examination of s. 3(1) that it lists a 
number of distinct rights belonging to the copyright 
holder. As stated in Ash v. Hutchinson & Co. (Publishers), 
Ltd., [1936] 2 All E.R. 1496 (C.A.), at p. 1507, per  
Greene L.J.:
 Under the Copyright Act, 1911 [on which the   
 Canadian Act was based], s. 1(2), the rights of the 
 owner of copyright are set out. A number of acts are 
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 specified, the sole right to do which is conferred on  
 the owner of the copyright. The right to do each of 
 these acts is, in my judgment, a separate statutory  
 right, and anyone who without the consent of the 
 owner of the copyright does any of these acts 
 commits a tort; if he does two of them, he commits 
 two torts, and so on.
See also Compo Co. v. Blue Crest Music Inc., supra,  
at p. 373.
In context, it is clear that “acts” are intended to be equivalent to 
the sole rights of copyright and not with activities. Yet Abella and 
Moldaver JJ, in paraphrasing that decision, write: “Bishop does not 
stand for the proposition that a single activity (i.e., a download) can 
violate two separate rights at the same time. This is clear from the 
quote in Ash v. Hutchinson, which refers to ‘two…acts’.”46 
It breaks from precedent to contend that a copyright owner 
cannot exercise more than one right per “activity”. “Activity” appears 
in only a few places in the Copyright Act, and the only close instances 
to the majority’s usage are the references in sections 27(2) and 27.1, 
where it is used to refer back to previously described activities that 
constitute secondary infringement. In the legislation, the term 
“activity” is never used to delimit how the copyright owner may 
exercise exclusive rights. However, that is what the majority does in 
ESA. The majority invokes “activity” as a restrictive device to address 
their concern that applying the communication right to the download 
of musical works would “capture activities akin to reproduction” and 
“would result in abandoning the traditional distinction in the Act 
between performance-based rights and rights of reproduction.”47 But 
recognizing that the transmission of a work is a communication to the 
public by telecommunication does not amount to a wrongful incursion 
into the realm of reproduction rights. The reproduction of the work 
(which, as Rothstein J notes, the Supreme Court has already defined 
in Théberge as requiring the multiplication of copies48) is a distinct act 
from the communication of that work and thus both rights may apply. 
Further, the majority does not clearly explain why, if these rights 
are indeed distinct, more than one right cannot be involved in an 
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“activity”. It is a truism of intellectual property that any given physical 
property can implicate more than one type of intellectual property 
right. The rights protect different aspects, so generally this is not 
double counting or overprotection. For example, an electronic device 
will likely have a trademark, copyrighted software and a patented 
process. Similarly, for each type of intellectual property right, owner’s 
rights are usually characterized as a bundle of rights, and the owner 
can exercise any or all of them. The rights can be disentangled and 
separately exercised, including by assignment and licensing, and can 
be limited in duration or by region. That structure is replicated in 
the collective society regimes in which different collectives exercise 
different rights (e.g., the music performing rights administered by 
SOCAN and the reproduction rights administered by ACCESS). 
It follows then, as Rothstein J writes:49 
The occurrence of one infringement therefore does not 
preclude the finding of another. As “[i]nfringement is the 
single act of doing something which ‘only the owner of the 
copyright has the right to do’” (Compo Co. v. Blue Crest 
Music Inc., at p. 375), if two protected acts occur without 
authorization of the copyright holder, there are two 
infringements. The fact that there are two protected rights 
does not restrict the protection afforded by each right.
The majority stresses that the principle of technological neutrality 
demands that an Internet download be treated equivalently to a 
hard copy and that the mere choice of a delivery method should not 
implicate additional rights. But, as Rothstein J counters, a “media 
neutral application of the Act…does not imply that a court can depart 
from the ordinary meaning of the words of the Act in order to achieve 
the level of protection for copyright holders that the court considers 
is adequate.”50 For copyright purposes, the transmission of a digital 
work does implicate different rights than the sale of a hard copy. That 
conclusion is inherent in the catalogue of rights that the legislation 
provides. It is also consistent with prevailing contracting practices, 
with Canadian case law, and with international and other national 
definitions of the exclusive rights of copyright for works. 
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C.  Other Sources
Copyright law is “purely statutory law”, which “simply creates rights 
and obligations upon the terms and in the circumstances set out in the 
statute.”51 As such, this question of how to define the exclusive rights 
of copyright is purely an exercise of statutory interpretation of the 
Canadian Copyright Act. The Supreme Court has rightly cautioned that 
other countries’ copyright acts “must be scrutinized very carefully”, 
given differences in the statutory wording.52 However, the Supreme 
Court has consulted international agreements, the legislation of member 
countries bound by the same treaties, and the legislation of “like-
minded” countries to aid in interpreting the Canadian statute.53 The 
Berne Convention, the TRIPS Agreement and the copyright legislation 
of other countries, which, like Canada, share historical links with the 
United Kingdom, all support treating the listed rights as independent.
1. International Agreements 
In the Berne Convention, the exclusive rights of copyright are 
listed in separate articles and are specific to particular types of works.54 
Article 8 provides translation rights for authors of literary and artistic 
works. Article 9 provides reproduction rights for literary and artistic 
works and includes sound and visual recordings. Article 11 provides 
authors of dramatic and musical works with translation rights (art 
11(2)), as well as the rights to authorize public performance (art 11(1)
(i)) and communication to the public by telecommunication (art 11(1)
(ii)). Article 11ter provides authors of literary works with the right to 
authorize the public recitation and communication to the public of 
their works and translation rights. Finally, Article 12 provides authors 
of literary and artistic works with the right to authorize adaptations, 
arrangements and other alterations of their works. Communication 
rights are present in both articles 11ter and 11 and, significantly, are in 
the same hierarchy as the reproduction rights and performance rights. 
All of these rights are in TRIPS, which incorporates articles 
1 through 21 of the Berne Convention (with the exception of the 
provisions in article 6bis on moral rights).55 In United States—Section 
110(5) of the US Copyright Act, a WTO panel discussed “exclusive 
rights” in the context of addressing the application of TRIPS’s three-
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step test for copyright, which WTO members must satisfy in order 
to impose limitations and exceptions to copyright.56 The test, which 
is set out in TRIPS article 13, provides that “Members shall confine 
limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases 
which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and 
do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right 
holder.”57 The meaning of copyright “exclusive rights” is integral to 
the application of the three-step test because “whether a limitation or 
an exception conflicts with a normal exploitation of a work should be 
judged for each exclusive right individually.”58 The WTO panel treated 
each Berne subsection that was involved in that dispute as constituting 
a separate exclusive right: “In our view, normal exploitation would 
presuppose the possibility for right holders to exercise separately all 
three exclusive rights guaranteed under the three subparagraphs of 
Article 11bis(1), as well as the rights conferred by other provisions, 
such as Article 11, of the Berne Convention (1971).”59 Moreover, 
the panel determined that any limitation or exception must be 
justified for each right. The panel reasoned that “the exclusive rights 
conferred by different subparagraphs of Articles 11bis and 11 need 
not necessarily be in the possession of one and the same right holder”, 
and hence, “[i]f it were permissible to justify the interference into one 
exclusive right with the fact that another exclusive right generates 
more revenue, certain right holders might be deprived of their right 
to obtain royalties simply because the exclusive right held by another 
right holder is more profitable.”60 In this dispute, the WTO panel 
distinguished the right to authorize communication to the public by 
telecommunication of a musical or dramatic work as separate from 
the right to authorize a performance of a dramatic or musical work. 
Analogizing the WTO panel reasoning on exclusive rights to the 
Canadian Copyright Act, the section 3(1)(f) communication right 
would likewise be a separate right from the performance right; that 
interpretation is consistent with the ESA dissent’s approach of treating 
sections 3(1)(a)-(i) as separate rights, rather than with the majority’s 
approach that they are merely illustrative of three broad rights. As the 
WTO panel emphasized, “[i]t must be remembered that a copyright 
owner is entitled to exploit each of the rights for which a treaty, and 
the national legislation implementing that treaty, provides.”61 
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2. Other Countries’ Copyright Statutes
None of the statutes of the United Kingdom, Australia, New 
Zealand or Singapore have the split structure of the Canadian Act 
of an introductory paragraph with a general definition for copyright 
followed by other rights. Instead, the structure of these statutes 
accords equal precedence to each of the rights. 
In the United Kingdom’s Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 
1988,62 section 2 defines the “Rights subsisting in copyright works” as 
the exclusive right to do the acts in Chapter II. In Chapter II, section 
16 provides that the copyright owner has the exclusive right to do six 
acts, including the right to “copy”, to “perform, show or play the work 
in public”, and “to communicate the work to the public.” Section 17 
further provides that the right to communicate the work to the public, 
which applies to all types of work, covers any electronic transmission, 
including broadcasting, and also includes the making available right.
In Australia’s Copyright Act 1968, section 31 defines copyright as 
the right to do “all or any of the following acts”: reproduce, publish, 
publicly perform, communicate to the public and adapt the work in the 
case of literary, dramatic and musical works; and reproduce, publish 
and communicate the work to the public in the case of artistic works.63 
In New Zealand’s Copyright Act 1994,64 section 16(1) sets out nine 
acts that the copyright owner has the exclusive right to do, including 
to copy, perform the work in public, communicate the work in public, 
and to authorize the protected acts. Communicating the work in 
public is a restricted act for all types of works.65 Again, each of these 
rights is set out in the same hierarchy. 
In Singapore’s Copyright Act, section 26 defines copyright as 
the exclusive right to do “all or any of the following acts”, including 
reproduction, publication, public performance, communication to 
the public, and adaptation for literary, dramatic and musical works; 
and reproduction, publication and communication to the public for 
artistic works.66 
While it must be stressed that these statutes have limited 
significance for the statutory interpretation of the Canadian 
Copyright Act, it is nonetheless interesting that in each of these “like-
minded” and Berne- and WTO-member jurisdictions, the right to 
communicate to the public is separately listed, accorded equal weight 
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to the other rights, and not treated as a subset of a more general right. 
Australia and Singapore emphasize this by stating that the copyright 
owner has the right to do “all or any” of the described acts; that is, 
each right may be exercised independently and more than one right 
may be exercised. Each of these jurisdictions lists performance and 
communication to the public as separate rights and places them in 
the same hierarchy of all the other rights (e.g., equal to reproduction). 
None of these jurisdictions first generally defines copyright and then 
lists more particular rights. 
iV: Conclusion 
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in ESA, a group of 
companies providing mobile phone services have asked the Copyright 
Board to reconsider the certification of a different communication-
based tariff (Tariff 24), which assesses royalties based on the 
communication right for the transmission of ringtones from wireless 
carriers to their subscribers, and seek the Federal Court to order 
SOCAN to repay $15 million in royalties that the phone companies 
have paid. Extrapolating from ESA, the companies contend that 
transmitting a ringtone implicates only the reproduction right 
and not the communication right and that Tariff 24 is invalid.67 In 
SOCAN’s response to the application to the Copyright Board, SOCAN 
conversely argues that even if ESA adversely affects Tariff 24, the 
making available right in the newly enacted section 2.4(1.1), which 
is part of the package of amendments in the Copyright Modernization 
Act that came into force shortly after ESA, restores its right to collect 
communication tariffs, and that section 2.4(1.1) applies not only to 
ringtones but to video games as well.68 
This development points to two open questions: how far does 
ESA’s ruling on the scope and number of section 3 rights extend? And 
how does ESA (and, more broadly, the other cases in the Supreme 
Court’s copyright pentalogy) intersect with the amendments in the 
Copyright Modernization Act, particularly those like section 2.4(1.1), 
which relate to treaty obligations under the WIPO Copyright Treaty? 
If one were to emphasize the majority’s reasoning in ESA, one 
would argue that there are only three economic rights and thus only 
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one means per activity for a copyright owner to acquire a revenue 
stream. Downloads of works, whether they be ringtones or video 
games, by telecommunication is a reproduction that does not engage 
the performance right and hence does not support a right to collect 
tariffs based on a communication right. The implications of the 
majority’s logic in ESA would also seem to mean that section 2.4(1.1)’s 
making available right is not a freestanding right; it is simply a variant 
of the performance right. Regardless of the passage of section 2.4(1.1) 
in the Copyright Modernization Act, then, a collective society would 
not be able to collect a tariff based on the communication right for 
the Internet transmission of a permanent copy of a work (as opposed 
to streaming) since that properly falls within the reproduction right. 
This is the core of the phone companies’ argument.
But if the coming into force of the Copyright Modernization Act is 
emphasized, one could alternatively argue either that section 2.4(1.1) 
indicates Parliament’s intent to enact a new right for copyright owners 
(the making available right), which is separate from section 3 and 
therefore that ESA’s ruling on the interpretation of section 3 is not 
apposite, or that the making available right in section 2.4(1.1) is a 
species of a communication right, but its recognition in the Copyright 
Modernization Act overrides the earlier ruling in ESA. Either way, 
section 2.4(1.1) suggests a new basis on which to support a revenue 
stream through the imposition of tariffs. According to SOCAN, 
the introduction of the MAR [making available right] 
re-establishes SOCAN’s right to require licences—and 
the Board’s jurisdiction to certify tariffs—in respect of 
the downloading of musical works made available to 
the public in such a way that members of the public 
may access the musical works from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them. This would cover ringtones 
and ringbacks, as well videogames and full-length 
musical tracks.69 
This is the central premise of SOCAN’s counter argument. 
These tensions, both between the two views of section 3 rights 
and between ESA and the Copyright Modernization Act, will no 
doubt continue to ramify. Section 3 defines copyright’s economic 
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rights, those rights that Binnie J in Théberge described as “based 
on a conception of artistic and literary works essentially as articles 
of commerce” and as taking a more “dollars and cents view of the 
relationship between an artist and his or her work.”70 Hence, the 
composition and number of those rights has significant repercussions 
for a copyright owner’s revenue stream. If there are only three rights 
and if these rights are limited per activity, as the majority ruled in 
ESA, then that presages significant changes to tariffs and copyright 
licensing; but it also suggests a more profound reconceptualization 
of the legal framework for a copyright owner’s economic exploitation 
of a work and more broadly foretells a rethinking of the purpose of 
copyright law. The implications of ESA and its relationship to the 
Copyright Modernization Act affect elemental questions regarding the 
nature of rights in copyright law, the relationship between Canadian 
copyright law and international treaties, statutory interpretation, 
the interplay between Parliament and the courts, the role of policy 
in copyright law, and the delineation of the principles of copyright 
balance and technological neutrality. Rothstein J is thus no doubt 
correct to remark in ESA that it is “fundamental principles of copyright 
law” on which the majority and dissent “part company”.71 
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User-Generated Content and  
Canadian Copyright Law
teresa scassa1
Bill C-112 provides for a new exception to infringement for 
user-generated content (UGC), along with new grounds for fair 
dealing. These provisions, combined with a strong and clear message 
from the Supreme Court of Canada’s pentalogy of copyright cases 
regarding users’ rights and the copyright balance, signal a new paradigm 
for copyright law in Canada—one that tolerates a much greater level 
of interaction with copyright-protected works. This chapter considers 
the shape Parliament has given to the UGC exception and examines 
its place within the scheme of the Copyright Act, particularly in light 
of recent Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence. The chapter begins 
with a discussion of the definition of UGC, followed by an analysis of 
the statutory exception. It next considers the relationship between the 
UGC exception and the fair dealing exception. Although opponents 
might characterize both the UGC exception and expanded fair 
dealing as unjustifiable encroachments upon the rights of copyright 
owners, this chapter argues that these exceptions reflect the shifting 
realities of cultural production and dissemination. 
 14
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1.  Defining User-Generated Content
User-generated content, or UGC,3 is a term that has been used to 
describe a fairly wide range of Internet-based activity from blogging 
to file-sharing.4 Gervais, admitting the difficulty of defining a term 
that covers such a broad range of conduct, has characterized it as 
“content that is created in whole or in part using tools specific to the 
online environment and/or disseminated using such tools.”5 Halbert 
defines it not so much in terms of what it is, but in terms of who makes 
it, writing that UGC is “used to describe activities engaged in by those 
typically seen not as cultural producers but cultural consumers.”6 
Although these characterizations emphasize different features 
of UGC, together they highlight the profound transformations 
wrought by the digital information context. On the one hand, digital 
technologies empower users of digital works to interact in new ways 
with copyright-protected content; at the same time, the proliferation 
of new and modified content from non-professional sources has 
undermined the traditional content intermediaries, creating a 
radically transformed context for the dissemination of information 
and cultural content.7 It is precisely this new paradigm that underpins 
the recent Supreme Court of Canada copyright jurisprudence.8
The expansive definitions of UGC have led to further attempts to 
categorize UGC for the purposes of legal analysis. Trosow et al9 offer 
a taxonomy for UGC that features three broad categories: creative 
content, small-scale tools (such as apps) and collaborative projects 
(such as wikis). In this taxonomy, the focus is on function, and it is 
certainly worth reflecting upon the broad range of purposes served 
by UGC. UGC may be innovative, creative or informative. Indeed, 
in fields of activity where UGC has had an impact on knowledge 
generation and dissemination, the focus of inquiry has been on the 
substantive issues around the quality and reliability of the new content, 
rather than on issues of copyright.10 Copyright lawyers employ a 
different taxonomy. Gervais offers a taxonomy based on the nature of 
the content in relation to copyright principles. He would divide UGC 
into three broad categories11: content authored by users,12 content 
derived by users13 and content copied by users.14 This taxonomy 
emphasizes the different ways in which individuals now engage with 
digital works and digital modes of dissemination. The focus on the 
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characterization of the user’s activity, as opposed to, for example, the 
form of the work, is echoed as well in the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
emphasis in SOCAN v Bell Canada [Bell] on the importance of the 
perspective of “the ultimate users” and their purposes in relation to 
the works at issue.15
The UGC exception in Bill C-11 is oriented only toward the 
second category in Gervais’ taxonomy: content that is created by users 
and that incorporates, to a greater or lesser extent, copyright works by 
others. It is therefore this category of UGC that will be the focus of 
this chapter. Because this chapter is about intellectual property law, it 
is the copyright lawyers’ taxonomy that is adopted. Nevertheless, it is 
important to note that UGC in its many forms is already becoming 
accepted in different fields of activity as a source of information and 
creativity, and inquiries in these fields have moved ahead to issues of 
how best to use, integrate and derive benefit from these new modes of 
knowledge creation.
2.  UGC in Context
The phenomenon of user-generated content is linked to the 
widespread digitization of works, the more recent broad accessibility 
of the software tools required to modify, mix and mash up digital 
content, and the availability of Internet platforms on which such UGC 
may be widely shared and disseminated.16 Yet while it is true that it 
is this digital perfect storm that has driven UGC onto the legislative 
agenda in Canada, UGC has its pre-digital antecedents. Fan fiction, 
parodies, satires and other forms of UGC have been around far longer 
than the Internet and digitization. What has changed is the ease with 
which users may now interact with content, the facility with which 
such content can reach global audiences, and the fact that users 
can create and disseminate their content without the participation 
of traditional cultural industry gatekeepers. In this respect, UGC 
is part of a much broader social transformation. The technological 
revolution that has facilitated the creation of UGC has achieved a 
more fundamental shift as well. Globally, and across a wide range 
of sectors and industries, digitization and the Web 2.0 environment 
have led to dramatically new ways in which individuals choose to 
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receive and share information, communicate with one another, and 
participate actively in the generation of knowledge, information and 
creative content. It is not the activity of “users” generating new content 
from existing works that is novel; rather, it is the social, political and 
economic consequences of such activity on a massive scale that are 
fundamentally new.17
The creation of UGC is sometimes characterized as economically 
neutral, culturally trivial and mildly parasitic activity. For example, the 
term “YouTube exception”18 was coined to refer to the UGC exception 
in Bill C-11 and its predecessor, Bill C-32.19 This term suggests that 
the paradigmatic activity contemplated by the exception is something 
like that of an individual who creates a home video using copyright-
protected music as a background, and then posts it to YouTube.20 
Seen from this angle, UGC is amateur in nature and carries little 
significance except within a circle of family and friends. Yet it would 
be a mistake to dismiss UGC so quickly. As discussed earlier, the label 
UGC is broad enough to capture a much wider diversity of activity. 
Fan fiction, mashups,21 video game modifications,22 and parodic and 
satirical uses of works can also be UGC. Many of these works reach 
a wide audience, and some may take on real cultural significance. 
Even if individual contributions are not specifically significant, fan 
interaction with ‘mainstream’ works marks an important cultural 
phenomenon.23 As some video game producers have learned, 
consumer interaction with their products is a trend better embraced 
than ignored or suppressed.24 
UGC also includes the very broad range of works contemplated by 
the open data movement. Individuals may take copyright-protected 
compilations of government data and use them to create “apps” 
(such as those for users of public transit systems, for example).25 
Some data sets are geospatial data that can be used to create complex 
information maps, often layering other content (including other 
government data sets) onto the map.26 This type of activity is now 
being actively encouraged by governments seeking to promote 
economic development and stimulate innovation.27 UGC in these 
contexts can be innovative, useful, critical or analytical. It can make 
a significant economic or social contribution and may play a role in 
political discourse by increasing transparency or critical engagement 
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with political and social issues. In this context, UGC cannot easily 
be dismissed as economically neutral, culturally trivial or mildly 
parasitic. UGC may play an undeniable, if not fully fathomed, role in 
cultural, social and political discourse.
It is worth noting that the open licensing phenomenon—the 
making available of all manner of copyright-protected works under 
open licences—is a kind of private response to copyright restrictions 
that shares some of the goals of the UGC exception. Movements such 
as Open Source,28 Creative Commons29 and now Open Data30 create 
the licensing tools that allow copyright owners to share their works 
and to allow them to be used, modified and adapted with relatively 
few restrictions. The creation of UGC has for some time now been 
actively encouraged by the open licensing movement, and has 
perhaps contributed to the blurring of lines between works that can be 
engaged with in transformative ways and those that cannot. Canada’s 
UGC exception carves out a space for the creation and dissemination 
of UGC in contexts where rights holders have not made their works 
available for the creation of derivative works through open licensing.
3.  The UGC exception and the Purpose of the Copyright act
The Supreme Court of Canada in Théberge described copyright 
law as “a balance between promoting the public interest in the 
encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts and intellect 
and obtaining a just reward for the creator”.31 In CCH, the Court 
characterized statutory exceptions to infringement as “users’ rights”,32 
thus placing them on a par with the rights of copyright owners, in 
terms of achieving the purposes of the legislation. More recently, 
in Bell, the Court stated that: “users’ rights are an essential part of 
furthering the public interest objectives of the Copyright Act.”33 As an 
exception to infringement, therefore, the UGC exception is part of 
the legislative balance aimed at achieving the public policy objectives 
underlying copyright law. 
User-generated content, as characterized in Bill C-11, serves 
both of the twin public policy goals of creation and dissemination of 
works. Of course, UGC implicates at least two different creators—one 
of the source work and the other of the UGC. The balance between 
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these creators is such that it is the creator of the source work who 
may profit economically from their work; the creator of the UGC 
may use the modified source work and may disseminate it, but only 
non-commercially, and only so long as there is no adverse impact 
on the source work. At the same time, the UGC exception facilitates 
the broad dissemination, not just of the modified source work, but of 
new content. In Bell, the Supreme Court of Canada emphasized the 
importance of dissemination to the copyright balance, noting: “the 
dissemination of artistic works is central to developing a robustly 
cultured and intellectual public domain.”34
4. The statutory exception
Bill C-11’s UGC exception35 is for non-commercial user-generated 
content. By characterizing it in this way, Parliament recognizes that 
UGC may have commercial and non-commercial objectives; the 
exception is only available for UGC that is used for “non-commercial” 
purposes. 
The following discussion of the statutory exception for UGC 
is structured around key features of UGC. These are the “user”, the 
source work, the new work, and the uses to which the new work may 
be put. 
a. The “user”: It is clear from the exception that the party who 
creates UGC must be an individual. The exception is not available to 
corporate entities. This is in contrast to the fair dealing exceptions 
in the statute. The exception for fair dealing for the purpose of the 
communication of news, for example, is clearly available to corporate 
news outlets.36 In both Alberta (Education)37 and Bell,38 the Supreme 
Court of Canada also dealt with corporate entities that claimed 
fair dealing by proxy; in these cases, the corporate defendants were 
permitted to assert the fair dealing rights of ultimate users of works 
(students and consumers of music services, respectively). 
Although the UGC exception is designed for individual users, 
it would appear to extend an indirect protection to those who 
disseminate UGC. A creator of UGC is expressly permitted to 
authorize an intermediary to disseminate it. Presumably, then, the 
disseminator may rely upon this authorization, if, in keeping with 
TERESA SCASSA   |   437
the recent Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence, the “non-
commercial” status of UGC is assessed from the point of view of the 
user and not the disseminator. This will be so even if the disseminator 
is a major corporation with a business model that profits directly 
from the supply of UGC to a broader audience.39 Thus, so long as the 
creator of UGC makes a non-commercial use of it, it does not appear 
to matter that the disseminator is a for-profit company.
The UGC exception in Bill C-11 touches only a subset of UGC, 
and characterizes the “user” in UGC as one who makes use of the 
copyright-protected works of others. This is not without its own 
difficulties. In the first place, it perpetuates the myth that the regular 
“creator” does not borrow from or use the works of others. They may 
not do so quite so explicitly, but the contemporary creative context is 
rife with examples of appropriation both from the public domain and 
from copyright-protected works.40 Further, by emphasizing the “use” 
of the works of others, it constructs UGC as a more parasitic activity 
than perhaps it deserves to be. Some UGC may be highly creative, 
innovative and transformative.
Indeed, broad taxonomies of UGC include user-authored 
works,41 which suggests that the “user” is not necessarily a user of the 
works of others, but rather is one who takes advantage of the available 
technology to create and disseminate their work. In this sense, the 
only distinction between “users” and regular creators is their non-
professional status.42 There is perhaps something quite significant in 
the characterization of non-professional creators of works as “users”, 
especially since the term implies at worst a certain parasitism, and at 
best a role as primarily a consumer of the works of others. If indeed 
the paradigm for content creation is changing, as many have observed 
that it is,43 the user/creator or user/rights holder distinctions should 
also start to crumble (or be more forcefully deconstructed). The myth 
of the author as originator has been thoroughly debunked;44 culture is 
built upon the work of others.45 
The word “user” in UGC also emphasizes that the creator of 
the generated content is not aligned with the traditional content 
industries. Thus, instead of works generated by professional artists/
creators via traditional modes of content dissemination (such as 
the music, film or publishing industries), much UGC is created by 
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non-professional content creators, often ordinary individuals in 
their own homes. Of course, this does not mean that the “user” in 
UGC is unskilled or is lacking in professional qualifications. These 
so-called users may be computer software engineers, geographers or 
other professionals who create or generate UGC for their own private 
purposes in their spare time. They may also be amateur musicians, 
filmmakers, artists or writers who enjoy engaging with, remixing 
or mashing up other content to create their own works. In the case 
of wiki-type works that combine original, user-created content 
with existing platforms, software or copyright-protected content, it 
becomes more difficult to think of the “users” in UGC as users at all; 
their role is much more directly one of content generation.
It is worth noting that the UGC exception in Bill C-11 requires 
that the generated content be works in which copyright subsists.46 This 
draws a line under the fact that the works themselves must have the 
degree of authorial effort and originality required for such protection. 
Perhaps the term “user”, then, is an abbreviated description of the 
creators’ place on a spectrum of creative activity; it reflects the degree 
to which they have incorporated the copyright-protected work of 
others into their original creations. On such a spectrum they might 
find themselves between the passive consumer on one end and the 
mythical creator from whole cultural cloth on the other. Yet the space 
they occupy is also shared with editors of anthologies, creators of 
other compilations, translators, adapters of books to movies, music 
arrangers, and so on. Within this space, the term “user” accurately 
describes all of these creators. In this respect, the differences between 
the UGC creator and the other creators is that the works they draw 
upon are still protected by copyright, they lack the economic ability 
to acquire the rights to the work or to license their adaptation, and/
or their immediate expressive goals are served by a non-commercial 
dissemination of their work.
A final comment about the term “user” in UGC and the reference 
to the user as an “individual” relates to the fact that there is a well-
established and growing trend toward collaborative co-creation in 
the digital environment. Most would characterize wikis and other 
crowd-sourced projects as UGC. Nevertheless, the UGC exception 
seems wedded to the conventional notion of the individual author. It 
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remains to be seen how the UGC exception will apply to collaborative 
co-creation that incorporates the copyright protected works of others.
b. The source work: The UGC exception is triggered when a work 
in which copyright subsists is used to create a new work. Obviously, 
such an exception would not be required in order to make use of a work 
in the public domain, or one that is not sufficiently original to give 
rise to copyright. This might raise interesting questions, particularly 
in an age where many users mash up data sets or integrate data that 
they have obtained elsewhere into maps or other information-based 
works.47 In such cases, it may be unclear whether the compilation of 
data relied upon by the user is one which has a sufficient degree of 
originality for copyright to subsist, or whether enough of the original 
selection or arrangement has been taken to constitute substantial 
taking in the first place.48 In other words, it may not be clear whether 
what has been created by the user is UGC, or whether it is a fresh 
work using public domain materials. For uses that otherwise fit within 
the UGC exception, this issue may be moot; however, it may become 
live if the user’s use of the work has a commercial dimension or if it 
could be argued to have a “substantial adverse effect” on the party 
who claims rights in the data set. 
The work that is used by the user must be one that has been either 
published or made available to the public. Thus, the UGC exception 
would not be available to one who incorporates private letters, 
unpublished journal entries, or other such works into their work. The 
work must also be one that the individual “had reasonable grounds to 
believe” was not infringing copyright. 
The UGC exception also creates an attribution requirement, 
although it is not particularly strong. The source of a work and 
other information about the author, performer and so on must be 
mentioned if “it is reasonable in the circumstances to do so”.49 Given 
the broad range of UGC, and its extremely amateur nature on one end 
of the spectrum, it is not clear what criteria will be used to determine 
in which circumstances it is reasonable to require attribution.
c. The new work: The work that is created as a result of the use 
of previously existing copyright-protected material must be one in 
which copyright subsists.50 This would mean that it must meet the 
requirements for copyrightability. The most important of these 
440   |   THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY
requirements in this context is originality. The requirement that 
a new work be created removes from the scope of the exception 
“works” that are either mere copies of existing works or that are 
barely modified copies. The user’s contribution to the new work must 
represent a sufficient exercise of “skill and judgment”.51 Since skill and 
judgment may be present in the creation of a compilation (an original 
selection or arrangement of materials), it does raise the question 
of whether an anthology of some kind might be considered a new 
work in which copyright subsists. In other words, one might wonder 
whether the UGC exception might finally legitimize the “mix tape”; a 
user’s compilation of songs appropriate to a particular occasion.52 The 
exception speaks only of using “an existing work” in the singular, but 
there is no clear reason why UGC should become illegitimate if more 
than one work was used in the creation of a new work. 
The potential that compilations might constitute UGC for the 
purposes of this exception is of real significance. To return to the 
mix tape, neither the private copying exception for musical works 
in sections 79 and 80 of the Copyright Act, nor the new exception 
for private purposes in section 29.22, would permit the sharing of 
any work copied under their terms. Yet a compilation that qualifies 
as UGC can explicitly be shared. While placing a compilation of 
music online might not meet the other requirements of the UGC 
exception, sharing copies with friends and family might not amount 
to a substantial enough adverse effect on the work to disqualify it 
from the exception.
d. The use to which it may be put: The UGC exception allows 
the user/creator to “use” their newly created work, or to authorize a 
member of their household to do so. “Use” is defined in this provision 
as the exercise of any of the rights of a copyright holder, except the 
right to authorize “anything”.53 The difference between a “regular” 
rights holder and the creator of UGC is that, in the case of UGC, the 
work also happens to implicate the rights of another copyright holder. 
Canadian copyright law already contemplates layered copyrights; for 
example, the translator is the author of a translation, and presumably 
the first owner of copyright therein, even though he or she may not be 
the author of the copyright-protected work that has been translated.54 
The creator of UGC is in an analogous position to the author of an 
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unauthorized translation; they may not commercially exploit their 
work. However, thanks to the exception, they have a broad licence to 
use or disseminate it in non-commercial ways. 
In addition to their general right to “use” the new work (which 
would appear to include performing it in public, communicating it 
to the public by telecommunication and reproducing it), the creator 
of UGC may also authorize an intermediary to disseminate it. This 
would cover the posting of the work to social media sites, such as 
YouTube or Facebook. Thus the exception carves out a broad space 
for the use and dissemination of UGC. However, paragraphs 29.21(1)
(a) and (d) do place potentially significant limits on any such uses. 
According to paragraph 29.21(1)(a), the use or dissemination must 
be done solely for non-commercial purposes. These would be the 
user’s non-commercial purposes. As noted earlier, it seems to be 
accepted that the disseminator may be involved in a commercial 
enterprise wherein it provides UGC and other content for a profit. 
This is interesting; as others have suggested, it means that major 
corporations such as Facebook and Google may profit from the 
vast and enthusiastic audience for UGC, while the creators of such 
content may not derive rents for their creative output. This generates 
an interesting dynamic and one that is sure to displease the owners of 
copyright in the source works. The fact that someone is commercially 
exploiting, at least indirectly, their creative output, without any 
obligation to provide some form of remuneration, no doubt strikes 
a nerve. From the perspective of the disseminator, the aggregation 
of free content supports a commercial enterprise based largely upon 
advertising revenues. The user, in exchange for their content, receives 
no payment, but rather an unprecedented vehicle of dissemination 
with global reach and opportunities to gain profile, to develop 
or enhance reputation, and even to move at some point toward 
professional status. 
These latter intangible benefits of UGC raise the further question 
of what “non-commercial” really means. It is clear from the business 
world that “free” does not necessarily mean non-commercial. Free 
content may be a means of self-promotion, or it may build or enhance 
reputation with a view to professional or other advancement. In 
some cases, the fame or notoriety that leads to commercial benefits 
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may be entirely unanticipated, but may nevertheless flow from the 
dissemination of UGC. 
It is the creator of the source work who seems to be excluded 
from the possibility of direct benefit. Normally, any exploitation of an 
author’s work would have to be negotiated with the copyright holder. 
To return to our unauthorized translation, the translator who sought 
to publish her translation would have to seek the copyright owner’s 
permission, and this permission could be withheld if the copyright 
owner were not satisfied with the quality of the translation or if 
they had already made arrangements for an authorized translation 
to be made. The UGC exception limits the control of the author of 
the source work over its non-commercial use or dissemination. 
Nevertheless, the owner of the original still has important economic 
rights that he or she is entitled to exercise. Creators of UGC who seek 
to exploit their work commercially still have the option of negotiating 
these rights,55 and the copyright holder may agree to or decline to 
license the work.
It would be interesting to consider what the consequences might 
be for a user who chooses to commercially exploit her UGC without 
negotiating such rights, and who is sued for copyright infringement as 
a result. While the owner of copyright in the source work might seek 
an injunction to prevent the exploitation, injunctions are discretionary 
remedies. An accounting of profits might distinguish between those 
profits that were due to the use of the plaintiff ’s work and those that 
were the result of the plaintiff ’s own contributions.56 In other words, it 
is not a given that a court would entirely suppress the dissemination of 
a transformative work, or that it would reduce a defendant’s profits to 
zero.57 The contemporary approach of the Supreme Court of Canada 
to copyright issues and “users’ rights” reflects a copyright balance 
that places some limits on copyright owners’ rights in the interest of 
the generation of new works and their broad dissemination. Such an 
approach might lead to some novel approaches to remedies in such cases.
Paragraph 29.21(1)(d) presents the most significant limitation on 
UGC. Its significance lies in its open-ended and thus unpredictable 
nature. Exceptions to infringement that have such an open-ended 
character tend to be problematic because the user of the work can 
only really know if her use is legitimate after costly litigation.58 In 
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this case, the use and/or dissemination of UGC is legitimate only if it 
“does not have a substantial adverse effect, financial or otherwise, on 
the exploitation or potential exploitation of the existing work…”.59 A 
non-commercial use might not have a substantial financial effect on 
the work it has transformed, but the use of the language “or otherwise” 
to qualify the effect leaves open a potentially broad range of impacts 
that might be taken into account. A rights holder might argue that 
the use diminishes the cultural impact or significance of the work by 
trivializing it, or perhaps it tarnishes the reputation of the work as, for 
example, where fan fiction strays into the pornographic. The alleged 
adverse effect (financial or otherwise) may be with respect not just 
to the current work but also the potential exploitation of the existing 
work. Thus, for example, it might be possible for a rights holder to 
argue that there is a market for the licensing of transformative or 
derivative works that is being undermined by, for example, fan fiction. 
The rather open-ended nature of this limitation on the UGC 
exception makes the scope of the exception considerably more 
uncertain. It will likely also have the effect of limiting UGC that is 
on the more creative and transformative end of the spectrum. Home 
videos that incorporate music as a background are much less likely 
to be problematic than fan fiction that takes on a life of its own, 
even if it is non-commercial. It is not clear whether a more robust 
UGC exception was an option; it is remarkable enough that such an 
exception made it into the Bill. It is also possible to argue that the 
current formulation reaches an acceptable balance; if a transformative 
use is likely to have a substantial impact on the original work, perhaps 
it is a use for which a licence should be negotiated between the parties. 
This may certainly be the case where the adverse impact is merely 
financial. More problematic, however, would be situations where 
the rights holder objects to the “adverse effect” caused by UGC that 
expresses a different morality or politics than the original.60
This raises, of course, the issue of the relationship of the moral rights 
provisions to the UGC exception. The exception provides that UGC 
is not an infringement of copyright, within its specified boundaries. 
If moral rights provisions continue to apply, then an author might 
well object to UGC on the basis that it violates her moral rights. Thus 
it might be argued that the UGC is a modification or mutilation of 
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her work to the prejudice of her honour or reputation.61 Indeed, even 
non-commercial UGC may reach a very broad audience, a fact that 
might magnify any such reputational harm. In some circumstances, 
the copyright owner might also argue that their modified work is used 
in support of a cause or institution that impacts negatively on the 
honour or reputation of the author.62 The applicability of moral rights 
would supplement the limitation in paragraph 29.21(1)(d). While that 
paragraph limits uses that have an adverse effect on the source work, 
moral rights would constrain those uses having an adverse effect on 
the author’s reputation.
5.  UGC and Fair Dealing
Bill C-11 expands the categories for fair dealing in a way that makes the 
intersection of the UGC exception and fair dealing more likely. Once 
confined to research, private study, criticism, comment and news 
reporting, Bill C-11 adds “education” and “parody and satire” to the 
acceptable bases for fair dealing.63 These changes come at a time when 
the Supreme Court of Canada has sent a strong message about the 
broad and liberal interpretation owed to the fair dealing exceptions. 
In both Alberta (Education) and Bell, the Supreme Court of Canada 
confirmed that fair dealing must not be interpreted restrictively,64 and 
that it is a user’s right.65 
Not all UGC will fit within the fair dealing exceptions, although 
much UGC may well do so.66 For example, UGC that is parodic or 
satirical in nature may also qualify as fair dealing. Similarly, there 
is a great deal of UGC that may fit within a broadly interpreted 
exception for “news reporting” or for “criticism or comment”.67 Other 
UGC might be characterized as being for the very broad purposes of 
“education”. Indeed, given the Supreme Court of Canada’s expansive 
interpretation of “private study” in Alberta (Education),68 it should 
be expected that the exception for education will cover a very broad 
range of activity. The question then becomes whether a creator of 
UGC must rely upon the UGC exception or may also rely upon fair 
dealing to justify their use of the work. In CCH, the Supreme Court 
of Canada ruled that the fair dealing exception was always available 
to users of works, notwithstanding any other exceptions that might 
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be found in the Act and that might be specifically tailored to the type 
of user making use of the work.69 Presumably, then, the fair dealing 
exception is also available to the creator of UGC.
The fair dealing exception may be broader than the UGC 
exception in some respects. If the defendant’s dealing with the work 
falls into one of the categories of permitted uses, a court must then 
consider whether her dealing with the work was “fair”. Fairness is 
evaluated according to a series of criteria that explore the nature, 
extent and impact of the dealing in relation to the work. In CCH, the 
Chief Justice stated that: “[t]he following factors [must] be considered 
in assessing whether a dealing was fair: (1) the purpose of the dealing; 
(2) the character of the dealing; (3) the amount of the dealing; (4) 
alternatives to the dealing; (5) the nature of the work; and (6) the 
effect of the dealing on the work.”70
According to the Supreme Court of Canada, the commercial/non-
commercial nature of the dealing is a relevant factor for consideration, 
but dealing with a work for commercial purposes is not necessarily 
unfair.71 Thus, UGC that is created or disseminated in a commercial 
context may not qualify for the UGC exception, but may nevertheless 
constitute fair dealing. This might be particularly important, for 
example, in the case of parodic or satirical works. A satirical song might 
receive radio airplay or be sold through online distribution channels. 
In the case of Campbell v Acuff-Rose,72 the US Supreme Court accepted 
that the defendants’ parody of a Roy Orbison song constituted fair use, 
notwithstanding the fact that it was commercially distributed. 
On the flip side, the UGC exception might operate to exempt from 
copyright infringement some works that would otherwise not meet 
the fair dealing test established by the Supreme Court of Canada. One 
of the factors for consideration in the fair dealing analysis is the nature 
of the dealing. Under this factor, one can consider the manner in which 
the work was reproduced or distributed. It might well be that in many 
circumstances, the dissemination of the defendant’s modified work 
online would mitigate against a finding of fair dealing.73 In the UGC 
exception, however, it is expressly contemplated that non-commercial 
UGC may be disseminated in online fora. Of course, the Internet-
based dissemination of a work would be only one of the factors for 
the Court to balance in a fair dealing analysis. Now that the UGC 
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exception has been added to the Act, a court might well draw from 
this the proposition that the online non-commercial distribution of a 
transformative dealing with a work is presumptively fair.
Conclusion
This chapter has offered an interpretation of the scope of the UGC 
exception in light of the recent copyright jurisprudence of the Supreme 
Court of Canada, and in the context of other principles of Canadian 
copyright law. The UGC exception is a concession to the dramatically 
changing environment for both the creation and dissemination of 
works, and attempts to balance competing rights. Although it may 
dismay rights holders, the UGC horse has long since left the proverbial 
stable. We have sufficient copyright law for the industrial age; it is time 
now to grapple with law for the digital age. The UGC exception may 
have its weaknesses and may provoke some unintended consequences; 
nevertheless, it serves as an overt acknowledgement that the game has 
changed—and with it, so must the rules.
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